Com. v. Morales-Gasparini, J. ( 2017 )

J-S58032-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JORGE MORALES-GASPARINI :
:
Appellant : No. 324 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003144-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 11, 2017
Appellant, Jorge Morales-Gasparini, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, following his
bench trial convictions for four (4) counts each of delivery of a controlled
substance, possession with intent to distribute (“PWID”), and possession of a
controlled substance, three (3) counts of corrupt organizations, and one (1)
count each of criminal use of a communication facility and dealing in
proceeds of unlawful activities.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
In May through June 2014, a team from the Berks County District Attorney’s
____________________________________________
135 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 911(b)(2), 7512(a),
5111(a)(1), respectively.
J-S58032-17
office surveilled a group of individuals, which included Appellant, who were
suspected of selling narcotics. During surveillance, the team discovered
Appellant provided transportation to and from drug transactions, answered
the organization’s phone to facilitate drug transactions, took instructions
from superiors, and was present when customers arrived to purchase drugs.
Appellant also discussed financial terms with customers and arranged for
adjusted transactions based on the customers’ finances. Appellant was
arrested and charged with thirty-two (32) counts related to his participation
in the narcotics organization.
On February 20, 2015, Appellant signed a written waiver of a jury trial
and the court conducted an oral colloquy on the record. The court
thoroughly explained the jury selection process and Appellant’s right to a
jury trial during the colloquy. When asked if Appellant wanted a jury trial or
judge trial, Appellant responded, “judge trial.” After a bench trial on April
24, 2015, the court convicted Appellant of four (4) counts each of delivery of
a controlled substance, PWID, and possession of a controlled substance,
three (3) counts of corrupt organizations, and one (1) count each of criminal
use of a communication facility and dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities.
The court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of thirteen (13) to thirty
(30) years’ imprisonment on May 21, 2015.
On May 27, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se motion for removal of
counsel and a pro se post-sentence motion, which challenged the weight of
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the evidence. The court entered an order permitting counsel to withdraw on
May 29, 2015, and appointed new counsel on June 16, 2015. Appellant filed
an amended post-sentence motion on August 13, 2015, which challenged
the mandatory fine imposed for dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities,
and the validity of his jury trial waiver. On September 9, 2015, the court
granted in part Appellant’s post-sentence motion regarding the mandatory
fine, but denied in part the remaining issues in his post-sentence motion.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on October 6, 2015, and that same
day, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely
complied on October 23, 2015.
On March 9, 2016, this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal for failure
to file a brief. Appellant filed a pro se petition under the Post Conviction
Relief Act at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”) on May 16, 2016, seeking
reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. On May 19, 2016,
the PCRA court appointed counsel, and on January 24, 2017, the PCRA court
granted PCRA relief and reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro
tunc. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc on February 22,
2017. On March 1, 2017, the court ordered Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b)
statement, which Appellant timely filed on March 21, 2017.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WERE
MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE, UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION
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OF THE SENTENCING CODE, AND INSUFFICIENT REASONS
FOR THE SENTENCE APPEAR OF RECORD?
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS
AT COUNTS 1, 2, AND 3: CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS,
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT,
THOUGH AN ADDICT, WAS ALSO AN ORGANIZER,
CONTROLLING PARTICIPANT, AND/OR INTERESTED PARTY
IN ANY PATTERN OF RACKETEERING OR CORRUPT
ORGANIZATION AS REQUIRED BY 18 PA.C.S.A. § 911?
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT’S CONVICTION AT
COUNT 5: DEALING IN UNLAWFUL PROCEEDS, WHERE
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT, AN ADDICT,
RECEIVED MONEY AND/OR PARTICIPATED IN A FINANCIAL
TRANSACTION AS DEFINED IN 18 PA.C.S.A. § 5111?
WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF
APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON APRIL 24,
2015[,] WHERE NO WRITTEN COLLOQUY OR WAIVER WAS
PLACED ON THE RECORD ON APRIL 24, 2015[?] RATHER,
A COLLOQUY WAIVING APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL WAS CONDUCTED, IMPROPERLY, ON FEBRUARY 20,
2015, TWO MONTHS BEFORE HIS BENCH TRIAL ON APRIL
24, 2015, WITH THIS COLLOQUY BEING STALE AND
IRRELEVANT AT THE TIME OF APPELLANT’S BENCH TRIAL
ON APRIL 24, 2015[.]
WHETHER APPELLANT’S BENCH TRIAL CONDUCTED [ON]
APRIL 24, 2015, WAS IN ERROR AS THERE WAS NO
KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL
PLACED ON THE RECORD AT THE TIME OF THE BENCH
TRIAL[,] WHERE THE WRITTEN “WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL”
FORM FILED ON FEBRUARY 20, 2015, DOES NOT MEET
THE REQUIREMENTS OF [PA.R.CRIM.P. 620] AND THE
TRIAL COURT MADE NO EFFORT AT THE TIME OF THE
BENCH TRIAL TO CONDUCT A TIMELY, CONTEMPORARY
KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER COLLOQUY?
WHETHER THE BENCH TRIAL WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT
A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER TO SHOW THAT
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APPELLANT WAS OF A SOUND MIND AND KNOWINGLY
AGREED TO WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON APRIL
24, 2015?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5-6).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d
910 (Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary
sentencing issue:
[W]e conduct a [four-part] analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, See
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, [See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted);
Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788 (Pa.Super. 2003) (stating issues
that challenge discretionary aspects of sentencing are generally waived if
they are not raised during sentencing proceedings or in post-sentence
motion).
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence implicates the following
legal principles:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
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element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super.
2003)).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 620 governs a defendant’s
waiver of his right to a jury trial and provides:
Rule 620. Waiver of Jury Trial
In all cases, the defendant and the attorney for the
Commonwealth may waive a jury trial with approval by a
judge of the court in which the case is pending, and elect
to have the judge try the case without a jury. The judge
shall ascertain from the defendant whether this is a
knowing and intelligent waiver, and such colloquy shall
appear on the record. The waiver shall be in writing, made
a part of the record, and signed by the defendant, the
attorney for the Commonwealth, the judge, and the
defendant’s attorney as a witness.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 620.
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[A] voluntary waiver of a trial by jury will be found to be
knowing and intelligent when the on-record colloquy
indicates that the defendant knew the essential ingredients
of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the
significance of the right being waived. These essential
ingredients are the requirements that the jury be chosen
from members of the community (a jury of one’s peers),
that the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be
allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.
Commonwealth v. O’Donnell, 559 Pa. 320, 337, 740 A.2d 198, 207-08
(1999).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Scott D.
Keller, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 4, 2017, at 4-10) (finding:
(1) Appellant failed to raise challenge to discretionary aspects of sentencing
in his post-sentence motion or amended post-sentence motion; specifically,
Appellant’s post-sentence motions do not question court’s imposition of
consecutive sentence; Appellant has waived his challenge to discretionary
aspects of sentence; (2-3) testimony at trial established Appellant involved
himself as vital member of drug trafficking organization whose purpose was
to profit in drug trade; Appellant provided transportation to and from drug
transactions and answered organization’s phone to facilitate drug
transactions; Appellant took instructions from superiors in organization;
Appellant was present when purchasers arrived to complete transactions;
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Appellant did not have control of organization, but he had direct impact on
daily business of organization and participated in organization’s affairs;
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s
convictions for corrupt organizations; further, Appellant discussed financial
terms with drug customers and arranged for adjusted transactions based on
customers’ finances; Appellant accounted for completed drug transactions
and financial terms of transactions to superiors; Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction for dealing in proceeds
of unlawful activities; (4-6) court orally conducted on-the-record colloquy
for jury trial waiver on February 20, 2015; court explained to Appellant his
right to jury trial, jury selection process, Appellant’s participation in jury
selection, and requirement of unanimous verdict; court enumerated
Appellant’s charges and instructed Commonwealth to explain maximum
penalties for and elements of each offense; Appellant affirmatively
responded when asked by court if he understood charges and maximum
penalties; Appellant stated he wished for “judge trial”; Appellant confirmed
he was not forced or threatened to waive his right to jury trial and indicated
he had previously consulted with counsel; Appellant signed written jury trial
waiver form on same day as oral colloquy; court informed Appellant of
“essential ingredients” of jury trial before Appellant waived his right to jury
trial; Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to jury trial;
Appellant appeared and was represented by counsel at bench trial; court
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would have addressed request if counsel had indicated desire for jury trial;
there is no authority for Appellant’s proposition that waiver conducted prior
to date of bench trial renders waiver stale, therefore, Appellant’s claims are
meritless). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/11/2017
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Circulated 09/19/2017 09:30 AM
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
BERKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v. : CRIMINAL DIVISION
JORGE MORALES-GASP ARINI : No. CP-06-CR-3144-2014
Appellant : KELLER, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION, -,t,~ April 3 , 2017
Following a bench trial on April 24, 2015, the Court found Appellant guilty of three (3)
counts of Corrupt Organizations,1 one (1) count of Criminal Use of a Communication Facility,2
one (1) count of Dealing in Proceeds of Unlawful Activities;' four (4) counts of Delivery of a
Controlled Substance," four (4) counts of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled
Substance' and four (4) counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance.6
On May 21, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to serve two and a half to five years of
7
incarceration on the Corrupt Organizations conviction, with 'a credit of 332 days of time served.
The Court also sentenced Appellant to a consecutive term of two and a half to five years of
incarceration on the Dealing in Proceeds of Unlawful Activities conviction. Finally, Appellant
was sentenced to four consecutive two to five year terms of incarcerationon the Delivery counts.
Appellant was represented at trial and sentencing by Gary Dorsett, Esquire.
At sentencing, the Court granted the motion of trial counsel to withdraw from
representation. On May 27, 2015, Appellant filed a prose Post Sentence Motion. On June 16,
2015, the Court entered an Order appointing Kevin Feeney, Esquire as counsel for Appellant.
Counsel Feeney filed an Amended Post Sentence Motion on August 13, 2015. The Court
1
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 91 l(b)(2)-(4).
2
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 7512(a). .
3 18Pa.C.S.A.§ ' 511 l(a ){ 1) . ',1_,
• ' ' ,\,' • •:'~.t1\J,.J
' .~ r ,-, C,_;,-,;_1,;,;
\ 1 \ ! --; {'.'
4 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). , , ... , .. ,
5
6
35 P.S. § 780-l 13(a)(30). +J I :OI ~N t1- L }:kr: rnz
35 P.S. § 780-l 13(a)(l6).
7
Appellant was also sentenced to a eoncurrent.termof one to five years of incarceration on the Criminal Use of a
Communication Facility count. · · ·· : · · · -· ·~ , '·
1
directed the Commonwealth to respond to Appellant's post-sentence motions, which the
Commonwealth did on September 2, 2015. After consideration of the filings, the Court entered
I'" an Order on September 9, 2015, granting Appellant's post-sentence motion in part8 and denying
. .....
the remaining motions.
On October 6, 2015, Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court. The
Court ordered Appellant to file within 21 days a Concise Statement of the Errors Complained of
on Appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure l 925(b ). Appellant filed this
Concise Statement on October 23, 2015. The Court issued a Memorandum Opinion on
November 13, 2015, recommending that Appellant's appeal be denied. On March 9, 2016, the
Superior Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for failure to file a brief.
On May 16, 2016, Appellant filed a timely Post Conviction Relief Act Petition,
requesting reinstatement of direct appellate rights. On May 19, 2016, the Court appointed Osmer
Deming, as counsel for Appellant in this matter. On May 24, 2016, Counsel Deming filed a
Motion for Reassignment of Counsel, which the Court granted on May 25, 2016; on the same
day, the Court appointed Lara Glenn Hoffert, Esquire, as PCRA counsel. On August 3, 2016,
Counsel Hoffert filed a Petition for Extension of Time to File an Amended PCRA Petition or
"No Merit" Letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). The Court granted Counsel Hoffert's
petition on August 8, 2016. Counsel Hoffert filed two additional Petitions for Extension of Time,
9
both of which the Court granted.
s The Court granted Appellant's P892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006). Challenges to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing do not automatically entitle an appellant to appellate review. Commonwealth v.
Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa.Super.2000). Instead, before discussing the merits of a claim
concerning the discretionary aspects of a sentence, a court must consider "(1) whether appellant
has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410 [now Rule 720]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b)". Commonwealthv. Hyland, 875
A.2d 1175 (Pa. Super. 2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 611 A.2d 731, 735 (Pa. Super.
1992). "Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they are not
raised at the sentencing hearing or raised in a motion to modify the sentence imposed at that
hearing." Id.
In the instant matter, Appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal nunc pro tune from the
judgment of sentence imposed on May 21, 2015. However, Appellanthas failed to preserve his
objection to the discretionary aspect of his sentence, as this objection was not raised in his
4
original post sentence motion or in the amended post sentence motion filed by Counsel Feeney.
Appellant;s pro se motion asserts that the conviction was against the weight of the evidence,
presents alleged facts to support this assertion, and requests that an arrest of judgment be granted
for the charge of Corrupt Organizations or that the Court grant a new trial. Likewise, the
amended motion asserts that the mandatory fine for the conviction for Dealing in Proceeds of
Unlawful Activities was unconstitutional and unjust", and substantially repeats what Appellant
now alleges in paragraphs 2 through 5 of his Concise Statement; the relief requested is a
dismissal of some convictions and a new trial on the other counts. Neither motion requests a
modification of sentence or challenges the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed on
Appellant, and certainly not with regard specifically to the consecutive sentences. Accordingly,
as Appellant failed to preserve the arguments in support of the discretionary aspects of his
sentencing claim in his post-sentence motion, these arguments are not subject to review.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In paragraphs 2 and 3 of his Concise Statement, Appellant alleges that the evidence was
insufficient for his convictions for Co1TI1pt Organizations and Dealing in Unlawful Proceeds. A
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law requiring a plenary scope of
review. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 870 A.2d 336 (Pa. Super. 2005). The state Supreme Court has
stated the proper review standard as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing all
the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact finder to find every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
11
See footnote 8.
5
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
..¢') wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1236 n.2 (Pa. 2007), citing Commonwealth v.
Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014-15 (Pa. Super. 2002). "Any doubt about the defendant's guilt is to
be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of
law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances." Commonwealth v.
Stays, 40 A.3d 160, 167 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574,
582 (Pa. Super. 2001)).
Corrupt Organizations
Defendant was found guilty of three (3) counts of Corrupt Organizations. The Corrupt
Organizations statute provides:
( l) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such person
participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of any interest in, or
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise: Provided, however, That a
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without
the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the
securities of the issue held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate
family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity after
such purchase, do not amount in the aggregate to 1 % of the outstanding securities
of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one
or more directors of the issuer: Provided, further, That if, in any proceeding
involving an alleged investment in violation of this subsection, it is established
that over half of the defendant's aggregate income for a period of two or more
years immediately preceding such investment was derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that such investment
included income derived from such pattern of racketeering activity ..
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise.
6
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
( 4) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 911 (b). A "racketeering activity" is defined as "an offense indictable
under. .. The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act ... " § 91 l{h)(l){ii). A
"pattern of racketeering activity" "refers to a course of conduct requiring two or more acts of
racketeering activity ... "§ 91 l(h)(4).
The testimony at the bench trial clearly established that Appellant was a vital member of
a corrupt organization with the purpose of profiting in the drug trade. Appellant provided
transportation to and from drug transactions. (N.T. 4/24/15 at p. 63). Appellant was responsible
for answering the organization's telephone to facilitate drug transactions. (N.T. 4/24/15, Exhibit
2 at p. 110-13, 127-31, 139-41, 144-50, 155-57, 160-73, 176-83, 194-95, 210-16, 249-50, 253-
57, 261-63, 668-77, 281-341. 348-356). Appellant took instructions from and accounted to his
superiors in the organization. (N.T. 4/24/15 at p. 98-100). Appellant was also entrusted to be
present when customers arrived to complete drug transactions. (N.T. 4/24/15 at p. 73, 84-85,
98). That Appellant was not the ultimate controller of this corrupt organization should not
invalidate the fact that Appellant had a direct impact on the organization's daily business:
Appellant was clearly associated with this enterprise and participated in the conduct of the
enterprise's affairs. This evidence was thus sufficient to support Appellant's Corrupt
Organizations' convictions.
Dealing in Proceeds of Unlawful Activities
"A person commits a felony of the first degree if the person conducts a financial
transaction ... : With knowledge that the property involved, including stolen or illegally obtained
7
property, represents the proceeds of unlawful activity, the person acts with the intent to promote
the carrying on of the unlawful activity." 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5111 (a)(l ). A "financial transaction" is
defined as "[a] transaction involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or involving
one or more monetary instruments". § 511 l(f).
As described above, the testimony presented at trial established Appellant's role in a drug
trafficking organization for profit. Appellant discussed financial terms with drug customers and
arranged for adjusted transactions based on customers' finances. (N .T. 4/24/l 5 at p. 107).
Appellant also accounted for the drug transactions completed and the financial terms to his
superior in the organization. (N .T 4/24/15 at p. 99-100, Exhibit 2, at 281-87). In considering the
evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, the Court
believes that there was sufficient evidence presented to support Appellant's Dealing in Proceeds
of Unlawful Activities conviction. Accordingly, the Court finds no merit in the alleged errors
presented in paragraphs 2 and 3.
W AIYER OF JURY TRIAL
In paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of his waiver of a jury trial
conducted on February 20, 2015. "In all cases, the defendant and the attorney for the
Commonwealth may waive a jury trial with approval by a judge of the court in which the case is
pending, and elect to have the judge try the case without a jury." Pa. R. Crim. P. 620. "The
judge shall ascertain from the defendant whether this is a knowing and intelligent waiver, and
such colloquy shall appear on the record." Id. "To be valid, it is well settled that a jury waiver
must be knowing and voluntary, and the accused must be aware of the essential ingredients
inherent to a jury trial." Commonwealth. v. Houck, 948 A.2d 780, 787 (Pa. 2008) (intemal
citations omitted). "[The] essential ingredients, basic to the concept of a jury trial, are the
8
requirements that the jury be chosen from members of the community (a jury of one's peers), that
the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the
jury panel." Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 696-97 (Pa. 2008) (internal citations
omitted). "[I]t is the defendant's burden, and not the Commonwealth's, to establish that a jury
waiver is invalid." Houck. at 788.
The Court conducted a thorough colloquy with Appellant on the record on February 20,
2015. The Court explained to Appellant his absolute right to a trial by jury, the jury selection
process, his participation in that process, and the requirement of a unanimous verdict. (N.T.
2/20/15 at p. 4-6). The Court likewise enumerated the charges Appellant faced, and instructed
the Assistant District Attorney to explain the elements of each offense and the maximum
penalties for each. (N.T. 2/20/15 at p. 7-9). Appellant affirmed, when asked by the Court, if he
understood the charges and maximum penalties. (N.T. 2/20/15 at p. 9). When then asked by the
Court if he wished to waive his right to a jury trial, Appellant answered "Judge trial". (N.T.
2/20/15 at p. 9-10). Appellant further affirmed that he had not been forced or threatened to give
up his right to a jury trial, that he was acting of his own free will, and that he had consulted with
counsel before making this decision. (N.T. 2/20/15 at p. 10). Finally, Appellant also signed a
written waiver form on the same date. Id.
Given this evidence, the Court believes that Appellant knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to a jury trial. The record indicates that the Court did inform Appellant of the
"essential ingredients" of a jury trial before Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. Moreover,
on the date of his bench trial, Appellant appeared and was represented by counsel. If counsel
had indicated to the Court any desire to request a jury trial, the Court would have addressed that
request. (N.T 4/24/15 at p. 6). Finally, the Court has found no authority that a waiver conducted
9
in advance of the bench trial date is inappropriate and renders the waiver ineffective. Therefore,
Appellant's alleged errors in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 are meritless.
Therefore, based on the reasons set forth above, this Court respectfully requests that
Appellant's appeal be DENIED.
DISTRIBUTION: Clerk of Court; CIM; Judge; District Attorney; Lara Glenn Hoffert, Esq.; Defendant
10
COUNTY OF BERKS, PE"Tl\lSYL VANIA
:al:
l'l~
Clerk of Courts ·
CQ Courthouse, 4111 Floor
.
•';'Ii 633 Court Street
Reading, PA 19601-3585 Phone: 610.478.6550
BelhArin G. Hartman, Chief Deputy James P. Troutman, Clerk of Courts
. James M. Polyak, Solicitor
Daryl F. Moyer, Sollcllor, Emeritus
PROOF OF SERVICE Docket No. .3 / 91/-19
District Attorney ) Solicitor ( ) Prison Society { ) CVS
) Public Defender ) Court Reporter ( ) Controller ( ) CtAdmin
) Adult Probation ) Prothonotary ( ) commissioner ( )GAL
) Bureau of Traffic Safety ) Sheriff ( ) Bar Association
) Reading Central Court )MHMR ( ) Reading Eagle
} Law Library ) Dr. Rotenberg (,~eth
)TASC ( }q._ Computer
``u~g:ecords i,J}Jf/
( )DlstrlctJustice _
{ rPolice Department _
onthe dayof __,20 __
Q(zoefendant and/or Claimant by malled a certified ~opy thereof to the following address:
Onthe dayof _,20
. ~ Defendant's attorney by mailing a certified copy thereof to:
Onthe 5 dayof 4,•1 f · 20.J]_.
Signature of Server
Dedicated to public service with integrity, virtue & excellence
www.countyofberks.com
~ Docket N~.: CP_-06-CR-0003144-2014
A~ Date Mailed: 04/05/2017
Address Sheets
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File Copy Recipient List
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\ Addressed To: Lara Christine Glenn Hoffert (PCRA Counsel)
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Sodomsky & Nigrini
606 Court St Ste 200
Reading, PA 19601-3539
Jorge Morales-Gasparini (Defendant)
SCJ Forest DOC# MA9193
PO Box 945
Marienville, PA 16239