Com. v. Voron, M. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
MARK THOMAS VORON, : No. 1876 WDA 2013
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, October 25, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Criminal Division at No. CP-65-CR-0001926-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2014
Appellant, Mark Thomas Voron, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered October 25, 2013, following his conviction of driving under
the influence (DUI)--general impairment, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1),
DUI--highest rate, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c), and failure to signal a turn,
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334(b). Appellant was sentenced to five years’ intermediate
punishment with six months of electronic home monitoring. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the pertinent facts as follows:
In the instant case[,] the testimony showed
that [appellant] was operating a motor vehicle in the
Borough of Manor on March 25, 2012. At
approximately 2:15 a.m. in the morning[,] the
appellant approached a stop sign located on Main
Street in Manor Borough. The stop sign is located at
the intersection of Main Street in Manor Borough and
State Route 993. The officer testified that the
vehicle operated by [appellant] stopped at the stop
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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sign and then proceeded to make a left-hand turn
from Main Street onto State Route 993.
The police officer further testified that the
appellant turned his vehicle from Main Street left
onto State Route 993 without the use of a turn
signal.
The officer testified that he stopped the
operator of the vehicle for failure to use a turn signal
at the stop sign when he had proceeded from Main
Street as he changed lanes and direction of travel
onto State Route 993.
As a result of stopping the motor vehicle[,] the
police officer indicated that there was an odor of
alcoholic beverage on the appellant, that his eyes
were bloodshot and glassy and that he had slurred
speech. The officer further testified that the
appellant unsatisfactorily performed field sobriety
tests and that he was placed under arrest for driving
under the influence of alcohol to a degree which
rendered him incapable of safe driving. Eventually
[appellant] submitted to a blood alcohol test and his
blood alcohol level was determined by the
Pennsylvania State Police crime laboratory to be a[t]
.254 percent.
Trial court opinion, 1/17/13 at 2-3.
A preliminary hearing was held on May 22, 2012, and all charges were
held for court. On January 23, 2013, appellant filed a motion to suppress
claiming Officer Justin Susich of the Manor Borough Police Department
lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle because there is no duty to signal
at a stop sign. The suppression court, relying on the preliminary hearing
transcript, denied the motion on January 25, 2013. Following a bench trial
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on October 25, 2013, appellant was convicted and sentenced as previously
indicated.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial
court’s order to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A. Appellant presents two
questions for our review:
I. DID THE APPELLANT’S LACK OF USE OF A
TURN SIGNAL WHEN HE WAS STOPPED AT A
STOP SIGN VIOLATE TITLE 75 [Pa.C.S.A.]
§ 3334(A) OF THE VEHICLE CODE TO GIVE
OFFICER JUSTIN SUSICH OF THE MANOR
BOROUGH POLICE A LEGAL BASIS TO STOP
[APPELLANT] WHILE HE WAS TRAVELLING IN
HIS VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS IN THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA?
II. DID THE COURT ERR IN RULING THAT
OFFICER SUSICH HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO
SUPPORT A VEHICLE STOP OF THE
APPELLANT’S VEHICLE?
Appellant’s brief at 1.
Appellant concedes that he did not use his turn signal. Appellant
argues the statute governing duties at stop signs, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323 of
the Motor Vehicle Code, does not include the use of a turn signal. Based on
that section, appellant argues a driver is not required to indicate his
intention to turn left or right to other drivers. Appellant goes on to argue
because the legislature has set forth the duties of the driver at a stop sign,
he does not believe the court can read 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334, Turning
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Movements and Required Signals, to require a driver to perform a “vain
and useless act.” (Appellant’s brief at 15.)
We begin our discussion by pointing out appellant was not charged
with a violation of Section 3323. Officer Susich testified appellant stopped at
the stop sign at the intersection of Main Street and State Route 993.
Officer Susich stopped appellant’s vehicle based on his belief that appellant
violated Section 3334, which in pertinent part, provides:
§ 3334. Turning movements and required
signals
(a) General rule.--Upon a roadway no
person shall turn a vehicle or move from
one traffic lane to another or enter the
traffic stream from a parked position
unless and until the movement can be
made with reasonable safety nor without
giving an appropriate signal in the
manner provided in this section.
(b) Signals on turning and starting.--At
speeds of less than 35 miles per hour, an
appropriate signal of intention to turn
right or left shall be given continuously
during not less than the last 100 feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning.
The signal shall be given during not less
than the last 300 feet at speeds in
excess of 35 miles per hour. The signal
shall also be given prior to entry of the
vehicle into the traffic stream from a
parked position.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334.
Based on the plain language of Section 3334, the use of an
appropriate signal is required anytime someone is turning. It is clear from
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the above language that the legislature intended to require signals to be
used anytime a vehicle turns or changes lanes. As such, it was appellant’s
duty when turning, not when stopping, that resulted in the violation.
Appellant contends the use of a turn signal is only required in three
situations: first, when the motorist is going to change lanes at a speed
above 35 miles an hour; second, when the motorist is moving but traveling
at less than 35 miles an hour; and third, when a car is in a situation of no
movement and is in a “parked position.” Appellant notes that the definition
of “parked” does not include a vehicle stopped at a stop sign. (Appellant’s
brief at 16.)
We believe the language of Section 3334(b) makes clear the manner
in which a turn signal is to be used. A vehicle traveling at speeds less than
35 miles per hour must give an appropriate signal of intention to turn right
or left continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning. It is obvious that a vehicle approaching a stop sign is
traveling at less than 35 miles per hour. Therefore, a driver must signal not
less than 100 feet before turning. Since appellant did not signal at all, he
did not signal in the manner required by the statute.
In support of our holding, we note the recent case of Commonwealth
v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101 (Pa.Super. 2013). In Brown, appellant argued
that the lane from which he was turning was designated for left lane turns
only, giving him no option other than to turn left. Appellant did not use his
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signal because he argued being in the lane is already a signal of his intention
to turn. In rejecting appellant’s argument, the Brown court stated, “The
statute requires use of a signal lamp or a hand signal when making a turn,
and provides no exception for turns made from a lane designated for turns
only.” Id. at 1106. Thus, the officer was justified in initiating the traffic
stop. Instantly, it does not appear appellant was in a designated turning
lane; however, the statute specifically provides that no person shall turn a
vehicle without giving an appropriate signal. The statute provides no
exception to this requirement, and absent legislative direction, we decline to
create an exception that the legislature did not see fit to include. If a turn is
made from one street to another, a signal is required.
In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in ruling that
Officer Susich had probable cause to support a vehicle stop of his vehicle. A
police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle when he or she has
reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code has taken
place, for the purpose of obtaining necessary information to enforce the
provisions of the code. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). However, if the violation is
such that it requires no additional investigation, the officer must have
probable cause to initiate the stop. Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d
1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 327 (Pa. 2011).
Probable cause is made out when the facts and
circumstances which are within the knowledge of the
officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to
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warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief
that the suspect has committed or is committing a
crime.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The question we ask is not whether the officer’s
belief was correct or more likely true than false.
Rather, we require only a probability, and not a
prima facie showing, of criminal activity. In
determining whether probable cause exists, we apply
a totality of the circumstances test.
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Pennsylvania law makes clear, however, that a police officer has probable
cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observed a traffic code violation,
even if it is a minor offense. Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 113
(Pa. 2008).
In this case, Officer Susich testified that he witnessed appellant fail to
use a turn signal when turning left onto State Route 993 from Main Street.
(Notes of testimony, 5/22/12 at 9, 19.) It is clear that Officer Susich had
articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that appellant violated
Section 3334(a) pertaining to turning movements and required signals.
There is no question that Officer Susich had probable cause to stop appellant
for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Simply stated, if a turn is made
from one street onto another, a signal is required. Because appellant
committed a traffic violation by failing to signal before his turn,
Officer Susich was authorized to make a traffic stop.
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Accordingly, the judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2014
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