Stahl, S. v. Stahl, C. ( 2017 )

J-S06003-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SUZANNE STAHL IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTIAN STAHL
Appellant No. 1304 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 2012-006263
BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2017
Christian Stahl (“Husband”) appeals pro se from the April 12, 2016
order entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas denying his
amended petition for special relief in the nature of a request to vacate the
divorce decree and strike the property settlement agreement for lack of
disclosure and fraud and ordering that he pay counsel fees. We affirm.
On August 2, 2002, Husband and Suzanne Stahl (“Wife”) married. On
July 23, 2012, Wife filed a complaint in divorce.1 On January 16, 2015, the
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
There have been numerous petitions filed in this matter, both in
divorce and in custody. In this memorandum, we discuss only the petitions
relevant to this appeal.
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parties signed a property settlement agreement.2 On February 17, 2015,
the trial court entered an order of divorce, which incorporated the property
settlement agreement. On November 18, 2015, Husband filed a petition for
special relief in the nature of a request to vacate the property settlement
agreement for lack of disclosure. On December 1, 2015, Wife filed a petition
to strike Husband’s petition for special relief for failure to state a basis upon
which relief can be granted and for failure to plead alleged fraudulent
behavior with specificity and failure to attach party verification. On
December 18, 2015, Husband filed an amended petition for special relief in
the nature of a request to vacate the divorce decree and strike the property
settlement agreement for lack of disclosure and fraud (“amended petition to
vacate”). In his amended petition to vacate, Husband claimed, in part, that
Wife failed to disclose all marital assets and misrepresented the amount of
funds in a trust account. On January 27, 2016, Wife filed an answer to
Husband’s amended petition to vacate, in which she requested counsel fees.
On March 10, 2016 and March 11, 2016, the trial court held a hearing,
which it described as follows:
A full and fair hearing on the Petition, Amended Petition
and response thereto was scheduled to occur on March 10,
2016. At such time, [Husband] failed to appear as
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2
Husband was represented by counsel until January 2015. On
January 8, 2015, Husband filed an entry of appearance as a self-represented
party and on January 12, 2015, counsel that had been assisting with the
property settlement agreement withdrew his appearance.
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directed by the Trial Court. Indeed, the Court and [Wife],
who was present with counsel, waited from 9:00 A.M. until
11:00 A.M. before learning that [Husband] would not be
appearing. [Husband’s] counsel,[3] after being contacted
by Court staff, finally appeared at the March 10, 2016
hearing and stated that he “thought” the hearing had been
continued. When questioned as to why he thought this,
Counsel could offer no reasonable explanation. Indeed,
Counsel admitted he did not contact chambers or opposing
counsel to verify or question whether the hearing had been
continued. Counsel at that time withdrew the initial
Petition on the record and requested argument on the
Amended Petition. (N.T. 3/10/2016, at p. 9). In spite of
the fact that the allegations ple[]d in the Amended Petition
were very fact specific and the Trial Court could not accept
counsel’s mere representations without direct testimony,
the Trial Court allowed [Husband’s] counsel to attempt to
make argument. Indeed counsel for [Husband], without
[Husband] present, could not produce evidence that
information about various assets were not produced prior
to [Husband] signing the Property Settlement Agreement.
(N.T. 3/10/2016, at p. 77). Although counsel for
[Husband] represented to the Trial Court that [Husband]
learned in July of 2015 that the trust amounts disclosed on
the inventory on the Property Settlement Agreement were
inaccurate, [Husband] by and through counsel, could
provide no response to the Trial Court’s questions
concerning the four (4) month delay in filing of the
Petition. (N.T. 3/10/2016, at p. 86).
[Husband’s] argument at the March 10, 2016 hearing
was centered on an argument about intrinsic fraud relative
to the Property Settlement Agreement. At the conclusion
of the March 10, 2016 hearing, the Trial Court scheduled
another day for the hearing so that [Husband] could be
present to offer testimony and likewise to allow counsel for
[Husband] the opportunity to submit case law in support of
[Husband’s] intrinsic fraud argument. (N.T. 3/10/2016, at
p. 107). The next hearing date, which occurred on March
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3
On May 27, 2016, Husband again filed an entry of appearance as a
self-represented party.
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11, 2016, [Husband] abandoned his intrinsic fraud
argument, now taking up an argument for setting aside
the Property Settlement Agreement and opening the
Divorce Decree on the grounds of extrinsic fraud. At this
time, counsel for [Husband] made an oral motion to create
a constructive trust under Section 3505(d) of the Divorce
Code. Counsel for [Wife], Mr. Huffman, however, objected
to the oral motion arguing that his preparation for the
hearing was centered on [Husband’s] fraud argument. The
Trial Court, therefore, denied [Husband’s] oral motion, but
stated on record that [Husband] had the right to file a
petition under this section, if he felt it was pertinent. (N.T.
3/10 /2016, at p. 8).
[Husband’s] new argument at the March 11, 2016
hearing was an unsubstantiated accusation that extrinsic
fraud occurred because [Wife] over-litigated the divorce,
custody and support actions, which caused such an
economic strain on [Husband] that he was under
“economic duress” to sign the Property Settlement
Agreement. Besides having no basis in law, this
accusation has no basis in fact. Indeed, a review of the
docket reveals that there were petitions filed by both
parties. As outlined in detail above, a portion of
[Husband’s] filings have amounted to mere frivolous
filings. Furthermore, although directed by the Trial Court
to provide case law, [Husband] failed to do so. The Trial
Court likewise granted [Husband’s] request to submit a
Memorandum of Law on the extrinsic fraud issue.
[Husband’s] Memorandum of Law cites no cases to support
his proposition and [Wife] spent time and resources
drafting a response Memorandum. [Wife] attached to the
response Memorandum an Affidavit attesting under oath
that the time spent representing [Wife] at the March 10,
2016 hearing, March 11, 2016 hearing, and responses to
[Husband’s] pleadings related to the fraud issue cost
Appellee $6,000.00 in legal fees.
Opinion, 6/27/2016, at 5-7 (“1925(a) Op.”) (unpaginated).4
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4
Wife had reiterated her request for counsel fees at the hearing, and
both counsel presented argument on the request. N.T., 3/11/16, 105-120.
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On April 12, 2016, the trial court denied Husband’s amended petition
to vacate and ordered Husband to pay counsel fees to Wife’s counsel in the
amount of $6,000.
Husband filed a timely notice of appeal. He raises the following issues:
I. The honorable trial court abused its discretion in
awarding [counsel] fees without finding or stating any
basis for the award.
II. The honorable trial court abused its discretion in not
determining the parties ability to pay and the
reasonableness of the award.
III. The honorable trial court abused its discretion in not
first hearing [Husband]’s motion to recuse.
IV. The honorable trial court abused its discretion in failing
to create a constructive trust with [Wife’s] assets omitted
from the Delaware County pre-trial statement inventory
and appraisement pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. § 1920.33 sua
sponte pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(d).
V. The honorable trial court abused its discretion in
awarding [counsel] fees that were improperly requested in
divorce.
Husband’s Br. at 6-7.
In his first, second, and fifth issues, Husband challenges the award of
counsel fees. Husband maintains the trial court abused its discretion
because it did not base its award of counsel fees on any factual findings, it
did not determine whether Husband was financially able to pay the award,
and the award would have a chilling effect and went against the general
principle that parties are responsible for their own fees.
Our review of an order awarding counsel fees is:
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limited solely to determining whether the trial court
palpably abused its discretion in making a fee award. In
re Estate of Liscio, 432 Pa.Super. 440, 444, 638 A.2d
1019, 1021 (1994), appeal denied, 539 Pa. 679, 652 A.2d
1324 (1994). If the record supports a trial court’s finding
of fact that a litigant violated the conduct provisions of the
relevant statute providing for the award of [counsel] fees,
such award should not be disturbed on appeal. Id.Berg v. Georgetown Builders, Inc., 822 A.2d 810, 816 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(quoting Thunberg v. Strause, 682 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. 1996)).
A party is entitled to reasonable counsel fees where he or she is
awarded fees “as a sanction against another participant for dilatory,
obdurate or vexatious conduct during the pendency of a matter.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 2503(7). Our Court has stated:
Generally speaking, “obdurate” conduct may be defined in
this context as “stubbornly persistent in wrongdoing.”
WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 815
(1987). Conduct is “dilatory” where the record
demonstrates that counsel displayed a lack of diligence
that delayed proceedings unnecessarily and caused
additional legal work. See Gertz v. Temple Univ., 443
Pa.Super. 177, 661 A.2d 13, 17 n. 2 (1995).
In re Estate of Burger, 852 A.2d 385, 391 (Pa.Super. 2004). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined “vexatious” for section 2503(9)5
as: “An opponent also can be deemed to have brought suit ‘vexatiously’ if
he filed the suit without sufficient grounds in either law or in fact and if the
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5
We have stated that conduct that is “dilatory, obdurate or vexatious”
under section 2503(7) is similar to that which would constitute conduct that
is “arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith” under section 2503(9). In re Estate
of Burger, 852 A.2d at 391.
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suit served the sole purpose of causing annoyance.” Berg, 822 A.2d at 816(quoting Thunberg, 682 A.2d at 299).
Here, the trial court conducted a hearing on the amended petition to
vacate. At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Husband,
including on Husband’s finances. See, e.g., N.T., 3/11/16, 28-37. Further,
the trial court heard argument from both Husband’s counsel and Wife’s
counsel on the motion for counsel fees. Id. at 105-20.
The trial court found Husband’s conduct was “dilatory, obdurate or
vexatious.” 1925(a) Op. at 7. It reasoned:
The Trial Court’s decision in this instance is supported
by ample evidence of record. As outlined in detail above,
[Husband] blatantly disregarded the Trial Court’s
instructions to be present at a hearing, which the Trial
Court specially listed for disposition of [Husband’s] Petition
and the Amended Petition. After judicial resources and
[Wife’s] time were wasted awaiting a response with
respect to whether [Husband] was appearing, [Husband’s]
counsel attempted to make “legal argument,” which
amounted to recitation of facts or which counsel had no
first-hand knowledge. At the conclusion of the March 10,
2016 hearing, the Trial Court instructed counsel to provide
case law in support of his argument, which [Husband] then
failed to provide. Indeed, after a whole day of hearing
[Husband’s] argument on March 10, 2016, [Husband]
appeared the very next day, March 11, 2016, abandoning
his initial argument of intrinsic fraud and spent another
day of testimony pursuing the theory of extrinsic fraud.
[Husband’s] new legal theory of “economic duress” as
extrinsic fraud was not supported by any case law or
testimony, in spite of the Trial Court providing [Husband]
additional time to craft a legal memorandum.
Finding [Husband’s] Amended Petition completely
without merit and unsupported by law, the Trial Court
accepted [Wife’s] Affidavit of [Counsel] fees, which counsel
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provided, requesting fees for approximately nine (9) hours.
As the bulk of that time was spent in court, litigating this
matter, the Trial Court had first-hand knowledge of the
time expended. The Trial Court therefore accepted
[Wife’s] Affidavit of [Counsel] fees as reasonable. As for
[Husband’s] ability to pay the [counsel] fee, testimony was
presented at the hearing or previous hearings that
[Husband] earns in excess of $100,000.00 a year.
Id. at 7-8. We conclude this was not an abuse of discretion.
In his third issue, Husband claims the trial court should have
addressed his motion to recuse before ruling on the amended petition.6
On March 8, 2016, Husband filed a motion to recuse Judge Cartisano.7
The caption of this motion states “[i]n custody,” rather than “in divorce.”
Judge Cartisano did not rule on it prior to denying the amended petition to
vacate. At the end of the March 11, 2016 hearing, Judge Cartisano and the
parties agreed to re-schedule a hearing in the custody matter because
Husband had filed a notice of appeal in the custody matter, which divested
the trial court of jurisdiction. N.T., 3/11/16, at 120-22. The trial court also
discussed the motion to recuse, which it stated was filed in the custody
matter. Id. at 122.8 The trial court noted it would set a hearing for the
motion after this Court released the case. Id. Husband did not object. Id.
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6
Although we have found no order denying the recusal motion in the
certified record, the parties agree that Judge Cartisano eventually denied the
motion. Husband’s Br. at 40; Wife’s Br. at 7.
7
This case was re-assigned to Judge Cartisano in October 2015,
following the recusal of the Honorable Barry C. Dozer. 1925(a) Op. at 2.
8
On March 14, 2016, Wife filed a response to the motion to recuse.
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at 122-23. Based on this procedural posture, we conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in not addressing the motion prior to ruling on the
amended motion to vacate.
In his fourth issue, Husband claims the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to create a constructive trust.
At the hearing on the amended petition to vacate, Husband made an
oral motion for a constructive trust. The trial court noted that Husband
could not request a constructive trust by oral motion, stating: “What is
before me is a Petition to Open the Divorce Decree because of fraud. That
may or may not be pertinent, but it’s the petition that’s been filed.” N.T.,
3/11/16, at 7. The trial court denied the motion, but stated: “[Y]ou have
the right to file, if you feel that section is pertinent.” Id. at 8.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
oral motion for constructive trust and informing Husband he could file an
petition seeking a constructive trust if pertinent.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/14/2017
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