Com. v. Postell, S. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S23022-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    STANLEY POSTELL
    Appellant                  No. 512 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 26, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008438-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                                  FILED JULY 13, 2016
    Stanley Postell appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on
    September 26, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
    following his conviction by jury of first-degree murder1 and related offenses,
    in the fatal shooting of Bernard Scott.        The mandatory sentence of life
    imprisonment was imposed immediately following the jury verdict. In this
    timely appeal, Postell raises four issues.      The first is a claim there was
    insufficient evidence to prove Postell committed an “intentional killing.”
    Issues 2, 3 and 4 are all aspects of Postell’s claim that the Commonwealth
    failed to disprove his claim of self-defense. We will address these claims as
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
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    one.   After a thorough review of the submissions by the parties, relevant
    law, and the certified record, we affirm.
    We begin by relating the factual background as determined and related
    by the trial court in its April 27, 2015, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
    In the days leading up to April 11, 2013, a group of high school
    students associated with the Lansdowne section of Philadelphia,
    and a group of high school students associated with the
    Wynnefield section of Philadelphia, had an escalating series of
    conflicts. On April 11, 2013, Basil Harrison from Wynnefield was
    going to fight Anthony White, known as “Tone,” from Lansdowne
    as the next step in this conflict. On April 11, 2013, prior to the
    fight, Harrison met with his friends from Wynnefield, Tyler
    Blango and Rahim Pleasant. Harrison informed Blango and
    Pleasant that there was going to be a fight at the Tustin
    Playground, across from the Overbrook High School, and that he
    thought some of the people who would be present would have
    guns. Blango was armed with a silver Colt .38 revolver with duct
    tape on the handle and rubber bands replacing the missing
    spring that put tension on the weapon’s hammer.
    At approximately 3:30 in the afternoon, a group from
    Wynnefield, which included Harrison, Blango, and Pleasant,
    congregated at the Tustin Playground, in the outfield of the
    baseball diamond, where a group from Lansdowne was already
    present.    [Postell] and Jaquan Jordan [co-defendant] were
    present with the students from Lansdowne.           [Postell] was
    wearing a red hoody sweatshirt with light pants and possessed a
    .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun. By the time he arrived at
    the playground, Blango had been told that [Postell] was going to
    have a gun. Approximately 30 students were present on the
    playground, forming a circle around the fight location. Although
    Harrison and Tone were supposed to fight, Tone backed out of
    the fight for an unknown reason. Instead, Daquan Briscoe
    stepped in for Harrison while Jordan stepped in for Tone.
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    While Briscoe and Jordan were fighting, [Postell], Blango and
    Samir[2] (a friend of Blango) got into a verbal argument. During
    this argument, [Postell] stated, “You got your gun? Because I
    got my gun too.” [Postell] then drew his gun and shot at Blango
    and the crowd. Thereafter, Blango pulled his gun and attempted
    to return fire, but Blango’s gun did not work. Jordan was also in
    possession of a firearm and shot it during the exchange, though
    it is unclear at whom he was shooting. Upon the shots being
    fired, the spectators watching the fight began to flee from the
    area. Blango was shot once in the hip and retreated away from
    the playground to the Little Caesar’s Pizza store across the
    street. Blango was later taken to the hospital by police, where
    surgeons removed a portion of Blango’s small intestine and
    colon.
    While [Postell] was shooting at Blango, a fight spectator,
    Bernard Scott, was hit. Antoine Gardiner, an eyewitness from
    the street who was in his truck, stopped his vehicle and, with the
    assistance of a few students from the playground, placed Scott
    into his truck and transported him to Lankenau Hospital. Scott
    was hit three times, once in the right wrist, once through the
    right abdomen, and once in the left wrist.
    After shooting Blango and into the crowd, [Postell] fled towards
    60th Street. Pleasant, who had been watching the fight, obtained
    a gun from Samir and chased after [Postell]. Approaching
    [Postell], Pleasant shot at [Postell] approximately four or five
    times, striking him once in the back.
    Mark Robinson, an eyewitness to the shooting and [Postell’s]
    flight, directed police officers to the direction [Postell] had fled.
    Police found [Postell] shortly thereafter as he walked near the
    corner of 61st Street and Jefferson Street. Robinson and Donald
    Jones, another eyewitness to [Postell’s] flight, were transported
    to [Postell’s] location, where they positively identified [Postell].
    Police then placed [Postell] under arrest and were about to
    transport him to police headquarters when [Postell] stated, “I’m
    shot, I’m shot in the back.” The arresting officers verified that
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Samir’s full name is not revealed in the certified record.
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    [Postell] had been shot and transported him to the University of
    Pennsylvania Hospital.
    [Postell] was interviewed at hospital, where he denied being
    present at the fight. [Postell] also denied having a gun that day.
    [Postell] further stated that he must have been shot while
    Pleasant or Blango were shooting at an unidentified male in a
    plaid shirt. After [Postell’s] release from the hospital the next
    day, he provided another statement to police. In his second
    interview, [Postell] stated he was present in the playground and
    that, while the fight was ongoing, “Rahim[’s] brother” took a gun
    from a “little short boy on [a] bike,” pointed it at everybody, and
    started shooting. [Postell] further stated that he was shot in the
    back and that he then drew his gun and indiscriminately fired
    back as he was running away. [Postell] admitted to possessing
    a “big” gun, either a .40 or .45 caliber pistol.
    Police recovered five .45 caliber fired cartridge casings at the
    scene of the shooting. Another four .380 caliber fired casings
    were recovered at the alley where Harrison shot at [Postell].
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/2015, at 2-5 (citations to notes of testimony
    omitted).      As a result of the gunfire, Blango was wounded and Scott was
    killed.
    In light of the above facts, we now look to Postell’s claims of
    insufficient evidence. Initially, we note:
    The standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence is well-
    settled. With respect to such claims, we consider the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner.
    Commonwealth v. Barnes, 
    871 A.2d 812
    , 819 (Pa. Super.
    2005). In that light, we decide if the evidence and all reasonable
    inferences from that evidence are sufficient to establish the
    elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id. We keep
              in mind that it was for the trier of fact to determine the weight of
    the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. 
    Id. The jury
    was
    free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. 
    Id. This Court
              may not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment or that of
    the factfinder. 
    Id. Commonwealth v.
    Thur, 
    906 A.2d 552
    , 569 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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    Additionally, “a mere conflict” in the testimony of the witnesses does
    not render the evidence insufficient because “it is within the province of the
    factfinder to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to
    believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Montini, 
    712 A.2d 761
    , 767-78 (Pa. Super. 1998). “The Commonwealth may sustain its
    burden of proof of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.”       Commonwealth v.
    Bragg, 
    133 A.3d 328
    , 330-31 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Finally,
    “If the record contains support for the verdict, it may not be disturbed.”
    Commonwealth v. Adams, 
    882 A.2d 496
    , 499 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation
    omitted).
    In his first claim, Postell argues there was insufficient evidence to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt he engaged in an “intentional killing.” The
    doctrine of “transferred intent”3 renders Postell legally culpable for the
    homicide of Scott, an unintended victim, if Postell had the specific intent to
    kill Blango when he fired at Blango. Postell argues he was justified in firing
    at Blango and therefore had no criminal intent. Therefore, he concludes, he
    neither attempted to murder Blango nor murdered Scott.
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The doctrine of transferred intent provides the intent to murder may be
    transferred where the person actually killed is not the intended victim. See
    Commonwealth v. Padilla, 
    80 A.3d 1238
    , 1247 (Pa. 2013); 18 Pa.C.S. §
    303(b)(1). Accordingly, if Postell intended to kill Blango but actually killed
    Scott, the intent is legally transferred to include Scott.
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    Although Postell argues this claim in terms of self-defense, we will
    initially review the trial court’s determination that, as a matter of law, there
    was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that Postell
    possessed the specific intent to kill Blango and that Postell took a substantial
    step to accomplish that goal. See Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 
    946 A.2d 645
    (Pa. 2008) (attempted murder requires proof beyond a reasonable
    doubt defendant possessed specific intent to kill and took a substantial step
    toward that goal). The trial court noted, and the certified record supports,
    the facts that Postell and Blango and Samir engaged in an argument prior to
    the shooting.    While arguing with Samir, Postell was clutching his gun.
    During the argument, Postell stated to Blango, “You got your gun? Because
    I got my gun too.” N.T. 9/9/2014 at 92. Both men pulled their guns and
    Postell fired at Blango, hitting him in the hip/abdomen. The wound required
    surgery to repair, with the doctors removing portions of Blango’s small
    intestine and colon. The trial court reasoned:
    The above evidence establishes that [Postell], after arguing with
    Blango, pulled a large caliber handgun and fired it multiple times
    in Blango’s direction, striking him once in the hip. From that
    evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that [Postell] acted
    with the specific intent to kill Blango. See [Commonwealth v.]
    Manley, 985 A.2d [256,] 272 [(Pa. Super. 2009) (firing a bullet
    in the general area in which vital organs are located, can, in and
    of itself, be sufficient to prove specific intent to kill)]. By firing
    those bullets, [Postell] took a substantial step towards killing
    Blango. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
    find that [Postell] attempted to kill Tyler Blango.
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/2015, at 9.
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    Accordingly, our review confirms that the certified record supports the
    determination that Postell engaged in an intentional killing and that the
    doctrine of transferred intent was applicable.
    Postell’s final three issues all involve his claim that he is not legally
    culpable for homicide because he fired his gun at Blango in self-defense.
    Specifically, Postell argues: (1) the elements of justifiable self-defense were
    raised and satisfied, (2) the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Postell’s acts were not justifiable self-defense, and (3)
    if the killing of Scott was justified, Postell cannot be guilty of attempted
    murder and aggravated assault of Blango. We note that the first “issue” is
    simply a statement that Postell believes the evidence supported his claim of
    self-defense; there is no actual claim of error within the brief under this
    heading, and, in fact, the trial court gave a charge on self-defense.
    Additionally, the third issue is basically a restatement of Postell’s initial claim
    that he did not engage in an intentional killing. The only salient point in the
    remaining three claims is Postell’s assertion that the Commonwealth did not
    disprove his claim of self-defense.
    Self-defense, using deadly force, is defined by statute:
    The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section
    unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect
    himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual
    intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:
    (i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious
    bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in
    the same encounter; or
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    (ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of
    using such force with complete safety by retreating, except
    the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or
    place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is
    assailed in his place of work by another person whose
    place of work the actor knows it to be.
    18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
    Case law has interpreted this statute as follows:
    According to our Supreme Court, the justified use of deadly force
    requires:
    a) the actor was free from fault in provoking or continuing
    the difficulty which resulted in the use of deadly force; b)
    the actor must have reasonably believed that he was in
    imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that
    there was a necessity to use such force in order to save
    himself or others therefrom; and c) the actor did not
    violate any duty to retreat or to avoid the danger.
    Commonwealth v. Harris, 
    542 Pa. 134
    , 137, 
    665 A.2d 1172
    ,
    1174 (1995). The defendant has no “burden to prove” his self-
    defense claim. Commonwealth v. Torres, 
    564 Pa. 219
    , 224,
    
    766 A.2d 342
    , 345 (2001). The Supreme Court explained the
    evidentiary burdens as follows:
    While there is no burden on a defendant to prove the [self-
    defense] claim, before that defense is properly at issue at
    trial, there must be some evidence, from whatever source
    to justify a finding of self-defense. If there is any evidence
    that will support the claim, then the issue is properly
    before the fact finder.
    
    Id. (internal citations
    omitted). See also Commonwealth v.
    Bullock, 
    948 A.2d 818
    , 824 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating same
    standard). If the defendant properly raises “self-defense under
    Section 505 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the burden is on
    the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant's     act    was     not   justifiable   self-defense.”
    Commonwealth v. McClendon, 
    874 A.2d 1223
    , 1229-30 (Pa.
    Super. 2005).
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    The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it establishes at
    least one of the following: 1) the accused did not
    reasonably believe that he was in danger of death or
    serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or
    continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to
    retreat and the retreat was possible with complete safety.
    Commonwealth v. Hammond, 
    953 A.2d 544
    , 559 (Pa. Super.
    2008), appeal denied, 
    600 Pa. 743
    , 
    964 A.2d 894
    (2009)
    (quoting McClendon, supra at 1230). The Commonwealth must
    establish only one of these three elements beyond a reasonable
    doubt to insulate its case from a self-defense challenge to the
    evidence. Commonwealth v. Burns, 
    765 A.2d 1144
    , 1149 (Pa.
    Super. 2000), appeal denied, 
    566 Pa. 657
    , 
    782 A.2d 542
    (2001).
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    97 A.3d 782
    , 787 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    Additionally relevant to this matter,
    As the Mouzon[4] Court observed, the use of deadly force itself
    “cannot be viewed in isolation with [the victim] as the sole
    physical aggressor and [the defendant] acting in responsive self-
    defense. [T]his would be an incomplete and inaccurate view of
    the circumstances for self-defense purposes.” 
    Id. at 549,
    53
    A.3d at 751. To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free
    from fault in provoking or escalating the altercation that led to
    the offense, before the defendant can be excused from using
    deadly force. 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Smith, supra, at 787-88
    .
    Our review of the certified record indicates that it was Postell who
    introduced firearms to the already volatile situation when he first clutched
    his gun while arguing with Samir and Blango, and then further escalated the
    situation by lifting his shirt and asking Blango, “You got your gun? Because
    I got my gun too.”       N.T. 9/9/2014 at 92.    For this reason alone, Postell’s
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 
    53 A.3d 738
    (Pa. 2012).
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    claim of self-defense fails.   See, Commonwealth v. Alvin, 
    516 A.2d 376
    (Pa. Super. 1986) (actor must be free from fault in provoking or continuing
    difficulty which resulted in injuries).
    Nevertheless, we also agree with the trial court’s analysis, stating:
    [T]he Commonwealth offered compelling evidence to refute
    [Postell’s] self-defense claim. Blango testified that he watched
    as [Postell] “clutched on his gun” before Blango and [Postell]
    both drew their guns. Likewise, Pleasant testified that both
    Blango and [Postell] reached for their guns and that [Postell]
    started shooting. Pleasant clarified that Blango did not have his
    firearm fully drawn by the time [Postell] started shooting.
    Harrison testified that [Postell] told Blango before drawing his
    gun and shooting at Blango, “You got your gun? Because I got
    my gun too.” Eyewitness Mark Robinson also testified that
    [Postell] pulled a gun from his waist and started shooting,
    though Robinson did not see anyone else attempt to shoot at
    that time. Robinson further testified that [Postell] did not begin
    to flee the scene until after he had shot several times.
    Eyewitness Antoine Gardiner also testified that [Postell] was
    standing still at the time he was shooting.          Finally, when
    detained by police officers, [Postell] initially denied any
    involvement in the shooting at the playground and denied that
    he was in possession of or fired a gun, instead alleging that he
    had been accidentally shot while Pleasant and Blango attempted
    to shoot some unidentified third individual. [Postell] did not
    acknowledge that he was even present on the playground until
    the next day, when he told the police that he only drew his
    firearm after having been shot himself as he was fleeing the
    scene.     However, [Postell’s] second statement was soundly
    refuted by all other eyewitness accounts and the physical
    evidence, which detailed that [Postell] fired the first shots, that
    Blango’s gun never fired, and that [Postell] was shot by Pleasant
    only after he had fled the scene and was chased down by
    Pleasant outside of the playground.
    This compelling evidence established that [Postell] provoked the
    encounter by making threatening statements about possessing a
    gun and clutching at his waistband, and then started the
    gunfight by shooting at Blango on the Tustin Playground.
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    J-S23022-16
    Accordingly, there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Postell] did not act in
    justifiable self-defense. Moreover, [Postell’s] culpability as the
    first shooter was corroborated by his behavior after the shooting,
    which included fleeing the scene, disposing of his gun, and lying
    to police about his involvement in the playground shooting.
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/2015 at 11-13 (citations to notes of testimony
    omitted).
    In light of the above, it is clear that contrary to his assertions, Postell
    did not fulfill all the elements to obtain the benefit of a claim of self-defense,
    the Commonwealth disproved his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable
    doubt, and neither the attempted murder of Blango nor the murder of Scott
    was justifiable.   Accordingly, Postell is not entitled to relief on any of his
    claims.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/13/2016
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