Com. v. Parks, J. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S54038-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    JORDAN M. PARKS                          :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 459 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 1, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-43-CR-0000552-2017
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                      FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2018
    Jordan M. Parks (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed after he pled guilty to a single count of involuntary deviate sexual
    intercourse (IDSI).     Appellant claims that his standard-range sentence is
    excessive. Upon review, we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the factual and procedural background of
    this case as follows:
    [Appellant] was charged with multiple counts of involuntary
    deviate sexual intercourse, rape, aggravated indecent assault,
    and indecent assault. On January 10, 2018, [Appellant] entered
    a plea of guilty to one count of Involuntary Deviate Sexual
    Intercourse, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b), a felony of the
    first degree. Pursuant to the plea agreement and on motion of
    the Commonwealth, the balance of the charges were nol prossed.
    On March 1, 2018, [Appellant] was sentenced to six (6) to
    twelve (12) years of imprisonment in a state correctional facility
    with credit for 333 days’ time served. On March 9, 2018,
    [Appellant] filed a Motion to Modify Sentence, claiming the
    J-S54038-18
    sentence of the Court was manifestly excessive in length. This
    Court denied [Appellant’s] motion that same day. On March 29,
    2018, [Appellant] filed a timely Notice of Appeal and this Court
    entered an order that [Appellant] file a concise Statement of
    Errors Complained of on appeal. On April 10, 2018, [Appellant]
    timely filed his Statement of Errors Complained of on appeal.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/18, at 1-2.
    On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review:
    That the sentenc[ing] court erred when it sentenced
    [Appellant] to a term of imprisonment in a state correctional
    facility of not less than six (6) years nor more than twelve (12)
    years after he entered a plea of guilt[y] to one count involuntary
    deviate sexual intercourse (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b)).
    Appellant’s Brief at 7.
    Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.           Our
    standard of review when considering a discretionary aspects of sentencing
    claim is as follows:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge. The standard employed when reviewing the
    discretionary aspects of sentencing is very narrow. We may
    reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or
    committed an error of law. A sentence will not be disturbed on
    appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
    abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
    Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
    that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
    its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We must accord
    the sentencing court’s decision great weight because it was in the
    best position to review the defendant’s character, defiance or
    indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.
    Commonwealth v. Cook, 
    941 A.2d 7
    , 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal
    quotations and citations omitted).
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    J-S54038-18
    “The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
    is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 
    91 A.3d 1247
    , 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014),
    appeal denied, 
    104 A.3d 1
     (Pa. 2014). “An appellant must satisfy a four-
    part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary
    aspects of a sentence.”    
    Id.
       We conduct this four-part test to determine
    whether:
    (1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the
    time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the
    appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth
    a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of
    his appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant
    raises a substantial question for our review.
    Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    72 A.3d 652
    , 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
    omitted), appeal denied, 
    86 A.3d 231
     (Pa. 2014). “A defendant presents a
    substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the
    sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the
    fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Dodge,
    
    77 A.3d 1263
    , 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted),
    appeal denied, 
    91 A.3d 161
     (Pa. 2014).
    Appellant has complied with the first three prongs of the discretionary
    aspect test to invoke our jurisdiction. See Appellant’s Brief at 3, 12-13. We
    thus proceed to determine whether he has raised a substantial question.
    Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the
    appropriateness of a sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-case
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    basis. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    961 A.2d 877
    , 879 (Pa. Super. 2008),
    appeal denied, 
    968 A.3d 1280
     (Pa. 2009).
    Appellant argues that his 6 to 12 year sentence was manifestly
    excessive because he was “a minor himself” when he committed IDSI, and
    “the relationship [with the victim] continued after he became an adult. Years
    later the victim made a statement which led to charges in this case.”
    Appellant’s Brief at 11, 15. Appellant maintains that the trial court imposed
    an unreasonable sentence because:
    Here, [Appellant] was a minor at the commencement of his
    relationship with the victim. And though it continued after
    [Appellant] turned of legal age, his age and lack of sophistication
    called for a sentence that would not expose him to those who will
    pr[e]y on him in a state facility. Rather, a sentence in a county
    facility with a substantial period of parole and probation would
    protect the victim and the public as well as protect [Appellant]
    while meeting [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs.
    
    Id. at 15-16
    .
    Significantly, Appellant concedes that the trial court sentenced him
    within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.              
    Id. at 15
    .   The
    essence of his claim is that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
    consider mitigating factors, i.e., his youth and alleged vulnerability to
    incarceration in a state facility.      Appellant has failed to raise a substantial
    question.1
    ____________________________________________
    1 The Commonwealth has               arrived     at   the   same   conclusion.    See
    Commonwealth Brief at 4, 6.
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    J-S54038-18
    When an appellant has been sentenced in the standard range, “a claim
    that the court failed to consider certain mitigating factors does not present a
    substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 171 (Pa.
    Super. 2010); see also Commonwealth v Ventura, 
    975 A.2d 1128
    , 1135
    (Pa. Super. 2009) (a sentence within the guidelines is presumed to be
    reasonable).
    In addition, the court in this case had the benefit of a pre-sentence
    investigation report.    N.T., 3/1/18, at 13.       It is well-settled that where a
    sentencing court imposes a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a pre-
    sentence      report,   we    will    not    consider   the    sentence   excessive.
    Commonwealth v. Corley, 
    31 A.3d 293
    , 298 (Pa. Super. 2011). “In those
    circumstances, we can assume the sentencing court ‘was aware of relevant
    information    regarding     the     defendant’s   character   and   weighed   those
    considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.’” 
    Id.
     (citations
    omitted).
    Finally, this Court has repeatedly held that “an allegation that the trial
    court failed to consider particular circumstances or factors in an appellant’s
    case go to the weight accorded to various sentencing factors and do not raise
    a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 
    78 A.3d 1
    , 10–11
    (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam), aff’d, 
    125 A.3d 394
     (Pa. 2013);
    see also Commonwealth v. Cannon, 
    954 A.2d 1222
    , 1228–1230 (Pa.
    Super. 2008) (claim that trial court failed to consider appellant’s rehabilitative
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    J-S54038-18
    needs, age, and educational background did not present substantial question),
    appeal denied, 
    964 A.2d 893
     (Pa. 2009).
    Even if Appellant had presented a substantial question, it is well-settled
    that:
    [W]e can reverse a standard-range sentence only if the sentence
    is clearly unreasonable when viewed in light of the four statutory
    factors outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d). Commonwealth v.
    Walls, 
    592 Pa. 557
    , 
    926 A.2d 957
    , 963–964 (2007); see also
    Commonwealth v. Macias, 
    968 A.2d 773
     (Pa. Super. 2009).
    Section 9781(d) provides that when we review this type of
    question, we have regard for:
    (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history and characteristics of the defendant.
    (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
    defendant, including any presentence investigation.
    (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
    (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
    Walls, supra at 963. Furthermore, “rejection of a sentencing
    court’s imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds
    [should] occur infrequently, whether the sentence is above or
    below the guidelines ranges.” Macias, supra at 777 (quoting
    Walls, 
    supra at 964
    ).
    Commonwealth v. Corley, 
    31 A.3d at 298
    .
    It is evident from the record that – contrary to Appellant’s argument –
    the trial court at sentencing considered “the nature and circumstances of the
    offense and the history and characteristics” of Appellant, including his youth
    and rehabilitative needs. The Commonwealth requested a sentence of 7 to
    14 years. N.T., 3/1/18, at 6. The trial court noted that it had read “numerous
    -6-
    J-S54038-18
    letters from [Appellant].” Id. at 9. Appellant’s counsel2 referenced the pre-
    sentence investigation report and stated:
    [Appellant] acknowledges that there was to be a sentence
    recommendation at the time he entered the plea, but he’s
    informing me that he was under the impression that Attorney
    Goodwin would present some issues before the Court and ask the
    Court to consider a lesser sentence, perhaps even a county
    sentence. . . . [H]e indicated that one of the issues is that he was
    a juvenile at the time of this incident; that he now has an
    eighteen-month old son and is anticipating marriage.
    Id. at 12-13.
    The trial court responded that Appellant, “in his letters, is very detailed
    about his situation. And so everything that you just mentioned I was aware
    of and did take into consideration when thinking about the sentence.” Id. at
    13. The trial court also addressed the impact of the offense on the victim and
    the community, as well as Appellant’s criminal history and his rehabilitative
    needs.     For example, the trial court recognized “a need to protect the
    community” because Appellant “certainly has been involved in a large amount
    of criminality for his young age.” Id. at 14-15.
    In addition, the trial court explained:
    At sentencing, after discussion with the parties, this Court
    stated that it would sentence [Appellant] with an Offense Gravity
    Score of fourteen (14) and a Prior Record Score of one (1), making
    the standard range seventy-two (72) to two hundred forty (240)
    months. In imposing the sentence, the Court considered all the
    ____________________________________________
    2 Appellant has been represented by the Mercer County Public Defender’s
    Office throughout this case. Attorney Goodwin represented Appellant at the
    plea hearing and on appeal; Attorney Williams represented Appellant at
    sentencing.
    -7-
    J-S54038-18
    relevant factors, including [Appellant’s] entire file, pre-sentence
    investigation, any letters sent on [Appellant’s] behalf, any
    information presented by the Commonwealth or victims, and any
    other pertinent documentation, as well as all applicable law,
    including the sentencing guidelines. The Court considered the
    impact on the victim and the community, noting that the victim
    was under thirteen (13) years old at the time and emphasizing the
    importance of protecting children and families in the community.
    While there was no victim impact statement, the Court considered
    that the victim had difficulty writing one and was uncomfortable
    making one at the hearing due to the nature of the incident. The
    Court also understood that the victim felt that she and [Appellant]
    were a couple at the time of the incident. The Court also
    considered the need to protect the community and the
    rehabilitative needs of [Appellant], stating that his rehabilitative
    needs would be best served at a state correctional facility. The
    Court additionally asked [Appellant] about his current age,
    education and family, taking into consideration that he has an
    eighteen (18) month old child and is engaged.
    . . . The Court’s sentence was both less than the Commonwealth’s
    recommendation, and within [the] standard range. The Court
    made [the] appropriate consideration of all relevant factors.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/29/18, at 2-3.
    For all of these reasons, we find no merit to Appellant’s claim that his
    sentence was excessive.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/20/2018
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