Com. v. Herriott, M. ( 2014 )


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  • J-A19016-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                          IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    MARTELL HERRIOTT,
    Appellant                      No. 358 WDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of October 11, 2012
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0010556-2011
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                              FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2014
    Appellant, Martell Herriott, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered on October 11, 2012 in the Criminal Division of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Allegheny County, as made final by the denial of
    -sentence motion. We affirm.
    At the conclusion of trial on July 24, 2012, the jury found Appellant
    guilty of first-degree murder1 and carrying a firearm without a license.2 On
    July 25, 2012, the trial court granted a petition to nolle prose a charge of
    persons not to possess a firearm.3             On October 11, 2012, the trial court
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).
    3
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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    sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison without parole for his first-degree
    murder conviction. The court imposed no further penalty on the charge of
    carrying a firearm without a license.
    in the following manner:
    On June 30, 2011, at approximately 1:25 a.m. Officer [David]
    McManus was in a marked police car and responded to a
    dispatch of shots fired. Officer McManus was responding as
    backup to the unit dispatched to a male down at 5200 Keystone
    Street [in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania]. Officer McManus was the
    first to arrive on scene. Upon arrival, Officer McManus found the
    victim face down with blood coming from underneath his body.
    It appeared that he was shot. The victim was unresponsive and
    appeared to have sustained injuries from at least one bullet. At
    that time, Officer McManus was approached by a female that
    stated her son witnessed the shooting. The victim was identified
    as Sean [Lydell] Thompson. Officer McManus did not observe
    any weapon or firearm on the victim.             The victim was
    transported to UPMC and pronounced dead at 1:56 a.m. on June
    30, 2011. The [young man] who witnessed the shooting was
    transported to [police] headquarters for questioning, along with
    his mother. Officer McManus testified that upon his arrival the
    street was very well lit. Officer McManus testified that there
    were some porch lights on; however, some parts of the street
    were darker, but not dark.
    Prosecution witness, Rachel Zwipf, was engaged to Mr.
    Thompson. She testified that they lived together with her older
    son in Lawrenceville at the time of the murder. [Ms. Zwipf]
    testified [that] on the evening of June 27, 2011, while asleep,
    she received a phone call from Mr. Thompson. Mr. Thompson
    asked Ms. Zwipf to come and meet him at the pizza shop next to
    Thompson and Ms. Zwipf went back and forth because she did
    wanted her to meet him. She subsequently got out of bed and
    drove to the bar Remedy [], located a few minutes from her
    home. Ms. Zwipf testified that there was a sense of urgency in
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    the demeanor of Mr. Thompson when he was requesting her to
    get inside the bar. Mr. Thompson introduced her to several
    gentlemen. One of these men was [Appellant]. Ms. Zwipf
    testified she was in close proximity to Mr. Thompson and
    the bar, and it appeared to her that he was trying to make a
    point.    [Appellant] and Ms. Zwipf were in the bar for
    approximately fifteen minutes before they both left the bar.
    While in the bar, Ms. Zwipf testified [that Appellant] was wearing
    a fisherman style hat. [Appellant] came outside of the bar when
    the couple left and interrupted in their conversation and Ms.
    Zwipf found this suspicious.          After about five minutes,
    [Appellant] went back inside the bar. At some point outside of
    the bar Mr. Thompson told Ms. Zwipf about a beef, or dispute [,]
    that a friend of his had with [Appellant], and another man,
    Montez Freeman. Ms. Zwipf believed that this was part of the
    reason she was asked to come to the bar by Mr. Thompson. Mr.
    Thompson told her to walk home, because he did not want them
    to know what kind of car she drove. Upon Mr. Thompson
    returning home that night, he indicated he did not want to talk
    about what was going on with the men she met at the bar.
    On June 29, 2011, Mr. Thompson and Ms. Zwipf went to his
    10:00
    sic] go
    to the Remedy. Mr. Thompson left Ms. Zwipf in the car and went
    inside the bar to get cigarettes for his sister. Prior to entering
    the bar, Ms. Zwipf testified that Mr. Thompson was in a good
    mood and they planned on staying in the rest of the evening.
    Mr. Thompson was in the bar approximately five minutes and
    returned to the car. Upon his return, his demeanor had changed
    significantly. He appeared upset and agitated. Mr. Thompson
    told Ms. Zwipf that he needed to return to the bar after taking
    two had a heated argument at the house. Ms. Zwipf testified
    that he looked sad, and she was concerned about him returning
    to the bar. She tried to tell him to stay at home. Mr. Thompson
    left in the car and she went to bed. Ms. Zwipf woke up around
    12:30 a.m., and spoke with Mr. Thompson on a cell phone and
    he told her he would be home in about fifteen minutes.
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    Ernestine Jordon, Mr
    12:30 [a.m.] and 1:45 a.m. on June 30, 2011. Officer Evans
    testified that their address on Natrona Way is literally around the
    ess on Keystone. Ms. Jordan
    testified her son left her house that morning and within minutes
    she heard gun shots. Shortly afterward, someone knocked on
    her door and she was informed that her son had been killed up
    the street.
    On June 30, 2011, Jacob Orcun (referred to earlier as the [young
    man] who witnessed the shooting) was on the third floor of his
    house at 5233 Keystone Street at approximately 1:00 a.m. and
    heard gunshots. He immediately ran to the other room and
    opened the window. The distance from the house of the witness
    to the sidewalk was eight feet, 11 inches. The distance from the
    front of the house to the width of Keystone Street was 29 feet,
    ten inches. He saw a white SUV and a man holding a gun. He
    described the man as [an] African American male, heavy set,
    almost six feet tall, between 20-30 years old, with side burns.
    Mr. Orcun further testified the gun was black in color and that he
    he man moved over
    the front door of the car and began to shoot over the hood.
    When he looked out the window there were three lit light posts
    on the street. After the shooting, Mr. Orcun ran downstairs and
    told his mom that he had witnessed the shooting. When he told
    his mom that he had witnessed the shooting she went over to a
    police officer. A few hours later he was interviewed by the
    police. Mr. Orcun testified that he had witnessed [Appellant] get
    out of the car, shoot and walk closer, and shooting more.
    Subsequently, he picked [Appellant] out of a photo array.
    Detective [James] McGee testified that as soon as Mr. Orcun
    looked at the array he saw the photograph; he pointed right to it
    Ms. Jasmine Lewis was talking with Mr. Thompson just before he
    was shot on Keystone Street. She started to walk away and
    heard shots fired. Ms. Lewis was interviewed by the police the
    following day and identified the shooter through a photo array.
    The Defendant was the person Ms. Lewis identified in the photo
    array as the shooter.
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    Detective Klaczak, from the investigations branch, works the
    night felony squad. He investigated the scene of the shooting.
    He recovered fifteen 40 caliber casings on the scene. All the
    casings had Smith and Wesson on them. Thirteen out of fifteen
    were brand name Winchester; two of them were PMC.
    Firearms expert, Dr. Robert T. Levine, testified that he
    determined that all fifteen casings were discharged from the
    same firearm.     He further concluded that the firearm was
    probably a 40-caliber Glock.
    On July 23, 2011, at approximately 1:30 a.m. Officer Schmidt
    received a call from a reliable, confidential informant that a male
    with an outstanding warrant was located inside the Red Onion
    Bar located at the intersection of Kirkpatrick Street and Webster
    Avenue. Officer Schmidt was provided a detailed description of
    the homicide actor, the male with the outstanding warrant. The
    actor they were looking for was [Appellant]. Officer Schmidt had
    a photo of the suspect. Officer Schmidt and Office McManus
    observed [Appellant] exit the bar and enter a Chevy Tahoe in the
    rear passenger seat. A pursuit followed. Officer Schmidt was in
    the passenger seat. His primary responsibility was observing the
    vehicle and advising police dispatch. There were times during
    the pursuit he did not have full visibility of the vehicle. One of
    those times was when the vehicle made a right hand turn onto
    Jane Street from 24th Street. Officer Schmidt observed a black
    firearm come out of the passenger window as they continued to
    pursue the vehicle.       Officer Schmidt had a clear view of
    [Appellant] throwing the firearm out the window. The pursuit
    ended at 28th and Jane Street where the vehicle stopped.
    [Appellant] was apprehended and asked to provide his personal
    information: name, date of birth, social security number, (as the
    officer does with all his arrests). [Appellant] responded that his
    name was David Williams.
    Officer McManus went back to the scene where [Appellant] threw
    the gun and recovered a loaded Glock 27, 40-caliber firearm.
    The gun was loaded with a magazine clip with eight rounds in
    the magazine and one round in the chamber of the gun.
    Subsequently, Officer Stern was working on July 23, 2011, and
    recovered a gun magazine from Jane Street found by a resident.
    The magazine was made of polymer plastic as opposed to a steel
    magazine. This magazine, if inserted into a 40 caliber Glock
    firearm, would hold a total of 32 rounds of ammunition. The 32
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    rounds of ammunition would consist of 31 rounds in the
    magazine and 1 round in the guns chamber. Upon review of the
    video of the chase with [Appellant], the magazine was found on
    that route.    The magazine when found had 17 rounds of
    ammunition. The 17 rounds of ammunition were manufactured
    by Winchester.
    Officer Stern documented in a police report where the magazine
    was found and a description of the magazine.         When the
    magazine was turned into the property room, Officer Stern was
    unaware of the chase earlier in the morning. The magazine was
    ultimately destroyed by the evidence room. However, Officer
    Stern was shown a magazine, which was introduced into
    evidence, that was consistent with the magazine he recovered
    and documents. Ultimately, it was determined the recovered
    gun was not the gun used to shoot the victim Mr. Thompson.
    Simply stated the weapon utilized to kill Mr. Thompson was
    never recovered.
    Dr. Robert Levine was questioned about the polymer plastic
    magazine recovered on July 23, 2011.         He testified if the
    polymer plastic magazine had a number 31 and the letters RDS
    on it, this indicates it had capacity for 31 cartridges
    (bullets/rounds). He further stated, polymeric is a type of plastic
    material. Glock magazines have a plastic outer shell associated
    with them, so it is consistent with a Glock pistol. Dr. Levine
    testified the gun used in the shooting was probably a 40 caliber
    Glock. He further stated, based on his knowledge of the firing
    pin impression, the firing pin aperture marks, and the polygonal
    rifling, he would be shocked if any other manufacturer of a
    firearm was used in this incident (i.e. other than Glock). He
    concluded the polymeric magazine recovered could have been
    used to load the gun used in the shooting.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/23/13, 2-11.
    Followi                                                 -degree murder
    and related charges, counsel for Appellant presented an oral post-sentence
    January 17, 2013. A timely notice of appeal ensued on February 15, 2013.
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    On February 20, 2013, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise
    statement of error complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    After requesting and receiving an extension of time, Appellant filed his
    concise statement on April 4, 2013. The trial court issued its opinion on July
    23, 2013.
    Appellant raises two claims for our review:
    I.    DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
    PERMITTING THE COMMONWEALTH TO PRESENT OTHER
    CRIMES EVIDENCE THAT APPROXIMATELY A MONTH AFTER
    THE HOMICIDE, [APPELLANT] POSSESSED A FIREARM
    THAT WAS NOT USED IN THE HOMICIDE AND HE MAY
    HAVE POSSESSED AN EXTENDED MAGAZINE THAT WAS
    NOT DEFINITIVELY CONNECTED TO THE HOMICIDE?
    II.   DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
    ADMITTING PREJUDICIAL HEARSAY TESTIMONY BY THE
    THE VICTIM THAT IMPLICATED [APPELLANT]?
    In his first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its
    discretion in admitting evidence pertaining to other crimes which showed
    discarded a loaded gun and an extended magazine during a police chase.
    Appellant argues that because the gun was not used in the shooting, and
    because it was not proven that the magazine was used in the shooting, this
    evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial and therefore should not have been
    admitted at trial.
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    -settled standard of review
    and firmly established principles:
    The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound
    discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed
    only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.
    Commonwealth v. Reid, 
    811 A.2d 530
    , 550 (Pa. 2002).
    having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
    consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
    less probable than it would be without the evide
    value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
    of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
    undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
    Commonwealth v.
    Kitchen, 
    730 A.2d 513
    (Pa. Super. 1999).]
    Because all relevant Commonwealth evidence is meant to
    prejudice a defendant, exclusion is limited to evidence so
    prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision
    based upon something other than the legal propositions relevant
    to the case. As this Court has noted, a trial court is not required
    to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the
    jury's consideration where those facts form part of the history
    and natural development of the events and offenses with which
    [a] defendant is charged. Commonwealth v. Serge, 
    837 A.2d 1255
    , 1260-[12]61 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    In addressing the admissibility of a gun for demonstrative
    purposes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that:
    [a] weapon shown to have been in a defendant's possession
    may properly be admitted into evidence, even though it
    cannot positively be identified as the weapon used in the
    commission of a particular crime, if it tends to prove that
    the defendant had a weapon similar to the one used in the
    perpetration of the crime.
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    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    640 A.2d 1251
    (Pa. 1994).
    Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Shoatz, 
    366 A.2d 1216
    (Pa.
    1976), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that:
    [A]t the time of his arrest approximately one and one-half
    years after the incident, appellant along with his
    companions were found to have possessed numerous
    advanced military weapons and munitions. These items
    included two of the United States Army's most advanced
    automatic rifles or machine guns, the M-16, plastic
    explosives manufactured solely for military use and other
    various military-type of ammunition. It is now contended
    that this evidence was irrelevant and served only to inflame
    and prejudice the jury since appellant was not being tried
    for the possession of this property.
    ***
    Inasmuch as the instruments and devices found on
    appellant consisted of guns, ammunition and explosives, all
    of which corresponded generically and some of which
    corresponded exactly to the type of ammunition used in the
    homicide, it was relevant as a circumstance to help identify
    appellant and to help to connect him with the crime of
    which he was accused ...
    Shoatz, 
    366 A.2d 1216
    , 1225-26.
    Commonwealth v. Broaster, 
    863 A.2d 588
    , 591-593 (Pa. Super. 2004),
    appeal denied, 
    876 A.2d 392
    (Pa. 2005).
    Applying these principles in the case at bar, it is evident that Appellant
    is not entitled to relief on his opening claim. As the trial court observed, the
    discarded gun and magazines were relevant to connect Appellant with the
    victim was shot with a handgun of the same caliber; and, (2) the recovered
    magazine housed the same number of rounds that would have been left
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    after a 15-round volley (the number of shell casings recovered at the crime
    scene one month earlier). Furthermore, no unfair prejudice emanated from
    the admission of this evidence since the trial court instructed the jury that
    the proof should be considered for identification purposes only and that the
    gun was not used to kill the victim. Since the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in admitting this evidence, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his
    initial claim.
    In his second claim, Appellant complains that the trial court erred and
    girlfriend. In developing this claim, Appellant points to testimony in which
    he victim said that he had a dispute with
    Appellant which he (the victim) needed to address.       Appellant argues that
    under the state of mind exception to the rule against hearsay. We conclude
    that this claim is meritless and that Appellant is not entitled to relief. In the
    alternative, even if Appellant established that admission of the challenged
    testimony violated the rule against hearsay, we find that this error was
    harmless.
    while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
    Hearsay
    Pa.R.E. 802. One of the more well-established exceptions to the
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    inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, commonly referred to as the
    exceptions in Pa.R.E. 803. Specifically, Rule 803(3) provides an
    exception to the hearsay rule for:
    (3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.
    A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind
    (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or
    physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily
    health), but not including a statement of memory or belief
    to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates
    to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. Pa.R.E.
    803(3).
    Commonwealth v. Green, 
    76 A.3d 575
    , 579 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
    denied, 
    87 A.3d 318
    (Pa. 2014).
    In this case, the trial court found that the challenged testimony related
    solely to the vict
    See Trial Court
    Opinion, 7/23/13, at 22-25.       Our review of the record confirms this
    assessment. Hence, we perceive no error or abuse of discretion in the trial
    trial court erred in admitting the challenged evidence under Rule 803(3), we
    conclude that any such error was harmless in view of the independent and
    compelling                                    See 
    Green, 76 A.3d at 583
    (finding that trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay statements
    from two witnesses under the state of mind exception but that error was
    harmless given other evidence of guilt); Commonwealth v. Levanduski,
    
    907 A.2d 3
    , 22 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc
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    wife/defendant and her paramour inadmissible in murder trial under state-
    of-mind   exception   but   that   error   was   harmless   in   view   of   other
    overwhelming evidence), appeal denied, 
    919 A.2d 955
    (Pa. 2007), cert.
    denied, 
    552 U.S. 823
    (2007). Thus, no relief is due.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/23/2014
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