Hupp, D. v. Wheeland, C. ( 2017 )

J-S12030-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DAWN E. HUPP : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CRAIG T. WHEELAND : No. 1444 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree August 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County
Civil Division at No(s): CV-2010-2026
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J. and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 12, 2017
Dawn E. Hupp appeals from the final decree entered on August 4,
2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County that
divorced the parties from the bonds of matrimony and resolved equitable
distribution claims. In this timely appeal, Hupp claims seven errors1 on the
part of the trial court regarding the equitable distribution of marital property.
After a thorough review of the submissions by the parties, relevant law, and
the certified record, we affirm the decree granting the parties’ divorce, and
affirm the order determining equitable distribution in part on the basis of the
trial court opinion and Revised Master’s Report as adopted by the trial court
____________________________________________
1
While there are six numbered claims in Hupp’s “Statement of the Questions
Involved”, see Appellant’s Brief at 2-3, one of the claims is broken into two
subparts, making a total of seven claims of error.
J-S12030-17
in its opinion, and reverse the order determining equitable distribution in
part as stated in the trial court opinion at pages 2-3, 6.
Initially, we note our standard of review:
A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of
equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing
the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution
of marital property is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow
proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of
discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing
evidence. This Court will not find an “abuse of discretion” unless
the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment
exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in
the certified record. In determining the propriety of an equitable
distribution award, courts must consider the distribution scheme
as a whole. We measure the circumstances of the case against
the objective of effectuating economic justice between the
parties and achieving a just determination of their property
rights.
Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the
evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse
those determinations so long as they are supported by the
evidence. We are also aware that a master's report and
recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the
fullest consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of
witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe
and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.
Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386-87 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations
omitted). Additionally,
The Divorce Code does not set forth a specific method for
valuing assets, and consistent with our standard of review, the
trial court is afforded great discretion in fashioning an equitable
distribution order which achieves “economic justice.”
Mundy v. Mundy, 151 A.3d 230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
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J-S12030-17
For ease of reference, we quote the relevant factual history as related
by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
The parties were married on May 19, 2001. This was
[Wheeland’s] third marriage, and it was [Hupp’s] second
marriage. Each had children from the prior marriages. They
had a son together, born June 8, 2005. [Hupp] was employed
by the Lewisburg School District as a teacher’s aide, earning
approximately $20,000.00 per annum. On the other hand,
[Wheeland] was a federal employee at the United States
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, with earnings in 2012 of $58,707.00.
The marriage lasted nine years, with the date of separation on
April 23, 2010. The exclusive possession of the marital home
was awarded to [Hupp] by court decree on December 12, 2010.
The marital home was constructed around the time of the
marriage. The land was a 3 acre parcel donated to them by
[Hupp’s] parents, carved out of the family farm. [Wheeland]
contributed his own funds of $20,000.00 toward the construction
from his sale of his own home. The marital home now has a fair
market value of $225,000.00. There are two mortgages thereon
totaling $97,420.58, leaving an equity of $127,579.49.
As the Master noted, [Hupp] desired foremost to be awarded the
realty in view of its location adjacent to her family’s farm.
[Hupp] also claimed tangible property of $9,125.00 that was
awarded to her.
The other large assets are [Hupp’s] pension of $38,377.98 as
her marital portion established by the Master. [Wheeland] has a
savings plan in connection with his employment (Thrift Savings
Plan) that was valued by the Master as to [Wheeland’s] marital
portion in the sum of $97,711.74. Lastly, there is [Wheeland’s]
federal pension as to which it was determined that the most
suitable approach is to divide, by appropriate qualified order for
distribution (COAP), as the time of [Wheeland’s] retirement, as
noted by the Master as “the safest route.”
Since [Hupp] had exclusive possession of the marital home for
five and half years prior to the award here, there had to be
taken into account [Wheeland’s] credit for his share in the loss of
the fair rental value at $1,800.00 per month; thus, his loss of
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J-S12030-17
rental income during [Hupp’s] exclusive possession was
$54,000.00. However, [Hupp] was making mortgage payments
to which she was then entitled a credit from [Wheeland] that
was in the undisputed amount of $18,822.75.
The parties were both in their mid-forties, in relatively good
health. Neither contributed to the education or training of the
other spouse. [Hupp] had some training and experience as a
dental assistant, so she could pursue this avenue for increased
earnings, and to work in the summer months. [Wheeland’s]
employment was stable, but he did not have much of any
increase in salary over the past four years prior to the hearing.
There is no separate property. The parties had a modest
standard of living, with no unusual tax ramifications to transfer
of assets.
[Hupp] had custody of their teenage son, for which she was
receiving child support of approximately $655.00 per month, as
well as APL of $526.00.
As requested, [Hupp] was awarded the marital home. However,
there is a substantial amount of equity therein to which
[Wheeland] was entitled to his proportionate share. The scheme
devised was for [Hupp] to retain her entire pension she earned
during the marriage. She also owed [Wheeland] a substantial
rental credit as these divorce proceedings dragged out over four
years until the Master’s hearing was even held. In making the
calculations there was a net obligation for [Hupp] to pay
[Wheeland] the sum of $33,748.99 to achieve economic accord.
This court also considered the possibility that [Hupp] may not
elect or be able to pay [Wheeland’s] share within a reasonable
time (60 days) and also retain the home. In that event, the
realty would be placed for sale with a realtor with her receiving a
greater share of the net proceeds by an additional $27,167.01 to
her.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/2016, at 1-3.
Hupp’s issues are: 1) Whether the trial court erred in allowing
additional evidence to be presented to the Master after remand; 2A)
Whether the trial court erred in splitting the marital estate on a 50/50 basis;
2B) Whether the trial court erred in granting a Fair Rental Credit to husband
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J-S12030-17
and further erred in calculating that credit; 3) Did the trial court err in
determining a 50/50 division without applying statutory factors and without
considering parties’ disparate incomes; 4) Whether the trial court erred in
failing to award alimony and determining the 50/50 division of the marital
estate met Hupp’s reasonable needs without applying statutory factors or
considering parties’ disparate incomes; 5) Whether the trial court erred in
distributing parties’ pensions and Wheeland’s TSP account; and 6) Whether
the trial court erred in finding Hupp received $9,125.00 of tangible property.
Our review of the certified record leads us to the conclusion that the
trial court correctly rejected issues, 1, 2A, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Issue 1 is an
evidentiary matter in which updated values of assets were presented. We
note that values closer to the proximate date of distribution are favored.
See Oak v. Cooper, 638 A.2d 208 (Pa. 1994). Such evidentiary issues are
within the sound discretion of the court. See K.T. v. L.S., 118 A.3d 1136,
1165 (Pa. Super. 2015). Issues 2A, 3, 4, and 5 all address various aspects
of splitting the marital estate on a 50/50 basis. We rely upon the sound
analysis of the trial court, including the adoption of the Revised Master’s
Report, in affirming the trial court on these issues. Issue 6 involves factual
determinations of the distribution of certain tangible property. The trial
court noted that Hupp was not specific in this allegation and therefore the
trial court did not amend said distribution. However, our review of the
certified record found two items that support Hupp’s claim. These involve
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J-S12030-17
blue barrels and a Suzuki motorcycle, both valued at $200.00. Our review
of the record indicates that there is no dispute that these belong to
Wheeland and that he can take possession of them. We see no reason to
amend the order given the $400.00 total value of the property is de minimis
in light of the approximately $700,000.00 value of the marital estate.
However, with respect to issue 2B, we find the trial court committed
an abuse of discretion regarding the calculation of the amount of fair rental
value credit Hupp owed to Wheeland. Therefore, we limit our discussion to
this single issue.
By way of background, we include the marital asset distribution chart,
taken from the Revised Master’s Report2:
Marital Asset Total Husband Wife
$707,448.65 355,645.63 351,803.03
Tangibles 14,125.00 9,125.00 5,000.00
Jeep Liberty 7,458.00 7,458.00
Dodge Truck 2,342.00 2,342.00
Volkswagen 1,000.00 1,000.00
Wife’s Pension 38,337.98 38,337.98
Husband’s TSP 121,831.00 121,831.00
Husband’s FERS 394,775.25 197,387.63 197,387.63
Real Estate 225,000.00 225,000.00
PHFA Debt (81,787.30) (81,787.30)
HELOC Debt (15,633.28) (15,633.28)
Fair Rental Value
Credit 2,460.00 (2,460.00)
Post-Separation
____________________________________________
2
We have highlighted those figures which are at issue.
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J-S12030-17
Debt Credit 22,500.00 (22,500.00)
The equitable distribution chart created by Master Michael Suders,
Esquire, demonstrates how the total assets of $707,448.663 have been
allocated so that each party receives approximately 50%. This 50/50 split
was accepted by the trial court. See Trial Court Opinion, at 1 (“The overall
distribution on an equal 50-50 basis was appropriate here as recommended
by the Master after due consideration of the relevant factors set forth in 23
Pa.C.S. § 3502; Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194 (Pa. Super.
2004).”). Pursuant to the chart, Wheeland would receive $355,645.63 and
Hupp would receive $351,803.03.4 However, these totals are based upon a
scrivener’s error: Master Suders inadvertently transposed the figures related
to “Tangibles” thereby improperly granting Wheeland $9,125.00 and Hupp
$5,000.00. It is apparent by comparing page 22 of the Revised Master’s
Report, dated February 5, 2016, to the chart, that those numbers have been
transposed. Recalculating based upon the proper apportionment of
tangibles, the totals are: Wheeland - $351,520.63; Hupp - $355,928.03. By
this recalculation, correcting the error, Wheeland receives 49.69% and Hupp
____________________________________________
3
Our calculation of the figures supplied in the Equitable Distribution chart is
slightly different from Master Suders’. The total for husband is the same,
but Wife’s total is $351,773.03 – thirty dollars less than the figure provided
in the chart. Accordingly, the total assets would be $707,418.66.
4
Using pecentages, Wheeland would receive 50.27% and Hupp would
receive 49.73% of the marital assets.
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J-S12030-17
receives 50.31% of the marital assets. The trial court’s final decree
correctly shows Wheeland receiving $5,000.00 in tangibles and Hupp
receiving 9,125.00 in tangibles.5
Turning to the issue of the fair rental value credit, the Master
determined that Wheeland was owed $1,800.00 per month 6 for 60 months
when it was undisputed that Hupp had exclusive possession of the marital
residence. However, for the same period of time, Hupp was paying
$1,718.00 per month on the mortgages. The $82.00 per month difference
for 60 months totals $4,920.00. The fair rental value credit was then
determined by granting Wheeland half that sum, $2,460.00 and subtracting
the identical amount from Hupp’s side of the ledger. It is important to note
that the Master also credited Wheeland, and debited Hupp, with $22,500.00
in post-separation debt which is directly attributable to Wheeland’s mortgage
payments while Hupp was in exclusive possession of the marital property.
See Revised Master’s Report, 2/5/2016 at 18. We note that where fair
rental value is at issue, credit for mortgage payments is usually taken into
account within that calculation. See Trembach v. Trembach, 615 A.2d 33,
37 (Pa. Super. 1992).
However, in ruling on exceptions, the trial court determined:
____________________________________________
5
See our discussion on page 6, supra.
6
$1,800.00 per month rental value was a stipulated amount.
-8-
J-S12030-17
The record before the Master established the fair rental value at
$1,800.00 per month; thus, [Wheeland’s] loss of rental income
during [Hupp’s] exclusive possession was $54,000.00. However,
[Hupp] was making mortgage payments to which she was then
entitled a credit from [Wheeland] that was in the undisputed
amount of $18,822.75.
Trial Court Opinion at 2-3.
The trial court then subtracted the $18,822.757 from the $54,000.00
and determined Hupp owed Wheeland an additional $33,748.998 In making
this determination, the trial court appears to have inadvertently double
credited Wheeland with his mortgage payments. The result of this
miscalculation, granting Wheeland an additional $33,749.99 and subtracting
$33,748.99 from Hupp, results in a final distribution significantly skewed in
favor of Wheeland. Specifically, Wheeland would receive $382,809.62 while
Hupp would receive $324,639.04. This equates to 54.11% to Wheeland and
45.89% to Hupp. Compounding the problem, in addition to miscalculating
the fair rental value, the trial court neglected to adjust any values of other
items of distribution to retain the overall 50/50 division of the marital estate
that was recommended by the Master and accepted by the trial court.
____________________________________________
7
The difference between the trial court’s $18,000 figure and the Master’s
$22,000 figure is explained on page 18 of the Revised Mater’s Report.
8
We do not know how this figure was determined. By our calculations,
Hupp would owe Wheeland an additional $35,177.25.
-9-
J-S12030-17
Because the trial court erred in its calculation of the fair rental value,
we vacate that portion of the trial court’s decision and remand this matter to
the trial court to reinstate the Master’s calculations regarding fair rental
value so that the 50/50 division remains.9
As noted above, in all other aspects we agree with the trial court’s
sound reasoning. Accordingly, on those issues, we rely on the trial court’s
opinion and Revised Master’s Report as adopted by the trial court. The
parties are directed to attach a copy of both documents in the event of
further proceedings.
That portion of the decree granting divorce is affirmed; that portion of
the decree addressing equitable distribution is affirmed in part and reversed
in part. The trial court is directed to amend the decree in accordance with
this decision. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/12/2017
____________________________________________
9
The portion of the trial court’s opinion we are reversing is found at the last
paragraph on page 2 to that paragraph’s conclusion on page 3.
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Circulated 05/24/2017 03:41 PM
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL DIVISION h-:
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DAWN E. HUPP,
PLAINTIFF
vs.
NO. 01-10-2026
CRA.IG T. WHEELAND,
DEFENDANT IN DIVORCE
OPINION
Saylor, P.J.
This appeal is from a final decree in divorce entered on August 4, 2016, that equitably
distributed the marital property. In most respects this Court adopted the conclusions of the
Master that he set forth in a comprehensive report; however, the undersigned did an
independent analysis as set forth in a discussion accompanying the final decree in making
certain revisions tc the Master's findings and conclusions.
The overall distribution on an equal 50-50 basis .vas appropriate here as recommended
by the Master after due ccnsideration of the relevant factors set forth in 23 Pa. CS. § 3502;
Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194 (Pa. Super. 2004). In Northumberland County, the
Master conducts the hearing; thus, this Court is "limited to the evidence presented before the
master." Cunningham v. Cunningham/ 548 A.2d 611, 613-14 (Pa. Super. 1988). The Master's
findings will not be set forth again in detail herein; a summary thereof follows.
The parties were married on May 19, 2001. This was Husband's third marriage, and it
was Wife's second marriage. Each had children from the prior marriages. They had a son
together, born on June 8, 2005. Wife was employed by the Lewisburg School District as a
teacher's aide, earning approximately $20,000.00 per annum. On the other hand, Husband was
1
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a federal employee at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, with earnings in 2012 of
$58, 707 .00. The marriage lasted nine years, with the date of separation on April 23, 2010.
The exclusive possession cf the marital home was awarded to Wife by court decree on
December 12, 2010.
The marital home was constructed around the time of the marriage. The land was a 3
acre parcel donated to them by Wife's parents, carved out of the family farm. Husband
contributed his own funds of $20,000.00 toward the construction from his sa!e of his own
home. The manta! home now has a fair market value of $225,000.00. There are two
mortgages thereon totaling $97,420.58, leaving an equity therein of $127,579.49.
As the Master noted, Wife desired foremost to be awarded the realty in view of its
location adjacent to her family's farm. Wife also claimed tangible property of $9,125.00 that
was awarded to her.
The other large assets are Wife's pension of $38,377.98 as her marital portion
established by the Master. Husband has a savinqs plan m connection with his employment
(Thrift Savings Plan) that was valued by the Master as to Husband's marital portion in the sum
of $97,711.74. Lastly, there is Husband's federal pension as to which it was determined that
the most suitable approach is to divide, by appropriate qualified order for distribution (COAP),
at the time of Husband's retirement, as noted by the Maste, as "the safest route."
Since Wife had exclusive possession of the marital home for five and a half years prior
to the award here, there had to be taken into account the Husband's credit for his share in the
loss of the fair rental value of such home during that time frame. The record before the Master
established the fair rental value at $1,800.00 per month; thus, his loss of rental income during
Wife's exclusive possession was $54,000.00. However, Wife was making mortgage payments to
2 3S
which she was then entitled a credit from Husband that was in the undisputed amount of
$18,822.75.
The parties were both in their mid-forties, in relatively good heaith. Neither contributed
to the education or training of the other spouse. Wife had some training and experience as a
dental assistant, so she could pursue this avenue for increased earnings, and to work in the
summer months. Husband's employment was stable, but he did not have much of any increase
in salary over the past four years prior to the hearing. There is no separate property. The
parties had a modest standard of living, with no unusual tax ramifications to transfer of assets.
Wife had custody of their teenage son, for which she was receiving child support of
approximately $655.00 per month, as well as monthiy APL of $526.00.
As requested, Wife was awarded the marital home. However, there is a substantial
amount of equity therein to which Husband was entitled to his proportionate share. The
scheme devised was for vVife to retain her entire pension she earned during the marriage. She
also owed Husband a substantial rental creoit as these divorce proceedings dragged out over
four years until the Master's hearing was even held. In making the calculations there was a net
obligation for Wife to pay to Husband the sum of $33,748.99 to achieve economic accord.
This court also considered the possibility that Wife may not elect or be able to pay
Husband's share within a reasonable time (60 days) and also retain the home. In that event,
the realty would be placed for sale with a realtor with her receiving a greater share of the net
proceeds by an additional $27,167.01 to her. See Dean v. Dean/ 98 A.Jd 637 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(economic justice is not served through the indefinite delay of payment of a spouse's share of
the marital estate).
Wife's Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal are hereinafter listed and
3 3CD
addressed as follows:
1. It was error to allow Master to hear additional evidence.
There was proper consideration of updated values upon a remand to the Master in order
to make a property determination of such values near the time of distribution, espec,a!!y
in view of the inordinate delays occurring in this case. Sutliff v. Sutliff, 543 A.2d 534
(Pa. 1988).
2. It wa; error to divide on a 50/50 split without d1scussion of statutory
factors.
The statutory factors in Section 3502(a) of the Divorce Code were set forth by the Master
on page 7 of his report end the facts relating thereto were fully discussed throughout his
thorough thirty-one page report. The relevant facts were summarized in this opinion as
well, with respect to the criteria applied in reaching the court's conclusions.
3. It was error to :1ot consider the diffetence in the oarties' 1nco~es.
Wife misstates Husband's lncome as being more than $74,000.00 which rs not supported
by the record. Husband's earnings were flat in the range of $59,000.00. Wife had a
greater earning capacity than her current earnings working only 9 months out of the year
as a teacher's aide.
4. It was error in not distributing to V·Jife a portion of the Thrift Savings Plan
at this time.
The request by Wife to be awarded the real estate then required an offset from the other
assets (including the TSP) to which she was entitled a proportionate share. Accordingly,
the net award requires Wife to pay a certain sum to Husband.
4 31
5. It was error to defer distribution to Wife from Husband's federal pension
The court adopted the Master's considered view that the Wife would benefit the most by
receiving her share of the pension ~t the time of retirement, for which the pension vvas
designed for financial assistance at that time in her life and in advanced age.
6. It was error to award Husband a rental credit
The standards for an award of rental credit were summarized in Trembsch v. Trembech.
615 A.2d 33, 37 (Pa. Super. 1992):
"First, the general rule is that the dispossessed party is entitled to a credit
for the fair rental value of jointly held marital property against a party in
possession of that property, provided there are no equitable defenses to the
credit. Second, the rental credit is based upon, and therefore limited by, the
extent of the dispossessed party's interest in the property. Third, the rental
vaiue is limlted to the period of time during which a party is dispossessed
and the other party is in actual or constructive possession of the property.
Fourth, the party in possession is entitled to a credit against the rental value
for payments made to maintain the property on behalf of the dispossessed
spouse. Generally, in regard to the former marital residence, payments
made on behalf of the dispossessed spouse wiii be one-half of the expenses
including debt service on the property. This is to because equity places a
presumption upon the dispossessed spouse of responsibihty for expenses to
the extent of her/h,s ownership interest wh:ch is genera!iy one-half. Finally1
we note that whether the rental credit is due and the amount thereof is
within the sound discretion of the court of common pleas."
There was no error here in this award of a rental credit to Husband.
There is no valid equitable defense thereto. Compare Lee 1/. Lee/ 978 A.2d 380
(Pa. Super. 2009) (Protection from Abuse Order of no contact). Husband was
requested to leave when Wife obtained an order for exclusive possession after
her filing for divorce.
5 38
7. It was error to include the marital real estate in the 50/50 award
as the home was built on Wife's non-marital reaity, and her other
contributions.
The land was donated to the parties around the time of their marriage, and it was placed
in the names of both of them. They constructed a home together, with Husband utilizing
$20,000.00 from the safe of his prior home. Clearly, there was no basis for the home not
to be fully considered as marital property subject to distribution with both parties making
fairly equal contributions as to its value over the course cf the marriage.
8. It was error to rea11!reWife to pav Husband $~3.748.99 for her to
keep the marital residence.
It is unclear to the court as to the error being asserted by VNe by this bald
statement. This is the calculated amount of her obligation to Husband under the
distribution scheme requested by her.
9. It was error to allow only 60 nays for Wife to refinance the marital
residence.
In the event Wife required a reasonable extension of time, a petition setting forth
the circumstances would have been readily considered by the court.
10. It was error to find that Wife received $9,125.00 in gersonal
property as Husband admitted he had S2,000.00 of such property.
It is not clear exactly what Wife is referring to or where in the record the
admission appears. This may be in reference to a 560 Suzuki motorcycle as to
which there was testimony by Wife that even though it was in her father's barn
she would make it available to Husband. Yet this was listed by the appraiser as
having a value of only $200.00. (Master's report p. 22). In any event, the Master
found as to this motorcycle that "no value was established on the record."
6 :fl
11. It was error in not awarding Wife alimony.
After due consideration of the criteria for an award of alimony under Section 3701(b) of
the Divorce Code, the Master concluded that Wife can meet her reasonable needs after
the divorce. There was cited by the Master the case of Teodorskt v. Teodorski.supra,
which is instructive that a relatively short marriage (six years) and the number of years
(four and a half years) that APL has already been paid, may make it inequitable to
require further payment of alimony. The marriage in the case at bar was nine years and
Husband had been paying APL since March 9, 2011. Wife also has steady employment
with reasonable earnings, and the additional ability to add income through summer
employment. She has past experience in the denta! field that she can pursue with some
more education. The determination not to award alimony was proper.
In view of all the foregoing, the court's determination does meet the standards
for achieving economic justice for the parties. It should be affirn;Ji1d.
//
COURT· ''/
By, "T'"l-..ir'"
I 1 :C 1 1. / I
I'
DATED: October 26, 2015 ~t
pc: Melodie Protasio, Esquire, 36 West Fourth Street, Williamsport, PA 17701
Martin R. Wilson, Esquire, 222 Market Street, Lewisburg, PA 17837
Court
7 YO