State Farm insurance Company v. Mc Ateer, D. ( 2019 )


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  • J-A27040-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    DAWN MCATEER                             :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 576 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Order Entered January 17, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
    2012-01070
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED MARCH 05, 2019
    Dawn McAteer appeals from the Order entered on January 17, 2018
    dismissing her “Petition to Strike, Set Aside and Open Judgment, Award, and
    All Actions of Arbitrators.” She maintains that she was denied a full and fair
    arbitration hearing and that the judgment entered on the resultant award is
    therefore void. We affirm.
    The trial court aptly summarized the procedural history and facts of this
    case as follows:
    On July 31, 2001, [McAteer] was involved in a vehicle accident
    resulting in personal injury. [State Farm] insured [McAteer] at the
    time of the accident. On December 2, 2002, [McAteer] sued the
    alleged tortfeasor in The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
    resulting in settlement on or about October of 2003.
    On April 23, 2004, [McAteer] filed a Petition to Appoint
    Arbitrator and Compel Arbitration in the Philadelphia Court of
    Common Pleas. [McAteer] challenged the policy coverage
    provided by [State Farm] for uninsured motorists. After engaging
    J-A27040-18
    in discovery to discern where the Petition should be litigated and
    what policy provisions apply, the Philadelphia Court of Common
    Pleas transferred the case to Bucks County on July 19, 2004, due
    to the insurance policy stating arbitration “shall take place in the
    county in which the insured resides.”
    [McAteer] averred she lived in Philadelphia in the instant
    Petition, however, she also averred she was a resident of Bucks
    County in previous matters.
    [McAteer] changed counsel in 2011. On November 15,
    2011, [McAteer] filed a second Petition to Appoint Arbitrator and
    Compel Arbitration in Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. After
    filing the second petition, counsel retired, and again new counsel
    was retained. Thereafter, The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
    again transferred the second Petition to Bucks County. [McAteer]
    appeal the court’s decision and the Superior Court held, inter alia:
    [McAteer] develops no argument related to the trial
    court’s determinations that it was bound by the 2004
    ruling transferring venue to Bucks County and that
    she failed to assert a specific contractual basis that
    permitted venue in any county in which she resided at
    the time of filing her petition. Accordingly, we have no
    basis on which to grant relief. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a),
    2119(a); Creazzo v. Medtronic, Inc., 
    903 A.2d 24
    ,
    28 (Pa.Super. 2006).
    McAteer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 1428 EDA
    2013, at *3 (Pa.Super. Jan. 7, 2014) (unpublished opinion).
    On February 6, 2012, [State Farm] filed a Petition to Appoint
    Arbitrator(s) whilst [McAteer] second Petition was pending. After
    repeated attempts to serve this third Petition on [McAteer] at
    various addresses, this [c]ourt entered an Order granting
    alternative service by means of publication, or regular and
    certified U.S. Mail, and by serving [McAteer’s] last known attorney
    of record. [McAteer] avers “[a]t no time was an arbitration
    scheduled and held by the arbitration panel or was any notice of
    anything provided to Dawn McAteer relating to or regarding the
    third petition.” In fact, The Bucks County Prothonotary and [State
    Farm] issued notice by several means.
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    The Court entered a Rule to Show Cause on November 6,
    2013. [McAteer] failed to respond by December 2, 2013, and on
    April 21, 2014, [State Farm] entered a Motion to Make Rule
    Absolute. The Court entered an Order on May 6, 2014, making
    rule absolute. [State Farm] filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
    Prosecution and Violation of the Order to the Court, which was
    granted. [McAteer’s] counsel did not answer the phone calls, or
    messages from the neutral arbitrator attempting to schedule an
    arbitration hearing. Due to [McAteer’s] inaction, in their arbitrator
    did not participate in the proceedings and the panel decided in
    favor of [State Farm] on November 3, 2014. A Judgment on the
    Award of the Arbitrators in favor of [State Farm] was entered on
    December 10, 2014. Notice of the Judgment was mailed in
    accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 236.
    Nearly two (2) years later, [McAteer] filed the instant
    Petition to Strike, Set Aside and Open Judgment, Award, and All
    Actions of the Arbitrators on December 6, 2016. [State Farm]
    sought a Protective Order from the Court on January 25, 2017.
    The parties sought a ruling on [McAteer’s] Petition to Strike/Open
    and [State Farm’s] Protective Order in accordance with Bucks
    county Rule of Civil Procedure 208.3(b). On January 18, 2018, this
    Court entered an Order granting [State Farm’s] Protective Order
    and denying [McAteer’s] Petition to Strike, Set Aside, and Open
    the Judgment. [McAteer] filed his Notice of Appeal on February
    20, 2018.
    Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), filed May 1, 2018, at 1-4.
    McAteer’s brief identifies one issue for appellate review: “Whether the
    trial court erred in dismissing [McAteer’s] petition to strike the award entered
    in the arbitration of her uninsured/underinsured motorist claim?” McAteer’s
    Br. at 3.
    The trial court notes that McAteer failed to file her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement with the court’s prothonotary, but evidently delivered it to the trial
    judge. Our review of the docket confirms that she failed to file her Rule
    1925(b) statement, and indeed, it does not appear in the certified record.
    -3-
    J-A27040-18
    McAteer thus waived all issues on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)
    (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with
    the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Greater Erie Indus.
    Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 
    88 A.3d 222
    , 223 (Pa.Super.
    2014) (en banc) (holding appellant waived all issues on appeal by filing
    untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, even though trial court accepted untimely
    statement and issued an opinion).1
    Moreover, the 58-paragraph Rule 1925(b) statement she attached to
    her brief – even assuming it is the same as what she delivered to the trial
    judge – preserved no issues due to its incoherence. See Commonwealth v.
    Ray, 
    134 A.3d 1109
    , 1114 (Pa.Super. 2016); Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 
    939 A.2d 343
    , 346 (Pa.Super. 2007). What is more, none of the many issues she
    catalogues in her lengthy Rule 1925(b) statement correspond to the one issue
    McAteer lists in her Statement of Questions Presented. See Krebs v. United
    Refining Co. of Pa., 
    893 A.2d 776
    , 797 (Pa.Super. 2006). As such, we
    conclude that McAteer waived all issues on appeal.
    In any event, the trial court properly dismissed her petition. Despite the
    broad title she gave to her petition, the only relief she sought was to set aside
    the arbitration award. However, McAteer filed her petition nearly two years
    after receiving the arbitration award, when she ought to have filed it within
    ____________________________________________
    1 See also Paluch v. Beard, 
    182 A.3d 502
    , 503-04 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2018)
    (holding appellant waived all issues on appeal by filing untimely Rule 1925(b)
    statement, and did not show “good cause” for remand to file it nunc pro tunc).
    -4-
    J-A27040-18
    30 days. 42 Pa.C.S. 7315(a); Maxton v. Phila. Housing Auth., 
    454 A.2d 618
    , 619 (Pa.Super. 1982). The fact that McAteer’s insurance policy provides
    for arbitration under the now-repealed Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of 1927
    (“1927 Act”)2 does not change the outcome. Even the 1927 Act’s provision of
    90 days in which to seek relief in court from an arbitration award would not
    help McAteer. In any event, although parties to a contract may elect to
    arbitrate disputes under the 1927 Act’s substantive standards, they cannot
    choose that act’s procedural provisions, such as the 90-day period for petitions
    to court. Maxton, 
    454 A.2d at 619
    .
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/5/19
    ____________________________________________
    2   See State Farm Insurance Policy, at 20.
    -5-