Com. v. Jackson, K. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
KADIR JACKSON
Appellee No. 1898 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Order June 5, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001919-2011
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 09, 2014
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered June 5, 2013, in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County suppressing Kadir
Jackson’s statements to police officers.1 The Commonwealth claims the
court erred by suppressing Jackson’s confession on the ground that there
was no probable cause to arrest him. Based on the following, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual history as follows:
In the course of the investigation of the shooting death of
Richard Curry on November 17, 2010, Detective Holmes received
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
In compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d), the
Commonwealth certified in its July 1, 2013, notice of appeal that the trial
court’s order terminates or substantially handicaps its prosecution of this
case. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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a note from Detective Fetters that Curry’s girlfriend, Felicia, had
information about Jackson’s potential involvement in Curry’s
murder…. Detective Holmes spoke to Felicia, who told him that
Jackson had been having problems with Curry and that there
had been an ongoing dispute between two neighborhood groups
– 76th Avenue and Sharpnack Street. Felicia knew Jackson’s
family and was familiar with the individuals associated with the
two groups. She also stated that she had seen Jackson rapping
in a YouTube video, the content of which was unclear on the
record.2 Felicia also told Detective Holmes that she had heard
from friends of friends that Jackson was bragging about the
Curry shooting, but the context of the bragging is unclear on the
record.
2
The content of the rap captured in the video may have
been about a shooting or may have been about the
ongoing conflict between 76th Avenue and Sharpnack
Street.
Based upon this information from Felicia and without a
warrant, Detective Holmes went to Jackson’s home on November
22, 2010 to question him about the murder of Richard Curry.
Detective Holmes spoke with Jackson’s mother in the front door
area while other officers stayed in the alley behind the home.
Upon informing Jackson’s mother that he wished to speak with
Jackson, Jackson’s mother called Jackson, and Detective Holmes
spoke with Jackson by phone. Jackson told the detective that he
was at his girlfriend’s house and would speak with detectives in
ten minutes at a local Walgreens. Immediately after the phone
conversation with Detective Holmes, Jackson exited the house
from the back door. There was conflicting evidence as to
whether Jackson exited the house with another person. It is
unclear to this court whether Jackson was actually fleeing, as he
had lied to police about his whereabouts, but his exit from the
home could be seen either as an attempt to avoid speaking with
police or as his attempt to go to the Walgreens as arranged.
Jackson was detained and handcuffed by officers and
subsequently transported to the homicide unit at approximately
1:00 p.m. Detective Holmes stated that he put Jackson in
custody because Jackson had lied about being at his girlfriend’s
house, he had attempted to flee from his home, and he was a
“person of interest” for the homicide.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/2013, 2-3 (footnote omitted).
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After Jackson was handcuffed, he was transported down to the police
station and was given his Miranda2 warnings. Jackson originally denied any
involvement in the shooting, but eventually confessed to shooting Curry with
a 9 mm pistol, stating: “I heard that [Curry] was looking for me, and on my
way home I ran into him in the driveway of 76th Avenue. [Curry] said to
me, ‘Let me holla at you.’ [Curry] then pulled out a gun, and I pulled mine
and shot him. I ran across the street to the other driveway and went
home.’” N.T., 4/5/2013, at 91-92.
Jackson was charged with murder, criminal conspiracy, and other
related offenses. On November 29, 2012, he filed a pretrial motion to
suppress his statement made to police because it was “obtained illegally and
unconstitutionally and there was no knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver of [his] constitutional right to counsel and his constitutional right to
remain silent and be free from self-incrimination[.]” Jackson’s Pretrial
Motion to Suppress Statement, 11/29/2012, at 1. On April 5, 2013, the
court held a hearing on the matter. At that time, Jackson also argued the
police lacked probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, his statements to
police were inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal arrest. N.T., 4/5/2013, at
5-6. Following the hearing, the Commonwealth filed a responsive letter brief
on May 2, 2013.
____________________________________________
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Subsequently, on June 5, 2013, the trial court entered an order, and
corresponding opinion, granting Jackson’s motion to suppress because it
found the police did not have probable cause to arrest him.3 The
Commonwealth filed this timely appeal.4
In the Commonwealth’s sole issue, it claims the trial court erred by
suppressing Jackson’s confession. Commonwealth’s Brief at 11.
Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts probable cause did exist to support
Jackson’s arrest based on the following: (1) the victim’s girlfriend, “Felicia,”
was a “reliable” informant who knew Jackson from the neighborhood and
gave police information linking Jackson to the murder, including a YouTube
video where Jackson “rapped” about his dispute with the victim, and Felicia
had heard from mutual friends that Jackson was observed bragging about
the killing; (2) when police went to Jackson’s home to interview him, he lied
about his whereabouts, stating that he was at his girlfriend’s house when he
was really in the basement of the house; and (3) Jackson fled the house,
running from the basement door into a back alley. Id. at 12-15. The
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3
On June 20, 2013, the court entered a second order, stating that while it
found Jackson’s statements at issue were voluntary, the confession was the
fruit of a poisonous tree.
4
The court did not order the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Nevertheless, it
filed a concise statement on July 1, 2013. On October 8, 2013, the trial
court issued an opinion under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), which was substantially
similar to its June 5, 2013, opinion.
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Commonwealth contends Jackson’s “ruse to avoid contact with the police --
with regard to specific matter under investigation -- was a compelling sign of
his consciousness of guilt.” Id. at 15 (citations omitted). Moreover, it
states the court improperly minimized the probative value of the information
Felicia provided to police and erred by finding her unreliable. Id. at 17-19.
Lastly, the Commonwealth argues the court erred by failing to contribute
any evidentiary significance to Jackson’s alleged “flight” from the home
because one could not reasonably infer he was merely “hurrying along in
order to meet the police at Walgreens as arranged” as the trial court opined
in its determination. Id. at 19. Based on the totality of the circumstances,
the Commonwealth concludes Jackson “had already demonstrated by his
conduct that he was intent on evading [the police], rather than deal with the
matter forthrightly[,]” and taking him into custody was necessary to arrive
“at the truth while he was available to face the consequences.” Id. at 20.
In reviewing an order granting a defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence,
[w]e are bound by that court’s factual findings to the extent that
they are supported by the record, and we consider only the
evidence offered by the defendant, as well as any portion of the
Commonwealth’s evidence which remains uncontradicted, when
read in the context of the entire record. Our review of the legal
conclusions which have been drawn from such evidence,
however, is de novo, and, consequently, we are not bound by
the legal conclusions of the lower courts.
Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 421 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1048 (Pa. 2012).
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In addition, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole province
as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v.
Elmobdy, 2003 Pa. Super. 158, 823 A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super.
2003). The suppression court is also entitled “to believe all, part
or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v.
Benton, 440 Pa. Super. 441, 655 A.2d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super.
1995). Finally, at a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth
has the burden of “establish[ing] by a preponderance of the
evidence that the evidence was properly obtained.”
Commonwealth v. Culp, 378 Pa. Super. 213, 548 A.2d 578,
581 (Pa. Super. 1988).
Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011).
With respect to the existence of probable cause for an arrest, we are
guided by the following principles:
Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and
circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of
which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been
committed by the person to be arrested. Probable cause
justifying a warrantless arrest is determined by the totality
of the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 2008 Pa. Super. 6, 941 A.2d 14,
27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
. . . . It is the facts and circumstances within the personal
knowledge of the police officer that frames the determination of
the existence of probable cause. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 27, 309 A.2d 391, 394 (1973) (“Probable
cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer
warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense has been
committed.”).
Galendez, 27 A.3d at 1046.
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Linda
Carpenter, we conclude the Commonwealth’s sole issue on appeal merits no
relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly
disposes of the question presented. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/2013, at
4-8 (finding the police lacked probable cause based on the following: (1)
with respect to the Commonwealth’s allegation regarding Felicia’s
statements to police that Jackson had been bragging to people in the
neighborhood that he had murdered the victim, this contention was not
supported by the record as Detective Holmes testified Felicia informed him
that “[Jackson] was in the area bragging about the shooting of Mr. Ricky
Curry,”5 but to whom Jackson was bragging was unclear, and the detective’s
testimony does not indicate if Jackson stated he was involved in the shooting
or merely talking about the incident; (2) the police lacked sufficient objective
facts and independent corroboration where (a) the specificity of Felicia’s
information was insufficient as it did not reflect a special familiarity with
Jackson’s affairs because the video was on a public website and the rivalry
between Jackson’s and the victim’s neighborhood groups was likely known
by community members, (b) Felicia’s background information was not
provided to the court nor did the Commonwealth present evidence as to how
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5
N.T., 4/5/2013, at 38.
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Felicia came upon this information, (c) the Commonwealth did not introduce
the YouTube video or any testimony that a police officer or detective saw the
video, and (d) there was no police follow-up on Felicia’s information about
Jackson’s bragging, as to whom Jackson had been bragging or as to the
specific content of the bragging; (3) while Jackson did lie about his
whereabouts to police which is indicative of consciousness of guilt, there was
inconclusive evidence of flight because it was unclear whether he was
actually attempting to flee from police; and (4) the court was not presented
with any other factors to consider along with the perceived flight, other than
Felicia’s uncorroborated information).
We agree with the court’s analysis and we reiterate the sentiment that
we “are bound by that court’s factual findings to the extent that they are
supported by the record.” Busser, 56 A.3d at 421. Here, the record
substantiates the trial court’s findings, particularly where Detective Holmes
testified that he had a conversation with Felicia regarding the acrimonious
relationship between Jackson and the defendant, but he did not formally
interview her. N.T., 4/5/2013, at 36. Moreover, other than stating that
Felicia told him the two men had an ongoing dispute and that Jackson was in
the area “bragging about the shooting,” Detective Holmes did not testify that
Felicia provided him with any details regarding Jackson’s involvement in the
shooting. Id. at 38. As such, there was no demonstrably reliable
information that Jackson committed the murder.
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Furthermore, the record indicates that Detective Holmes went to
“make contact” with Jackson because “based on information [he] received
from the decedent’s girlfriend, [he] wasn’t going to just take that as a
whole. [He] just wanted to make contact with Mr. Jackson to see was there
a problem and did he know anything about this incident.” Id. at 38-39.
After the detective arranged to meet with Jackson at another location to
question him, Jackson was observed “exit[ing] the rear door [of his home] in
haste.” Id. at 13. As found by the trial court, there was inconclusive
evidence to establish whether Jackson had absconded, or whether he was
going to meet the police at the designated location. Based on these facts
and circumstances, the police only had a falsehood from Jackson with
respect to his actual whereabouts. Accordingly, one cannot reasonably infer
there was sufficient information to warrant a belief that an offense had been
committed by Jackson, supporting probable cause for his arrest. Therefore,
because we conclude the trial court, in its opinion, thoroughly discussed and
properly disposed of the only issue raised by the Commonwealth on appeal,
we rest on its well-reasoned basis.
Order affirmed.
Judge Shogan joins this memorandum.
Judge Platt files a dissenting memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/9/2014
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