Davis III, C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. ( 2014 )


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  • J.A22039/14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    CHARLES DAVIS III,               :                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :                     PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant     :
    :
    v.                :
    :
    :
    HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, :
    :
    :                No. 2274 MDA 2013
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
    Civil Division No(s).: 14077-2005
    BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                   FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2014
    Appellant, Charles David, III, takes this counseled appeal from the
    order entered in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, denying his
    court that it lacked jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 to hear the petition,
    filed five years after a prior order modified the arbitration award.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    accident in question has resulted in court filings to no less than three
    l Ct. Op., 1/30/14, at 1. On September
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J. A22039/14
    9, 2005, Appellant, was driving a car in the course of his employment with
    accident, and allegedly suffered injuries. The car was owned by Keystone.1
    In December of 2005, at the instant trial docket, 14077-2005,
    Appellant filed a praecipe for a writ of summons and petition to appoint an
    arbitrator. The Honorable Joseph F. Sklarosky, Jr., presided over the instant
    matter.     In October of 2007, an arbitration panel awarded $2,930,150 to
    Appellant. Hartford filed an application to modify the award, arguing there
    , and in the
    alternative that any policy had UIM limits of $2 million. The arbitration panel
    denied the application.
    Meanwhile, in March of 2007, Hartford filed a declaratory judgment
    action under a different docket, 2822-2007, seeking a declaration that
    us that this case is still pending in Luzerne County. Trial Ct. Op. at 2 n.4.
    Hartford then filed, under a third docket, 13910-2007, a petition to
    vacate or modify the arbitration award. On February 8, 2008, the Honorable
    million. Appellant took no action and did not file an appeal.
    1
    Keystone has filed an amicus curiae brief in this appeal.
    -2-
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    Five years and seven months later, on September 4, 2013, Appellant
    filed the ins
    the instant docket, #14077.     The petition averred the following.     In May
    2012, Appellant served under the second docket, #2822, a request on
    In June 2012, Appellant received declaration pages for the following excess
    insurance coverage:
    $25 million
    CNA                   $20 million
    Traveler   $5 million
    Id.
    possession of documents which showed that these excess and umbrella
    would be available benefits in excess of the $2,000,000.00 limit owed by
    Id. at ¶ 17. Appellant requested the instant trial court to modify
    with 6% interest.
    Hartford filed a response, arguing, inter alia: (1) the trial court lacked
    (2) the coordinate jurisdiction rule prevented the trial court from modifying
    existence of
    additional excess insurance policies until discovery in docket #2822; and (4)
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    Hartford had no duty to Appellant to determine whether other insurance
    companies issued policies to his employer, Keystone.
    The trial court held a hearing on November 18, 2013, and denied
    2
    It reasoned the only relief
    the court lacked jurisdiction under Section 5505. Appellant took this timely
    appeal.3
    For ease of disposition, we first set forth the relevant law and the trial
    upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days
    after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if
    2
    While the text of the order stated that it was entered November 25, 2013,
    the filing stamp on the order bears the date of November 27th, and a
    -27-
    11/27/13.
    3
    On December 23, 2013, the trial court directed Appellant to         record
    a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement within twenty-one days. Order, 12/23/13
    (emphasis in original). The trial court opinion states that Appellant mailed a
    1925(b) statement to the trial judge on or about January 6, 2014, but the
    statement was not time-stamped by the Prothonotary and not entered on
    the docket. There is no 1925(b) statement in the certified record.
    However, unlike other orders filed in this matter, the 1925(b) order
    does not bear a handwritten note that copies were mailed, and the
    corresponding docket entry likewise does not indicate the date and manner
    of service on the parties.    Accordingly, we decline to find waiver for
    See In re
    L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 509-10 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    -4-
    J. A22039/14
    vides:
    (a) General rule. Except as provided in section 1722
    (c) (relating to time limitations) or in subsection (b) of this
    section, the time limited by this chapter shall not be
    extended by order, rule or otherwise.
    (b) Fraud. The time limited by this chapter may be
    extended to relieve fraud or its equivalent, but there shall
    be no extension of time as a matter of indulgence or with
    respect to any criminal proceeding.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 5504.
    This Court has explained:
    Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 . . . th
    discretion to modify its orders ceases thirty days after the
    entry of an order, and thereafter the trial court may
    exercise discretion to modify an order only upon a showing
    of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
    matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or
    -day
    period, a trial court may modify an order only to correct a
    clerical error or other formal error which is clear on the
    face of the record and which does not require an exercise
    of discretion.
    ISN Bank v. Rajaratnam, 
    83 A.3d 170
    , 172-73 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (citations omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(b) requires,
    Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b).
    To establish a prima facie case of fraud, a plaintiff must
    show:
    (1) a representation; (2) which is material to the
    transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with
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    J. A22039/14
    knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether
    it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading
    another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on
    the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury
    was proximately caused by the reliance.
    Kostryckyj v. Pentron Lab. Techs., LLC, 
    52 A.3d 333
    , 338 (Pa. Super.
    2012) (citation omitted).
    In the case sub judice, the trial court reasoned the following. Although
    underinsured arbitration award, a review of the pleading, prayer for relief,
    February 8, 2008 order.     Trial Ct. Op. at 1 n.1, 3.     Furthermore, while
    er pursuant
    absent fraud or its equivalent.[      ]
    Id. at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
    offer[ed] no averment[s] that set forth sufficient facts to
    conclude Hartford made a material misrepresentation to
    anyone, including Judge Mundy. [Appellant] simply offers
    his opinion in par
    possession of documents which showed the excess policies
    particular document, or reason why Hartford was or would
    have been in possession of the excess policy information,
    where the policies at issue were not otherwise
    underwritten by Hartford.
    Id.
    -6-
    J. A22039/14
    compelling circumstances                                     Id.
    In the instant appeal, Appellant presents one issue for our review:
    s
    of fraud and that only evidence of fraud could suffice to modify Judge
    Id. at 12. Appellant contends the basis for his petition
    was not fraud, but instead wa
    Id.   He then reasons that the trial
    court had broad discretion to modify or rescind the prior order under Section
    5505.    In support, Appellant asserts extraordinary circumstances justified
    representation that coverage was limited to $2 million. We find no relief is
    due.
    of not only th
    court did not proceed on a premise that he was alleging fraud; indeed, the
    failed to aver fraud.   We
    that because Appellant failed to aver
    fraud or other extraordinary cause under Section 5504, the court could not
    extend the thirty-day period set forth in Section Section 5505.       See 42
    Pa.C.S. §§ 5504, 5505; ISN Bank, 
    83 A.3d at 172-73
    . Appellant does not
    -7-
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    deny that he did not aver fraud. Again, he emphasizes on appeal that he did
    not.
    See
    th Hartford.
    Finally, where the trial court properly noted that the three additional
    other than Hartford
    that Appellant petition to modify failed to explain why the existence of other
    insurance   compani
    payment. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (emphasis in original).
    Appellant has presented no meritorious claim for relief, and we affirm
    the order denying his petition on the ground that the court lacked
    jurisdiction under Section 5505 to modify a five-year old order issued under
    another docket.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/30/2014
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2274 MDA 2013

Filed Date: 9/30/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014