Heidorn, J. v. Chelten Church ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JEANNE HEIDORN, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
CHELTEN CHURCH,
Appellee No. 1590 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-32390
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2016
Appellant, Jeanne Heidorn, appeals from the order entered on April 10,
2015, that granted preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer filed
on behalf of Appellee, Chelten Church (“the Church”) in the underlying
wrongful termination of employment action. We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court provided the following factual
background:
[The Church] employed [Appellant] as an administrative
employee from 1996 until her termination on June 2, 2014. The
Church also employed Andrew Hudson (hereinafter “Hudson”) as
Lead Pastor from 2001 until September 2013. After Hudson’s
resignation, [Appellant] testified in a court proceeding involving
Hudson on Wednesday, May 28, 2014. The Church’s leaders
attended the court proceeding when [Appellant] testified. On
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Friday, May 30, 2014, the Church’s leaders scheduled a meeting
with [Appellant] for Monday, June 2, 2014. At the meeting,
[Appellant] was discharged with no performance issues
documented or cited. [Appellant] alleges she was terminated
because the Church’s leaders did not approve of her testimony
at the court proceeding the previous week.
[Appellant] filed the instant Complaint on December 5,
2014 for equitable relief and damages due to her wrongful
termination. In her Complaint, [Appellant] alleges the Church
terminated her employment as retaliation because she “testified
honestly under oath” at Hudson’s court proceeding. The Church
filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer on
January 15, 2015 and [Appellant] timely replied on January 28,
2015. Oral argument was held before the undersigned on April 7,
2015. This Court issued an order sustaining the Church’s
Preliminary Objections and dismissing [Appellant’s] Complaint on
April 9, 2015.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/15, at 1-2 (internal citations omitted). Appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:
1. Did the Trial Court err by sustaining [the Church’s] demurrer
to [Appellant’s] one-count complaint for wrongful
termination?
2. If the Superior Court finds that the Trial Court did not err in
sustaining [the Church’s] demurrer, was it error not to allow
[Appellant] to file an amended complaint?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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At the outset, we note that appeals from orders granting a preliminary
objection in the nature of a demurrer are reviewed under the following
standard:
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is properly
granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient.
Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the
court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings;
no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be
considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the
demurrer. All material facts set forth in the pleading and all
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as
true.
In determining whether the trial court properly sustained
preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine the
averments in the complaint, together with the documents and
exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the sufficiency of
the facts averred. The impetus of our inquiry is to determine the
legal sufficiency of the complaint and whether the pleading
would permit recovery if ultimately proven. This Court will
reverse the trial court’s decision regarding preliminary objections
only where there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion.
When sustaining the trial court’s ruling will result in the denial of
claim or a dismissal of suit, preliminary objections will be
sustained only where the case is free and clear of doubt.
Thus, the question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the
facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is
possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should
be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling
it.
Weiley v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 51 A.3d 202, 208-209 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
As noted, Appellant initiated a wrongful termination action against the
Church. “In Pennsylvania, employment is presumed to be at-will, unless
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there is an agreement otherwise.” Wakeley v. M.J. Brunner, Inc., ___
A.3d ___, ___, 2016 Pa. Super. 88 (Pa. Super. filed April 19, 2016).
Pennsylvania does not recognize a common law action for wrongful
termination of at-will employment. Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555,
562 (Pa. 2009). As an at-will employee, Appellant “may be terminated at
any time, for any reason or for no reason.” Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Mun.
Auth., 658 A.2d 333, 335 (Pa. 1995). An employee may bring a cause of
action for termination only in the most limited circumstances, namely “where
the termination violates a clear mandate of public policy.” Roman v.
McGuire Memorial, 127 A.3d 26, 32 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 287 (Pa.
2000)).
Here, Appellant claims she was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for
testifying truthfully at Hudson’s hearing, and she argues that the public
policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine applies. Complaint,
12/5/14, at 3, ¶¶ 14-15; Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. Appellant cites to Mikhail
v. Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early Recovery, 63 A.3d
313, 317 (Pa. Super. 2013), as support for her position. Appellant’s Brief at
9. In Mikhail, a panel of this Court discussed at-will employment and the
public policy exception. This Court explained:
Pennsylvania courts have found actionable exceptions where the
employee was terminated for filing a claim for worker’s
compensation benefits, Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 716 A.2d
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1231 (1998); for filing a claim for unemployment benefits,
Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, 443 Pa.Super. 120, 660
A.2d 1374 (1995); for failing to submit to a polygraph test
where a statute prohibited employers from so requiring, Kroen
v. Bedway Security Agency, Inc., 430 Pa.Super. 83, 633 A.2d
628 (1993); for complying with a statutory duty to report
violations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Field v.
Philadelphia Electric Co., 388 Pa.Super. 400, 565 A.2d 1170
(1989); and for serving jury duty, Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
Mikhail, 63 A.3d at 317.
In the case at bar, Appellant argues that her termination for testifying
truthfully under oath at a judicial proceeding violated public policy and is
akin to the aforementioned exceptions. Appellant’s Brief at 10. We
disagree. The trial court addressed this issue as follows:
[Appellant] argues that “in Pennsylvania, the public policy
exception to employment at will recognizes a cause of action for
wrongful discharge if the employee has been retaliated against
for conduct actually required by law” (i.e. testifying honestly
under oath). Appellant’s Compl. ¶ 14-15[. Appellant] relies on
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super.
1978), to support her position that the Church’s termination of
[Appellant’s] employment violated public policy. In Reuther, the
court held “that the law of this Commonwealth recognizes a
cause of action for damages resulting when an employee is
discharged for having performed his obligation of jury service”
because “the necessity of having citizens freely available for jury
service is just the sort of ‘recognized facet of public policy’”
which “an employer’s ‘intrusion into’ ... should ‘give rise to a
cause of action.’” [Reuther,] 386 A.2d at 120, 121 (citation
omitted) (quoting Geary, [v. U. S. Steel Corp.,] 319 A.2d
[174] at 180 [(Pa. 1974)]). Reuther is distinguishable from the
instant case because an “obligation of jury service” is a
“‘recognized facet of public policy,’” pursuant to Article I, § 6 of
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the Pennsylvania Constitution and an individual may be
penalized for choosing to ignore “‘summonses of the court’” in
accordance with 17 P.S. §§ 1099, 1336.[1] Id. (citations and
footnote omitted) (quoting 17 P.S. § 1336). Testifying in a court
proceeding has never been a “recognized facet of public policy.”
[Appellant] has not averred she was wrongfully terminated
for obeying a lawfully issued subpoena, but that she was
discharged because she “testified honestly under oath.”
[Appellant’s] Compl. ¶ 15[.2]
Pennsylvania law simply does not support a claim for
wrongful termination under any permutation of [Appellant’s]
factual scenario. [Appellant] is asking this Court to establish a
new public policy exception which would prohibit an employer
from discharging an “at-will” employee who testified “honestly.”
If this scenario supported a cause of action, every wrongful
termination claim would, in essence, turn on the issue of
whether the underlying testimony was “honestly” given.2
Suppose the testimony in the underlying matter was completely
honest, but incomplete? Suppose the underlying testimony was
substantially honest, but inaccurate, mistaken, or contradicted in
one or more respects? Suppose the underlying testimony was
honest in all respects, but nonetheless gave a misleading or false
impression because of the way it was presented?
2
It is not clear whether honest testimony means
testimony made in good faith or truthfully made.
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1
The procedure for selecting and summoning jurors, which was previously
enumerated in Title 17, is now encompassed as part of the Judicial Code at
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 4501-4584.
2
We note that terminating an employee for complying with a subpoena
could violate public policy because “A subpoena is an order of the court
commanding a person to attend and testify at a particular time and place. It
may also require the person to produce documents or things which are
under the possession, custody or control of that person.” Pa.R.C.P.
234.1(a). Thus, complying with a subpoena is parallel to a jury summons.
However, that scenario is not present in the instant case.
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Just as there is no prohibition for an employer to terminate
an at-will employee who gives false testimony in a court
proceeding, nor can there be any conceptual or practical
prohibition for an employer to terminate an employee whose
honest testimony may be incomplete, mistaken, or misleading in
some respect. This new cause of action, previously not
recognized by any appellate authority, would be completely
unworkable. Pennsylvania law simply does not support
[Appellant’s] claim.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/15, at 5-6.
After review, we conclude that there was no statute or constitutional
provision compelling Appellant to provide testimony. If the Church did
terminate Appellant’s employment because it did not agree with her
testimony, public policy was not violated. Nevertheless, Appellant avers that
she was terminated because her testimony was truthful. Appellant’s Brief at
7. First, we must point out that we cannot verify the veracity of Appellant’s
testimony as we are not privy to those ancillary proceedings. Secondly,
while Appellant notes that she was not permitted to testify untruthfully
because perjury is a crime,3 there is no indication that the Church suborned
perjury or coerced Appellant to testify falsely. As noted above, Appellant
testified voluntarily. Thus, the truth of her testimony is immaterial.
After review, we conclude that Appellant has failed to illustrate how
her termination violated public policy. As an at-will employee, the Church
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3
Appellant’s Brief at 11; 18 Pa.C.S. § 4902.
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was free to terminate Appellant’s employment for any reason or for no
reason. Stumpp, 658 A.2d at 335.
Next, Appellant claims the trial court erred in not allowing Appellant to
amend her complaint. Appellant’s Brief at 15. “[T]he right to amend
pleadings is within the sound discretion of the trial court and should be
liberally granted.” In re Lokuta, 11 A.3d 427, 439 (Pa. 2011). However,
where amendment would be futile, the complaint may be dismissed without
allowance for amendment. Wiernik v. PHH U.S. Mortg. Corp., 736 A.2d
616, 624 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation omitted). Because we have concluded
that no public policy consideration was implicated, we reiterate that the
Church was free to terminate Appellant for any reason or for no reason.
Stumpp, 658 A.2d at 335. Accordingly, no amendment could cure this fatal
flaw in Appellant’s cause of action.
For the reasons set forth above, we discern no error in the trial court
granting the Church’s preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/22/2016
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