Com. v. Andrews, J. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S58029-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JAMES L. ANDREWS,
    Appellant                 No. 337 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 27, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-37-CR-0001120-2006
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                   FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2014
    27, 2014 order denying as untimely his petition for relief filed pursuant to
    the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    In March of 2007, Appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated
    indecent assault, indecent assault, and simple assault. He was sentenced on
    July 25, 2007, to an aggregate term of five to ten y
    Appellant filed a direct appeal, but that appeal was ultimately discontinued
    On July 18, 2008, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition seeking, inter
    alia, the restoration of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc.     The court
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S58029-14
    granted that request and Appellant filed a nunc pro tunc direct appeal. After
    petition for allowance of appeal on February 8, 2011. Commonwealth v.
    Andrews, 
    6 A.3d 566
     (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum),
    appeal denied
    of sentence became final on May 9, 2011.         See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3)
    (stating that a judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of
    direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the review);
    Commonwealth v. Owens, 
    718 A.2d 330
    , 331 (Pa. Super. 1998) (directing
    days after our Supreme Court rejects his or her petition for allowance of
    appeal since petitioner had ninety additional days to seek review with the
    United States Supreme Court).
    On August 1, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition and counsel
    was appointed. Counsel filed an ame
    the court conducted an evidentiary hearing. On January 27, 2014, the PCRA
    filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).        Herein,
    Appellant raises two questions for our review:
    (a) [Did] [t]he exception(s) of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)/(b)(2)
    apply to fulfill the timeliness requirements of the PCRA statute
    pro se PCRA petition[?]
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    (b) [Did] [p]rior PCRA counsel fail[] to pursue and/or preserve
    previously raised issue(s) involving ineffectiveness of the
    Lawrence County PA Public Defender Office as set forth in the
    Amended [first] PCRA petition (i.e., failure to call character
    witness(es) to testify on behalf of the defense at trial) thereby
    constituting ineffectiveness since [Appellant] was previously
    unaware (until being informed by present counsel in connection
    with filing of the Amended [second] PCRA [p]etition) that these
    issue(s) were not fully pursued in prior PCRA proceeding(s)[?]
    order denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the
    PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.
    Commonwealth v. Ragan, 
    923 A.2d 1169
    , 1170 (Pa. 2007).             The PCRA
    findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 
    768 A.2d 1164
    ,
    1166 (Pa. Super. 2001).
    the PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered
    or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition. Commonwealth
    v. Bennett, 
    930 A.2d 1264
    , 1267 (Pa. 2007) (stating PCRA time limitations
    implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded to address
    the merits of the petition); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    803 A.2d 1291
    ,
    1294 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to
    reach merits of an appeal from an untimely PCRA petition). Under the PCRA,
    any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or subsequent one,
    must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes
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    final, unless one of the exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 applies.
    That section states, in relevant part:
    (b) Time for filing petition.--
    (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
    or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
    date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition
    alleges and the petitioner proves that:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
    result of interference by government officials with
    the presentation of the claim in violation of the
    Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
    Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
    unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
    ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
    was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
    States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
    the time period provided in this section and has been
    held by that court to apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).   Any petition attempting to invoke one of
    days of the date the claim could
    and thus, he had until May 9, 2012, to file a timely petition. Consequently,
    his August 1, 2013 petition is facially untimely and, for this Court to have
    jurisdiction to review the merits thereof, Appellant must prove that his
    petition meets one of the exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth
    ch are related, he
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    contends that his petition satisfies the after-discovered fact exception of
    section 9545(b)(1)(ii).    Specifically, Appellant claims that his current
    represented Appellant in the disposition of his July 18, 2008 PCRA petition)
    that he believed his prior PCRA counsel pursued this claim, and it was not
    until his present attorney was appointed that he discovered that prior
    counsel had not done so.
    because it is meritless on its face. Our Supreme Court has expressly stated
    -discovered evidence exception
    merely by alleging that possible ineffective assistance of counsel claims were
    unknown to the petitioner and could not have been discovered until after
    Commonwealth v. Abu-
    Jamal, 
    833 A.2d 719
    , 725-726 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Howard, 
    788 A.2d 351
    , 355 (Pa. 2002)); see also Commonwealth v.
    Gamboa-Taylor
    the benefit of the exception for after-discovered evidence.       In sum, a
    conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of after-
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    Based on this precedent, which Appellant makes no attempt to
    distinguish, it is clear that App
    exception set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(ii).   Accordingly, the PCRA court
    did not err in denying his petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/23/2014
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