Com. v. Pugh, R. ( 2014 )


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  • J-E01005-14
    
    2014 Pa. Super. 221
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ROBERT MICHAEL PUGH,
    Appellant                   No. 343 EDA 2012
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered December 19, 2011
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000303-2010.
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA,
    DONOHUE, ALLEN, LAZARUS, MUNDY AND OLSON, JJ.
    CONCURRING OPINION BY OLSON, J.:                 FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014
    with respect
    Therefore, I write separately.
    In his second issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court
    1
    Specifically,
    Appellant arg
    that she was a virgin when that representation could not have been true
    The learned
    1
    At times, Alverio is identified as Rocky Alverio; however, his name is Raziel
    Alverio. See N.T., 9/15/11, at 3.
    J-E01005-14
    See Majority Opinion,
    ante at 8-9.     However, I do not believe that the Rape Shield Law is
    applicable in this case.
    The Rape Shield Law provides that:
    sexual conduct shall not be admissible in prosecutions under this
    conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim
    is at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to
    the rules of evidence.
    word conduct does not include prior sexual assaults and that evidence of
    prior sexual assaults is admissible as long as such evidence is relevant and
    material u                                        Commonwealth v. Fink,
    
    791 A.2d 1235
    , 1241 (Pa. Super. 2002) (emphasis added; internal quotation
    marks and footnote omitted), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    638 A.2d 940
    , 942 (Pa. 1994); see Commonwealth v. Holder, 
    815 A.2d 1115
    ,
    1118-1119 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 
    827 A.2d 430
    (Pa. 2003)
    (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. L.N., 
    787 A.2d 1064
    , 1069 (Pa.
    Super. 2001), appeal denied, 
    800 A.2d 931
    (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted). In
    this case, any sexual contact between Alverio and S.P. was a sexual assault
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    as S.P. had yet to reach the age of consent.2     See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1
    (age of consent in Pennsylvania is 16); Commonwealth v. Slocum, 
    86 A.3d 272
    , 283 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2014) (same).         Accordingly, evidence of
    protected by the Rape Shield Law, and, therefore, the Rape Shield Law does
    not apply to this case.
    Shield Law was
    misplaced, its ultimate conclusion to bar further examination of Alverio
    medical center that she was a virgin was medically false. See
    Brief at 42. The trial court permitted Alverio to be examined regarding the
    fact that he had sexual intercourse with S.P.     See N.T., 9/15/11, at 17.
    Thus, the jury was made aware of the fact that Appellant was attempting to
    elicit.   Any further inquiry would have had no probative value and would
    have been highly prejudicial.    Thus, the evidence was properly excluded.
    See
    3
    v                                                                    see also
    2
    Alverio pled guilty to statutory sexual assault for the sexual contact
    between himself and S.P. See Commonwealth v. Alverio, CP-45-CR-
    0000995-2010.
    3
    The quoted text is that of the former Rule 403, which was in place at the
    March 18, 2013, former Rule 403 was
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    73 A.3d 1283
    , 1286 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2013),
    appeal denied
    In his third issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred
    recorded.      The learned majority concludes that the trial court              had
    ante
    at 10.      My review of the jury charge reveals that, although the jury
    , the credibility of witnesses and
    interrogation was not addressed. See N.T., 9/19/11, at 96-126. However, I
    ultimately agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining
    interrogation.
    Appellant implicitly argues that the failure to record his custodial
    interrogation violated his right to due process.          In Commonwealth v.
    Harrell, a panel of this Court held that the due process clause of the
    Pennsylvania Constitution does not require that custodial interrogations be
    recorded. 
    65 A.3d 420
    , 429 (Pa. Super. 2013), citing Commonwealth v.
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    rescinded and replaced with current Rule 403. See 43 Pa.B. 620 (Feb. 2,
    2013).
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    Craft, 
    669 A.2d 394
    (Pa. Super. 1995) (Del Sole, J. opinion announcing the
    judgment of the court).
    the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee due process protections.             Our
    Commonwealth v. Nase, 
    2014 WL 4415061
    , *2 (Pa. Super. Sept. 9,
    2014). (footnote and citation omitted).           Thus, the question is whether
    recording is required under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
    Constitution.
    There is no authority for the proposition that recording is required by
    the Fourteenth Amendment. The Alaska Supreme Court is the only court to
    have held that failure to record a custodial interrogation violates a
    Const
    Stephan v. Alaska, 
    711 P.2d 1156
    , 1162-1165 (Alaska 1985). This issue
    has been litigated in courts throughout the country for at least three decades
    and not a single jurisdiction has held that recording is required by the
    Fourteenth Amendment.            Federal Courts have similarly aligned themselves
    with this view. At least 11 United States Courts of Appeals have held that
    neither the Fifth nor Fourteenth Amendment requires that custodial
    interrogations be recorded.4         See United States v. Meadows, 
    571 F.3d 4
     The same due process requirements that apply to the states through the
    Fourteenth Amendment apply to the federal government through the Fifth
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-E01005-14
    131, 147 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Tykarsky, 
    446 F.3d 458
    , 477
    requiring the recording of interrogations may be, it is clear that such
    United
    States v. Williams                                                     per curiam);
    United States v. Cardenas, 
    410 F.3d 287
    , 296 (5th Cir. 2005); United
    States v. Smith, 319 F.                                                per curiam);
    United States v. Montgomery, 
    390 F.3d 1013
    , 1017 (7th Cir. 2004);
    United States v. Williams, 
    429 F.3d 767
    , 772 (8th Cir. 2005); United
    States v. Toscano-Padilla, 
    996 F.2d 1229
    (9th Cir. 1993) (table) (per
    curiam); United States v. Zamudio, 
    211 F.3d 1279
    (10th Cir. 2000)
    (table); United States v. Boston
    (per curiam); United States v. Yunis, 
    859 F.2d 953
    , 961 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
    In Harrell, this Court restated the law as it stood when Craft was
    decided, i.e., only two states required custodial interrogations to be
    recorded.5    
    Harrell, 65 A.3d at 429
    .            The laws of our sister states have
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Amendment. Raditch v. United States, 
    929 F.2d 478
    , 481 (9th Cir. 1991)
    (citation omitted).
    5
    In addition to Alaska, the Minnesota Supreme Court required (and still
    requires) recording pursuant to its supervisory authority. Minnesota v.
    Scales, 
    518 N.W.2d 587
    , 591-592 (Minn. 1994).
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    changed significantly since Craft.6    Today, 24 states and the District of
    Columbia require the recording of custodial interrogations in certain
    circumstances and Vermont will begin requiring such recording in October
    2015.7 See 
    Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1162-1165
    ; Ark.R.Crim.P. 4.7; Cal. Penal
    Code § 859.5; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-1o; D.C. Code § 5-116.01; 705
    Ill.Comp.Stat. 405/5-401.5; 725 Ill.Comp.Stat. 5/103-2.1; Ind.R.Evid. 617;
    Me. Rev. Stat., title 25, § 2803-B(1)(K); Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 2-402;
    Mich. Comp. Laws § 763.8; Minnesota v. Scales, 
    518 N.W.2d 587
    , 591-
    592 (Minn. 1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 590.700; Mont. Code § 46-4-408; Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 29-4503; N.J.R.Crim.P. 3:17; N.M. Stat. § 29-1-16; N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 15A-211; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 133.400; Tex. Code Crim. Proc., art.
    6
    See                       Compendium: Electronic Recording of Custodial
    Interrogations        (July     11,      2014),        available       at
    http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=33287&libID=33256
    (last accessed Sept. 15, 2014).
    7
    Each state differs with respect to the scope of its recording requirement.
    In some states, all custodial interrogations must be recorded. Other states
    only require that a custodial interrogation be recorded if police are
    investigating certain enumerated offenses. Furthermore, some states have
    certain exceptions to the recording requirement. For example, some states
    do not require a custodial interrogation be recorded if the person being
    interrogated requests that the interrogation not be recorded. As the exact
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    38.22; Wis. Stat. § 968.073; see also 2014 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 193
    (effective Oct. 1, 2015).8
    Although beginning next year, a majority of jurisdictions in the United
    States will require custodial interrogations to be recorded in certain
    circumstances, that does not alter my analysis of the discrete issue of
    whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires the recording of custodial
    interrogations. On that issue, states are unanimous that it does not.
    The fact that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the
    recording of custodial interrogations is not dispositive of whether the trial
    court abused its discretion in rejecting a jury instruction regarding the
    court in this Commonwealth has addressed the issue of whether a trial court
    is required to give such an instruction when so requested by the defendant.
    At least two states require a jury instruction upon request when an
    interrogation is not recorded.   Massachusetts v. DiGiambattista, 813
    8
    Appellant argues that Iowa, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts also
    mandate recording of custodial interrogations. Those three jurisdictions,
    however, have not implanted mandatory recording. See Iowa v. Hajtic,
    particularly videotaping, of custodial interrogations should be encouraged,
    Massachusetts v.
    DiGiambattista, 
    813 N.E.2d 516
    , 532-535 (Mass. 2004) (requiring a jury
    instruction be given if a custodial interrogation is not recorded); New
    Hampshire v. Barnett, 
    789 A.2d 629
    , 632-633 (N.H. 200
    incomplete recording of an interrogation results in the exclusion of the tape
    recording itself, evidence gathered during the interrogation may still be
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    N.E.2d 516, 533 (Mass. 2004); N.J.R.Crim.P. 3:17(e).             The instruction is
    required       in    Massachusetts,   however,   because   failing    to   record   an
    interrogation goes against the preferred procedure of the Supreme Judicial
    Court of Massachusetts. 
    DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 533
    . Likewise, the
    failure to record an interrogation violates a rule of criminal procedure in New
    Jersey; thus, such an instruction has been mandated.                 In Pennsylvania;
    however, no statute, rule of court, or court decision mandates that custodial
    interrogations be recorded.           Thus, the reasons that an instruction is
    appropriate in Massachusetts and New Jersey do not apply to Pennsylvania.
    The proposed instruction submitted by Appellant instructs the jury that
    the failure to record an interrogation can be considered when determining
    voluntary. A criminal defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding
    credibility.        See Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 
    337 A.2d 873
    , 883 (Pa.
    charge requested would have given undue weight to a single factor in the
    . . the trial court acted
    Commonwealth
    v. Powers, 
    577 A.2d 194
    , 197 (Pa. Super. 1990).
    Furthermore, if this Court were to require such an instruction upon
    request in all cases in which an interrogation was not recorded, it would
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    strongly suggest that such recording is mandatory. As noted below, that is
    not the job of this Court.    As such, I conclude that the trial court did not
    nstruction.
    confusion. The learned majority states that:
    Furthermore, we note that [Appellant] cites to no legal authority
    requiring instructions on the absence of recorded interrogations.
    Indeed, while acknowledging that recording such interrogations
    is not mandatory in Pennsylvania, Appellant invites us to create
    such a rule. Creation of such a rules and regulations, however,
    is a role reserved for the General Assembly, not the courts.
    Majority Opinion, ante at 10-11 n.10.          I do not interpret this footnote as
    prohibiting a trial court from giving an instruction similar to that requested
    by Appellant in this case. Instead, the learned majority merely holds that
    there is no requirement that such an instruction be given.          Accordingly, I
    believe that there is no legal prohibition to giving such an instruction if a trial
    court, in the exercise of its discretion, believes such an instruction is
    appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the case before it.
    statement that only the General Assembly may create a rule requiring that
    custodial interrogations be recorded. As noted above, although a majority of
    states that have adopted such a rule have done so through the legislative
    process, one court of last resort has done so under its supervisory authority
    and three jurisdictions have done so through rulemaking authority.           Thus,
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    such a rule can be promulgated by either our Supreme Court or our General
    Assembly, and not just our General Assembly. See 
    Harrell, 65 A.3d at 450
    -based decision to compel recordation of
    all police interrogations is a step that we, as an intermediate appellate court,
    cannot take. Our legislature and our Supreme Court are empowered to do
    In sum, I believe that the Rape Shield Law is not applicable in this case;
    however, further examination of Alverio was properly excluded pursuant to
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403. I also believe that the jury charge did
    however, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give
    be affirmed.
    Judge Donohue joins this Concurring Opinion.
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