Com. v. Beck, J. ( 2014 )

J-S61034-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JUSTIN M. BECK, :
:
Appellant : No. 691 WDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 1, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002646-2010
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014
Justin M. Beck (Appellant) appeals from the order entered on April 1,
2014, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The background underlying this matter can be summarized in the
following manner. A jury convicted Appellant of aggravated assault, simple
assault, recklessly endangering another person, and endangering the welfare
of a child. The trial court sentenced Appellant on July 11, 2011. On August
31, 2012, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth
v. Beck, 60 A.3d 587 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum).
Appellant did not petition our Supreme Court for allowance of appeal.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S61034-14
On February 3, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. Counsel then requested
leave to withdraw his representation.
On March 11, 2014, the PCRA court issued notice pursuant to
without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court concluded that Appellant
untimely filed the petition. On April 1, 2014, the court formally dismissed
court directed Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant
subsequently filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In his brief to this Court,
nnecessary capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the court's rulings are supported by the evidence of
record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d
1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Under the PCRA, all petitions must be filed within one year of the date
exceptions applies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Chester,
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895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006). For purposes of the PCRA, a judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
Chester, 895
neither this Court nor
the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. 2005)).
This Cour
2012. Appellant had 30 days to petition our Supreme Court for allowance of
appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). He did not do so. Thus, for purposes of the
er 1, 2012. He,
therefore, had until October 1, 2013, in order to file timely a PCRA petition.
Because Appellant untimely filed his PCRA petition on February 3,
2014, he had the burden of pleading and offering to prove one of the
following exceptions.
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
statutory exceptions
does mention that his counsel never informed him that this Court affirmed
his judgment of sentence. According to Appellant, he learned that this Court
affirmed his judgment of sentence 14 months after that event occurred.
In his brief to this Court, Appellant invokes the exception found at 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i). Appellant essentially asserts that counsel was
ineffective for failing to inform him that this Court affirmed his judgment of
sentence
interference, and that his petition, therefore, fits within the Subsection
9545(b)(1)(i) exception.
Even if we assume arguendo
alleged this exception, he is not entitled to relief. For purposes of the PCRA,
the
ineffectiveness of his counsel does not qualify his petition as timely filed
under Subsection 9545(b)(1)(i). We, therefore, conclude that the PCRA
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/7/2014
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