Com. v. Sigorenko, A. ( 2018 )

J-S83020-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
ANNA SIGORENKO,
Appellant No. 3798 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 9, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010627-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON AND DUBOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2018
Appellant, Anna Sigorenko, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on December 9, 2016. In this direct appeal, Appellant’s court-
appointed counsel filed both a petition to withdraw as counsel and an
accompanying brief pursuant to Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d
1185 (Pa. 1981), and its federal predecessor, Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967). We conclude that Appellant’s counsel complied with the
procedural requirements necessary to withdraw. Furthermore, after
independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the appeal is wholly
frivolous. We, therefore, grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the
judgment of sentence.
The factual background and procedural history of this case are as
follows. Early in the morning on August 29, 2015, Amanda Maraj (“Maraj”)
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left a restaurant and placed her wallet in her vehicle. She then spoke with
family for approximately two hours in the area around her vehicle. When
Maraj reentered her vehicle, her wallet was missing.
One week later Appellant contacted Maraj and informed her that she
knew who stole the wallet. When the two met, Appellant told Maraj that she
had some of the twenty credit cards that were in Maraj’s wallet and provided
the name of the alleged thief. Appellant also offered to return all of Maraj’s
property in exchange for $100.00. Maraj agreed to this arrangement and they
scheduled a later meeting. Prior to the scheduled meeting, Appellant
increased her demand to $120.00. Appellant was arrested when she, along
with her son, appeared to make the exchange with Maraj.
On November 2, 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant via
criminal information with receiving stolen property.1 On August 10, 2016,
Appellant was convicted of that offense. On December 9, 2016, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to one year of probation. This timely appeal followed.2
Appellant’s counsel raises one issues in his Anders brief:
Was the evidence sufficient to prove [Appellant] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt?
Anders Brief at viii.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).
2 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925.
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Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, we must first determine
whether counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural requirements for
withdrawing as counsel. See Commonwealth v. Blauser, 166 A.3d 428,
431 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). To withdraw under Anders, court-
appointed counsel
must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious
examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly
frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth
issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any
other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation
thereof. Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders
petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the
right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional
points worthy of this Court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 175 A.3d 345, 348 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned up).
If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the
responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the
proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal
is in fact wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 355
n.5 (Pa. 2009), quoting McClendon, 434 A.2d at 1187. It is only when both
the procedural and substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be
permitted to withdraw. In the case at bar, counsel has met all of the above
procedural obligations. We now turn to whether this appeal is wholly
frivolous.3
3 Appellant did not file a response to counsel’s Anders brief.
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The lone issue raised in counsel’s Anders brief is whether there was
sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of receiving stolen property. “The
determination of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a
question of law; accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 160 A.3d 127, 136 (Pa.
2017) (citation omitted). In assessing Appellant’s sufficiency challenge, we
must determine “whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the [Commonwealth], there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 806 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted). “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence. . . . [T]he finder of fact while
passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Waugaman, 167 A.3d 153, 155–156 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation omitted).
“The elements of receiving stolen property [are]: (1) intentionally
acquiring possession, control or title, retaining, disposing, or lending on the
security of movable property of another; (2) with knowledge or belief that it
was probably stolen; and (3) intent to deprive permanently.”
Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 807 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 72 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). In this case, the
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Commonwealth produced overwhelming evidence to prove all three elements.
First, Appellant was apprehended with Maraj’s moveable property and
Appellant admitted to possessing her moveable property. Second, Maraj
informed Appellant that the wallet was stolen. Nonetheless, Appellant
retained possession of the wallet. Finally, Appellant intended to permanently
deprive Maraj of her moveable property. Appellant had the opportunity to
return the wallet and its contents on two occasions but failed to do so.
Instead, she demanded that Maraj pay a ransom in exchange for return of the
property. At the third meeting, where Appellant was ultimately arrested, she
had her son hold the wallet while she attempted to extort funds from Maraj in
exchange for the wallet. Hence, any argument that the evidence was
insufficient is wholly frivolous.
In sum, we conclude that the sole issue raised in counsel’s Anders brief
is wholly frivolous. Furthermore, after an independent review of the entire
record, we conclude that no other issue of arguable merit exists. Therefore,
we grant counsel’s request to withdraw. Having determined that the sole issue
raised on appeal is frivolous, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment of sentence
affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/8/18
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