Dunsworth v. The Design Studio at 301, Inc. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S39019-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    GARY DUNSWORTH AND CYNTHIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    DUNSWORTH,                                             PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellees
    v.
    THE DESIGN STUDIO AT 301, INC.,
    Appellant                 No. 2071 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 2, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
    Civil Division at No.: 2014-01993
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., PLATT, J.*, and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                                FILED JUNE 23, 2016
    Appellant, The Design Studio at 301, Inc., in this companion case to
    the appeal filed at No. 2070 MDA 2015, appeals from the order denying its
    petition to strike and/or open a default judgment against it and in favor of
    Appellees, Gary and Cynthia Dunsworth. For the reasons discussed below,
    we affirm.
    We take the facts and underlying procedural history in this matter
    from the trial court’s January 14, 2016 opinion.
    On November 12, 2014, [] Gary and Cynthia Dunsworth
    (hereinafter “Appellees”) filed a [c]ivil [c]omplaint. The caption
    referred to the Appellant as “The Design Group at 301, Inc.”
    The [c]omplaint alleged that Appellees and Appellant entered
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S39019-16
    into a contract for the Appellant to complete certain home
    improvement work.      However, Appellant failed to fulfill its
    obligations under the contract. The [c]omplaint contained three
    counts: breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, and
    fraud/misrepresentation.
    On January 7, 2015, Appellees filed a praecipe for entry of
    default judgment due to Appellant’s failure to file a responsive
    pleading to the [c]omplaint. The praecipe indicates that a notice
    of intention to file the praecipe was mailed to Appellant on
    December 24, 2014. Default judgment was entered against the
    Appellant on January 7, 2015 by the [p]rothonotary via praecipe
    in the amount of $18,356.00, exclusive of interest and costs.
    On February 9, 2015, Appellees filed a [m]otion to
    [a]mend [c]aption. Counsel asserted that through inadvertence
    and clerical error, the [c]omplaint recited the name of Appellant
    as “The Design Group at 301, Inc.” instead of “The Design Studio
    at 301, Inc.,” and the latter is the correct name of Appellant.
    Appellees sought to amend Appellant’s name wherever it
    appear[ed] in the record to reflect the correct name. The matter
    was listed for the March 2015 [t]erm of [a]rgument [c]ourt. The
    parties waived oral argument and agreed to have the matter
    decided on the briefs. Appellees filed a brief in support of their
    position on February 25, 2015. Appellant did not file a brief
    in opposition. By [c]ourt [o]rder and [o]pinion [entered] April
    10, 2015, [the trial c]ourt granted the [m]otion to [a]mend
    [c]aption.
    On March 30, 2015, Appellees filed a [m]otion to [c]ompel
    [d]iscovery asserting that they served upon Appellant post-
    judgment discovery requests, but Appellant failed to respond to
    the requests. The [m]otion to [c]ompel [d]iscovery was listed
    for the May 2015 [t]erm of [a]rgument [c]ourt. Appellant
    never filed a response to the [m]otion to [c]ompel.
    Accordingly, the [m]otion to [c]ompel was granted by [c]ourt
    [o]rder dated [June 1], 2015.         The [o]rder stated, "The
    [d]efendant (Appellant) shall provide full, complete, and verified
    responses to the [p]laintiffs’ (Appellees) discovery requests
    within 30 days after entry of this [o]rder, or suffer appropriate
    sanctions upon further application to the [c]ourt.”
    On July 13, 2015, Appellees filed a [m]otion for [s]anctions
    claiming that they still did not receive the discovery requests
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    despite the [c]ourt [o]rder. On July 14, 2015, the [m]otion for
    [s]anctions was granted and Appellant was ordered to remit the
    sum of $1,650.00 to Appellees, which sum represented
    attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion.
    Further, Appellant was found in contempt of the [June 1], 2015
    [c]ourt [o]rder. However, no additional sanctions were ordered.
    On August 5, 2015, Carmen Stanziola, Esq. entered his
    appearance on behalf of Appellant. On the same date, said
    counsel filed a [m]otion to [v]acate the July 14, 2015 [sanctions]
    [c]ourt [o]rder, and he additionally filed a [p]etition to [o]pen
    and/or [s]trike the [d]efault [j]udgment. On August 24, 2015,
    Appellees filed respective answers, and filed briefs in support of
    their positions on September 10, 2015.           The [m]otion to
    [v]acate [sanctions] and [p]etition to [o]pen and/or [s]trike
    were both listed for the September 2015 [t]erm of [a]rgument
    [c]ourt. Oral argument was heard on September 25, 2015. On
    [November 2], 2015 [the trial c]ourt denied Appellant’s [m]otion
    to [v]acate and [p]etition to [o]pen/[s]trike.
    Appellant filed its notice of appeal on November 30, 2015.
    [The trial c]ourt ordered Appellant to file a [c]oncise [s]tatement
    of [e]rrors [c]omplained of on Appeal, pursuant to [Pa.R.A.P.]
    1925(b), which was filed on December 4, 2015. Appellant filed
    its [c]oncise [s]tatement of [e]rrors [c]omplained of on [a]ppeal
    on December 21, 2015. [On January 14, 2016, the trial court
    issued an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)].
    (Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/16, at 1-3) (emphasis added).
    On appeal, Appellant raises the following question for our review:
    Whether the trial court erred in denying the petition to
    strike/open judgment and to vacate order?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 4) (most capitalization omitted).
    Appellant challenges the denial of its motion to open the default
    judgment. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 8-10). However, this issue lacks merit.
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    It is well settled that a petition to open a
    default judgment is an appeal to the equitable
    powers of the court, and absent an error of law or a
    clear, manifest abuse of discretion, it will not be
    disturbed on appeal. An abuse of discretion occurs
    when a trial court, in reaching its conclusions,
    overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises
    judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or the
    result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
    Generally speaking, a default judgment may be opened if
    the moving party has (1) promptly filed a petition to open the
    default judgment, (2) provided a reasonable excuse or
    explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading, and (3)
    pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in the
    complaint.
    Kelly v. Siuma, 
    34 A.3d 86
    , 91-92 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 
    42 A.3d 294
     (Pa. 2012) (citations and footnote omitted).
    Here, Appellant has waived this claim because its argument is
    undeveloped. The argument consists of a paragraph of boilerplate law (see
    Appellant’s Brief, at 8), followed by several intervening paragraphs that
    concern the denial of the motion to strike. (See id. at 8-9). Subsequently,
    Appellant inserts a single sentence argument regarding the denial of the
    motion to open, in, which it claims it had no opportunity to develop a record
    on the issue because the trial court did not “provide Appellant with notice
    and any opportunity to respond or be heard, in the form of an oral argument
    or evidentiary hearing.”1 (Appellant’s Brief, at 9-10). Appellant at no point
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    1
    We note the record demonstrates that the prothonotary listed this matter
    for oral argument on September 25, 2015. (See Notice of Listing Case for
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-S39019-16
    attempts to apply the facts of this matter to the three-part test for granting
    a motion to open.        It is long-settled that failure to argue and to cite any
    authority supporting the argument constitutes a waiver of the issue on
    appeal.   See Jones v. Jones, 
    878 A.2d 86
    , 90 (Pa. Super. 2005).             This
    Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an
    appellant.   See Bombar v. West Am. Ins. Co., 
    932 A.2d 78
    , 94 (Pa.
    Super. 2007).     When deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct
    meaningful appellate review, we can dismiss the appeal entirely or find
    certain issues to be waived.          See Pa.R.A.P. 2101.   Because Appellant has
    failed to develop this issue, it waived it.2 See id.; see also Bombar, 
    supra at 94
    ; Jones, 
    supra at 90
    .
    Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion to
    vacate the July 14, 2015 order imposing the sanction of attorney’s fees. We
    note “[o]ur standard of review of issues concerning sanctions is one of abuse
    _______________________
    (Footnote Continued)
    Argument Court, 8/10/15, at unnumbered page 1). In its Rule 1925(a)
    opinion, the trial court states that oral argument did take place on that date.
    (See Trial Ct. Op., 1/14/16, at 3). The record does not contain any
    transcript of oral argument; however, it also does not contain any indication
    that the trial court canceled oral argument. This Court has clearly stated
    that it is the Appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the certified record
    contains all documents necessary to ensure that this Court is able to review
    its claims. See Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 
    959 A.2d 362
    , 372 (Pa. Super.
    2008); Pa.R.A.P. 1926; Pa.R.A.P. 1931.
    2
    In any event, the trial court opinion properly disposes of this issue. (See
    Trial Ct. Op., 1/14/16, at 4-5) (holding that Appellant did not timely file its
    petition to open, when it filed the petition approximately seven months after
    entry of the default judgment).
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    J-S39019-16
    of discretion by the trial court.”   ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at
    Lloyds and Companies, 
    939 A.2d 935
    , 945 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff’d, 
    971 A.2d 1121
     (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
    However, Appellant waived this claim because it did not include it in its
    Rule 1925(b) statement, which only challenged the denials of the motion to
    open and petition to strike. (See Concise Statement of Errors Complained of
    upon Appeal, 12/21/15, at unnumbered page 1). Thus, the trial court did
    not address it in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. (See Trial Ct. Op., 1/14/15, at 4-
    6).
    As amended in 2007, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925
    provides that issues that are not included in the Rule 1925(b) statement or
    raised in accordance with Rule 1925(b)(4) are waived.            See Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b)(4)(vii); see also Commonwealth v. Lord, 
    719 A.2d 306
    , 308 (Pa.
    1998), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Commonwealth v.
    Burton, 
    973 A.2d 428
    , 431 (Pa. Super. 2009).         Accordingly, we find that
    because Appellant did not raise the denial of its motion to vacate the
    sanctions order in its Rule 1925(b) statement, it waived the claim.
    Lastly, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying its petition
    to strike. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 8-9). We disagree.
    Our standard of review from the denial of a petition to
    strike a judgment is limited to whether the trial court manifestly
    abused its discretion or committed an error of law. A petition to
    strike a judgment will not be granted unless a fatal defect in the
    judgment appears on the face of the record. Matters outside of
    the record will not be considered and if the record is self-
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    J-S39019-16
    sustaining, the judgment will not be stricken. For example, a
    judgment is properly stricken where the record indicates a fatal
    flaw such as defective service.
    Vogt v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    900 A.2d 912
    , 915-16 (Pa. Super.
    2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    To the extent it can be determined from Appellant’s brief, its argument
    is a layered one.      Appellant claims that the original complaint had a fatal
    defect on the face of the record because its name in the complaint was
    stated incorrectly.3 (See Appellant’s Brief, at 8).   Appellant next seems to
    contend that the trial court’s grant of Appellees’ motion to amend the
    caption did not cure the defect because the trial court erred in allowing
    amendment. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 8-9). We disagree.
    Initially, we note that the defect in this case consisted of a single
    word; Appellees used the word “group” in the caption instead of “studio,”
    when naming Appellant. “We have held that inconsequential and technical
    defects which are not prejudicial should not be the basis for opening a
    judgment. Here, where the defect was cured by a subsequent amendment
    [of the caption] . . . the original improp[riety] was a harmless irregularity
    which would not justify striking the judgment.” Equibank, N.A. v. Dobkin,
    
    425 A.2d 461
    , 464 (Pa. Super. 1981) (citation omitted).         In the instant
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    3
    While Appellant also complains that the address listed for Appellant was
    incorrect, it fails to provide any proof in support of that assertion and does
    not contend that it did not receive service of any of the documents in this
    action. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 4-11).
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    J-S39019-16
    matter, Appellees cured the error by seeking and obtaining leave to amend
    all filed documents to correct the name. See 
    id.
     Appellant has not shown
    that the use of a single incorrect word prejudiced it. Thus, the trial court
    neither abused it discretion nor committed an error of law in failing to strike
    the judgment on this basis. See id.; Vogt, 
    supra at 915-16
    .
    Moreover, to the extent that Appellant claims that the trial court erred
    in allowing the amendment, (see Appellant’s Brief, at 8-9), it waived the
    claim.   It is a long settled principle of law that a party must “raise all
    defenses or grounds for relief at the first opportunity. A party who fails to
    raise such defenses or grounds for relief may not assert that the trial court
    erred in failing to address them.” Walsh v. Borczon, 
    881 A.2d 1
    , 5 (Pa.
    Super. 2005) (citation omitted).
    In the instant matter, on February 17, 2015, the trial court directed
    that the parties file briefs in response to Appellees’ motion to amend the
    caption. (See Notification of Listing Case for Argument Court, 2/17/15, at
    unnumbered page 1). Appellant elected not to comply. By order of April 10,
    2015, the trial court granted the motion noting that the error in question
    was a “scrivener’s/clerical error” and that Appellant did not file a brief in
    opposition. (Trial Court Opinion, 4/10/15, at 3; see 
    id. at 2
    ). As Appellant
    failed to oppose the motion at the first available opportunity, he cannot now
    claim that the trial court granted it in error. See Walsh, 
    supra at 5
    ; see
    also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dill, 
    108 A.3d 882
    , 886 (Pa.
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    J-S39019-16
    Super. 2015), appeal denied, 
    116 A.3d 605
     (Pa. 2015) (appellant waived
    argument regarding composition of arbitration panel by not objecting at first
    available opportunity). Thus, Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in
    granting the motion to amend the caption is waived.4
    Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above we affirm the order of
    November 2, 2015.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/23/2016
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Moreover, we note that the sole legal support cited by Appellant in support
    of its contention is Heybach & Sons, Inc. v. Rascal’s Tavern, 19 D. &
    C.3d 497 (Philadelphia County, Ct. of Com.Pl. 1981). Decisions of the
    Courts of Common Pleas are not binding precedent. See Hirsch v. EPL
    Tech., Inc., 
    910 A.2d 84
    , 89 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 
    920 A.3d 833
     (Pa. 2007). While such decisions can be persuasive, see 
    id.,
     we
    see nothing in this brief opinion, which is lacking in analysis, which would
    cause us to question the trial court’s thorough and well-written decision
    granting leave to amend the caption.
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