In the Interest of: M.P., a Minor ( 2016 )


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  • J. S67012/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: M.P., A MINOR          :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :           PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: M.P., A MINOR                   :
    :          No. 3117 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Dispositional Order, September 15, 2015,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-JV-0001519-2015
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                    FILED October 6, 2016.
    M.P. appeals from the September 15, 2015 juvenile dispositional order
    entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County adjudicating
    her as delinquent, placing her on probation, and releasing her to the custody
    of her father, after she was adjudged delinquent by the juvenile court for
    recklessly    endangering    another    person   (“REAP”),    possession   of   an
    instrument of crime (“PIC”), and aggravated assault.1 We affirm.
    The juvenile court set forth the following factual history:
    On   July   12,   2015    at   approximately
    2:30 [p.m.], Kashia Jones drove from work to the
    area of 1530 S. 53rd Street, which is at a distance of
    two blocks from her home, located at 1205 S. 54 th
    Street. Ms. Jones went to said area, because she
    was aware that her son’s current girlfriend and past
    girlfriend were going to fight. The current girlfriend
    was Lashay and the former girlfriend was Willa Dean.
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705, 907(a), and 2702(a), respectively.
    J. S67012/16
    Ms. Jones’ son is named Khaleeq Williams. M.P. was
    standing over top of the two girls who were fighting.
    Ms. Jones was three to four feet away. M.P. had a
    skinny steak knife, approximately four to five inches
    long, in her hand and she was trying to hit Lashay.
    M.P. appeared to be attempting to poke Lashay with
    the knife. Ms. Jones grabbed M.P.’s hand, and put it
    behind her back, forcing M.P. to drop the knife,
    which was recovered by Ms. Jones.          M.P. told
    Ms. Jones to get off of her and she walked in the
    direction of what appeared to be an abandoned
    house.
    The house was approximately six feet away.
    The house had dilapidated white steps and a grassy
    area in front of the steps. As M.P. walked into the
    house, the two girls remained fighting.          M.P.
    reemerged from the house screaming and yelling,
    holding a blue aluminum bat with a black base. M.P.
    was yelling “Get the F away” and swinging the bat.
    Ms. Jones asked her to stop swinging the bat and
    M.P. told Ms. Jones to get out of her face. Ms. Jones
    stepped away and M.P.’s friend approached
    Ms. Jones and swung her arm toward Ms. Jones.
    Ms. Jones grabbed the friend’s arm, placed the friend
    on the ground, and got on top of the friend.
    Ms. Jones heard a sound and then heard someone
    comment that she got hit on the head with a bat.
    Ms. Jones felt and saw blood on the back of her
    head. Ms. Jones still saw M.P. holding the bat.
    Ms. Jones asked M.P. why she hit her with the bat
    and M.P. responded “that’s why I F’ed you up, that’s
    why I F’ed you up.”
    Ms. Jones suffered a concussion and received a
    CAT scan. Ms. Jones received two to three deep
    sutures and five staples in her head. Ms. Jones has
    scarring from the wound and still sees a neurologist
    as a result of this incident, and still suffers from
    painful headaches once or twice a week. Ms. Jones
    has missed work as a phlebotomist as a result of this
    injury. Ms. Jones was unsure if she had told the
    detectives that M.P. had a knife that day. Ms. Jones
    did tell the detectives that M.P. told her “that’s why I
    -2-
    J. S67012/16
    F’ed you up, that’s why I F’ed you up.” Ms. Jones’
    son and a group of other boys were also present at
    the scene. Her son was engaged in a fight with
    another individual.
    After the incident, Ms. Jones drove to the
    hospital, accompanied by her son to make sure she
    remained conscious. Two of Ms. Jones’ sons were
    fighting at the scene.
    Khaleeq Williams was fighting on the scene, at
    which M.P. was also present fighting. Mr. Williams
    had seen M.P. associating with Willa Dean prior to
    the fight. M.P. was screaming and holding a knife,
    while Willa and Lashay were fighting. Mr. Williams
    testified consistently with his [sic] Ms. Jones, in that
    Ms. Jones took the knife from M.P. and that M.P.
    obtained a bat from the house. Mr. Williams testified
    that M.P. was swinging the bat wildly, that M.P. hit
    his brother on the head with the bat, and that M.P.
    eventually hit Ms. Jones on the head with the bat.
    Mr. Williams drove half of the way to the hospital,
    because Ms. Jones was losing consciousness.
    Mr. Williams went to the scene with three other
    people to fight Willa’s brother.
    M.P. testified in her own defense, but the court
    did not find her credible and found that her
    testimony was mostly self-serving. This court does
    not believe that the knife fell out of her pocketbook
    as she claimed. This court finds that Mr. Williams
    and Ms. Jones testified credibly that M.P. had
    brandished the knife during the fight. M.P. admitted
    that she was swinging the bat and that the bat hit
    Ms. Jones on the head. M.P. also confirmed that she
    hit Mr. Williams’ brother with the bat. This court
    does not believe that M.P. was swinging the bat to
    “scare them” as she claims. This court also notes
    that the appellant failed to provide notice of a
    self-defense claim or defense-of-others claim.
    Furthermore, although the appellant’s attorney
    argued that Ms. Jones was slamming Willa’s head
    into the ground, there was no evidence on the record
    supporting said argument.
    -3-
    J. S67012/16
    M.P.’s father[] testified that M.P. has a
    reputation for being truthful and peaceful. This court
    did not give [his] testimony any weight.
    After finding M.P. guilty of said charges and
    reviewing her history, the court believed that M.P.
    was in need of treatment, rehabilitation, and
    supervision. M.P.’s mother reported that M.P. has a
    history of running away on two occasions, causing
    the family to file a missing person’s report. M.P. was
    reported to suffer from anger issues and anxiety.
    M.P. has also refused medication while in therapy.
    This court acknowledges that M.P.’s behavior has
    improved since living with her father; however, this
    event occurred while M.P. was already living with her
    father, according to Lauren McLaughlin Willias, the
    Community Umbrella Agencies [sic] [] case
    management supervisor.
    Upon being adjudicated, M.P. stated “That’s
    what I’m saying. I believe I was in the wrong place
    at the wrong time. I didn’t intend to or mean to hurt
    anybody. It wasn’t like on purpose. I apologize and
    that’s it.”     This court disagrees with M.P.’s
    assessment. This court believes that M.P. still does
    not realize what she did, that M.P. has failed to show
    remorse for her actions, and that M.P. is in in [sic]
    further need of treatment, supervision, and
    rehabilitation.
    Juvenile court opinion, 1/21/16 at 1-4 (citations to notes of testimony
    omitted).
    The juvenile court set forth the following procedural history:
    On July 12, 2015, Philadelphia police arrested
    [M.P.] and charged her with [aggravated assault,
    simple assault, PIC, and REAP]. On September 15,
    2015, M.P. went to trial and was found guilty of
    [aggravated assault, PIC, and REAP]. On said date,
    M.P. was adjudged delinquent and the court placed
    M.P. on probation.
    -4-
    J. S67012/16
    
    Id. at 1.
    This timely appeal followed.
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    Did not the juvenile court err as a matter of law and
    abuse its discretion in adjudicating appellant
    delinquent where the evidence established that she
    was not in need of treatment, rehabilitation or
    supervision?
    Appellant’s brief at 2.
    “The Juvenile Act grants juvenile courts broad discretion when
    determining an appropriate disposition. . . .     We will disturb a juvenile
    court’s disposition only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.”
    In the Interest of T.L.B., 
    127 A.3d 813
    , 817 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation
    omitted). An adjudication of delinquency requires both findings “(1) that the
    juvenile has committed a delinquent act; and (2) that the juvenile is in need
    of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.” Commonwealth v. M.W., 
    39 A.3d 958
    , 959 (Pa. 2012). “In a juvenile proceeding, the hearing judge sits
    as the finder of fact.”     In re L.A., 
    853 A.2d 388
    , 391 (Pa.Super. 2004)
    (citation omitted).       “The weight to be assigned the testimony of the
    witnesses is within the exclusive province of the fact finder.”   
    Id. (citation omitted).
    Here, no dispute exists that following the adjudicatory hearing, the
    juvenile court correctly found that M.P. committed delinquent acts;
    specifically, the crimes of aggravated assault, REAP, and PIC. Rather, M.P.
    complains that the evidence demonstrated that she is not in need of
    -5-
    J. S67012/16
    treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation because the Commonwealth did not
    present evidence that contradicted the testimony of Lauren McLaughlin
    Willis, the case management supervisor at Community Umbrella Agencies.
    The record reflects that although Ms. Willis testified that M.P.’s
    behavior has significantly improved since she moved in with her father in
    May of 2015, Ms. Willis never opined that M.P. is not in need of treatment,
    supervision, and/or rehabilitation. (Notes of testimony, 9/15/15 at 80-86.)
    M.P. nevertheless claims that Ms. Willis’ testimony established that she does
    not need treatment, supervision, and/or rehabilitation and because the
    juvenile court ignored that testimony, it abused its discretion. Contrary to
    M.P.’s claim, the juvenile court found that neither this evidence, nor any
    other, was persuasive enough to tip the scales in M.P.’s favor.      (Juvenile
    court opinion, 1/21/16 at 7.)    As finder-of-fact, it was within the juvenile
    court’s exclusive province to assign weight to the testimony.      See in re
    
    L.A., 853 A.2d at 319
    .
    The record further reflects that the incident giving rise to M.P.’s
    delinquency adjudication occurred approximately two months after M.P.
    moved in with her father. (Id. at 84, 86.) The juvenile court took this fact,
    as well as many others, into consideration before finding that M.P. needs
    treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation. (Juvenile court opinion, 1/21/16
    at 7.)    In making its determination, the juvenile court considered the fact
    that when M.P. struck the victim in the head with an aluminum baseball bat,
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    J. S67012/16
    she could have killed the victim. (Notes of testimony, 9/15/15 at 90.) The
    juvenile court also considered M.P.’s decision to become involved in the
    fight, as well as her decision to escalate the situation, as opposed to calling
    the police or simply walking away.       (Id.)   Because of that, the court
    determined that M.P. needs to learn how to make better decisions in crisis
    situations. (Id.) The court also determined that M.P.’s statements during
    the adjudicatory hearing demonstrated her failure to realize what she did, as
    well as her lack of remorse. (Juvenile court opinion, 9/15/15 at 7.) Based
    on M.P.’s criminal acts, behavioral history, incredulous testimony, and how
    she minimalized her criminal acts, the juvenile court was “convinced” that
    M.P. needs treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation. (Id. at 7-8.)
    After reviewing the record, we find no abuse of discretion.
    Dispositional order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    JosephD.Seletyn,Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/6/2016
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3117 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 10/6/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/6/2016