Com v. Houck, R. ( 2014 )

J.S29039/12
2014 PA Super 213COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ROBERT HOUCK, :
:
Appellant : No. 2709 EDA 2011
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 28, 2011
In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County
Criminal No(s).: CP-52-CR-0000282-2010
BEFORE: GANTMAN, J., FITZGERALD, J.* and PLATT, J.**:
DISSENTING OPINION BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014
I respectfully dissent. The majority posits that under all three analytic
frameworks employed for determining the existence of a lesser-included
offense, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b) is a lesser-included offense of 75 Pa.C.S. §
proving a Section 3802(c) offense also proves a Section 3802(b) offense.
Houck, ___ A.3d at ___ (majority slip. op. at 15-16). In my view, Section
a holding that it is a lesser-included offense. I wish to avoid blurring the
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
**
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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distinctions between the physical actuality of a lesser amount and the legal
artifice of a lesser-included offense.
In Commonwealth v. Sims, 591 Pa. 506, 919 A.2d 931 (2007), our
Supreme Court set forth the following:
The question of whether an offense is a lesser-included
offense of a greater crime arises in three separate
contexts. First, as the question is presented here, the
inquiry arises in situations where a defendant is convicted
of a crime that was not actually charged. Second, the
question arises in the context of sentencing, i.e., whether
the crimes merge for sentencing purposes. Finally, the
question is presented in the double jeopardy context . . . .
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 356,
912 A.2d 815 ([ ] 2006), this Court surveyed the cases
and clarified that the test to be applied in determining
whether an offense is a lesser-included one for sentencing
purposes and for double jeopardy inquiries is the same.
Specifically, we held that courts should use the statutory
elements approach, but with an eye to the specific
allegations levied in the case. We noted, however, that
this approach is broader than that required for inquiries
concerning whether a defendant may be convicted of a
crime with which he had not been charged, because in
those cases, the due process concerns of notice and
fairness are implicated. Where due process and notice are
at issue, it is prudent to primarily focus the analysis on the
statutory elements of a crime to determine whether crimes
are lesser and greater included offenses because due
process protects an accused against any unfair advantage.
Id. at 518-19, 919 A.2d at 938-39 (footnote, citations, and quotation marks
omitted). In sum, in the context of sentencing and double jeopardy, courts
employ the Jones statutory elements approach. Id.The Sims Court adopted the Model Penal Code approach in resolving
whether a defendant could be convicted of an uncharged crime:
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r-included
offenses identifies three situations in which a defendant
may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged . . . . :
(4) Conviction of Included Offense
Permitted. A defendant may be convicted of
an offense included in an offense charged in the
indictment [or the information]. An offense is so
included when:
(a) it is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to
commit the offense charged or to commit an
offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in
respect that a less serious injury or risk of
injury to the same person, property or public
interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices
to establish its commission.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4) (alteration in original).
Section 1.07(4)(a) reflects the statutory elements
approach defined above and accepted by this Court in
Jones. In this first scenario, the defendant is given notice
of all the elements that the Commonwealth must prove to
obtain his conviction. The Commonwealth can convict the
defendant only of those offenses that contain all of the
elements as the offenses with which the defendant was
charged. The defendant does not need separate notice to
defend against these lesser offenses because the defense
that he prepares against the offenses charged will
evidence of the lesser offenses. Therefore, Section
1.07(4)(a) satisfies the due process concerns that the
doctrine of lesser-included offenses, properly understood,
must take into account.
* * *
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flexible than that employed in a strictly statutory-elements
approach.[1] It is slightly narrower than the test set forth
Jones for inquiries involving
sentencing and double jeopardy concerns, but it is a
reasonable means of assessing lesser-included offenses in
the charging context that does not infringe upon the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
Sims, 591 Pa. at 521-24, 919 A.2d at 940-42 (citations and footnote
where a defendant is convicted
i.e. Id. at 518, 524, 919 A.2d at 938, 942.
Furthermore, the Jones approach is a subset of the Model Penal Code
approach and invoked as needed. Id. at 521, 919 A.2d at 940 (stating,
ection 1.07(4)(a) reflects the statutory elements approach defined above
and accepted by this Court in Jones
The crimes at issue are defined by Section 3802(b) and (c):
§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance
* * *
(b) High rate of alcohol. An individual may not
drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount
of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the
at least 0.10% but less
than 0.16% within two hours after the individual has
1
The Model Penal Code approach is more flexible because it encompasses
two additional approaches: Section 1.07(4)(b) and Section 1.07(4)(c).
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driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the
movement of the vehicle.
(c) Highest rate of alcohol. An individual may not
drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount
of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the
0.16% or higher within two
hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in
actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b)-(c) (emphases added). Consequently, I ascertain
2
See
Sims, 591 Pa. at 521, 919 A.2d at 940.
Section 3802(b) has a lower and upper boundary of BAC. Section
3802(c) encompasses any BAC exceeding the upper boundary. That the
instant boundaries are denominated by numeric, physical amounts is
irrelevant. The boundaries could be geographic, chronologic, spatial, or any
other designation. The crucial fact, in my view, is not that numeric
denominations designate the boundaries, but that these two Sections are
bounded. I would hold that bounded categories are factually distinct
irrespective of the denominations, designations, or labels employed for the
boundaries.
2
Model Penal Code § 1.07(4)(b) does not apply because the instant crimes
do not involve attempt or solicitation. Similarly, Model Penal Code §
1.07(4)(c) does not apply because culpability is not at issue, e.g.,
negligently versus knowingly.
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The critical inquiry is whether proving one bounded category can be
established with proof of the same or less than all the facts necessary to
prove another bounded category, i.e., can proving a BAC exceeds a
particular boundary, i.e., Section 3802(c), also prove a BAC lies within two
different boundaries, i.e., Section 3802(b). I suggest the answer is no,
because when a BAC exceeds the boundary of Section 3802(c), the BAC
necessarily does not lie within the two boundaries of Section 3802(b).
Merely because a statute references two physical amounts does not
necessarily denote that a physical, lesser amount is presumptively a lesser-
included offense a legal construct of a statute referencing a physical,
greater amount. Whether the boundaries of one category are physically less
or smaller than the boundaries of another category is not germane to
blished by proof of
the second offense. See Sims, 591 Pa. at 521, 919 A.2d at 940. For the
quantifying ph -
included offenses. Accordingly, I suggest that Sections 3802(b) and 3802(c)
within the two boundaries of Section 3802(b), or exceeded the boundary of
Section 3802(c). See id.-6-
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I thus respectfully disagree with the majority that Commonwealth v.
Haight, 50 A.3d 137 (Pa. Super. 2012), and Commonwealth v. Sinclair,
897 A.2d 1219 (Pa. Super. 2006), are instructive. Initially, neither case
employed the Model Penal Code approach approved by our Supreme Court in
Sims. See Sims, 591 Pa. at 521-22, 919 A.2d at 940 (adopting Model
Penal Code framework for analyzing lesser-
where a defendant is convic
(citation omitted)). Regardless, in Sinclair, prior to trial, the
Commonwealth successfully moved to amend the information to include
Section 3802(b), in addition to Section 3802(c), on the basis that (b) was
cognate to (c). Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1221. On appeal, the defendant
challenged the grant to amend the information, and our Court affirmed. Id.
at 1222. The instant procedural posture is unlike Sinclair: the
Commonwealth never moved to amend the information but the court opted
to convict Appellant of an offense not charged in the information.
In Haight, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with violating
Section 3802(c) only, but he was convicted of violating Section 3802(b).
See Haight, 50 A.3d at 139. On appeal, the defendant challenged, inter
alia, the sufficiency of evidence for his Section 3802(b) conviction; he did
not argue that because he was charged with Section 3802(c), he could not
have been convicted of violating Section 3802(b). See id. at 140
(summarizing his argument that blood test result reflected only the
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sample). The Haight Court, however, citing Sinclair without further
explanation, noted that the trial court could nonetheless convict the
defendant of the uncharged offense of Section 3802(b) because it was
cognate to the charged offense of Section 3802(c). Id. at 144. But, as
noted above, Sinclair relied on a cognate-pleading framework not adopted
by the Sims Court.
Because the Commonwealth never sought to amend the instant
information, which charged Appellant with violating Section 3309(1), Section
3714, and Section 3802(c) only, I am troubled by correcting the certified
record, see Houck, ___ A.3d at ___ (majority slip. op. at 1 n.1), to reflect
well- sua sponte add a charge to
Commonwealth v. Donaldson, 399 Pa. Super. 237,
241, 488 A.2d 639, 641 (1985). In Donaldson, the Commonwealth
charged the defendant with felony aggravated assault but the trial court
substituted a charge of misdemeanor aggravated assault. Id. at 239, 488
A.2d at 640. This Court reversed, pointing to the requirement that the
sua sponte
Id. at
242, 488 A.2d at 642; see
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instant mandate, particularly as it
Section 3802 conviction, I would not address his other issues, and I
respectfully dissent.
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