Com. v. Falligan, J. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S13036-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    JAMES FALLIGAN
    Appellant                 No. 475 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 12, 2013
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division
    at No(s):CP-51-CR-0005376-2012
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                           FILED JUNE 07, 2017
    Appellant, James Falligan, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of
    sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.
    Appellant claims he was entitled to the suppression of a firearm he was seen
    discarding because he abandoned the firearm during an unlawful police
    pursuit. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the factual background to this appeal as
    follows:
    On March 7, 2012 at approximately 10:40 p.m., while on
    tactical response on routine patrol in a high crime area,
    Officer [Anthony] Comitilo and his partner Officer [Alfred]
    Glacken responded to a gun robbery at a laundromat in
    the 200 Block of Grange Street in Philadelphia. Officer
    Comitilo had been assigned to this area for ten years and
    testified that he responded to gun crimes “four or five
    times a week in that general area.” Through radio, the
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S13036-17
    officers received information that the offender was “a black
    male wearing all black [with a] black hoodie.” The officers
    were traveling east on Grange Street and surveying the
    area for offenders when they saw [Appellant]. [Appellant]
    was traveling north on Howard Street crossing Grange
    Street in front of the officers. [Appellant] was within one
    block of the robbery. Officer Comitilo first saw [Appellant]
    at a distance of “about one-hundred feet.” Officer Comitilo
    testified that Defendant “matched the description to a ‘T’.”
    In a marked SUV and in full uniform the officers
    accelerated to catch up to [Appellant] to get a better look
    at him. The officers were traveling at a speed of ten miles
    per hour and accelerated to thirty miles per hour. The
    speed limit on Grange Street was 25 miles per hour. The
    officers did not activate their light and sirens at any time.
    When the officers were forty to fifty feet away, [Appellant]
    began to walk faster and then ran. [Appellant] turned into
    an alleyway and the officers briefly lost sight of him. After
    the officers turned into the alleyway, Officer Comitilo saw
    [Appellant] enter a “recessed alleyway in the back yards of
    residential homes.”[ ] At this point, Officer Comitilo saw a
    gun in [Appellant’s] hand. [Appellant] threw the gun
    behind a door lying in the alleyway. The officers used their
    spotlight on [Appellant], who pulled out his cell phone and
    walked back to the officers.         [Appellant] said to the
    officers: “. . . it’s just my phone, it’s just my phone.”
    Officer Comitilo testified that Officer Glacken recovered the
    gun from behind the door. The gun recovered was a
    Taurus handgun with the serial number NWD54843.
    Trial Ct. Op., 6/13/16, at 1-3 (footnote omitted).
    Appellant was charged with violations of the Uniform Firearms Act.
    Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion on June 21, 2012, seeking, inter
    alia, the suppression of the firearm. The trial court convened a suppression
    hearing on August 23, 2013, at which Officer Comitilo testified. The court
    initially ordered that the firearm be suppressed, but vacated that order after
    the Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration. Following a hearing
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    J-S13036-17
    on the Commonwealth’s motion, the court denied Appellant’s motion to
    suppress on August 23, 2013.
    The trial court set forth the subsequent procedural history as follows:
    On October 24, 2013, [Appellant] was found guilty of all
    charges. On December 12, 2013, the [c]ourt sentenced
    [Appellant] to two and one half to five years [of
    imprisonment] on Possession of a Firearm under 18
    [Pa.C.S.] § 6105(a)(1), a felony of the second degree,
    three years reporting probation on Firearms Not to be
    Carried Without a License, under 18 [Pa.C.S.] §
    6106(a)(1), a felony of the third degree, and no further
    penalty on Carrying Firearms on the Public Streets of
    Philadelphia under 18 [Pa.C.S.] § 6108, a misdemeanor of
    the first degree.
    On May 28, 2014, [Appellant] filed a Petition under the
    Post-Conviction Relief Act[, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546]. On
    February 8, 2016, after an evidentiary hearing, the [c]ourt
    reinstated [Appellant’s] direct appeal rights. On February
    9, 2016, [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal. On February
    29, 2016, [Appellant] filed a Statement of Errors
    Complained of on Appeal . . . .
    Id. at 1-2.
    Appellant presents the following question for review:
    Did the trial court err when it denied [Appellant’s] pre-trial
    motion to suppress physical evidence allegedly abandoned
    by [Appellant] after [Appellant] was seized by police as the
    arresting officers did not have reasonable suspicion to
    stop, detain or search [Appellant] at the time that that
    officers began pursuing [Appellant]?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5. Appellant contends that the officers seized him when
    they accelerated toward him in a marked police vehicle. Further, Appellant
    argues that he was seized without reasonable suspicion.         Appellant thus
    claims that he was entitled to suppression of the firearm because his
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    J-S13036-17
    abandonment of the firearm was coerced by an illegal seizure. No relief is
    due.
    The principles governing our review are as follows:
    Our standard of review when assessing a challenge to the
    denial of a motion to suppress is well-established. Review
    is limited to whether the record supports the suppression
    court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions
    drawn from those facts are correct. Where the record
    supports the factual findings of the suppression court, we
    are bound by those findings and reverse only if the court’s
    legal conclusions are erroneous. When the appeal of the
    determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
    of legal error, the legal conclusions of the suppression
    court are not binding on the appellate court, which must
    determine if the law was properly applied to the facts.
    An interaction between police officers and a citizen can be
    classified using three categories to measure the degree of
    intrusion on a case-by-case basis.
    Traditionally, this Court has recognized three
    categories of encounters between citizens and the
    police.    These categories include (1) a mere
    encounter, (2) an investigative detention, and (3)
    custodial detentions. The first of these, a “mere
    encounter” (or request for information), which need
    not be supported by any level of suspicion, but
    carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond.
    The second, an “investigative detention” must be
    supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a
    suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does
    not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute
    the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an
    arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by
    probable cause.
    When a police officer temporarily detains an individual by
    means of physical force or a show of authority, an
    investigative detention has occurred.    An investigative
    detention constitutes a seizure of a person and activates
    the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the
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    J-S13036-17
    requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 5 [ ] (1968).
    To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level
    of an investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as
    a matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the
    person involved.
    To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court
    must consider all the circumstances surrounding the
    encounter to determine whether the demeanor and
    conduct of the police would have communicated to a
    reasonable person that he or she was not free to
    decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate
    the encounter. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry
    must be whether, considering the circumstances
    surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
    innocent of any crime, would have thought he was
    being restrained had he been in the defendant’s
    shoes.
    Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 
    147 A.3d 1200
    , 1202-03 (Pa. Super. 2016)
    (some citations omitted).
    Moreover,
    due to heightened privacy considerations in Pennsylvania,
    a police officer’s pursuit of a person fleeing the officer was
    a seizure for purposes of Article 1, Section 8 of the
    Pennsylvania Constitution. Thus, under [Commonwealth
    v. Matos, 
    672 A.2d 769
    , 771 (Pa. 1996)], any contraband
    discarded during the pursuit was abandoned by coercion
    and “the officer must demonstrate either probable cause to
    make the seizure or reasonable suspicion to stop and
    frisk.”
    Commonwealth v. Cook, 
    735 A.2d 673
    , 675 (Pa. 1999) (some citations
    omitted).
    Following our review, we agree with the trial court that Appellant was
    not seized by the officers when they approached him. Officer Comitilo was
    traveling east on Grange Street, when he observed Appellant walking north
    -5-
    J-S13036-17
    on Howard Street, crossing Grange Street. Officer Comitilo accelerated his
    marked police SUV and closed the distance to Appellant from one hundred
    feet to forty feet. The officer then turned onto Howard Street and observed
    Appellant turn west into an alleyway. The officer turned his vehicle into the
    alleyway, at which time Appellant was approximately forty feet in front of
    the officer and had a gun in his hand. Appellant then ducked behind a door
    and reemerged carrying his cellphone.           Throughout this interaction,
    however, the officers did not activate their emergency lights, engage the
    siren, honk the horn, or call out to Appellant. Although we appreciate that
    being followed by a police vehicle may be unnerving to a reasonable person,
    we discern no merit to Appellant’s initial contention that he was seized when
    the officer accelerated toward him and began to follow him. See Baldwin,
    147 A.3d at 1202-03. Because we conclude that the interaction was a mere
    encounter, we need not determine whether there was reasonable suspicion
    supporting the officer’s decision to follow Appellant into the alleyway.   See
    id.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/7/2017
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Falligan, J. No. 475 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 6/7/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024