Com. v. Ebert, K. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S68011-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    KEITH ALLEN EBERT,
    Appellant                 No. 2594 EDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered July 5, 2013,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
    Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-39-CR-0004816-2012
    BEFORE: ALLEN, JENKINS, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.:                           FILED OCTOBER 24, 2014
    Keith Allen Ebert (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of driving under the
    influence (“DUI”), and the trial court found him guilty of summary careless
    driving and disorderly conduct.1
    The trial court summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
    [B]etween 3:30 PM and 4:00 PM on March 20, 2012, Jose
    Cruz was at 201 North 2nd Street, sitting on a third floor
    apartment balcony.      Cruz’s 99 Chevy Silverado was parked
    outside in the 200 block of North 2nd Street. Cruz observed a
    blue minivan run a stop sign and hit his truck. Cruz yelled to the
    driver that he was coming downstairs.           When Cruz got
    downstairs, the driver and van were gone. A neighbor called the
    police.   Approximately 5-10 minutes later, while Cruz was
    waiting for the police to come, he saw the same van come back
    ____________________________________________
    1
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), 3802(c), 3714(a), and 5503(a)(4).
    J-S68011-14
    to the area and park behind his truck on an angle. Cruz
    approached the passenger side of the van to speak with the
    driver, later identified as [Appellant], but the driver exited the
    van and walked away. [Appellant] left the van running, so Cruz
    turned the ignition off and kept the keys until the police arrived.
    Cruz watched [Appellant] walk east towards a church on Turner
    Street, and observed [Appellant] urinate next to the church.
    Officer Michael Beidelman, of the Allentown Police
    Department was dispatched to the area of the 200 block of North
    2nd Street for a motor vehicle accident. When he arrived [in] the
    area, Officer Beidelman saw a blue Mercury Villager minivan
    parked at an angle with its rear end sticking out into the
    roadway. The van had damage to the left headlight/turn signal
    area. Beidelman also saw a Chevy Silverado with minor damage
    to the rear, driver’s side bumper. Beidelman spoke to Mr. Cruz
    and [Appellant], and observed approximately 10-15 other adults
    and children in the area. [Appellant] claimed the group stole his
    wallet, but after looking inside the van, Beidelman discovered
    the wallet under the passenger seat.
    Officer Beidelman noticed [Appellant] was acting nervous,
    had glossy [sic] eyes, and was unsteady on his feet. Beidelman
    called for back-up. Officer Bull arrived and had [Appellant]
    perform standardized field sobriety tests, including a Nystagmus
    test, walk-and-turn, and one-leg stand. Biedleman observed the
    walk-and-turn and one-leg stand tests and determined [that
    Appellant] was under the influence and incapable of safe driving.
    While handcuffing [Appellant], Beidelman detected a moderate
    odor of alcohol. [Appellant] was taken to the booking center.
    Beidelman observed [Appellant’s] blood [being] drawn and saw
    the tubes sealed in an evidence bag.             The blood was
    subsequently sent to Health Network Laboratories for testing.
    Nadine Koenig, a leading technologist in toxicology for
    Health Network Laboratories testified as an expert in the field of
    Forensic Toxicology.       Ms. Koenig certified the results of
    [Appellant’s] blood sample. Koenig noted the tubes in this case
    were not sealed, but the evidence bag they were contained in
    was sealed, and stated the sample would have been rejected by
    the lab if it arrived with no seals on the tube or on the bag.
    Additionally, Koenig described the steps taken with the sample
    from its arrival at the lab through the testing procedure. Testing
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    showed that [Appellant’s] blood alcohol concentration was .16
    percent.
    On June 5, 2013, following a jury trial, [Appellant] was
    found guilty of two counts of driving under the influence.
    Additionally, [the trial court] found him guilty of summary
    careless driving and disorderly conduct.         A presentence
    investigation was prepared, and on July 5, 2013, [the trial court]
    sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of imprisonment of
    1 year and 45 days to 5 years and 45 days in a State
    Correctional Institution.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/13, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).
    Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on July 15, 2012, which
    the trial court denied on August 1, 2013.    On August 30, 2013, Appellant
    filed notice of appeal and the trial court directed him to comply with
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).    Appellant however failed to comply and the trial court
    transmitted the record to this Court.     On January 10, 2014, this Court
    remanded the case for Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
    statement within twenty-one days. Appellant complied on January 27, 2014,
    and on February 26, 2014, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
    Appellant presents one issue for our review:
    DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED [APPELLANT’S]
    MOTION IN LIMINE WHICH REQUESTED THE SUPPRESSION OF
    THE BLOOD TESTS BASED UPON [APPELLANT’S] CONTENTION
    THAT THE TUBES CONTAINING [APPELLANT’S] BLOOD SAMPLE
    WERE NOT SEALED WHEN DELIVERED TO THE TESTING
    AGENCY    AND     THEREFORE    WERE     SUBJECT   TO
    CONTAMINATION?
    Appellant’s Brief at 9.
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    Preliminarily, we note that chain-of-custody is an evidentiary principle
    that “refers to the manner in which evidence was maintained from the time
    it was collected to its submission at trial.”   In re D.Y., 
    34 A.3d 177
    , 185
    (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).      Therefore, where chain of custody
    violations are alleged, suppression is not the appropriate remedy for such an
    evidentiary challenge. Rather, as with the admission of any other evidence,
    “[t]he admission of demonstrative evidence is a matter committed to the
    discretion of the trial court”, and where there has been an improper chain of
    custody, the trial court may make an evidentiary ruling that such evidence is
    inadmissible.   Commonwealth v. Hudson, 
    414 A.2d 1381
    , 1387 (Pa.
    1980). See Commonwealth v. McKellick, 
    24 A.3d 982
    , 986 (Pa. Super.
    2011) (“Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
    court, and this Court will find the trial court abused its discretion only where
    it is revealed in the record that the court did not apply the law in reaching its
    judgment or exercised manifestly unreasonable judgment or judgment that
    is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. In addition, it is the
    exclusive province of the finder of fact to determine the weight of relevant
    evidence.”).
    The standard for establishing a chain of custody for admission of
    physical evidence has been stated by our Courts as follows:
    The admission of demonstrative evidence is a matter
    committed to the discretion of the court ... Furthermore,
    there is no requirement that the Commonwealth establish
    the sanctity of its exhibits beyond a moral certainty ...
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    Every hypothetical possibility of tampering need not be
    eliminated; it is sufficient that the evidence, direct or
    circumstantial, establishes a reasonable inference that the
    identity and condition of the exhibit remained unimpaired
    until it was surrendered to the trial court ... Finally,
    physical evidence may be properly admitted despite gaps
    in testimony regarding its custody....
    Commonwealth          v. Bartley, 
    576 A.2d 1082
    , 1085 (Pa. Super. 1990)
    quoting Commonwealth v. Bruner, 
    564 A.2d 1277
    , 1285 (Pa. Super.
    1989) and Commonwealth v. Hudson, 
    414 A.2d 1381
     (Pa. 1980).
    Here, Appellant argues that the vials containing his blood were
    unsealed when they arrived for testing at Health Network Laboratories.
    Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.     Appellant contends that Ms. Koenig, the
    Commonwealth’s forensic toxicology expert, acknowledged that normal
    protocol for the transportation and delivery of blood required the individual
    vials to be sealed, marked with evidence tape, and then placed in a sealed
    evidence bag.   
    Id.
        Because the vials were not sealed and marked with
    evidence tape when delivered to the laboratory, Appellant contends that the
    vials may have been contaminated or tampered with (even though the
    evidence bag that they arrived in was sealed) and that the blood samples
    were therefore unreliable and should have been excluded. 
    Id.
    “When determining whether blood alcohol test results were properly
    admitted, we are primarily concerned with [1] the qualifications of the
    person performing the blood test and the equipment used; [2] whether the
    laboratory was licensed and approved by the Department of Health, and [3]
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    J-S68011-14
    the chain of custody.”       Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 
    581 A.2d 956
    , 959
    (Pa. Super. 1990).
    Appellant does not contest the qualifications of the persons performing
    the blood test, the equipment used, or whether the facility was approved by
    the Department of Health.          Nor does Appellant dispute the testimony of
    Officer Beidelman, who observed Appellant’s blood being drawn and placed
    in a sealed package2, together with the testimony of Ms. Koenig, the
    Commonwealth’s forensic toxicology expert, who attested to an unbroken
    chain of custody, testifying that after Officer Beidelman personally observed
    Appellant’s blood being drawn at the Lehigh Valley Booking Center, the blood
    samples were transmitted to the Health Network Laboratory by a courier
    who picked up the blood samples and transported them to the laboratory.
    N.T., 6/4/13, at 62; N.T., 6/5/13, at 17-18.
    With regard to Appellant’s assertion that the blood vials were not
    individually sealed, “[a]llegations of problems in the chain of custody go to
    the weight of the evidence, and it is [the fact-finder’s] duty to balance these
    allegations against the reasonable inference of an unaltered chain of
    custody.”     Commonwealth v. Alarie, 
    547 A.2d 1252
    , 1255 (Pa. Super.
    1988).      Moreover, “[t]here is no need for the Commonwealth to prove
    ____________________________________________
    2
    See Commonwealth v. Mahaney, 
    540 A.2d 556
    , 560 (Pa. Super. 1988)
    (“when the police observe the technician drawing the blood, the
    Commonwealth is not compelled to call the technician”).
    -6-
    J-S68011-14
    beyond a doubt the sanctity of a blood sample after it is withdrawn from a
    driver.    The Commonwealth must simply establish a reasonable inference
    that    the   sample   was   unimpaired   until   it   was   brought   to   court.”
    Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    575 A.2d 131
    , 134 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citations
    omitted).     Here, there is no evidence in the record to support Appellant’s
    claim that the blood samples were tampered with or contaminated. The trial
    court correctly stated that “any gaps in the chain of custody go towards the
    weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/26/13,
    at 4.     Clearly the jury in this case found credible the testimony of Officer
    Beidelman and Ms. Koenig that the vials were in a sealed evidence bag
    which had not been disturbed, and concluded that the failure to seal the
    individual vials did not undermine the reliability of the results of the blood
    alcohol test. We will not disturb such determinations on appeal.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/24/2014
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2594 EDA 2013

Filed Date: 10/24/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024