Com. v. Cottingham, T. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • J-S73020-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    TYLER LAVAR COTTINGHAM,
    Appellee                  No. 521 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 2, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0001312-2017
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OLSON, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                    FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2019
    The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered by the Court of
    Common Pleas of Cambria County granting the motion to suppress evidence
    filed by Appellee, Tyler Lavar Cottingham. After careful review, we affirm in
    part and reverse in part.
    The affidavit of probable cause filed in this matter read as follows:
    On 8 July 2017, units were [called] out to a shooting at
    Swallow PI behind the Wood St playground. The caller, Derek
    Rose, was also the shooter. Rose remained on scene and
    cooperated with [o]fficers. Rose was in the process of backing his
    vehicle into his garage. Rose opened the garage door and was
    returning to his vehicle [when] a maroon Nissan bearing PA
    [license plate number] JWP0304, came down the alley at a high
    rate of speed. The passenger, Leslie Jones, remained in the
    vehicle. The driver, [Appellee], got out of the Nissan ran up to
    Rose[,] began yelling at him[, and] then punched Rose in the
    head. [When] Rose asked [Appellee] what this [was] about,
    [Appellee] punched Rose again. [Appellee] said, “[Y]ou know
    what this is about! If you want to take this to the next level, I
    J-S73020-18
    have something under the seat for you!” [Appellee] punched Rose
    again in the head. At [that] point, Rose took a small Ruger .380
    handgun from his pocket. [When Appellee] turned to run, Rose
    fired multiple shots[,] hitting [Appellee] 4 times in the back.
    [Appellee] continued running[,] lo[]sing his sandals along the
    way. Rose immediately called 911, and told Jones[,] “Don’t be
    scared, I’m not gonna hurt you.” Rose placed the firearm on the
    back of his trunk and waited for police to arrive. Jones got out of
    the vehicle and ran after [Appellee,] picking up the Nissan key
    along the way. Rose and Jones cooperated with police and
    provided … statement[s].
    On 10 July 2017, this detective and Detective Adams
    responded to Conemaugh Hospital to check the status of
    [Appellee]. [Appellee] was still on a breathing tube and was
    unable to speak to police. This Detective spoke to [Appellee]’s
    mother Jeanene Callaway, who is also the owner of the Nissan….
    Callaway did sign a consent to search form for the Nissan
    [Appellee] was driving and in control of on the day of the incident.
    This [d]etective and Detective Adams went to Brat Towing
    and conducted a search of the Nissan. Between the driver[’]s seat
    and center console, in plain view, was a flashlight stun gun (similar
    to a cattle prod). Inside the middle console was found a mason
    jar, the inside of which was covered in marijuana residue.
    Detective Adams found a green Crown Royale Bag under the
    driver[’]s seat. Inside the bag was another mason jar, containing
    a large amount of marijuana and a digital scale. One cell phone
    was found in the center console. All items were photographed and
    collected as evidence.
    Affidavit of Probable Cause, 7/11/17, at 1.
    On September 19, 2017, the Commonwealth charged Appellee, by
    criminal information, with possession with intent to deliver marijuana (PWID),
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); possession of drug paraphernalia (PDP), 35 P.S. §
    780-113(a)(32); prohibited offensive weapons, 18 Pa.C.S. § 908; and simple
    assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1).      On March 1, 2018, Appellant filed an
    omnibus pretrial motion presenting 1) a motion to suppress the seized
    -2-
    J-S73020-18
    physical evidence; and 2) a motion to quash the criminal information based
    on the assertion that the Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case
    that Appellee possessed the seized contraband. On March 15, 2018, the court
    conducted a suppression hearing. On April 2, 2018, the lower court filed an
    opinion and order granting the motion to suppress with respect to the seized
    marijuana and paraphernalia, but denying the motion with respect to the
    weapon.
    On April 16, 2018, the Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (“In a criminal case, under the circumstances
    provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an
    order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in
    the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the
    prosecution.”).1 On May 4, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a timely, court-
    ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The suppression court issued its Rule
    1925(a) opinion on May 14, 2018, in which the court relied substantially on
    its April 2, 2018 opinion that accompanied the order under review.
    The Commonwealth now presents the following questions for our
    review:
    1. Whether the suppression court erred by suppressing evidence
    that was seized pursuant to the consent of the owner of the vehicle
    that was subject to a search after the consent was given to
    Detective Adams[?]
    ____________________________________________
    1   In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth so certified.
    -3-
    J-S73020-18
    2. Whether, in the alternative, if it was the suppression court’s
    intention to dismiss certain counts or quash certain counts based
    on a lack of prima facie evidence, … whether the suppression court
    erred by doing so[?]
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 7.
    Our well-settled standard of review of the granting of a motion to
    suppress evidence is as follows:
    When the Commonwealth appeals an order suppressing
    evidence, we may consider on review only the evidence
    from the defendant’s witnesses along with the
    Commonwealth’s evidence that remains uncontroverted.
    Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether
    the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings;
    however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression
    court’s legal conclusions.
    Commonwealth v. Guzman, 
    44 A.3d 688
    , 691–92 (Pa. Super.
    2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, … 
    996 A.2d 473
    , 476
    ([Pa.] 2010)).
    Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
    supported by the record, [the appellate court] is bound by
    [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
    conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the
    determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
    of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are
    not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
    determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
    to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below
    are subject to [] plenary review.
    Commonwealth v. Jones, … 
    988 A.2d 649
    , 654 ([Pa.] 2010)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Commonwealth v. Forsythe, 
    164 A.3d 1283
    , 1286–87 (Pa. Super. 2017).
    We begin with a summary of the suppression court’s reasons for
    granting suppression. First, the court determined that “the Johnstown Police
    Department conducted a lawful, warrantless search of the vehicle because the
    Johnstown Police Department sought and obtained the consent of the owner
    -4-
    J-S73020-18
    of the vehicle before effectuating the search.”   Suppression Court Opinion
    (SCO), 4/2/18, at 3 (unnumbered pages).       Second, the court found that
    Appellee “was aware of the presence of the weapon in the vehicle and,
    therefore, the evidence of the weapon cannot be suppressed.” Id. at 4. Third,
    the court found that there was “no evidence that [Appellee] exercised actual
    or constructive possession over the drugs or drug paraphernalia,” and,
    therefore, the court found it to be “appropriate for this evidence to be
    suppressed.” Id.
    As its first issue, the Commonwealth asserts that the trial court erred
    by granting Appellee’s suppression motion with respect to the seized
    marijuana and related paraphernalia. The Commonwealth argues that, once
    the suppression court determined that the consent obtained to search the
    Nissan was valid, the court’s suppression analysis should have ended. We
    agree.
    Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution protect individuals, their homes, their papers, and
    their effects and possessions from unreasonable searches and
    seizures. For a search to be lawful, police must first obtain a
    warrant, supported by probable cause, from a neutral and
    detached magistrate. A search conducted without a warrant is
    deemed to be unreasonable and therefore constitutionally
    impermissible, unless an established exception applies.
    One of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement is
    a consensual search. [W]e have long approved consensual
    searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to
    conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.
    Although a warrantless, but consensual, search is constitutionally
    permissible, obtaining consent is an investigative tool utilized by
    law enforcement. It allows police to do what otherwise would be
    -5-
    J-S73020-18
    impermissible without a warrant. As a consent search is in
    derogation of the Fourth Amendment, there are carefully
    demarked limitations as to what constitutes a valid consent
    search.
    First, consent must be voluntarily given during a lawful
    police interaction. For a finding of voluntariness, the
    Commonwealth must establish that the consent given by the
    defendant is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
    choice – not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied,
    or a will overborne – under the totality of the circumstances.
    If consent is given voluntarily, the ensuing search must be
    conducted within the scope of that consent. The standard for
    measuring the scope of an individual’s consent is one of objective
    reasonableness. We do not ascertain the scope of consent from
    the individual’s subjective belief or the officer’s understanding
    based on his or her training and experience, but based on what ...
    the typical reasonable person would have understood by the
    exchange between the officer and the suspect.
    Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 
    195 A.3d 855
    , 861–62 (Pa. 2018) (citations,
    footnotes, and quotations marks omitted). Moreover, “[i]t is well established
    that the government may search a vehicle without a warrant or probable cause
    if   the   owner   of   the   vehicle   voluntarily   consents   to   the   search.”
    Commonwealth v. Yedinak, 
    676 A.2d 1217
    , 1220 (Pa. Super. 1996).
    Here, like the Commonwealth, we ascertain no error in the suppression
    court’s initial legal determination regarding consent.       The police obtained
    written consent from the vehicle’s owner to search it. Accordingly, there was
    no violation of the state or federal constitutions when a search conducted
    pursuant to that consent ensued.         The second aspect of the suppression
    court’s order – the denial of suppression with respect to the discovered
    -6-
    J-S73020-18
    weapon – is not under dispute. Accordingly, we will not address that aspect
    of the court’s order.2
    Nevertheless, the suppression court went on to suppress the discovered
    marijuana and related paraphernalia because there was, ostensibly, “no
    evidence” of Appellee’s constructive possession of those items.              SCO at 4.
    This was plain error. Possession, constructive or otherwise, is an element of
    the criminal offenses at issue; it is not a factor pertinent to suppression
    analysis in this case.
    Indeed, the suppression court did not provide any case law supporting
    its conclusion in that regard, nor has this Court discovered any jurisprudence
    supporting the suppression court’s reasoning.               The only cases cited by
    suppression     court    regarding      the    issue   of   constructive    possession,
    Commonwealth v. Valette, 
    613 A.2d 548
     (Pa. 1992), and Commonwealth
    v. Macolino, 
    469 A.2d 132
     (Pa. 1983), were cases dealing exclusively with
    sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, not suppression claims.                Our Supreme
    Court in Valette, after citing the standard of review for sufficiency claims, and
    after discussing the Commonwealth’s evidence produced at trial, concluded
    that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate Valette’s constructive
    possession of narcotics discovered in his co-defendant’s apartment. Indeed,
    ____________________________________________
    2 As discussed, infra, it is of no moment that the court determined that
    Appellee knew of the presence of the stun gun with regard to the issue of
    suppression. Once the court determined that the consent to search given was
    valid, the weapon was not suppressible.
    -7-
    J-S73020-18
    the Valette Court clearly defined the dispute under consideration in that case
    as follows:
    The appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to
    establish constructive possession. He contends that he merely was
    in the wrong place at the wrong time, and that although he knew
    the co-defendants, he himself was not involved in drug dealing.
    In response, the Commonwealth contends that the testimony of
    lay and expert witnesses, together with the physical evidence, was
    sufficient to prove constructive possession of the controlled
    substances, and hence, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
    convictions.
    Valette, 613 A.2d at 549 (emphasis added). Nowhere in that opinion does
    the Court cite the standard of review for a suppression claim, nor does it
    discuss the Fourth Amendment or related search and seizure jurisprudence.
    The Macolino Court reached the opposite result regarding constructive
    possession, but, again, the Court was clearly addressing the sufficiency and
    not the suppression of evidence. See Macolino, 469 A.2d at 133 (“The sole
    issue confronting this Court is whether the Superior Court erred in reversing
    the trial court’s judgment of sentence against Carl Macolino. The Superior
    Court … held that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to
    establish that appellee was in constructive possession of the controlled
    substance, since his wife could also have had possession of the drug. We find
    that the Superior Court did err, and we reverse.”) (emphasis added, footnote
    omitted).
    As our Supreme Court has explained:
    Absent a successful motion to suppress, or its equivalent, the
    Commonwealth like any other party is entitled to attempt to
    introduce at trial any and all relevant evidence. The point of a
    -8-
    J-S73020-18
    motion to suppress physical evidence is to eliminate certain
    tangible      evidence     from     the     Commonwealth’s       trial
    armamentarium, on grounds that the manner of the government’s
    acquisition of that evidence involved a violation of the defendant’s
    constitutional rights. Whether that evidence is to be suppressed
    does not depend upon whether the Commonwealth has committed
    itself to introduce the evidence at trial, or how important it is to
    the Commonwealth’s case, or how strong the evidence is, or
    whether it is subject to trial contradiction, explanation or rebuttal;
    the focus is upon its manner of acquisition, and how that manner
    of acquisition implicated the defendant’s constitutional rights. By
    the same token, an unsuccessful motion to suppress does not
    restrict the defendant from arguing at trial that the evidence
    should be excluded, or discounted by the factfinder, on grounds
    unrelated to the constitutionality of its acquisition.
    Commonwealth v. Millner, 
    888 A.2d 680
    , 693 (Pa. 2005) (emphasis added,
    some emphasis in original omitted).
    Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred when it
    suppressed evidence of the seized marijuana and paraphernalia. Constructive
    possession or want thereof concerns the sufficiency of the evidence, not the
    admissibility of the evidence on constitutional grounds.       The lower court’s
    inquiry into suppression should have ended once it determined that the
    consent to search the Nissan was constitutionally valid.
    Next, the Commonwealth argues in the alternative that the suppression
    court erred if it intended to rule that the Commonwealth had failed to present
    a prima facie case for the crimes of PWID and PDP.
    Initially, we note that in the order under review, the court expressly
    stated that, “upon consideration of [Appellee]’s Motion to Suppress Evidence
    of drug possession, … it is hereby ORDERED and DIRECTED that said Motion
    is GRANTED.” Suppression Order, 5/2/2018, at 1 (single page). Likewise,
    -9-
    J-S73020-18
    in the opinion accompanying that order, the suppression court stated: “Finally,
    we find that there is no evidence that [Appellee] excercised actual or
    constructive possession over the drugs or drug paraphernalia, therefore, we
    find [it] appropriate for this evidence to be suppressed.” SCO at 4. Despite
    the fact that the Commonwealth raised the instant claim in its Rule 1925(b)
    statement, the suppression court did not discuss it at all in its Rule 1925(a)
    opinion. Thus, there is no indication in the record that the court intended to
    dismiss the PWID and PDP charges for want of a prima facie case, and the
    court did not enter any order to that effect.
    However, in his omnibus pre-trial motion, Appellee raised, in addition to
    his motion to suppress, a motion to quash those charges based on his
    assertion that the “Commonwealth has presented no prima facie evidence that
    the stun gun and drugs found in the vehicle were in fact owned by
    [Appellee]….” Appellee’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 3/1/18, at 8-9 ¶¶ 38-40
    (unnumbered pages). Moreover, “the law is well settled that if the record
    supports the result reached by the suppression court, we may affirm on any
    ground.”   Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 
    63 A.3d 294
    , 301 (Pa. Super.
    2013) (en banc). As such, we will address this issue out of an abundance of
    caution.
    Appellee’s motion to quash the criminal information was the equivalent
    of a pre-trial petition for habeas corpus.
    We review a decision to grant a pre-trial petition for a writ
    of habeas corpus by examining the evidence and reasonable
    inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the
    - 10 -
    J-S73020-18
    Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. James, 
    863 A.2d 1179
    ,
    1182 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In Commonwealth v.
    Karetny, … 
    880 A.2d 505
     ([Pa.] 2005), our Supreme Court found
    that this Court erred in applying an abuse of discretion standard
    in considering a pre-trial habeas matter to determine whether the
    Commonwealth had provided prima facie evidence. The Karetny
    Court opined, “the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a
    charged crime is a question of law as to which an appellate court’s
    review is plenary.” 
    Id.
     at 513…; see also Commonwealth v.
    Huggins, … 
    836 A.2d 862
    , 865 ([Pa.] 2003) (“The question of the
    evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case is
    one of law [.]”). The High Court in Karetny continued, “[i]ndeed,
    the trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining whether, as
    a matter of law and in light of the facts presented to it, the
    Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie burden to
    make out the elements of a charged crime.” Karetny, supra at
    513…. Hence, we are not bound by the legal determinations of
    the trial court. …
    A pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means for
    testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence to
    establish a prima facie case. [Commonwealth v.] Carroll, [
    936 A.2d 1148
    ,] 1152 [(Pa. Super. 2007)]. “To demonstrate that a
    prima facie case exists, the Commonwealth must produce
    evidence of every material element of the charged offense(s) as
    well as the defendant’s complicity therein.” 
    Id.
     To “meet its
    burden, the Commonwealth may utilize the evidence presented at
    the preliminary hearing and also may submit additional proof.”
    
    Id.
    Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 
    135 A.3d 1109
    , 1111–12 (Pa. Super. 2016)
    (en banc).
    Furthermore,
    [e]vidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
    when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
    and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in
    contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human
    experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient
    as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court
    is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    - 11 -
    J-S73020-18
    verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751 (Pa. 2000) (internal
    citations omitted).
    As noted above, the suppression court did not directly address the
    Commonwealth’s second issue.         However, in conflating the issues of
    suppression and sufficiency of the evidence, the court did opine on the matter
    to an extent that provides this Court with a clear understanding of the trial
    court’s reasoning regarding whether there was sufficient evidence that
    Appellee constructively possessed the seized contraband.
    Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to
    deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive
    possession is an inference arising from a set of facts that
    possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We have
    defined constructive possession as “conscious dominion.” We
    subsequently defined “conscious dominion” as “the power to
    control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control.” To
    aid application, we have held that constructive possession may be
    established by the totality of the circumstances.
    Commonwealth v. Cruz, 
    21 A.3d 1247
    , 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
    omitted).
    Here, there is no question that Appellee had the power to control the
    marijuana and related paraphernalia when the evidence is construed in a ‘light
    most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.          The suppression court received
    testimony indicating that Appellee had been in the driver’s seat of the Nissan.
    N.T., 3/15/18, at 7. Appellee had immediate access to any items within his
    reach while sitting there.   Common sense dictates that Appellee’s area of
    control necessarily included the space under his seat, as well as any items in
    - 12 -
    J-S73020-18
    the center console positioned between the front seats. These are the locations
    where the police discovered the marijuana and related paraphernalia.
    Thus, the only remaining question is whether there was sufficient
    evidence produced by the Commonwealth to demonstrate that Appellee
    intended to exercise control over the contraband.          In this regard, the
    suppression court stated:
    Here, there was no evidence provided that proves [Appellee] was
    aware of the presence of the drugs and paraphernalia located in
    the vehicle. This is further complicated by the fact that the vehicle
    did not belong to [him]. Furthermore, because of the presence of
    the female passenger in the front seat, we cannot speculate as to
    who exercised control over the drugs or drug paraphernalia.
    Therefore, we cannot find that the defendant maintained actual or
    constructive possession over the drugs or paraphernalia.
    TCO at 3.
    The Commonwealth contends, however, that it
    presented evidence that [Appellee] occupied the driver’s seat of
    the vehicle. The Commonwealth also presented evidence that
    [Appellee] indicated he had knowledge of what was under the seat
    of the vehicle. It is a reasonable inference that, as a driver or
    occupant of the vehicle, [Appellee] who claims knowledge of
    something secreted under the seat would also have knowledge of
    items that are located in other areas to which the driver would
    have access. These areas include the center console, the area
    between the driver’s seat and the center console and items that
    are in fact under the driver’s seat. While the facts noted by the
    suppression court that the vehicle did not belong to [Appellee] and
    there was another occupant of the vehicle are potential defenses
    against a finding that they were constructively possessed and/or
    jointly constructively possessed, they do not support dismissal of
    the charges at this stage.
    - 13 -
    J-S73020-18
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 13-14.3 For the following reasons, we agree with
    the Commonwealth. See Widmer, supra.
    It is certainly possible that Appellee did not know about the marijuana
    and related paraphernalia when he operated the Nissan.        As noted by the
    suppression court, the presence of a passenger in the vehicle, and the fact
    that Appellee was not the owner of that vehicle, could easily create a
    reasonable doubt for a factfinder as to whether Appellee had such knowledge.
    However, as noted by the Commonwealth, such evidence effectively
    constitutes the elements of a defense to the claim of constructive possession
    (and perhaps a strong defense thereto), but these facts do not render the
    inference that Appellee intended to control the contraband in “contradiction to
    the physical facts,” or “in contravention to human experience and the laws of
    nature.”    Widmer, supra.
    It is true that “we may not infer that” an occupant of a vehicle “knew of
    [an item]’s existence simply from the fact that it was hidden in the
    automobile.”     Commonwealth v. Hamm, 
    447 A.2d 960
    , 962 (Pa. Super.
    1982). However, in the instant case, additional evidence was produced to
    demonstrate that Appellee knew and intended to exercise control of the
    weapon located between the center console and the driver’s seat. See N.T.
    at 8 (“Mr. Rose did state to me that [Appellee said] that if you want to take it
    there, there’s something under my seat.”). Would it be unreasonable for a
    ____________________________________________
    3The record establishes that the weapon was located between the driver’s
    seat and the center console, not under the driver’s seat. See N.T. at 20.
    - 14 -
    J-S73020-18
    juror to conclude that Appellee’s demonstrated intent to control the weapon
    extended to the drugs and drug paraphernalia that were adjacently located?
    This is a difficult, subjective question. However, precisely because we cannot
    say with any certainty that such an inference would be unreasonable or
    reasonable, this is a matter best left to the factfinder at trial. The sufficiency
    test does not weigh the strength of evidence but, instead, establishes a bare
    minimum of evidence necessary to place a matter before a jury or judge sitting
    as factfinder as a matter of law. We then trust the factfinder to sort weak
    from strong inferences while assessing the presence or absence of a
    reasonable doubt in the context of the totality of the evidence produced.
    Thus, we conclude that the Commonwealth produced the bare minimum
    of evidence necessary to survive Appellee’s motion to quash for want of
    sufficient evidence of his alleged constructive possession of the seized
    marijuana and related paraphernalia.           We so conclude because the
    Commonwealth produced marginally more evidence than the mere fact that
    marijuana and related paraphernalia were secreted within the area of
    Appellee’s potential control; thus, the Commonwealth provided a modicum of
    evidence in excess of the floor set by the standard we stated in Hamm.
    For these reasons, we affirm the lower court’s order to the extent it
    denied Appellee’s motion to suppress the seized weapon. We reverse that
    order to the extent that it granted Appellant’s motion to suppress the
    marijuana and related paraphernalia. Alternatively, we reverse that order to
    - 15 -
    J-S73020-18
    the extent that the trial court intended to grant Appellant’s motion to quash
    the charges of PWID and PDP for a lack of sufficient evidence.
    Order affirmed in part, reversed in part.            Case remanded.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    President Judge Gantman concurs in the result.
    Judge Olson concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/1/2019
    - 16 -