Com. v. Wilson, A. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
AARON LASHAY WILSON, : No. 729 MDA 2018
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 20, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No. CP-67-CR-0006266-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2019
Aaron Lashay Wilson appeals from the October 20, 2017 judgment of
sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of York County following his
conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.1 After
careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the following:
[Appellant] was first brought to trial on September 20,
2016. However, upon being informed at the
courthouse prior to the commencement of jury
selection that Officer Michelle Miller was going to
testify, [appellant] fled the courthouse and a bench
warrant was issued. [Appellant] was eventually
apprehended and brought to trial again on March 9th,
2017, but [appellant’s] counsel did not appear when
the trial was to commence. [Appellant] then moved
for dismissal or release on nominal bail pursuant to
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 on
April 5th, 2017, which the [trial c]ourt denied.
Finally, a jury trial on [appellant’s] charge commenced
on September 12, 2017. The Commonwealth first
called Officer Adam Bruckhart. Officer Bruckhart
testified about a controlled drug buy using the
confidential informant [(“C.I.”)] that targeted
[appellant], which was conducted on October 7th,
2014. The [C.I.] Officer Bruckhart employed was
deemed reliable.
On October 7th, 2014, Officer Bruckhart had the [C.I.]
call a target known as “A-Will” at the phone number
717-[xxx-xxxx], and set up a buy for one eighth
ounce of cocaine. On the other end of this call,
Officer Bruckhart heard what he described as a male
voice. Prior to the transaction, Officer Bruckhart
searched the [C.I.] for any money or contraband,
detecting nothing.
Officer Bruckhart then turned the [C.I.] over to Officer
Michelle Miller, along with $180.00 in official funds.
Officer Bruckhart then traveled to the Pak’s Grocery
Store on East Princess Street in York and set up a
vantage point to maintain surveillance of the
transaction, approximately 100 feet away.
Officer Bruckhart observed [appellant] arrive at the
location in his vehicle. He then observed Officer
Michelle Miller arrive in a separate vehicle with the
[C.I.] Officer Bruckhart observed the [C.I.] exit
Officer Miller’s vehicle and get into [appellant’s]
vehicle. The officer observed “some interaction” in
the car, then the [C.I.] exited [appellant’s] vehicle,
got into Officer Miller’s car, and Officer Miller and the
[C.I.] drove away. After the interaction, Officer Miller
presented Officer Bruckhart with an eighth of an
ounce of crack cocaine.
Officer Bruckhart testified that while the lighting
conditions were not conducive to take clear
photographs of the interaction, and there was no
security camera footage of the buy, he could see the
interaction very well and had no blockages of his
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sightline. The police did not arrest [appellant] directly
after the October 7th, 2014 transaction, but instead
began surveillance of [appellant] and noticed him
driving the same vehicle he brought to the drug buy.
The Commonwealth next called Officer Michelle Miller.
Officer Miller testified that she transported the [C.I.]
to the location of the transaction and provided the
[C.I.] with the $180.00 in official funds. Officer Miller
testified that at the time of the transaction, while it
was not bright daylight, she could still see everything
that was going on. When the Officer and the [C.I.]
arrived at the location of the deal, they pulled up
beside a blue Volvo, occupied by [appellant]. The
[C.I.] exited Officer Miller’s vehicle and got into
[appellant’s] vehicle, sitting in the front passenger
seat. Officer Miller then witnessed the [C.I.] hand the
official funds to [appellant] and [appellant] hand
something back to the [C.I.] The [C.I.] next came
back to Officer Miller’s vehicle and handed her a bag
of cocaine, which was then turned over to
Officer Bruckhart.
The Commonwealth then called Sheriff’s Deputy
Moses Wogu, who testified that on September 20,
2016 he was working as a Sheriff’s Deputy in Judge
Richard K. Renn’s courtroom in York when [appellant]
was called in for a jury trial for [this] charge[].
Deputy Wogu stated that [appellant] was in the
courtroom initially, but after a 15 minute break prior
to beginning jury selection, [appellant] was nowhere
to be found in the courthouse and a bench warrant
was issued for his arrest.
[Appellant] then elected to take the stand and testify.
[Appellant] testified that he has never owned or
driven a blue Volvo, nor has he seen Officer Miller
before the day of trial. He also stated that he never
lived at the residence upon which the police did their
surveillance. [Appellant] did admit that on the date
of the previous trial, September 20th, 2016, that he
panicked and left the courthouse after finding out
Officer Miller was going to testify, because he felt
“blindsided.”
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Both parties then gave their closing arguments, the
jury instructions were given, and the jury retired to
deliberate.
Trial court opinion, 2/11/19 at 2-5 (citations to the record and extraneous
capitalization omitted).
On appeal, appellant raises the following issues for our review:
[I.] Whether this Court has jurisdiction over this
appeal where [appellant] timely filed a
post-sentence motion[?]
[II.] Whether the [trial] court erred in failing to
sustain [appellant’s] challenge to the weight of
the evidence where his conviction hinged on an
extremely unreliable eyewitness identification
backed with no substantial corroboration[?]
[III.] Whether the trial court erred in denying
[appellant’s] Motion to Dismiss for Violation of
Rule 600 where excluding the delay caused by
his absconding from trial and other appropriate
deductions—instead of deeming the claim
waived—leaves 480 days’ delay[?]
Appellant’s brief at 5.2
As noted by appellant’s first issue, we must initially determine whether
we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. On September 14, 2017, the
jury convicted appellant of the aforementioned crime. The trial court
sentenced appellant to 5½ to 11 years of incarceration and imposed a fine on
October 20, 2016. Appellant prepared a pro se post-sentence motion and
provided the motion to prison officials for mailing on October 24, 2017. See
2 Appellant’s issues on appeal have been re-ordered for ease of our discussion.
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Smith v. Pa. Bd. Of Prob. and Parole, 683 A.2d 278, 281 (Pa. 1996);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997) (holding that under
the prisoner mailbox rule, a document is deemed filed the day the document
is provided to prison officials for mailing). Appellant filed a pro se amended
post-sentence motion on November 12, 2017. Appellant’s post-sentence
motions and amended post-sentence motion were forwarded to appellant’s
counsel, Roy Galloway, III, Esq., pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4). See
also Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1044 (Pa. 2011) (mandating
that trial courts refer pro se pleadings from represented litigants to counsel
and take no further action on the pro se pleading unless counsel forwards a
motion).
Pursuant to Rule 576(A)(4) and Jette, the trial court did not initially act
on either of these motions. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal, which
was docketed on April 6, 2018, and forwarded to Attorney Galloway. On
April 18, 2018, Attorney Galloway filed a petition for leave of court to withdraw
his appearance, which the trial court granted on April 25, 2018. On April 30,
2018, appellant filed another pro se notice of appeal to this court.
The trial court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on May 1, 2018. On
May 15, 2018, appellant filed an application for appointment of counsel. While
his application was pending, appellant filed a pro se concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal. The trial court appointed Brian McNeil, Esq.,
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of the York County Office of the Public Defender to represent appellant on
direct appeal. Attorney McNeil filed a praecipe on June 4, 2018, for the trial
court to enter an order denying appellant’s pro se post-sentence motion by
operation of law. The trial court entered an order denying appellant’s
post-sentence motion by operation of law on June 8, 2018. Attorney McNeil
then filed an amended Rule 1925(b) statement on August 2, 2018, with leave
of court. The trial court then filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On August 27, 2018, this court entered an order directing appellant to
show cause why his appeal should not be quashed as untimely filed. Appellant
filed a response in which he indicated that his pro se post-sentence motion
dated October 24, 2017, tolled the period in which he could file a notice of
appeal. On September 21, 2018, this court discharged its rule to show cause,
referring the appealability issue to the merits panel.
The Commonwealth contends that appellant’s appeal should be quashed
as untimely filed because appellant filed a pro se post-sentence motion while
he was still represented by counsel, thus rendering the post-sentence motion
a legal nullity. (Commonwealth’s brief at 17-18.) Therefore, the
Commonwealth argues that appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed.
(Id. at 20.)
In order to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this court, a notice of
appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of an appealable order or
judgment of sentence. In re K.P., 872 A.2d 1227, 1230 (Pa.Super. 2005),
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citing Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). In criminal cases where post-sentence motions are
filed, the period in which to file a direct appeal is tolled and does not begin to
run until the motion is decided. Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d 1242,
1244 (Pa.Super. 2015), citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
It is well settled, however, that hybrid representation is not permitted
in this Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623
(Pa.Super. 2016). A pro se filing of post-sentence motions by a litigant
represented by counsel is considered a legal nullity. Commonwealth v.
Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355 (Pa.Super. 2007), citing Commonwealth v.
Piscanio, 608 A.2d 1027, 1029 n.3 (Pa. 1992).
Our cases have recognized an exception to the rule against hybrid
representation. Indeed, this court recognized that in cases where a defendant
is effectively abandoned by his counsel and the trial court fails to appoint new
counsel in a timely manner, a defendant’s pro se filing while still represented
by counsel “does not offend considerations of hybrid representation.”
Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79 (Pa.Super. 2015).
Here, the record reflects that during sentencing, the trial court stated
that appellant’s counsel3 would “continue to act as counsel for [appellant] . . .
unless an order stating otherwise is entered.” (Notes of testimony, 10/20/17
at 22.) Appellant filed a pro se post-sentence motion four days after being
3 At the sentencing hearing, appellant was represented by Attorney Martin
from Attorney Galloway’s firm. (Notes of testimony, 10/20/17 at 2.)
Attorney Martin’s first name was not included in the record. (Id.)
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sentenced by the trial court on October 24, 2017. Appellant then filed a
pro se amended post-sentence motion on November 12, 2017. Despite being
served with copies of appellant’s post-sentence motion and amended
post-sentence motion, Attorney Galloway took no action in this case until after
appellant filed his first pro se notice of appeal, when Attorney Galloway filed
his motion to withdraw on April 18, 2018.
Based on our review of the record, we find that Attorney Galloway
effectively abandoned appellant and that appellant filed a pro se
post-sentence motion, despite the fact that he was represented by counsel, in
order to preserve his direct appellate rights. See Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 79.
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to reach the merits of appellant’s remaining
issues.
In his second issue, appellant avers that the jury’s verdict was against
the weight of the evidence. Appellant specifically claims that his conviction
“hinged on an extremely unreliable eyewitness identification backed with little
in the way of corroboration.” (Appellant’s brief at 24.)
We review weight of the evidence claims under the following standard
or review:
The essence of appellate review for a
weight claim appears to lie in ensuring
that the trial court’s decision has record
support. Where the record adequately
supports the trial court, the trial court has
acted within the limits of its discretion.
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A motion for a new trial based on a claim
that the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. A new trial
should not be granted because of a mere
conflict in the testimony or because the
judge on the same facts would have
arrived at a different conclusion. Rather,
the role of the trial judge is to determine
that notwithstanding all the facts, certain
facts are so clearly of greater weight that
to ignore them or to give them equal
weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
An appellate court’s standard of review
when presented with a weight of the
evidence claim is distinct from the
standard of review applied by the trial
court. Appellate review of a weight claim
is a review of the exercise of discretion,
not of the underlying question of whether
the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Mucci, 143 A.3d 399, 410-11
(Pa.Super. 2016), (quoting Commonwealth v. Clay,
[], 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-1055 ([Pa.] 2013)). To
successfully challenge the weight of the evidence, a
defendant must prove the evidence is “so tenuous,
vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the
conscience of the court.” Mucci, 143 A.3d at 411
(quoting Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795,
806 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa.Super. 2017),
appeal denied, 171 A.3d 1286 (Pa. 2017).
Determining the reliability of an eyewitness is solely within the purview
of the jury, as the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the eyewitness’s
testimony. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1140 (Pa.Super.
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2017), appeal denied, 186 A.3d 941 (Pa. 2018), citing Commonwealth v.
Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc), appeal denied,
805 A.2d 521 (Pa. 2002).
Here, appellant challenges the reliability of Officer Miller’s eyewitness
testimony. In declining to find that the conviction was against the weight of
the evidence, the trial court determined that Officer Miller’s testimony was
corroborated by Officer Bruckhart and that the weight of the evidence was not
against appellant’s conviction. We find no abuse of discretion in such a
conclusion. Accordingly, appellant’s weight of the evidence claim is without
merit.
In his final issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it
denied appellant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss. (Appellant’s brief at 34.) The
Commonwealth argues that because appellant absconded on the original date
his case was called to trial, he waived any Rule 600 claim. (Commonwealth’s
brief at 21, citing Commonwealth v. Steltz, 560 A.2d 1390 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Brock, 61 A.3d 1015 (Pa. 2013).) Appellant counters
with an argument that our supreme court’s recent holding in Commonwealth
v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944 (Pa. 2018), “signal[ed] an intent to abandon [the
rule established in Steltz and Brock] and simply deduct the delay caused by
absconding.” (Appellant’s brief at 34.)
As noted by the Commonwealth, the Steltz court held that a “voluntary
absence from a day set for trial within Rule [600] is a waiver of that rule.”
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Steltz, 560 A.2d at 1391 (emphasis added). Our supreme court reaffirmed
the Steltz holding in Brock. Brock, 61 A.3d at 1022. Barbour does not
represent the abandonment of Steltz and Brock that appellant suggests.
Rather, Barbour restates the holding in Steltz and reaffirms that the waiver
rule applies “only where a defendant fails to appear for a trial that complied
with the requirements of Rule 600.” Barbour, 189 A.3d at 960-961.
Accordingly, our initial inquiry is whether appellant’s original trial date of
September 20, 2016, complied with Rule 600.
In assessing a Rule 600 claim, the court must exclude
from the time for commencement of trial any periods
during which the defendant was unavailable, including
any continuances the defendant requested and any
periods for which he expressly waived his rights under
Rule 600. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). “A defendant has no
duty to object when his trial is scheduled beyond the
Rule [600] time period so long as he does not indicate
that he approves of or accepts the delay.”
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 598 A.2d 1000, 1003
(Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 613 A.2d 559 (Pa.
1992) (addressing Municipal Court’s counterpart to
speedy trial rule).
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1241 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc),
appeal denied, 875 A.2d 1073 (Pa. 2005).
Here, appellant’s original trial date was September 20, 2016 – 509 days
after the complaint was filed in this case on April 30, 2015. Appellant concedes
that 171 days between the day the complaint was filed and his original trial
date are excludable for the purposes of Rule 600. (Appellant’s brief at 35-36.)
Taking into account the excludable time, the adjusted run-date for appellant’s
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trial was October 18, 2016. Appellant was called for trial well within the
adjusted run-date. We, therefore, find that appellant, through his voluntary
absence from the original day set for his trial within the Rule 600 time-frame,
waives his Rule 600 claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/22/2019
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