Com. v. Woodley, K. ( 2014 )

J-S49032-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KEVIN A. WOODLEY
Appellant No. 3441 EDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered November 20, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No: CP-45-CR-0001861-2010
BEFORE: OLSON, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2014
Appellant, Kevin A. Woodley, appeals from the November 20, 2013
order of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546. Upon review, we affirm.
On October 4, 2010, Appellant was charged with several crimes in
connection with a shooting. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of
two counts of aggravated assault, four counts of simple assault, and one
count each of recklessly endangering another person and possessing an
instrument of crime. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
prison term of 66 to 132 months. Appellant timely appealed. On November
20, 2012, this Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Woodley, 2846
EDA 2011, unpublished memorandum at 1-10 (Pa. Super. filed November
J-S49032-14
20, 2012). Our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of
Appeal on May 15, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Woodley, 67 A.3d 797
(Pa. 2013).
On July 12, 2013, Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition.
After appointing counsel, and holding a hearing, the trial court denied
Appellant’s petition. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
Did the trial court err in finding trial counsel was not ineffective
for failing to request a corrupt and polluted source instruction
since the Commonwealth relied on testimony from the co-
defendant involved in the case[?]
Was the imposition of a deadly weapons [sic] enhancement a
violation of [Appellant]’s right to due process since the jury was
not asked to find beyond a reasonable doubt whether the
weapon was used for the specific offenses to which the
enhancement was applied[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
In reviewing the propriety of a PCRA court’s order dismissing a
PCRA petition, we are limited to determining whether the PCRA
court’s findings are supported by the record and whether the
order in question is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings
will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in
the certified record.
Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In his first claim, Appellant raises an issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Specifically, Appellant argues his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel as a result of his failure to request a corrupt and
-2-
J-S49032-14
polluted source instruction in connection with the testimony of Appellant’s
accomplice and co-defendant. We disagree.
To obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA
petitioner must plead and prove: (1) the underlying claim has arguable
merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act;
and (3) resulting prejudice such that there is a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s
error. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa. Super.
2013)). Finally, a petitioner must satisfy all three prongs of the test for
ineffectiveness, or the claim must be rejected. Commonwealth v.
Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 719 (Pa. 2014).
There is no issue the underlying claim (corrupt source charge) has
arguable merit under the circumstances of the case.1 See Trial Court
____________________________________________
1
See Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1181 (Pa. 1999):
With respect to the corrupt source charge, it is well established
that, in any case in which an accomplice implicates the
defendant, the trial court should instruct the jury that the
accomplice is a corrupt and polluted source whose testimony
should be considered with caution. The charge is indicated in
cases in which the evidence is sufficient to present a jury
question with respect to whether the Commonwealth’s witness is
an accomplice. Such a jury question is present when the witness
could be indicted for the crime for which the accused is charged.
A person may be indicted as an accomplice where the evidence
would establish that he knowingly and voluntarily cooperated
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-3-
J-S49032-14
Opinion, 11/21/13, at 5. The trial court, however, found trial counsel had a
reasonable basis for not requesting the instruction. Id. at 6. We agree. To
this end, the learned trial court noted:
Here, a review of the record amply supports a conclusion that
trial counsel had some reasonable basis for not requesting [a
corrupt source charge]. [Trial] [c]ounsel argued that [Appellant]
was innocent, and the defense strategy was to show that [co-
defendant] shot the gun into the crowd. Trial counsel stated
that it was [Appellant]’s position during the trial that he was not
the shooter—rather [co-defendant] was responsible. . . .
[I]nstructing the jury that [co-defendant]’s testimony should be
used cautiously because [Appellant] and [co-defendant] were
accomplices would be damaging to his defense and confusing to
the jury.
Id.2
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
with or aids another in the commission of a crime with the intent
to assist the principal.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
2
Similarly, Appellant summarized trial counsel’s strategy as follows:
Although trial counsel considered requesting the [charge] and
researched the matter, trial counsel chose not to request the
instruction. . . . Trial counsel claims his decision against
requesting the instruction was based on his strategy to prove
Appellant was not involved in the shooting in any way. He also
claims he was concerned that the use of the word accomplice
would derogate the strategy. More specifically, he opined that
the word accomplice would automatically link the Appellant to
the crime and implicate him as participant.
Appellant’s Brief at 16.
-4-
J-S49032-14
Thus, it is clear from the record trial counsel had a reasonable strategy
intended to effectuate Appellant’s interests. While the strategy might not
have worked as hoped, this is not sufficient for finding ineffective assistance
of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 24 A.3d 319, 341 (Pa.
2011) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 790–92 (2011) (“[I]f
all that can be shown is ‘merely that the defense strategy did not work out
as well as counsel had hoped,’ ineffectiveness claim should not be
granted.”)).
Appellant acknowledges that well-settled “case law suggests that it is a
reasonable trial tactic for counsel to forego requesting a corrupt and polluted
source instruction where the trial strategy is to prove he/she was not
involved in the crime.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. Nonetheless, according to
Appellant, the jury charge was still appropriate because the defense strategy
was to show that co-defendant was accomplice to someone else, not
Appellant.
This reinterpretation of trial counsel’s strategy is not consistent with
Appellant’s own summary of the trial counsel’s stated strategy,3 and finds no
support in the record.4 In fact, the trial court found Appellant’s strategy was
____________________________________________
3
See supra n.3.
4
We also note the transcripts of the PCRA hearing are not part of the
original record forwarded to this Court.
-5-
J-S49032-14
to show that co-defendant was the shooter, and that he had nothing to do
with the shooter or the shooting. Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/13, at 6.
Appellant, in essence, is not arguing the strategy employed was
unreasonable. Rather, Appellant argues another strategy was available, and
trial counsel was ineffective for not taking the other strategy. The argument
is without merit.
Appellant’s argument fails to account for the applicable standard of
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. A court may find the
strategy employed had no reasonable basis “only if [a]ppellant proves that
an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially
greater than the course actually pursued,” Commonwealth v. Hutchinson,
25 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted), or, the alternative, that “in
light of all the alternatives available to trial counsel, the strategy actually
employed by him was so unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have
chosen that course of conduct.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 640 A.2d
1251, 1265 (Pa. 1994). “Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if
they effectuated his client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84
A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 987
A.2d 638, 653 (Pa. 2009)). “We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may have taken.” Id.
Finally, “ [a]lthough we do not disregard completely the reasonableness of
other alternatives available to counsel, the balance tips in favor of a finding
of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel’s
-6-
J-S49032-14
decision had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d
655, 664 (Pa. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Appellant has demonstrated, if anything, there was an
alternative to the strategy employed by trial counsel. However, Appellant
failed to argue, let alone prove, the alternative “offered a potential for
success substantially greater that the course actually pursued” or that “no
competent lawyer would have chosen that course of action.” Hutchinson,
supra; Williams, supra. The challenge, in fact, amounts to second
guessing trial counsel. We will not do so. Commonwealth v. Rivers, 786
A.2d 923, 930 n.5 (Pa. 2001).
Next, Appellant argues the trial court erred in applying a deadly
weapon enhancement5 because there was no finding by the jury that
____________________________________________
5
See 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(2), which provides:
(2) When the court determines that the offender used a deadly
weapon during the commission of the current conviction offense,
the court shall consider the DWE/Used Matrix (§ 303.17(b)). An
offender has used a deadly weapon if any of the following were
employed by the offender in a way that threatened or injured
another individual:
(i) Any firearm, (as defined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712) whether
loaded or unloaded, or
(ii) Any dangerous weapon (as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 913),
or
(iii) Any device, implement, or instrumentality capable of
producing death or serious bodily injury.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-7-
J-S49032-14
Appellant used a weapon in the course of the commission of crimes he had
been convicted. Appellant argues, the imposition of the enhancement was
illegal under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), “since the
jury was specifically asked to determine whether Appellant used a weapon
with the intent to cause bodily injury to another and acquitted Appellant of
the two specific counts of aggravated assault—deadly weapon pertaining to
the two victims the enhancement was applied.” Appellant’s Brief at 25.
Appellant also notes that neither recklessly endangering another person nor
disorderly conduct—some of other Appellant’s convictions—required proof
that of a weapon was used in the commission of these two offenses.
Accordingly, Appellant reasons the jury was never instructed, and therefore
never found, Appellant used a weapon in these other crimes. Id. at 26.
This claim fails for many reasons.
Despite Appellant’s characterization, it is well-established a challenge
to the imposition of the deadly weapon enhancement is in fact a challenge to
the discretion of the trial court, not to the legality of the sentence. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1266 (Pa. Super.
2014) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Pennington, 751 A.2d 212, 216 (Pa.
Super. 2000). Appellant should have raised it as such before the trial court,
but failed to do so. Failure to raise the discretionary aspects before the trial
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Id.
-8-
J-S49032-14
court results in a waiver of the challenge. Commonwealth v. Felder, 75
A.3d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 2013). Here, it is undisputed Appellant failed to
timely and properly raise this discretionary aspects challenge before the trial
court. Accordingly, the claim is waived.
Furthermore, it is well-established claims involving the discretionary
aspects of a sentence are not reviewable in the PCRA context See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“This
Court’s case law has stated that a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing is a matter that must be reviewed in the context of a direct
appeal and cannot be reviewed in the context of the PCRA.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2007);
Commonwealth v. Evans, 866 A.2d 442, 444-45 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Accordingly, the claim is not cognizable under the PCRA.
It is well-established that Alleyne does not require “that any fact that
influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury. We have long
recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding,
does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163. In
this regard, this Court recently noted:
Alleyne and [Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)],
dealt with factors that either increased the mandatory minimum
sentence or increased the prescribed sentencing range beyond
the statutory maximum, respectively. Our case does not involve
either situation; instead, we are dealing with a sentencing
enhancement [i.e., deadly weapon]. If the enhancement
applies, the sentencing court is required to raise the standard
guideline range; however, the court retains the discretion to
-9-
J-S49032-14
sentence outside the guideline range. Therefore, neither of the
situations addressed in Alleyne and Apprendi are implicated.
Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d at 1270 n.10. See also United States v. Ramirez-
Negron, 751 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[F]actual findings made for
purposes of applying the Guidelines, which influence the sentencing judge’s
discretion in imposing an advisory Guidelines sentence and do not result in
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, do not violate the rule in
Alleyne.”); United States v. Benn, --- F. App’x ----, 2014 WL 2109806, at
*11 (4th Cir. May 21, 2014) (“Alleyne has no application to [a]ppellants’
sentences in this case. The district court’s drug quantity determinations at
sentencing did not increase [a]ppellants’ statutory mandatory minimum
sentences, but rather, were used to determine their advisory Guidelines
ranges.”). Thus, reliance on Alleyne is misplaced.
Finally, we note the argument (i.e., jury did not find that Appellant
used a deadly weapon) is based on Appellant’s selective recollection of the
facts and/or misunderstanding of the law.
While Appellant was acquitted of two aggravated assault-deadly
weapon charges and neither recklessly endangering another person nor
disorderly conduct required proof that a weapon was used in the commission
of these two offenses, Appellant fails to mention that he was convicted of
possessing an instrument of crime, i.e., a weapon, in the commission of the
crimes he was convicted. While the jury’s findings might be at odds,
inconsistent verdicts are permissible. “[T]he law is clear that inconsistent
- 10 -
J-S49032-14
verdicts are permissible in Pennsylvania.” Commonwealth v. States, 938
A.2d 1016, 1025 (Pa. 2007).
Appellant seems also to ignore that a deadly weapon enhancement is
imposed by the trial court, not the jury, if certain conditions are met, see
204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(2), and fails to appreciate that Appellant’s
conviction of crimes that did not include possession/use of a deadly weapon,
not only does not negate the enhancement, but actually warrants its
applicability. The enhancement, in fact, can be applied only if a weapon was
possessed/used in the commission of a crime, as long as it does not involve
any crime enumerated in 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(3) or the possession/use
of a weapon is not an element of the crime itself. See Id.
§ 303.10(a)(3)(ix). Accordingly, in addition to being waived, this claim is
not cognizable, unsupported, and meritless. Thus, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentencing enhancement.
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order denying
Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
- 11 -
J-S49032-14
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2014
- 12 -