Com. v. McGinnis, V. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S82032-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    v.                              :
    :
    VERNON EARL MCGINNIS,                     :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 824 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the PCRA Order May 17, 2017,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County,
    Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000547-1996
    BEFORE:        BENDER, P.J.E., STEVENS, P.J.E.*, and STRASSBURGER, J.**
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                  FILED JANUARY 23, 2018
    Vernon Earl McGinnis (Appellant) pro se appeals from the May 17,
    2017 order which denied his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post
    Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.1
    “Appellant pled guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced
    immediately to life imprisonment on April 9, 1997. Appellant did not file a
    direct appeal. Rather, on March 15, 2000, Appellant filed a petition for writ
    1
    Also before us is a letter from Appellant, received by this Court on
    December 4, 2017. In this letter, Appellant averred it had been two weeks
    since the Commonwealth’s brief was due and he had yet to receive a copy.
    Thus, Appellant sought to inquire with this Court whether he would still have
    the opportunity to file a reply brief. A review of the record reveals that the
    Commonwealth did file its brief on November 16, 2017. However, it appears
    from the certificate of service, that while the Commonwealth sent a copy to
    Appellant, it was sent to the incorrect address. Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.
    This Court is unaware if Appellant has since received a copy of the brief.
    Regardless, in light of the issues presented on appeal, the argument set
    forth in Appellant’s brief and our disposition, a reply brief from Appellant
    would not alter this Court’s decision. Thus, we deny Appellant’s request for
    relief.
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court
    **Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S82032-17
    of habeas corpus, which the trial court treated as a PCRA petition.”
    Commonwealth         v.   McGinnis,    
    959 A.2d 969
        (Pa.    Super.    2008)
    (unpublished memorandum). The PCRA court ultimately denied Appellant’s
    petition.   “Over a year later, Appellant sought to appeal the denial of his
    PCRA petition nunc pro tunc, and the [PCRA] court granted his request.” 
    Id. However, on
    appeal, this Court treated Appellant’s request for                   the
    reinstatement of his PCRA appellate rights as his second PCRA petition, and
    affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s first PCRA petition.
    Commonwealth        v.    McGinnis,    
    844 A.2d 1284
       (Pa.     Super.   2003)
    (unpublished memorandum).
    Since then Appellant has filed numerous petitions.            Pertinent to this
    appeal, on March 29, 2017, Appellant pro se filed his tenth PCRA petition.
    The PCRA court filed a notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a
    hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and Appellant promptly filed a
    response. On May 17, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed the petition.
    Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the
    PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Appellant raises two
    substantive claims for relief. See Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Before we may consider the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must
    determine whether his PCRA petition was timely filed, as the timeliness of a
    post-conviction petition is jurisdictional.   Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    12 A.3d 477
    , 479 (Pa. Super. 2011).       Generally, a petition for relief under the
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    J-S82032-17
    PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one
    year of the date the judgment of sentence is final unless the petition alleges,
    and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition
    is met. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545.
    It is clear that Appellant’s petition is facially untimely; his judgment of
    sentence became final in 1997. However, Appellant alleges that his petition
    is based upon a change in the law, referencing Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
    , 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
    136 S. Ct. 718
    (2016). Appellant’s Brief at 6. Based on the foregoing case law, Appellant
    contends the following timeliness exception applies: “the right asserted is a
    constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
    States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided
    in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Appellant’s Brief at 6.
    In Miller, the Court held “that mandatory life without parole for those
    under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
    Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual 
    punishments.’” 567 U.S. at 465
    (emphasis added). In Montgomery, the Court determined that Miller
    announced a new substantive rule of law that applies retroactively.
    
    Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736
    .
    Appellant was not a juvenile at the time of the murder; rather, he was
    18 years old. See Appellant’s Brief at 8 (“Appellant was 18 [years] old at the
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    J-S82032-17
    time of the crime...”).    Accordingly, Miller and Montgomery are not
    applicable to Appellant’s petition.    See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,
    
    2017 WL 5476640
    , at *14 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“Appellant acknowledges that
    he was eighteen years old at the time he committed the murder; however,
    he argues, nevertheless, that he may invoke Miller because his immature
    and/or impulsive brain made him similar to a juvenile. Thus, Appellant seeks
    an extension of Miller to persons convicted of murder who were older at the
    time of their crimes than the class of defendants subject to the Miller
    holding. However, this Court has previously rejected such an argument.”).
    Because Appellant did not plead facts that would establish an
    exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, the PCRA court properly
    dismissed   Appellant’s   petition    without   holding   a   hearing.   See
    Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 
    994 A.2d 1091
    , 1095 (Pa. 2010) (affirming
    dismissal of PCRA petition without a hearing because the appellant failed to
    meet burden of establishing timeliness exception).
    Order affirmed.
    -4-
    J-S82032-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/23/2018
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 824 WDA 2017

Filed Date: 1/23/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/23/2018