Com. v. Helfrich, J. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JOANN NMN HELFRICH, :
:
Appellant : No. 2201 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on November 26, 2012
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-67-CR-0006875-2010
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2014
sentence imposed following her conviction of murder of the first degree.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). We affirm.
On October 12, 2010, Helfrich shot her boyfriend, the victim, eight
times, in their shared apartment. The victim died as a result of the gunshot
wounds. Helfrich was arrested and charged with murder of the first degree.
Order denying his Motion to Withdraw in this Court. This Court quashed the
appeal as interlocutory. Helfrich filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied. Helfrich filed a Petition for allowance of appeal with the
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which was denied on July 10, 2012. See
Commonwealth v. Helfrich, 48 A.3d 1247 (Pa. 2012).
Helfrich attempted to enter a negotiated guilty plea to murder of the
third degree, in exchange for a sentence of 20 to 40 years in prison, plus
costs and restitution. However, the trial court did not accept the plea. The
case proceeded to a jury trial, after which Helfrich was convicted of murder
of the first degree. The trial court sentenced Helfrich to the mandatory term
would not continue to work on her case if they did not receive payment.
post-sentence rights were reinstated on July 3, 2013. Helfrich filed a post-
sentence Motion. The trial court denied the Motion on November 8, 2013.
Helfrich subsequently filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Helfrich then filed a
court-ordered Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
On appeal, Helfrich raises the following questions for our review:
I. Was t
the criminal act of [m]urder [of] the [f]irst [d]egree?
presented by the Commonwealth?
III. Did the trial court commit reversible legal error when it
allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence at trial
regarding a set of keys that had not been properly preserved?
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IV. Did the trial court commit reversible legal error when it
denied [Helfrich] the right to plead guilty?
V. Did the trial court commit reversible legal error when it did
not allow trial counsel to withdraw prior to trial, despite
Brief for Appellant at 5 (issues renumbered for ease of disposition).
In her first claim, Helfrich asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
Id. at 18-
20. Specifically, Helfrich claims that the evidence relating to specific intent
and malice was insufficient, as she merely fired shots at a person whom she
thought was an intruder. Id. at 19-20.1
evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient
Commonwealth v. Kinney, 863 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In order for a jury to find a defendant guilty of murder of the first
human being was unlawfully killed, that the accused was responsible for the
killing, and that the accused acted with a specific intent to kill
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 279 (Pa. 2008); see also 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
1
Helfrich concedes that there was sufficient evidence pertaining to the first
two elements of murder of the first degree, as the victim died, and she
admitted that she had shot the victim. Brief for Appellant at 19.
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Moreover, a specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of
a deadly weapon to inflict injury on a vital part of the body. A
[a]ny firearm, whether loaded or
unloaded, or any device designed as a weapon and capable of
producing death or serious bodily injury, or any other device or
instrumentality which, in the manner in which it is used or is
intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or
Pagan, 950 A.2d at 279 (internal citations omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2301.
Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Helfrich shot the
victim a total of eight times. N.T., 9/8/12, at 307. The gunshot wounds
lung, aorta, and several veins. Id. at 308-18. One of the officers at the
scene testified that Helfrich told him that she was sleeping in her upstairs
bedroom when she thought she heard an intruder downstairs, and fired the
gun until it was empty. Id. at 128-29. However, the forensic pathology
expert testified that the trajectory of at least some of the bullets suggested
that Helfrich could not have been standing at the top of the stairs shooting
down at the victim. Id. at 309, 311, 317. This evidence, viewed in a light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to establish that
Helfrich intentionally used a deadly weapon on several vital parts of the
the weight of the evidence. Brief for Appellant at 20. Specifically, Helfrich
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claims that the Commonwealth did not introduce evidence that proved her
intent. Id. at 21. Helfrich argues that while the evidence may support a
verdict of murder of the third degree, the verdict of murder of the first
degree was against the weight of the evidence. Id.2
Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence
claims is as follows:
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact
who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witness. An appellant court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact.
justice.
Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial
court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Here, the verdict is not so contrary to the evidence as to shock the
conscience. Indeed, evidence was presented demonstrating that Helfrich
shot the victim eight times, on several vital parts of his body. N.T., 9/8/12,
at 308-18. The jury, as finder of fact, had the duty to determine the
credibility of the testimony and evidence presented at trial. See Collins, 70
2
Helfrich properly preserved this claim by raising it in her post-sentence
Motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3).
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evidence credible. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
In her third claim, Helfrich argues that the trial court erred in allowing
that the testimony about the keys was material to the finding of guilt
because the Commonwealth used the testimony to show that the sound of
the keys was distinctive to the victim, and, therefore, she could not have
mistaken the victim for an intruder. Id. at 13. Helfrich claims that the keys
should have been available to her at trial under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Brief for Appellant at 12-14.
The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be
reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its
discretion. In determining whether evidence should be
admitted, the trial court must weigh the relevance and probative
value of the evidence against the prejudicial impact of that
evidence. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a
material fact in the case or tends to support a reasonable
inference regarding a material fact.
Commonwealth v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 550 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted).
to the defense does not offend federal due process standards unless the
Commonwealth
v. Coon, 26 A.3d 1159, 1162 (Pa. Super. 2011).
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With regard to claims under Brady
prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
Brady, 373
U.S. at 87 (emphasis added). Here, Helfrich failed to prove that she had
requested that the Commonwealth produce the keys at any time before or
during the trial. Further, Helfrich failed to prove that the keys were, in any
way, favorable to her defense.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim as follows:
In this case, the keys the [v]ictim carried [were] not
evidence which would have been exculpatory for [Helfrich] or
that when you have multiple keys dangling from a key ring on a
belt loop, they make a noise (or jingle) when you walk.
Moreover, the other evidence presented at trial utterly belies
Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/13, at 5-
determination that the keys did not constitute a piece of evidence material
See id. Additionally, as noted above, the Commonwealth
by showing intent
succeed on this claim.
In her fourth claim, Helfrich avers that the trial court erred in refusing
to accept her guilty plea. Brief for Appellant at 14. Helfrich claims that the
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members wrote a letter implying she did not support the plea agreement.
Id. Helfrich also argues that the trial court refused the plea agreement
because it would not accept a plea from someone who believes that they are
not guilty. Id. at 15. Helfrich argues that her own thoughts regarding her
defense should not be a basis for refusing a negotiated guilty plea. Id.
that the judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty[.] The Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure grant the trial court broad discretion in the
acceptan Commonwealth v.
Hudson, 820 A.2d 720, 727-28 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to accept the plea agreement. Although the
strongly opposed to a plea agreement, the trial court did not use a family
See N.T., 9/12/12, at 14. In
the plea agreement. See id. at 12, 16-18.
Additionally, the trial court did not reject the plea agreement merely
because Helfrich thought she was not guilty. The trial court specifically
asked Helfrich whether she believed she was guilty, to which Helfrich
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responded in the affirmative. Id. at 21. The trial court then explained that
murder of the third degree requires the accused to intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently cause the death of another human being. Id. at
22. Helfrich indicated that she killed the victim in a reckless manner. See
id. at 22, 25. Helfrich told the court that she thought the victim was an
intruder, and that she shot until the gun was empty. See id. at 22.
However, upon further questioning, the trial court reached the conclusion
as she was rationalizing the situation. See id. at 25-26. At that time, the
trial court rejected the plea agreement. See id. at 27-28. Based upon the
foregoing, Helfrich has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
broad discretion in rejecting her guilty plea based on her equivocal
statements regarding her guilt. See Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24
A.3d 1044, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that defendant must clearly and
unequivocally acknowledge the facts leading to a guilty plea). Thus, Helfrich
is not entitled to relief on this claim.
In her fifth claim, Helfrich argues that the trial court erred in denying
that she submitted an application to the Public Defender
application was denied because prior counsel had not withdrawn
representation. Id. at 17. Helfrich argues that her application with the
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by trial counsel. Id. at 16.
the sound discretion of the trial court, and as such, should not be overturned
Commonwealth v. Tuck, 469 A.2d
644, 650 (Pa. Super. 1
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 364 A.2d 665, 674 (Pa. 1976).
No brightline rules exist to determine whether a trial court has
abused its discretion in denying a Petition to Withdraw as
counsel. A balancing test must be utilized to weigh the interests
of the client in a fair adjudication and the Commonwealth in the
efficient administration of justice. Thus, a resolution of the
problem turns upon a case by case analysis with particular
attention to the reasons given by the trial court at the time the
request for withdrawal is denied.
Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 533 A.2d 473, 481 (Pa. Super. 1987)
(citation omitted).
counsel did not require withdrawal. See N.T., 4/18/11, at 2. However, the
trial court specifically stated that it would grant the Motion to Withdraw
See id. at 3. Helfrich failed to provide evidence that she pursued new
counsel, and the recor
office never entered an appearance on her behalf. Further, Helfrich did not
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provide evidence to indicate a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.
Moreover, Helfrich failed to provide evidence that trial counsel did not fully
litigate her defense at trial.
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not
Helfrich cannot succeed on this claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/30/2014
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