Com. v. Rolon, L. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S37030-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    LEXIS M. ROLON                             :
    :
    Appellant                :   No. 1241 EDA 2021
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 21, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
    at CP-48-CR-0000245-2019, CP-48-CR-0000246-2019
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                              FILED JANUARY 4, 2022
    In this appeal, Lexis M. Rolon (Appellant) challenges the discretionary
    aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
    The trial court detailed the procedural history as follows:
    Following a jury trial … [Appellant] was convicted of a myriad of
    sexual offenses stemming from years of sexual abuse inflicted
    upon his sister, as well as separate instances of sexual assaults
    against his sister’s friend. Both victims were approximately age
    twelve when the sexual assaults began.           [Appellant] was
    approximately eighteen years old.
    The jury found Appellant guilty as charged in both case numbers
    245 and 246 of 2019. Specifically, in case number 245-2019,
    Appellant was found guilty of the following offenses for sexual
    assaults perpetrated upon victim, K.D.: Statutory Sexual
    Assault, victim under 16 years, a felony of the second degree;
    Sexual Assault, victim under 16 years, a felony of the second
    degree; Corruption of Minors, corruption by sexual offense, a
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S37030-21
    felony of the third degree; and Corruption of Minors, defendant
    age 18 or above, a misdemeanor of the first degree. In case
    number 246-2019, Appellant was found guilty of the following
    offenses for sexual assaults perpetrated upon [] J.R.: Statutory
    Sexual Assault, victim under 16 years, a felony of the second
    degree; Sexual Assault, victim under 16 years, a felony of the
    second degree; Corruption of Minors, corruption by sexual
    offense, a felony of the third degree; Corruption of Minors, a
    defendant age 18 or above, a misdemeanor of the first degree;
    and Incest of Minor, a felony of the second degree.
    On April 21, 2021, this [c]ourt sentenced Appellant as follows:
    In case number 245-2019 with respect to victim K.D.: 1) for the
    charge of Statutory Sexual Assault, victim under 16 years of
    age, to serve a term of imprisonment in a state correctional
    institution for a minimum period of 14 months, up to a maximum
    period of 36 months, and a consecutive period of probation of 60
    months; 2) for the charge of Sexual Assault, victim under 16
    years of age, to serve a consecutive term of incarceration in a
    state correctional institution for a minimum period of 54 months
    up to a maximum period of 108 months; 3) for the charge of
    Corruption of Minors, corruption by sexual offense, to serve a
    consecutive term of imprisonment in a state correctional
    institution for a minimum period of 12 months up to a maximum
    period of 24 months; and 4) for the charge of Corruption of
    Minors, defendant 18 years of age or above, to serve a
    consecutive term of imprisonment in a state correctional
    institution for a minimum period of 3 months up to a maximum
    period of 12 months.
    In case number 246-2019 with respect to victim J.R.: 1) for the
    charge of Statutory Sexual Assault, victim under 16 years of
    age, to serve a term of imprisonment in a state correctional
    institution for a minimum period of 14 months, up to a maximum
    period of 36 months, and a consecutive period of probation of 60
    months; 2) for the charge of Sexual Assault, victim under 16
    years of age, to serve a consecutive term of incarceration in a
    state correctional institution for a minimum period of 54 months
    up to a maximum period of 108 months; 3) for the charge of
    Corruption of Minors, corruption by sexual offense, to serve a
    consecutive term of imprisonment in a state correctional
    institution for a minimum period of 12 months up to a maximum
    period of 24 months; 4) for the charge of Corruption of Minors,
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    J-S37030-21
    defendant 18 years of age or above, to serve a consecutive term
    of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a minimum
    period of 3 months up to a maximum period of 12 months; and
    5) for the charge of Incest of a Minor, to serve a consecutive
    term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a
    minimum period of 24 months up to a maximum period of 48
    months.
    On April 29, 2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion,
    entitled “Petition for Reconsideration”, wherein Appellant
    asserted his belief that his sentence was unduly harsh and
    excessive and should be modified so that a portion of the
    offenses for which he was sentenced could be served
    concurrently. We denied this Petition on May 18, 2021.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/21, at 1-3.
    Appellant’s consecutive sentences resulted in an aggregate 15.8 to 34
    years of incarceration. Appellant timely appealed.1 Both Appellant and the
    trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.         Appellant presents the
    following question for review:
    ____________________________________________
    1  Appellant filed one notice of appeal, contrary to Commonwealth v.
    Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
    , 971 (Pa. 2018) (when “a single order resolves issues
    arising on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for
    each case.”). Notably, though, the trial court advised Appellant that he had
    “the right to file an appeal from th[e] judgment of sentence[.]” Order,
    5/18/21, at 1 (emphasis added). Under Commonwealth v. Stansbury,
    
    219 A.3d 157
    , 160 (Pa. Super. 2019), we found a breakdown in court
    operations had occurred when the trial court advised the defendant that he
    had the right to file a singular notice of appeal; on this basis, we declined to
    quash under Walker. Here, as with Stansbury, the misstatement by the
    trial court constituted a breakdown in court operations. We likewise decline
    to quash the appeal. Commonwealth v. Larkin, 
    235 A.3d 350
    , 353 (Pa.
    Super. 2020) (en banc) (we may decline to quash “when the defect resulted
    from an appellant acting in accordance with misinformation relayed to him
    by the trial court.”).
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    J-S37030-21
    Whether the Sentencing Court erred and exercised a lapse in
    its discretion in failing to adequately consider several
    mitigating factors when arriving at Appellant’s sentence?
    Appellant’s Brief at 3.
    It is well-settled that the “right to appellate review of the discretionary
    aspects of a sentence is not absolute.”      Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 
    107 A.3d 127
    , 132 (Pa. Super. 2014).          When an appellant challenges the
    discretionary aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a
    petition for allowance of appeal.     Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 
    932 A.2d 155
    , 163 (Pa. Super. 2007).
    We have explained:
    An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
    four-part test[.] We conduct a four-part analysis to determine:
    (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
    Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
    preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
    sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief
    has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
    substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
    Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Evans, 
    901 A.2d 528
    , 533 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
    In this case, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and post-
    sentence motion.      Also, he included in his brief the requisite concise
    statement of reasons relied upon for appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
    See Appellant’s Brief at 6.      We therefore examine whether Appellant has
    raised a substantial question.
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    J-S37030-21
    “We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine
    whether a substantial question exists.”    Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 
    961 A.2d 884
    , 886-87 (Pa. Super. 2008). Allowance of appeal will be permitted
    only when the appellate court determines there is a substantial question that
    the   sentence    is   not   appropriate    under      the   Sentencing   Code.
    Commonwealth v. Hartle, 
    894 A.2d 800
    , 805 (Pa. Super. 2006).                 A
    substantial question exists where an appellant sets forth a plausible
    argument that the sentence violates a particular provision of the Sentencing
    Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing
    process. 
    Id.
    [A] defendant may raise a substantial question where he
    receives consecutive sentences within the guidelines if the case
    involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines
    would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an excessive
    sentence; however, a bald claim of excessiveness due to the
    consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial
    question.
    Commonwealth v. Dodge, 
    77 A.3d 1263
    , 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
    omitted).
    In his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, Appellant asserts the trial court
    abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider mitigating factors.
    Appellant’s Brief at 6. He concedes the trial court,
    sentenced him to a minimum within the upper range of the
    standard range of the Sentencing Guidelines on all nine (9)
    offenses. Appellant also concedes the Sentencing Court had the
    discretion to impose consecutive rather than concurrent
    sentences with regard to all of the offenses.
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    J-S37030-21
    Id. at 11.      Nonetheless, Appellant asserts his sentence is unreasonable
    because the trial court failed to consider the following mitigating factors:
    a. that Appellant was barely 18 years of age when the acts
    allegedly occurred as charged and convicted;
    b. had no prior criminal record;
    c. was a high school graduate who was gainfully employed prior
    to his arrest;
    d. had no prison misconducts while incarcerated;
    e. was deemed not to be a sexual[ly] violent predator (SVP);
    f. had no father figure while growing up since his father was
    absent from his life;
    g. was raised by a mother who was a drug addict who passed
    away at an early age; and,
    h. had a lack of proper guidance from adult peers.
    Id. at 6, 12.
    Appellant has raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.
    Hill, 
    210 A.3d 1104
    , 1116 (Pa. Super. 2019) (a substantial question existed
    where appellant claimed the trial court failed to consider certain sentencing
    factors in conjunction with appellant’s assertion of an excessive sentence);
    Commonwealth v. Raven, 
    97 A.3d 1244
    , 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“This
    Court has held that an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an
    assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a
    substantial question.”).    We therefore review the merits of Appellant’s
    argument.
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    J-S37030-21
    Preliminarily, we recognize:
    [T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to
    affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of
    discretion .... [A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error
    of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
    discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
    exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
    partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms,
    our Court recently offered: An abuse of discretion may not be
    found merely because an appellate court might have reached a
    different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
    unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or
    such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
    The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
    concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the
    sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper
    penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
    individual circumstances before it.
    Moury, 
    992 A.2d at
    169–70 (citation omitted).
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Walls, 
    926 A.2d 957
    , 964 (Pa. 2007), determined that a sentence may be deemed
    unreasonable upon review of the trial court’s application of the factors set
    forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9721(b) and 9781(d). Section 9721(b) states:
    [T]he court shall follow the general principle that the sentence
    imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with
    section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection of
    the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
    on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
    rehabilitative needs of the defendant.       The court shall also
    consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted
    by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect
    under section 2155 (relating to publication of guidelines for
    sentencing, resentencing and parole, risk assessment instrument
    and recommitment ranges following revocation).
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    J-S37030-21
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).
    Section 9781(d) provides that this Court must have regard for:
    (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
    and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the opportunity of the
    sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any
    presentence investigation; (3) the findings upon which the
    sentence was based; [and] (4) the guidelines promulgated by
    the sentencing commission.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d); see also Commonwealth v. Ventura, 
    975 A.2d 1128
    , 1134-35 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    In   addition,   “long   standing   precedent      ...   recognizes    that   [the
    Sentencing Code] affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its
    sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at
    the same time or to sentences already imposed.”                 Commonwealth v.
    Brown, 
    249 A.3d 1206
    , 1212 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth
    v. Marts, 
    889 A.2d 608
    , 612 (Pa. Super. 2005)).                  We will not disturb
    consecutive sentences unless the aggregate sentence is “grossly disparate”
    to   the   defendant’s    conduct,   or    “viscerally     appear[s]    as    patently
    unreasonable.”    Commonwealth v. Gonzalez–Dejusus, 
    994 A.2d 595
    ,
    599 (Pa. Super. 2010). Moreover, when the trial court has the benefit of a
    presentence investigation (PSI) report, it is presumed that the court was
    both aware of and appropriately weighed all relevant information contained
    the report.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
    804 A.2d 1
    , 8 (Pa.
    Super. 2002).
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    While Appellant acknowledges the trial court’s consideration of some
    mitigating factors, he claims the court failed to “seriously consider these
    factors before rendering such an unreasonable and unduly harsh [s]entence
    under the circumstances.” Appellant’s Brief at 12.
    The Commonwealth counters that the trial court properly and
    thoroughly addressed the Section 9721(b) factors at sentencing.                    See
    Commonwealth Brief at 16-20.                   The Commonwealth cites the court’s
    determination that Appellant was “dangerous to any female, specifically
    minors, that he may come into contact with,” and its finding that Appellant
    was    not    amenable      to    a   shorter      or   probationary   sentence;   the
    Commonwealth also references the court’s consideration of Appellant’s
    youth, lack of prior criminal history, family background, and the fact he was
    not deemed to be a sexually violent predator. 
    Id. at 17-18
     (quoting N.T.,
    4/21/21, at 34).
    We agree with the Commonwealth. The record reveals the trial court
    ordered a PSI and a sexually violent predator assessment, and had the
    benefit of both reports at sentencing.2 See N.T., 4/21/21, at 4; see also
    Commonwealth v. Fowler, 
    893 A.2d 758
    , 766 (Pa. Super. 2006) (because
    ____________________________________________
    2 At Appellant’s request, the court also ordered a psychological evaluation
    and psychosexual evaluation. However, Appellant subsequently refused to
    participate in these evaluations, and the court sentenced Appellant without
    them. Id. at 5.
    -9-
    J-S37030-21
    the trial court considered the PSI report, “we are required to presume [it]
    properly weighed the mitigating factors present in the case.”).
    In addition, Appellant’s sentence is within the standard range of the
    sentencing guidelines, and as such, is presumptively reasonable.       See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3) (appellate court must vacate sentence imposed
    within the sentencing guidelines only if it “involves circumstances where the
    application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable”).
    At the hearing, defense counsel noted that Appellant was barely 18
    years old when he committed the crimes.        N.T., 4/21/21, at 9.    Counsel
    explained that Appellant is a high school graduate, was employed before he
    was arrested, and had taken courses at Northampton County Community
    College.   Id.   Counsel argued that Appellant’s lack of a father figure and
    mother’s drug abuse and death caused Appellant to receive “improper
    guidance from adult peers.” Id. at 10.
    Conversely, the Commonwealth noted the victims were only 12 years
    old when Appellant assaulted them, “[n]ot once, not twice, not a few times
    but over a hundred times,” and Appellant has “shown absolutely no
    remorse.” Id. at 11-12.
    Thereafter, in arriving at Appellant’s sentence, the court stated:
    I want everyone to know how much I struggled with this
    because [Appellant] is young. [Appellant] has no prior record.
    What he did is about as serious as things can possibly get. And
    [Appellant] will do a number of years in a state correctional
    facility.
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    J-S37030-21
    But what [Appellant] chose to do to [the victims] will far exceed
    that number of years and I know that. And so to some extent,
    what’s going to stay with them is going to far exceed whatever
    happens to him today. I can’t fix that. But I have had to
    consider his age, his education, all the information that
    was provided to me, the information in the PSI, however
    limited, the sexually violent predator assessment, the
    sentencing guideline forms, all the information presented
    at trial, the victim impact statements, the family
    relationships, [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs. Certainly
    it has weighed heavily on me the need to protect the public, the
    need to deter future similar conduct, and certainly the fact that a
    lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of these
    crimes.
    N.T., 4/21/21, at 27-28.
    In sum, the record belies Appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to
    adequately consider mitigating factors.     To the contrary, the court acted
    within its discretion in considering all appropriate factors and imposing
    Appellant’s sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/4/2022
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