J.K. v. W.L.K. ( 2014 )

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2014 Pa. Super. 231
J.K. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
W.L.K., : No. 3244 EDA 2013
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered October 25, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Civil Division at No. 2011-01265-CU
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS AND PLATT,* JJ.
OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:FILED OCTOBER 14, 2014
Appellant, W.L.K. (“Father”), appeals from the order that denied his
petition to transfer jurisdiction from Chester County, Pennsylvania, to
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Upon review, we reverse.
Father and J.K. (“Mother”) are the natural parents of N.P.K., born in
2005, and G.W.K., born in 2009 (“the Children”). On February 3, 2011,
Mother filed for divorce from Father and sought custody of the Children. At
the time, Mother and Father were residing in Chester County where Mother
filed her divorce complaint. The parties entered into a stipulated custody
order on March 10, 2011, whereby Mother obtained primary physical custody
of the Children subject to Father’s periods of partial physical custody.
Shortly thereafter, Mother and Father separately relocated to Montgomery
County and have been residing there for over two years with the Children.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(Notes of testimony, 10/16/13 at 3, 7.) The parties currently reside
approximately one mile from each other.
On September 16, 2013, Father filed a petition to transfer jurisdiction
to Montgomery County. Mother filed an answer contesting Father’s petition.
A hearing was held on October 16, 2013. An order denying Father’s petition
was issued on October 25, 2013, and docketed on October 30, 2013. Father
filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal concurrently with
his notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 904(f).1 Father raises two issues for this
court’s consideration:
a. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse
its discretion in continuing to exercise jurisdiction
over the custody matter in light of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5401 et seq.?
b. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse
its discretion when it found that Chester County was
not an inconvenient forum under Pennsylvania Rule
of Civil Procedure 1915.2?
Father’s brief at 4.2
In addressing Father’s first issue, we apply the following standard of
review:
A court’s decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction is subject to
an abuse of discretion standard of review and will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Under
1
We note this case is labeled a children’s fast track appeal; however, the only issue
before us concerns the transfer of venue/jurisdiction. There is no custody petition
or modification petition pending.
2
Mother has not filed a brief in this matter.
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Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the court
has overridden or misapplied the law, when its judgment is
manifestly unreasonable, or when there is insufficient evidence
of record to support the court’s findings. An abuse of discretion
requires clear and convincing evidence that the trial court
misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures.
Lucas v. Lucas, 882 A.2d 523, 527 (Pa.Super. 2005).
Father contends the trial court erred when it failed to apply the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”),
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5401-5484, to this matter. Instead, the trial court applied
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.2(c), 42 Pa.C.S.A., and denied
transfer of the case to Montgomery County. The trial court ruled Father
failed to show that that Chester County was an inconvenient forum.
Our supreme court explained jurisdiction and venue as follows:
Frequently, the terms jurisdiction and venue are used
interchangeably although in fact they represent distinctly
different concepts. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the
competency of a given court to determine controversies of a
particular class or kind to which the case presented for its
consideration belongs. Venue is the place in which a particular
action is to be brought and determined, and is a matter for the
convenience of the litigants. Jurisdiction denotes the power of
the court whereas venue considers the practicalities to
determine the appropriate forum.
In re R.L.L.’s Estate, 409 A.2d 321, 322 n.3 (Pa. 1979) (internal citations
omitted); Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066, 1075 (Pa. 2003)
(the terms, subject matter jurisdiction and venue, must exist simultaneously
in order for a court to properly exercise its power to resolve a particular
controversy).
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Pennsylvania adopted the UCCJEA in 2004.3 The purpose of the
UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional competition, promote cooperation between
courts, deter the abduction of children, avoid relitigation of custody decisions
of other states, and facilitate the enforcement of custody orders of other
states. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5401, Uniform Law Comment. While the UCCJEA is
applicable to interstate proceedings, our Legislature has determined that its
provisions “allocating jurisdiction and functions between and among courts
of different states shall also allocate jurisdiction and functions between and
among the courts of common pleas of this Commonwealth.” 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5471.
In order to effectuate this legislative mandate, our supreme court has
promulgated specific rules for applying the provisions of the UCCJEA to
intrastate custody disputes. The rules recognize that all counties within the
Commonwealth maintain subject matter jurisdiction of custody disputes.
However, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.2 governing venue of
custody matters defines how and what county may properly exercise that
jurisdiction. The rule provides:
3
The UCCJEA was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1997 and became effective in Pennsylvania in 2004. The
UCCJEA replaced the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”),
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5341-5366, repealed. The UCCJEA re-enacts many provisions of
the UCCJA.
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Rule 1915.2. Venue
(a) An action may be brought in any county
(1)(i) which is the home county of the child at the
time of commencement of the proceeding, or
(ii) which had been the child’s home county within
six months before commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from the
county but a parent or person acting as parent
continues to live in the county; or
(2) when the court of another county does not have
venue under subdivision (1), and the child and the
child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent
or a person acting as a parent, have a significant
connection with the county other than mere physical
presence and there is available within the county
substantial evidence concerning the child’s,
protection, training and personal relationships; or
(3) when all counties in which venue is proper pursuant
to subdivisions (1) and (2) have found that the court
before which the action is pending is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the
child; or
(4) when it appears that venue would not be proper in
any other county under prerequisites substantially in
accordance with paragraphs (1), (2) or (3); or
(5) when the child is present in the county and has been
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because the child or a sibling or
parent of the child is subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse.
(b) Physical presence of the child or a party, while desirable, is
not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody
determination except as provided in subdivision (a)(5)
above.
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(c) The court at any time may transfer an action to the
appropriate court of any other county where the action could
originally have been brought or could be brought if it
determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the
circumstances and the court of another county is the more
appropriate forum. It shall be the duty of the prothonotary
of the court in which the action is pending to forward to the
prothonotary of the county to which the action is transferred
certified copies of the docket entries, process, pleadings and
other papers filed in the action. The costs and fees of the
petition for transfer and the removal of the record shall be
paid by the petitioner in the first instance to be taxable as
costs in the case.
Pa.R.C.P. 1915.2, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
The Note and Explanatory Comment to Rule 1915.2 reference the
accommodation to the UCCJEA, restating the jurisdictional provisions of
Section 5421 of the UCCJEA in rule form without change in substance. To
the extent the provisions of the UCCJEA apply to intrastate custody disputes,
the proper county venue for an action is defined by the rule as set forth
above. Because of the necessary interplay in our discussion between the
UCCJEA and the rule, references to jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and venue
under the rule may, at times, be confusing in analyzing the issue in this
case. However, as explained recently by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
“Rules of venue recognize the propriety of imposing geographic limitations
on the exercise of jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Gross, A.3d ,
2014 WL 4745569, at *4 (Pa. September 24, 2014) (citation omitted). For
purposes of clarity, we will analyze Father’s issues in venue terms.
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Instantly, Father does not dispute that Chester County was the proper
venue to make the initial custody determination in 2011 when the parties
entered into the original custody stipulation. However, Father argues
Chester County no longer has continuing, exclusive venue because none of
the parties currently reside there.
As set forth above in Rule 1915.2(a)(1), an action may be brought
(i) in any county in which the child resides or (ii) was the home county
within six months before commencement of the proceeding and a parent
continues to live in the county. Pursuant to 1915.2(2), if no other county
has venue under subdivision (1) and the child or parent has a significant
connection to a county, the significant connection county, as defined under
the rule, may assume venue. These subsections substantially mirror the
requirements of Section 5421.4
4
§ 5421. Initial child custody jurisdiction
(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in section 5424
(relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction), a court of this
Commonwealth has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
determination only if:
(1) this Commonwealth is the home state of the child on
the date of the commencement of the proceeding or
was the home state of the child within six months
before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this Commonwealth but a parent
or person acting as a parent continues to live in this
Commonwealth;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction
under paragraph (1) or a court of the home state of
the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this Commonwealth is the more
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In the present case, it is clear that Chester County is no longer the
home county for the Children. Additionally, 1915.2(a)(2) cannot apply
because another county; specifically, Montgomery County, now meets the
provisions of 1915.2(a)(1).
As it relates to intrastate determinations, Section 5422 of the UCCJEA
defines the exercise of exclusive, continuing venue to determine whether the
court with initial custody venue, in this case Chester County, maintains
venue in subsequent proceedings. Section 5422, as adapted to fit intrastate
custody venue requirements, provides:
appropriate forum under section 5427 (relating to
inconvenient forum) or 5428 (relating to jurisdiction
declined by reason of conduct) and:
(i) the child and the child’s parents, or the child
and at least one parent or a person acting as a
parent, have a significant connection with this
Commonwealth other than mere physical
presence; and
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this
Commonwealth concerning the child’s care,
protection, training and personal relationships;
(b) Exclusive jurisdictional basis.--Subsection (a) is the exclusive
jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a
court of this Commonwealth.
(c) Physical presence and personal jurisdiction unnecessary.--
Physical presence of or personal jurisdiction over a party or a
child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody
determination.
23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5421.
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§ 5422. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in section
5424 (relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction), a court
of this Commonwealth which has made a child custody
determination consistent with section 5421 (relating to
initial child custody jurisdiction) or 5423 (relating to
jurisdiction to modify determination) has exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(1) a court of [the county which made the initial custody
order] determines that neither the child, nor the
child and one parent, nor the child and a person
acting as a parent have a significant connection with
[its county] and that substantial evidence is no
longer available in [its county] concerning the child’s
care, protection, training and personal relationships;
or
(2) a court of [the county which made the initial custody
order] or a court of another [county] determines that
the child, the child’s parents and any person acting
as a parent do not presently reside in this [county
which made the initial custody order].
(b) Modification where court does not have exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction.--A court of [a county] which has
made a child custody determination and does not have
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may
modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make
an initial determination under section 5421.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5422.
As indicated above, a trial court vested with initial custody venue
maintains the exclusive continuing ability to exercise its venue until a court
determines that significant connections no longer exist in, or determines that
the child and the parties are no longer residents of, the initial county.
Clearly, Chester County does not meet the requirements of Section 5422(a)
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or (b). Even if we were to apply a significant connections test and allow that
Chester County maintains continuing venue by way of
Subsection 5422(a)(1), nowhere does the trial court determine that
substantial evidence regarding the Children’s protection, training, and
personal relationships exists more in Chester County than in Montgomery
County. As neither the parents nor the Children have lived in Chester
County since March or April of 2011, exclusive, continuing venue cannot be
found under Subsection 5422(a)(2). Thus, under Section 5422, the Chester
County Court of Common Pleas has lost the exclusive, continuing authority
to exercise its venue over this matter.5
Although not essential to our holding today, in his second issue, Father
argues the trial court erred when it determined Chester County was not an
inconvenient forum under Pa.R.C.P. 1915.2. As previously set forth,
transfer of venue in custody matters is governed by Pa.R.C.P. 1915.2(c),
which provides that “[t]he court at any time may transfer an action to an
appropriate court of any other county where the action could originally have
been brought or could be brought if it determines that it is an inconvenient
forum under the circumstances and the court of another county is the more
appropriate forum.” Id. The Notes to the rule provide that this subsection
5
We note Section 5422(b) addresses modification of a custody determination.
Instantly, Father sought to transfer jurisdiction. See B.J.D. v. D.L.C., 19 A.3d
1081, 1084 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“An order to transfer custody jurisdiction is not a
modification of a custody order pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5422(b).”).
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is governed by the factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5427,6 and address the
6
§ 5427. Inconvenient forum
(a) General rule.--A court of this Commonwealth which has
jurisdiction under this chapter to make a child custody
determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time
if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the
circumstances and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient forum may be
raised upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion or request
of another court.
(b) Factors.--Before determining whether it is an inconvenient
forum, a court of this Commonwealth shall consider whether it is
appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction.
For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit
information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to
continue in the future and which state could best protect
the parties and the child;
(2) the length of time the child has resided outside this
Commonwealth;
(3) the distance between the court in this Commonwealth and
the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
(4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should
assume jurisdiction;
(6) the nature and location of the evidence required to
resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the
child;
(7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue
expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present
the evidence; and
(8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts
and issues in the pending litigation.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5427.
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same considerations which are subsumed in case law interpreting
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006, venue in civil actions,
establishing a proper forum for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses. Bratic v. Rubendall, A.3d , 2014 WL 4064028 (Pa.
2014).
In concluding Chester County was not an inconvenient forum, the trial
court noted the commuting time between the Chester County and
Montgomery County seats, the actions of Father in filing and withdrawing
petitions, and pending support litigation, all speak to a forum
non conveniens analysis. However, in order for Rule 1915.2(c) to apply,
as with Section 5427, the court determining inconvenient forum must have
venue in the first instance, and we have already determined Chester County
has lost the authority to exercise venue over this case. Therefore,
convenience issues are no longer relevant. Accordingly, we are compelled to
reverse the order of the trial court and grant Father’s petition to transfer to
Montgomery County.
Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2014
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