Com. v. Lowery, W. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S68010-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    WILLIAM LOWERY                             :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1848 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 9, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-02-CR-0002846-2017
    BEFORE:      SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                             FILED JANUARY 24, 2019
    Appellant, William Lowery, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on November 9,
    2017. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the procedural history of this case as follows:
    On August 17, 2017, a jury convicted Appellant, William
    Lowery, of three counts of Aggravated indecent Assault of a Child,
    one count of Criminal Solicitation —Involuntary Deviate Sexual
    Intercourse (IDSI) with a Child, three counts of Endangering the
    Welfare of a Child (EWOC), three counts of Corruption of Minors,
    [three1] counts each of Indecent Assault: Person Less than 13
    ____________________________________________
    1  The trial court opinion references six counts of indecent assault – person
    less than 13 years of age. Trial Court Opinion, 2/14/18, at 2. The Sentencing
    Order, however, states that for the “offense disposition” of counts 14, 15, and
    16, each of which were for indecent assault – person less than 13 years of
    age, that the “charge changed.” Sentencing Order, 11/7/17, at 2. Thus, there
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S68010-18
    years of age, and an additional three counts of Indecent Assault:
    Person Less than 13 years of age (course of conduct).[2] Appellant
    was sentenced on November 7, 2017 in the aggregate to 14.5 to
    29 years of incarceration with five years of consecutive probation.
    This Court denied Post Sentence Motions on November 9, 2017
    and Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on December 7, 2017.
    Appellant filed a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal on
    January 22, 2018.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/14/18, at 2 (footnote omitted).
    Appellant presents the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court
    err when it denied Appellant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal where the
    Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Appellant sexually assaulted any of the victims in this
    matter?” Appellant’s Brief at 4. As such, Appellant purports to challenge the
    sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.
    The standard for evaluating sufficiency claims is as follows:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
    to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
    the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder[’s].
    In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established
    by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
    resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
    inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
    ____________________________________________
    were only three counts of indecent assault of person less than 13 years of age.
    Remaining counts 17, 18, and 19 indicate convictions for indecent assault of
    person less than 13 years of age – course of conduct. Id.
    2  18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3125(b), 902(a), 4304(a), 6301(a)(1), and 3126(a)(7),
    respectively.
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    drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
    may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
    must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
    considered.
    Commonwealth v. Estepp, 
    17 A.3d 939
    , 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    A person is guilty of aggravated indecent assault of a child if he “engages
    in penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a complainant with a
    part of the person’s body for any purpose other than good faith medical,
    hygienic   or   law   enforcement   procedures...without    the   complainant’s
    consent...and the complainant is less than 13 years of age.”         18 Pa.C.S.
    § 3125 (a)(1) and (b). A defendant is guilty of criminal solicitation to commit
    a crime “if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he
    commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific
    conduct which would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such
    crime or which would establish his complicity in its commission or attempted
    commission.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a). “Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
    with a child” is defined as follows: “A person commits involuntary deviate
    sexual intercourse with a child, a felony of the first degree, when the person
    engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13
    years of age.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(b). Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
    “occurs when the actor, by physical compulsion or threats thereof, coerces the
    victim to engage in acts of anal and/or oral intercourse.” Commonwealth v.
    Zingarelli, 
    839 A.2d 1064
    , 1069 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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    Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1), a parent, guardian or other person
    supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, commits the offense
    of EWOC “if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a
    duty of care, protection or support.”    A person is guilty of the offense of
    corruption of minors when he engages in any act that “corrupts or tends to
    corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age....” 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 6301(a)(1). A person is guilty of indecent assault of a person less than
    thirteen years of age if he “has indecent contact with the complainant [or]
    causes the complainant to have indecent contact with [him]” if “the
    complainant is less than 13 years of age.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7). “Indecent
    contact” is defined as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of
    the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in either
    person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101. When there has been “a course of conduct of
    indecent assault by the person” the offense is graded as a felony of the third
    degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(b)(3)(ii).
    Before considering the merits of Appellant’s claim on appeal, we
    consider whether he has preserved it. Upon review, we determine that, for
    multiple reasons, Appellant has waived his sufficiency challenge.
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    J-S68010-18
    First, Appellant failed to preserve this claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement. Appellant included the following allegation in his statement:3
    The trial court erred when it denied [Appellant’s] Motion for
    Judgement [sic] of Acquittal where the Commonwealth failed to
    present evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
    that [Appellant] sexually assaulted any of the victims in this
    matter;
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 1/22/18, at 1.          As noted, Appellant was
    convicted of numerous counts, all of which related to claims of sexual assault
    and involved three different victims. As outlined above, each offense consists
    of multiple elements. Here, Appellant failed to identify the conviction(s) or
    the specific element(s) of the offense(s) he was challenging as not established
    by sufficient evidence. Instead, he made a vague, bald assertion regarding
    his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
    Our Supreme Court has held that “[a]ny issues not raised in a [Rule]
    1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 
    16 A.3d 484
    , 494 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lord, 
    719 A.2d 306
    , 309
    (Pa. 1998)). An appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement “shall concisely identify
    each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient
    detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii).
    A Rule 1925(b) statement “which is too vague to allow the court to identify
    ____________________________________________
    3 The second claim of error raised in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
    challenged his sentence. Appellant has not pursued the sentencing issue on
    appeal.
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    the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no [Rule 1925(b)]
    Statement at all” and will result in waiver. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 
    778 A.2d 683
    , 686–687 (Pa. Super. 2001).
    When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court
    has made clear our requirement that “an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement
    must state with specificity the element or elements upon which the appellant
    alleges that the evidence was insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Garland, 
    63 A.3d 339
    , 344 (Pa. Super. 2013). “Such specificity is of particular importance
    in cases where, as here, appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of
    which contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 
    981 A.2d 274
    , 281
    (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    959 A.2d 1252
    ,
    1257-1258 (Pa. Super. 2008) (sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge raised in
    a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, asserting that “[t]here was insufficient
    evidence to sustain the charges of Murder, Robbery, [violation of uniform
    firearms act (‘VUFA’)] no license, and VUFA on the streets” was inadequate to
    preserve appellant’s insufficiency claim.).
    Herein, Appellant’s bald assertion in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement is
    inadequate to preserve his sufficiency claim for review.    Thus, Appellant’s
    failure to file an adequately specific Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement results in
    waiver of his issue.
    -6-
    J-S68010-18
    Assuming arguendo that Appellant’s claim was not waived on the above-
    referenced basis, we would find it waived for failure to develop his sufficiency
    claim on appeal.        In his brief, Appellant fails to develop any argument
    regarding the element or elements of the offense or offenses that the
    Commonwealth allegedly failed to establish. Instead, Appellant simply and
    broadly, in one paragraph, asserts that there was no corroborating physical
    evidence of the assaults and that the testimony of the victims is not credible.
    Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. “The failure to develop an adequate argument in
    an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.”
    Commonwealth v. Beshore, 
    916 A.2d 1128
    , 1140 (Pa. Super. 2007)
    (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). “While this Court
    may overlook minor defects or omissions in an appellant’s brief, we will not
    act as his or her appellate counsel.” Commonwealth v. Freeman, 
    128 A.3d 1231
    , 1249 (Pa. Super. 2015). Thus, Appellant’s failure to develop a sufficient
    legal argument in support of his claim results in waiver of this issue.4
    ____________________________________________
    4  Even if Appellant’s sufficiency claim could survive the deficiencies we have
    identified, we note that Appellant would not be entitled to relief. Appellant’s
    argument that there was no physical evidence corroborating the victims’
    statements is of no merit. There is no requirement that physical evidence
    exist in order to sustain a conviction. This Court has long-recognized “that
    the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim, if believed by the
    trier of fact, is sufficient to convict a defendant, despite contrary evidence
    from defense witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Charlton, 
    902 A.2d 554
    , 562
    (Pa. Super. 2006). Thus, the testimony of the witnesses would have been
    sufficient to convict Appellant.
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    Moreover, Appellant’s argument challenging the victims’ credibility goes
    to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the evidence.              A
    sufficiency-of-the-evidence review does not include an assessment of the
    credibility of the testimony offered by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth
    v. Wilson, 
    825 A.2d 710
    , 713-714 (Pa. Super. 2003). Such a claim is more
    properly characterized as a weight-of-the-evidence challenge. 
    Id.
     Therefore,
    we find the Appellant has blurred the concepts of weight and sufficiency of the
    evidence, and in fact, is raising a weight of the evidence claim.
    While Appellant presented a weight-of-the-evidence claim in his post-
    sentence motion, he failed to present or develop that claim in his appellate
    brief. Because Appellant has not raised a weight-of-the-evidence challenge in
    his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and has not developed an argument
    regarding the weight of the evidence on appeal, we find that Appellant has
    waived any such contention.5 Thus, for the above-stated reasons, Appellant
    has waived his sufficiency of the evidence claim and is entitled to no relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    ____________________________________________
    5 We further note that “[r]esolving contradictory testimony and questions of
    credibility are matters for the finder of fact.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    172 A.3d 632
    , 642 (Pa. Super. 2017). “It is well-settled that we cannot substitute
    our judgment for that of the trier of fact.” 
    Id.
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    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/24/2019
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