Com. v. Schmincke, F. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S40017-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    FRANCIS SCHMINCKE
    Appellant                   No. 1950 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 26, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009698-2013
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 06, 2016
    Appellant, Francis Schmincke, appeals from the May 26, 2015
    aggregate judgment of sentence of 7 to 17 years’ incarceration, imposed by
    the trial court after a jury convicted Appellant of involuntary sexual
    intercourse (IDSI), unlawful contact with a minor, aggravated indecent
    assault, and indecent assault.1 After careful review, we affirm.
    The trial court recited the facts of record as follows.
    In 2000, [S.R.] and her two children, L.R., who
    was three years old at the time, and [G], moved in
    with her mother … in Philadelphia. During the six
    years [S.R.] lived with her mother, [S.R.’s] nephew,
    [Appellant] (L.R.’s cousin), would babysit her
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(6), 6318(a)(1), 3125(7), and 3126(a)(7),
    respectively.
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    children.    When L.R. was in first grade, while
    [Appellant] was babysitting, he took L.R. upstairs to
    her grandmother’s room. [Appellant] took his pants
    off and made L.R. suck his penis and put her hands
    on his penis. [Appellant] then took L.R.’s pants off
    and licked her vagina and stuck his finger in her
    vagina. [Appellant] then lay next to L.R. and made
    himself ejaculate. When L.R.’s mother came home,
    L.R. did not say anything about what [Appellant] had
    done because she did not understand that it was a
    bad thing.
    L.R. explained that incidents like these
    occurred over fifty times while she lived at her
    grandmother’s house []. Specifically, L.R. described
    another incident of abuse that occurred when she
    was about seven years old. While [Appellant] was
    babysitting L.R. at his house, he made L.R. perform
    oral sex on him and afterwards made himself
    ejaculate. Another incident occurred when L.R. was
    about eight years old.       While [Appellant] was
    babysitting L.R. at her grandmother’s house, they
    were on the couch when [Appellant] made L.R.
    perform oral sex on him. [Appellant] did not stop
    abusing L.R. until she and her family moved away
    from Philadelphia when she was nine years old.
    When L.R. was about thirteen or fourteen
    years old, she told a friend, [A.W.], about how
    [Appellant] had abused her. Later that year, she
    told her cousin on her father’s side, S.B., about the
    abuse. S.B. informed his mother, who eventually
    informed [L.R.’s mother].       [L.R.’s mother] then
    asked L.R. about it and L.R. told her mother about
    the abuse she had suffered. After L.R. disclosed the
    abuse to her mother, [her mother] insisted she
    report it and they contacted local authorities. On
    October 15, 2012, L.R. made a report to the Special
    Victims Unit of the Philadelphia Police.
    Sometime after [the family] moved out of
    Philadelphia to Perry County, [L.R.’s maternal aunt]
    told [L.R.’s mother] information which led [her] to
    question L.R.     L.R. admitted that in the past
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    [Appellant] had “done things to her.”        [L.R.’s
    mother] contacted the Perry County Police and Child
    and Youth Services. A few weeks after speaking to
    the Perry County Police, [L.R.’s mother] and L.R.
    traveled to Philadelphia and spoke to the
    Philadelphia Police. After speaking to police, L.R.
    became suicidal and was admitted to a hospital.
    While L.R. was in the hospital, she was again
    interviewed by detectives from the Philadelphia
    Police.
    In 2012, [A.W.], L.R.’s friend, went out to
    dinner with L.R. and her mother. L.R. seemed upset
    and when [A.W.] inquired why she was upset, L.R.
    told her that when she was younger, [Appellant] had
    molested her. L.R. asked [A.W.] not to tell anyone,
    especially her mother, about what she had disclosed.
    In March of 2013, Detective Erin Hinnov, who
    at the time was assigned to the Special Victims Unit
    of the Philadelphia Police Department, received a
    report from the Department of Human Services and
    began investigating. Detective Hinnov interviewed
    L.R., who informed her that [Appellant] used to
    perform oral sex on her, fondle her vagina, and have
    her perform oral sex on him. After the interview
    with L.R., Detective Hinnov interviewed [L.R.’s
    mother] and [Appellant’s] family members. After
    completing these interviews, Detective Hinnov
    prepared an arrest warrant for [Appellant].
    [J.S.], [Appellant’s] mother, [S.S.], and S.B.,
    [Appellant’s] brothers, testified on [Appellant’s]
    behalf.     [J.S.] lived on Braddock Street in
    Philadelphia for twelve years with her four sons.
    According to [J.S.], during that time, neither [L.R.’s
    mother] nor L.R. ever visited her house.
    Additionally, [Appellant] never babysat for L.R.
    However, [J.S.] son, [S.S.], would occasionally
    babysit for L.R.
    [S.S.] explained that when he was living on
    Braddock Street, he would occasionally babysit L.R.
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    J-S40017-16
    at his grandmother’s house. [S.S.] claimed that
    [Appellant] never accompanied him to babysit L.R.
    S.B. testified that when he was eleven years
    old, he was talking to L.R. about [Appellant] in a
    sexual manner. S.B. got confused and made an
    allegation of sexual abuse against [Appellant]. S.B.
    claimed he withdrew the complaint because it was
    not true.
    Cidney Canada testified to [Appellant’s]
    reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding
    citizen.
    [Appellant] testified that he only babysat for
    L.R. on one single occasion. [Appellant] denied that
    he ever sexually abused L.R. [Appellant] explained
    that he was an outsider in his family and he believed
    L.R. was making up these allegations to put him
    down.
    The Commonwealth presented testimony from
    L.R. and State Trooper Krista Miller in rebuttal. L.R.
    testified that in 2011, S.B. told her that [Appellant]
    had touched him. In April of 2013, State Trooper
    Krista Miller went to Joanne Schmincke’s home in
    Cumberland County in response to a report of child
    sexual assault. During that visit, S.B. recounted to
    State Trooper Miller that he had been abused by
    [Appellant].
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/13/15, at 2-5 (citations to notes of testimony
    omitted).
    Appellant was charged with the above offenses, and appeared for trial
    on February 17-18, 2015, after which the jury rendered its guilty verdicts.
    On May 26, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to concurrent terms of
    6 to 15 years’ incarceration for IDSI, 6 to 15 years’ incarceration for
    unlawful contact with a minor, and 2 to 4 years’ incarceration for aggravated
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    indecent assault; the trial court further sentenced Appellant to a consecutive
    term of 1 to 2 years’ incarceration for indecent assault, for an aggregate
    sentence of 7 to 17 years’ of incarceration.
    On May 28, 2015, Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, in which he
    raised ineffectiveness of counsel relative to the admission of L.R.’s
    testimony.    The trial court denied the motion on June 4, 2015.        Appellant
    filed a notice of appeal on June 22, 2015.2
    On appeal, Appellant presents three issues, enumerated as two, for
    our review.
    1. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence were
    such that the trial court erred in finding Appellant
    guilty of the crimes charged.
    2. The trial court erred in failing to merge
    aggravated indecent assault and indecent assault
    with [IDSI] and/or failing to merge aggravated
    indecent assault with indecent assault. []
    Appellant’s Brief at 10.
    In his first issue, Appellant argues against the weight and sufficiency
    of the evidence to support his convictions. Upon review of the pleadings, we
    decline to reach the merits of this argument, because Appellant failed to
    include any weight or sufficiency claims in his Rule 1925(b) concise
    statement. See Appellant's Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/10/15. Our finding
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925.
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    is supported by the fact that the trial court did not address weight and
    sufficiency claims in its Rule 1925(a) opinion.     See Trial Court Opinion,
    8/13/15.
    Unequivocally, by its plain text, Rule 1925(b) requires that statements
    “identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with
    sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.”   Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b)(4)(ii).   The Rule also requires that “[e]ach error identified in the
    Statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue contained
    therein which was raised in the trial court....” Id. at 1925(b)(4)(v).   Most
    significantly, any issues not raised in accordance with Rule 1925(b)(4) will
    be deemed waived.      Id. at 1925(b)(4)(vii).   Our Supreme Court has held
    that Rule 1925(b) is a bright-line rule, and “any issues not raised in a Rule
    1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”        Commonwealth v. Hill, 
    16 A.3d 484
    , 494 (Pa. 2011); accord Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).      Accordingly,
    Appellant’s weight and sufficiency claims are waived.
    In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred at
    sentencing by “failing to merge Aggravated Indecent Assault and Indecent
    Assault with IDSI and or failing to merge Aggravated Indecent Assault with
    Indecent Assault.”     Appellant’s Brief at 24.     The Commonwealth has
    responded, inter alia and apropos, that Appellant’s convictions “did not stem
    from one criminal act, but more than fifty acts committed over a period of
    approximately six years.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 6.
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    J-S40017-16
    In rejecting Appellant’s merger claim, the trial court capably explained,
    and it bears repeating here, as follows.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765 provides:
    No crimes shall merge for sentencing
    purposes unless the crimes arise from a single
    criminal act and all of the statutory elements of
    one offense are included in the statutory
    elements of the other offense. Where crimes
    merge for sentencing purposes, the court may
    sentence the defendant only on the higher
    graded offense.
    Section 9765 prohibits merger unless two distinct
    facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single
    criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of
    one of the offenses are included in the statutory
    elements of the other.          Commonwealth v.
    Baldwin, 
    985 A.2d 830
    , 833 (Pa. 2009).
    …
    In Commonwealth v. Allen, 
    856 A.2d 1251
    ,
    1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2004)[, appeal denied, 
    870 A.2d 319
     (Pa. 2005)], the Superior Court held that
    Aggravated Indecent Assault and Indecent Assault
    are not greater and lesser-included offenses and do
    not merge. Accordingly, [Appellant’s] argument that
    Aggravated Indecent Assault and Indecent Assault
    should have merged is meritless.
    In Commonwealth v. Yeomans, the Superior
    Court explained that “the preliminary consideration
    under Section 9765 is whether the two crimes at
    issue arose from a single act. This is because our
    courts have long held that where a defendant
    commits multiple distinct criminal acts, concepts of
    merger do not apply.” 
    24 A.3d 1044
    , 1050 (Pa.
    Super. 2011) (citation omitted).      The [Superior
    C]ourt explained that a defendant commits more
    than one criminal act if he commits multiple criminal
    acts beyond that which is necessary to establish the
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    J-S40017-16
    bare elements of the additional crime. 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted). The rationale is to prevent defendants
    from receiving a “volume discount” on crime. Id.;
    Commonwealth v. Ross, 
    543 A.2d 1235
    , 1237 (Pa.
    Super. 1988) (finding appellant’s conviction for
    Indecent Assault and IDSI did not merge where the
    defendant committed multiple acts during each
    encounter); Commonwealth v. Whetstine, 
    496 A.2d 777
    , 780-81 (Pa. Super. 1985) appellant’s
    convictions for IDSI and Indecent Assault did not
    merge where appellant committed separate and
    distinct injurious acts).
    Here, [Appellant] committed multiple distinct
    criminal acts.      In the first instance of abuse,
    [Appellant] forced L.R. to touch and suck on his
    penis, committing IDSI. N.T., 2/17/2015, at 95-96.
    [Appellant] then continued the abuse by licking
    L.R.’s vagina and inserting his finger into her vagina,
    committing Aggravated Indecent Assault. 
    Id.
     at 96-
    99.    Finally, [Appellant] ejaculated next to L.R.,
    committing Indecent Assault. 
    Id.
     In this single
    incident of abuse, [Appellant] committed multiple
    distinct criminal acts that supported his convictions
    for IDSI, Aggravated Indecent Assault, and Indecent
    Assault. Additionally, [Appellant] sexually abused
    L.R. over fifty times over the course of the years that
    she lived with her grandmother, further supporting
    that [Appellant] committed distinct criminal acts.
    Id. at 100-103. Accordingly, the charges did not
    merge.
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/13/15, at 9-11.
    Given    the   record   before   us,   we   are   in   agreement   with   the
    Commonwealth and trial court regarding Appellant’s merger claim.               As
    Appellant’s first issue is waived, and his second issue is without merit, we
    decline to grant Appellant relief, and affirm the May 26, 2015 judgment of
    sentence.
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    J-S40017-16
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/6/2016
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1950 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 6/6/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024