Haldaman, D. v. Eaton Corporation ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • J-S47002-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    DANIEL HALDAMAN, AS PERSONAL                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF                  PENNSYLVANIA
    GERDA W. HALDAMAN
    Appellant
    v.
    EATON CORPORATION, AS SUCCESSOR-
    IN-INTEREST TO CUTLER-HAMMER, INC.
    Appellee                   No. 1170 EDA 2012
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 23, 2012
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): February Term, 2011, No. 4493
    DANIEL HALDAMAN, AS PERSONAL                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF                  PENNSYLVANIA
    GERDA W. HALDAMAN
    Appellant
    v.
    P & H MINING EQUIPMENT F/K/A
    HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION
    Appellee                   No. 1172 EDA 2012
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 23, 2012
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): February Term, 2011, No. 4493
    DANIEL HALDAMAN, AS PERSONAL                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF                  PENNSYLVANIA
    GERDA W. HALDAMAN
    Appellant
    v.
    J-S47002-14
    READING CRANE & ENGINEERING
    Appellee                   No. 1173 EDA 2012
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 23, 2012
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): February Term, 2011, No. 4493
    DANIEL HALDAMAN, AS PERSONAL                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    RPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF                   PENNSYLVANIA
    GERDA W. HALDAMAN
    Appellant
    v.
    MORGAN ENGINEERING F/K/A MORGAN
    CRANE
    Appellee                   No. 1174 EDA 2012
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 23, 2012
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): February Term, 2011, No. 4493
    DANIEL HALDAMAN, AS PERSONAL                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF                  PENNSYLVANIA
    GERDA W. HALDAMAN
    Appellant
    v.
    CBS CORPORATION, F/K/A
    WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC
    CORPORATION
    Appellee                   No. 1175 EDA 2012
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 23, 2012
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    -2-
    J-S47002-14
    Civil Division at No(s): February Term, 2011, No. 4493
    DANIEL HALDAMAN, AS PERSONAL                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF                       PENNSYLVANIA
    GERDA W. HALDAMAN
    Appellant
    v.
    GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
    Appellee                No. 1176 EDA 2012
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 23, 2012
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Civil Division at No(s): February Term, 2011, No. 4493
    BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                          FILED OCTOBER 03, 2014
    In these consolidated appeals, Appellant, Daniel Haldaman, personal
    representative of the estate of Gerda W. Haldaman, deceased (Decedent),
    and plaintiff in the underlying asbestos mass tort litigation, 1 appeals from
    the final judgment entered May 23, 2012,2 which also rendered final the trial
    ____________________________________________
    1
    During the pendency of this appeal, original Appellant, Gerda W. Haldaman
    died on July 28, 2013. This Court granted the application for substitution of
    personal representative pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 502 on October 24, 2013.
    2
    March 12, 2012 order entering the jury verdict in favor of the last remaining
    defendant in the case, CertainTeed Corporation (CertainTeed is not a subject
    of these appeals). In a civil case, an appeal from the entry of a verdict is
    premature. Taxin v. Shoemaker, 
    799 A.2d 895
    , 860 (Pa. Super. 2002),
    citing Weiser v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
    508 A.2d 1241
    , 1244 n.6 (Pa.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -3-
    J-S47002-14
    Appellee, Eaton Corporation, as successor in interest to Cutler-Hammer, Inc.
    (Eaton); Kentile Floors Inc. (Kentile); P & H Mining Equipment, f/k/a
    Harnischfeger Corporation (P&H); Reading Crane & Engineering (Reading);
    Morgan Engineering, f/k/a Morgan Crane (Morgan); CBS Corporation, f/k/a
    Westinghouse Electric Corporation (CBS Corp.); and General Electric
    Company (GE). After careful review, we affirm based on the thorough and
    well-supported opinion of the Honorable Sandra Mazer Moss.
    We summarize the procedural history of this case, as gleaned from the
    certified record, as follows.            The instant action was commenced by
    complaint, filed on March 2, 2011, by Decedent against the various
    defendants, alleging she was exposed to asbestos dust while laundering her
    3
    work clothes, the asbestos dust was generated
    contract mesothelioma and interstitial fibrosis. An amended complaint was
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    -trial motions,
    the trial court entered final judgment in this case. Trial Court Order,
    -trial motions and
    unequivocally enters judgment in the same order, that order is immediately
    appealable and an appeal should be filed within thirty days of its entry on
    
    Id. (emphasis in
    original); cf. Pa.R.C.P. 227.4(2)
    (directing the prothonotary to enter judgment upon praecipe unless the
    court itself has entered judgment).      The caption has been adjusted
    accordingly.
    3
    Ray Haldaman died on April 3, 1996, prior to the commencement of the
    -4-
    J-S47002-14
    filed on August 9, 2011, naming additional defendants.               The case was
    Upon conclusion of discovery, all of the defendants implicated in this appeal
    filed respective motions for summary judgment.               Between February 13,
    motions.4
    The case proceeded to a jury trial with CertainTeed as the one
    remaining defendant, commencing on March 7, 2012.5 The jury returned a
    verdict in favor of CertainTeed that was entered on March 13, 2012.
    Appellant filed timely post-trial motions on March 22, 2012.           On April 19,
    2012, Appellant filed seven notices of appeal challenging the judgment
    relative to each respective Appellee.            On April 23, 2012, the trial court
    directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely complied on May
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Eaton
    on December 20, 2011, was
    on December 22, 2011, was granted on February 21, 2012.
    5
    Other defendants were released from the case by stipulation of the parties
    or by settlement.
    -5-
    J-S47002-14
    10, 2012.6                                                               -trial
    motions and ordered final judgment to be entered in the case.7 Meanwhile,
    also on May 23, 2012, this Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the instant
    appeals.     During the pendency of the consolidated appeal, this Court
    received a notice of suggestion of bankruptcy of Kentile on December 17,
    2012, and duly stayed all proceedings on December 27, 2012.                On
    ____________________________________________
    6
    deemed waived because his Rule 1925(b) statement is insufficiently clear
    1925(b) statement, Appellant noted the trial
    court had not provided a written explanation of its reasons for granting the
    Statement, 5/10/12, at 1; See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vi) (providing,
    Appellant
    such a case, the generality of the Statement will not be grounds for finding
    Appellant then advanced in general terms his allegation that the
    explained its determination that Appellant failed to present any material fact
    sufficient to state a prima facie
    whether this determination is correct in light of the factual record, which we
    deem is fairly suggested by her Rule 1925(b) statement. Accordingly, we
    decline to find waiver on the bases asserted by Morgan.
    7
    Having been filed before the final entry of judgment,
    appeal was premature. See Pa.R.A.P. 301. However, as noted, final
    judgment was subsequently entered, giving us jurisdiction over this appeal
    pursuant to                                           notice of appeal filed
    after the announcement of a determination but before the entry of an
    appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
    accord Am. and Foreign Ins. Co. v.
    , 
    948 A.2d 834
    , 842 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2008) (under
    Rule 905(a)(5), subsequent entry of judgment perfected premature appeal),
    affirmed, 
    2 A.3d 526
    (Pa. 2010).
    -6-
    J-S47002-14
    September 19, 2013, Appellant filed a praecipe for discontinuance of his
    appeal involving Kentile, whereupon this Court vacated the stay as to the
    remaining Appellees in this consolidated appeal on April 14, 2014, and
    briefing was thereafter completed.
    On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.
    Whether the [s]ummary [j]udgment in [f]avor of
    Appellees, P&H Mining Equipment, Inc. was
    improperly granted in this case, when the entire
    evidentiary record showed the following: Mrs.
    occurred because her husband worked at Bethlehem
    Steel and (1) the testimony of Mr. Weiss and others
    establishes he was exposed to asbestos from Kentile
    when replacing flooring; (2) the testimony of others
    establishes he was exposed to asbestos from
    replacement parts; (3) the testimony of Mr. Potteiger
    and others establishes Mr. Haldaman was exposed to
    asbestos from multiple crane brake manufacturers?
    8
    ____________________________________________
    8
    P&H has not filed a brief in this appeal. Reading, CBS Corp., and GE
    contend in their appellate briefs that this Court should quash this appeal due
    ure in
    his statement of the case section is argumentative, fails to include a
    summary of argument, contains insufficiently developed argument, and fails
    to append the trial court                             -20; CBS Corp. and
    -16; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2111, 2116-2119. We
    example, it places much of the factual analysis relevant to its argument in
    its statement of the case section, and the question presented is unartfully
    drafted. However, because these defects do not impede our ability to
    conduct appellate review, we decline to find waiver or quash the appeal. We
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -7-
    J-S47002-14
    judgment
    requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or
    Petrina
    v. Allied Glove Corp., 
    46 A.3d 795
    , 797-798 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
    ecord in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
    party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
    Barnes v. Keller, 
    62 A.3d 382
    , 385                                                            ere there is no
    genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is
    entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be
    
    Id. The rule
    governing summary judgment has been codified at
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2.
    Rule 1035.2. Motion
    After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within
    such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any
    party may move for summary judgment in whole or
    in part as a matter of law
    (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any
    material fact as to a necessary element of the
    cause of action or defense which could be
    established by additional discovery or expert
    report, or
    (2) if, after     the     completion of discovery
    relevant to       the      motion, including the
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    also note th
    appeal referencing Kentile is moot.
    -8-
    J-S47002-14
    production of expert reports, an adverse party
    who will bear the burden of proof at trial has
    failed to produce evidence of facts essential to
    the cause of action or defense which in a jury
    trial would require the issues to be submitted
    to a jury.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2
    Motions for summary judgment necessarily and
    of [his] cause of action. Summary judgment is
    proper if, after the completion of discovery relevant
    to the motion, including the production of expert
    reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden
    of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of
    facts essential to the cause of action or defense
    which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
    submitted to a jury. In other words, whenever there
    is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a
    necessary element of the cause of action or defense,
    which could be established by additional discovery or
    expert report and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is
    appropriate. Thus, a record that supports summary
    judgment either (1) shows the material facts are
    undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of
    facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or
    defense.
    Glaab v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., 
    56 A.3d 693
    , 696 (Pa. Super. 2012),
    quoting Chenot v. A.P. Green Servs., Inc., 
    895 A.2d 55
    , 60 62 (Pa.
    Super. 2006).
    motion for summary judgment was the failure of Appellant to provide prima
    facie evidence of exposure by Ray Haldaman, and by extension Decedent, to
    frequency,
    -9-
    J-S47002-14
    regularity, proximity factors of Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 
    544 A.2d 50
    (Pa.
    Super. 1988), appeal denied, 
    553 A.2d 968
    (Pa. 1988) and its progeny.
    summary judgment by showing circumstantial evidence depends upon the
    frequency of the use of the product and the regularity of p
    
    Id. at 53
    (citations omitted).
    Donoughe v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 
    936 A.2d 52
    , 72 (Pa. Super.
    2007).                                 a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial
    evidence of exposure, namely, the frequency of the use of the product and
    
    Id. at 62
    (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
    There is no requirement that a plaintiff who
    suffers an asbestos related injury must establish the
    specific role played by each individual asbestos fiber
    within the body. Instead, in order to make out a
    prima facie case, it is well established that the
    plaintiff must present evidence that he inhaled
    product. A plaintiff must, however, establish more
    than the mere presence of asbestos in the
    workplace.  The plaintiff must establish that he
    worked in the vicinity
    product.
    The nexus between an asbestos product and
    plaintiff may be established by direct and
    circumstantial evidence. The testimony of a witness
    exposure to an asbestos-containing product is
    admissible when probative. Even when the plaintiff
    is not able to identify specific products manufactured
    - 10 -
    J-S47002-14
    by particular defendants, the testimony of co-
    workers is admissible to establish that the plaintiff
    worked in close proximity to the asbestos products in
    question.
    Wright v. Allied Signal, Inc., 
    963 A.2d 511
    , 514-515 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   Our Supreme Court has
    described how to apply these frequency, regularity, and proximity factors.
    are to be applied in an evaluative
    fashion as an aid in distinguishing cases in which the
    plaintiff can adduce evidence that there is a
    product caused his harm, from those in which such
    likelihood is absent on account of only casual or
    Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts, Co., 
    943 A.2d 216
    , 225 (Pa. 2007). In Gregg,
    judgment stage, to make a reasoned assessment concerning whether, in
    light of the evidence concerning frequency, regularity, and proximity of a
    the necessary inference of a sufficient causal connection between the
    
    Id. at 227.
    Instantly, Appellant contends the trial court erred in determining he
    failed to produce evidence of frequent, regular, and proximate exposure to
    references the deposition testimony and affidavits of several of Ray
    -workers as fulfilling his requirement to present a prima facie
    case of such exposure.   
    Id. After careful
    review of the entire record, we
    - 11 -
    J-S47002-14
    conclude the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that
    all Appellees were entitled to summary judgment, as Appellant failed to
    Opinion, 8/22/12, at 5-8.       The trial court carefully recounts the specific
    fails to present a material issue of fact about such exposure. 
    Id. Based on
    our independent review of the record, we agree. While the
    evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant tends to show that,
    in general, asbestos containing products were present in the workplace
    times been around such products when they created dust, there is no
    products.   More particularly, we agree that the deposition testimony and
    -workers, John Weiss, Joseph Anfuso, Brian
    Gaugler, Michael Carl, John D. Wagner, Theodore Potteiger, Anthony
    Lubenesky, and Thomas G. Jones, relied on by Appellant, failed to establish
    an issue of material fact rel
    particular products and times, did not mention the presence of Ray
    Haldaman, and specific references to Ray Haldaman did not place him in
    proximity of specific asbestos containing products at specific times. All that
    - 12 -
    J-S47002-14
    Appellant established was general potential exposure from various sources
    nexus between Ray Haldaman, and by extension Decedent, and any of
    See 
    Wright, supra
    . Accordingly, we
    adopt the thorough analysis of the law and facts as developed by the
    Honorable Sandra Mazer Moss in her August 22, 2012 opinion as our own for
    purposes of further appellate review and affirm the orders granting summary
    judgment.9
    Orders affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/3/2014
    ____________________________________________
    9
    grant of
    as it is now moot.
    - 13 -
    Circulated 09/23/2014 03:20 PM
    Circulated 09/23/2014 03:20 PM
    Circulated 09/23/2014 03:20 PM
    Circulated 09/23/2014 03:20 PM
    Circulated 09/23/2014 03:20 PM
    Circulated 09/23/2014 03:20 PM
    Circulated 09/23/2014 03:20 PM
    Circulated 09/23/2014 03:20 PM