Com. v. Chambers, M. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S60006-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    MAURICE CHAMBERS
    Appellant                    No. 852 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order March 17, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000910-1997
    BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                           FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014
    Maurice Chambers appeals pro se from the order entered on March 17,
    2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, dismissing, as
    untimely, his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Chambers claims his petition satisfies a
    9545(b)(1)(iii) (newly-recognized constitutional right exception), and in
    support cites two United States Supreme Court cases, Alleyne v. United
    States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
     (2013), and Miller v. Alabama, 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    (2012). Based upon the following, we affirm.
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    On October 27, 1997, Chambers was found guilty by a jury of second
    degree murder, robbery, and two counts of criminal conspiracy (robbery).1
    On December 5, 1997, he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on
    the count of second degree murder, and a concurrent term of five to ten
    2
    On direct appeal, this
    Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Commonwealth
    v. Chambers, 
    742 A.2d 201
     (Pa. Super. 1999) (unpublished memorandum),
    appeal denied, 
    749 A.2d 466
     (Pa. 2000). On October 2, 2000, the United
    on     for   certiorari.
    Commonwealth v. Chambers, 
    531 U.S. 853
     (2000).
    On February 5, 2001, Chambers filed his first pro se PCRA petition.
    Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed on November 25,
    2002. The PCRA court denied relief on June 12, 2003.        Chambers filed a
    timely appeal with this Court and, in a published opinion, filed on May 17,
    2004, this Court affirmed the order of the PCRA court. Commonwealth v.
    Chambers, 
    852 A.2d 1197
     (Pa. Super. 2004). The Pennsylvania Supreme
    ____________________________________________
    1
    See 18 Pa.C.S §§ 2501(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), 903(a)(1), and 903(a)(2),
    respectively.
    2
    The robbery count merged with the count for second degree murder, and
    the two counts of conspiracy merged for purposes of sentencing.
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    Court denied Chamb
    Commonwealth v. Chambers, 
    871 A.2d 188
     (Pa. 2005).
    On October 12, 2007, Chambers filed his second pro se PCRA petition.
    On October 20, 2009, the court dismissed the petition as untimely. On
    appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief, and the Pennsylvania
    Commonwealth           v.   Chambers,          
    11 A.3d 1026
       (Pa.   Super.   2010)
    (unpublished opinion), appeal denied, 
    21 A.3d 1189
     (Pa. 2011).
    On April 24, 2012, Chambers filed a third PCRA petition, which was
    dismissed by the PCRA court on December 10, 2012.                  This Court, by per
    3
    curiam
    petition for
    allowance of appeal on October 17, 2013. Commonwealth v. Chambers,
    
    77 A.3d 1258
     (Pa. 2013).
    his third PCRA petition was still pending, Chambers filed the present petition,
    citing Miller v. Alabama, 
    supra.
     The PCRA court ordered that the petition
    be held in abeyance until return of the record.              See PCRA Court Order,
    5/30/2013.      On July 15, 2013, Chambers filed a petition to amend his PCRA
    petition, citing Alleyne, 
    supra.
             Subsequently, on January 29, 2014, the
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    3
    See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 288 MDA 2013.
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    PCRA court issued notice of intention to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
    907.    Following the filing of objections by Chambers, the PCRA court
    dismissed his PCRA petition on March 17, 2014.     Chambers then filed this
    timely appeal.
    Commonwealth v.
    Taylor, 
    67 A.3d 1245
    , 1248 (Pa. 2014) (quotations and citation omitted),
    cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2695
     (2014).         PCRA timeliness requirement,
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the
    judgment of sentence becomes final, unless the petition alleges, and the
    petitioner proves, that one of the three enumerated exceptions to the time
    for filing requirement is met.   See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).     The PCRA
    exceptions that allow for review of an untimely petition are as follows: (1)
    governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously unknown facts;
    and (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right.   See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545
    (b)(1)(i)-(iii). Furthermore, the statutory exceptions to the timeliness
    requirements of the PCRA are subject to a separate time limitation, and any
    petition invoking an exception must be filed within sixty (60) days of the
    time the claim could first have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
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    9545(b)(2).4 See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    35 A.3d 44
    , 53 (Pa.
    Super. 2011), appeal denied, 
    50 A.3d 121
     (Pa. 2012).
    2000, when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for
    certiorari.   See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes
    Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
    until October 2, 2001 to file a timely petition. Chambers does not dispute
    that his petition, filed on April 24, 2013, is patently untimely.           However,
    Chambers invokes the newly-recognized constitutional right exception, set
    forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
    Initially, we note that Subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) applies only where
    Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that
    court to apply retroactively
    added). This Court has reiterated:
    Subsection (iii) of section 9545 has two requirements.
    First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional
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    4
    provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim
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    right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the
    United States or th[e Pennsylvania] Supreme Court after
    the time provided in this section. Second, it provides that
    retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove that
    retroactively. The language
    the past tense. These words mean that the action
    has already occurred, i.e.
    held the new constitutional right to be retroactive
    to cases on collateral review. By employing the past
    tense in writing this provision, the legislature
    clearly intended that the right was already
    recognized at the time the petition was filed.
    Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 
    571 Pa. 219
    , 226, 
    812 A.2d 497
    , 501 (2002). See Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 
    596 Pa. 104
    , 
    941 A.2d 646
     (2007).
    Commonwealth v. Garcia, 
    23 A.3d 1059
    , 1063 (Pa. Super. 2011)
    (emphasis added), appeal denied, 
    38 A.3d 823
     (Pa. 2012).
    First, Chambers cites Alleyne v. United States, 
    supra,
     wherein the
    es
    
    Id. at 2155
    , citing Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 483, n.10, 490 (2000)).5              The relevance of
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    5
    As noted above, Chambers filed the instant PCRA petition on April 24,
    2013, and filed a petition to amend his PCRA petition, citing Alleyne, on July
    15, 2013. Because Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013, Chambers did
    comply with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) by filing the amended PCRA petition
    within 60                                                 See 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9545(b)(2).
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    Alleyne                                            but, in any event, no relief is due
    since the Alleyne Court did not address whether the holding would apply
    retroactively    to   cases   on    collateral     appeal.    Moreover,   neither   the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme Court has
    issued a decision giving Alleyne
    argument that this Court should apply Alleyne retroactively is unpersuasive.
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    6
    Here, with regard to the charge of robbery, which requires that the
    Chambers argues:
    ly did not mention the essential
    ****
    [Chambers] was charged, and because the fact of robbery
    aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences
    ****
    It is well settled that a jury cannot find the defendant guilty of
    robbery unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he
    (committed a theft) or (attempted to commit a theft), both
    which are elements of the charged offense.
    ****
    theft is essential to the penalty, it was an element of
    the offense. Alleyne would mean that the government cannot
    force a judge to impose a sentence unless the jury finds the
    requisite statutory factual predicate.
    pro se Brief at 8, 10, 11.
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    See United States v. Reyes, 
    755 F.3d 210
     (3d Cir. 2014) (holding Alleyne
    is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review); United States
    v. Winkelman, et al., 
    746 F.3d 134
     (3d Cir. 2014) (same).7 Accordingly,
    Alleyne is unavailing, as he has failed to
    Garcia, 
    supra at 1063
     (citations
    and quotation marks omitted).
    Secondly, Chambers cites Miller v. Alabama, 
    supra,
     wherein the
    for
    those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
    
    Id.,
     
    132 S. Ct. at 2460
     (emphasis added). Miller, however, was decided by the United
    States Supreme Court on June 25, 2012, and Chambers failed to raise his
    claim within 60 days, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). 8                See
    Commonwealth v. Brandon, 
    51 A.3d 231
    , 235 (Pa. Supe
    sixty-day period [of Section 9545(b)(2)] begins to run upon the date of the
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    7
    We recognize the holdings of federal circuit courts are not binding but may
    serve as persuasive authority. Commonwealth v. Haskins, 
    60 A.3d 538
    ,
    48 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 
    78 A.3d 1090
     (Pa. 2013).
    8
    It was not until April 24, 2013, when Chambers filed this fourth PCRA
    petition, that he cited Miller. We note Chambers filed his third PCRA
    petition on April 24, 2012, and he did not amend his petition to raise Miller
    after the decision was issued on June 25, 2012. As mentioned above, the
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    underlying judicial decision.
    cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) since: (1) Miller
    does not apply to Chambers because he was not under 18 years of age when
    he committed the underlying murder;9 and (2) even if Chambers had been
    under 18 years old when he committed the murder, the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 
    81 A.3d 1
    , 11 (Pa.
    2013), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2724
     (2014), held that Miller is not
    retroactive and does not apply to those already serving sentences of life
    imprisonment.      See also Commonwealth v. Cintora, 
    69 A.3d 759
     (Pa.
    Super. 2013), appeal denied, 
    81 A.3d 75
     (Pa. 2013) (holding a contention
    that Miller applies to persons over 18 whose brains were immature at the
    time of the crime does not bring the matter within the newly recognized
    constitutional right exception).
    Based upon our review, we agree with the PCRA court that the instant
    PCRA petition was untimely and no exceptions apply. Accordingly, the PCRA
    court properly dismissed this serial petition.
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    9
    Chambers states he was 19 years old at the time of the murder.      See
    Chambers was 20 years old at the time of the crimes.      See   PCRA Court
    date of birth as December 15, 1976. The date of the offenses which resulted
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/7/2014
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