Com. v. Bohannon, T. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S29024-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    TYREE BOHANNON                             :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2514 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the PCRA Order August 30, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0003140-2008, CP-51-CR-0003141-2008
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS,* P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 04, 2018
    Tyree Bohannon (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing
    his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 1 (PCRA). We
    affirm.2
    On September 22, 2007, Appellant shot Darren Deter and Deter’s
    girlfriend, Eileena Henry, outside a restaurant in Philadelphia.       One of the
    bullets severed Deter’s spinal column, causing him to be quadriplegic, as well
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    2 Upon Appellant’s request for an extension of time, this Court ordered that
    he file a brief on or before December 20, 2017. Appellant, however, filed an
    untimely brief on December 27, 2017. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth has
    not objected. See Pa.R.A.P. 2188 (if appellant fails to file his brief within the
    time as extended, appellee may move for dismissal).
    J-S29024-18
    as dependent on a ventilator and a pacemaker. Another bullet passed through
    Deter’s chest and struck Henry in the arm. With respect to Deter, Appellant
    was charged at docket CP-51-CR-0003140-2008 with, inter alia, attempted
    murder and carrying a firearm without a license. Appellant was also charged
    at CP-51-CR-0003141-2008 with aggravated assault against Henry. We refer
    to these two dockets together (2008 case).
    On December 8, 2008, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to the
    above charges, and on the same day, the trial court imposed the negotiated
    sentence: 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for attempted murder, 3 years and 6
    months to 7 years’ imprisonment for firearms not to be carried without a
    license, and 5 to 10 years for aggravated assault, all to run concurrently. The
    court also awarded Appellant credit for time served. Appellant did not take a
    direct appeal.
    Four years later, on December 13, 2011, Deter died as a result of the
    injuries he sustained in the shooting. Consequently, Appellant was charged
    with general homicide at docket CP-51-CR-0002619-2013 (2013 case). On
    October 28, 2013, he entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder.
    On the same day, the trial court imposed the negotiated sentence: 15 to 40
    years’ imprisonment, to run concurrently with the sentences in his 2008 case,
    with no credit for time served.3 Appellant did not take an appeal.
    ____________________________________________
    3   The Honorable Gwendolyn N. Bright presided over the 2008 case, as well as
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    On September 4, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se “motion to correct illegal
    sentence” in the 2008 case, arguing, inter alia, that his attempted murder
    sentence violated double jeopardy because a defendant cannot be convicted
    of both attempted murder and third-degree murder for the same conduct.
    Appellant subsequently filed a pro se motion seeking credit for time served in
    his 2008 case. On October 31, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se motion, which
    listed both the 2008-case and 2013-case docket numbers, to vacate an illegal
    sentence.
    On November 14, 2014, the trial court denied Appellant’s October 31,
    2014 motion, and Appellant appealed.4            On January 12, 2016, this Court
    vacated the trial court’s order, holding that Appellant’s motion should have
    been treated as a first PCRA petition, and remanded for the appointment of
    counsel.    Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 3561 EDA 2014 (unpublished
    memorandum) (Pa. Super. Jan. 12, 2016).
    Although the record transmitted on appeal does not include any order
    appointing counsel nor entry of appearance, the trial docket indicates that
    Lawrence Bozzelli, Esquire, was appointed and directed to file an amended
    ____________________________________________
    the instant PCRA petition. The Honorable Benjamin J. Lerner presided over
    the 2013 case.
    4There is no indication in the record or trial docket that the court ruled on
    Appellant’s two additional motions.
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    J-S29024-18
    petition or Turner/Finley5 letter. Furthermore, although there is neither an
    original Turner/Finley letter in the record nor a docket entry indicating that
    one was filed, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to
    dismiss on June 24, 2016, stating that Appellant’s counsel filed a
    Turner/Finley letter.6 On August 30, 2016, the court dismissed Appellant’s
    petition, finding that it was untimely filed and, in the alternative, there was
    no merit to his claims. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/7/16, at 4-8.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, which listed both the 2008 case
    and 2013 case docket numbers.              Although the PCRA court did not order
    Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, as referenced above, it filed
    an opinion on November 7, 2017. On January 12, 2018, this Court issued a
    per curiam order, which quashed the appeal taken at the 2013 case as having
    been taken from a purported order that was not in fact entered upon the
    appropriate docket in the PCRA court.            Accordingly, only the appeal in the
    2008 case is properly before this Court.
    ____________________________________________
    5Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    6 A copy of PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley letter appears as an exhibit to
    Appellant’s untimely, March, 13, 2017 response to the Turner/Finley letter.
    In the Turner/Finley letter, Attorney Bozzelli opined that double jeopardy did
    not bar Appellant’s 2013 homicide charge because his prior offense, attempted
    murder, was different as the victim, Deter, had not died. Attorney Bozzelli
    further noted that Pennsylvania Courts have held that aggravated assault does
    not merge with attempted murder for sentencing purposes.                  See
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    874 A.2d 66
    , 71-72 (Pa. Super. 2005).
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    J-S29024-18
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    Did the Lower Court[ err] in not crediting Appellant with all time
    spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and
    pending the resolution of an appeal as it applies to charges under
    information number CP-51-CR-0003140-2008?
    Did the Lower Court[ err] in recharging and resentencing
    Appellant, void of time credit, under docket number CP-51-CR-
    0002619-2013 when he was already sentenced under docket
    number CP-51-CR-0003140-2008, and both offenses arose out of
    a single act of violence and had one victim?
    Did the Trial Court violate Appellant’s rights in regard to the
    Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses when Appellant was
    already convicted of Attempted First Degree Murder, then was
    recharged, and resentenced for the lesser offense of Third Degree
    Murder, when the case and facts arose out of one single act and
    had one victim?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    For ease of discussion, we summarize Appellant’s arguments. In his
    first issue, he avers that trial court failed to award him credit in the 2008 case
    for all pre-trial confinement.   Appellant contends that he was arrested in
    Georgia on November 21, 2007 on unrelated charges, those charges were
    subsequently dropped, but he was then held on a detainer for the instant 2008
    Pennsylvania charges. He maintains that he should have been given credit
    retroactive to the date his Georgia charges were dropped.
    Appellant’s   second   issue   is   whether   the   trial   court   erred   in
    “resentencing” him in the 2013 case when he was already sentenced in the
    2008 case for the same act of violence against the same victim. Id. at 9.
    Appellant further avers that, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(2), he should
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    have been awarded credit in the 2008 case because he was “later
    reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense.” Id. at 11, citing 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(2) (“Credit . . . shall be given to the defendant for all time
    spent in custody under a prior sentence if he is later reprosecuted and
    resentenced for the same offense or for another offense based on the same
    act . . . .”).
    Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court violated the double
    jeopardy and due process clauses of the Constitution when it “recharged and
    resentenced [him] for the lesser offense of third degree murder, when the
    case and facts arose out of a single act and had one victim.” Appellant’s Brief
    at 12. Appellant thus argues that his 2013-case sentence is illegal.
    “The standard of review for an order denying post-conviction relief is
    limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and
    whether that decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Walters,
    
    135 A.3d 589
    , 591 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
    It is well-established that “the PCRA’s timeliness requirements are
    jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may
    not address the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not
    timely filed.” Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one
    year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final unless
    the petitioner meets his burden to plead and prove one of the
    exceptions enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii)[.]
    Id. at 591-92.     “Although legality of sentence is always subject to review
    within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of
    the exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 
    737 A.2d 214
    , 223 (Pa.
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    J-S29024-18
    1999).
    We first consider the PCRA court’s finding that Appellant’s PCRA petition
    was untimely. See also Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-14 (arguing same). In
    the prior appeal, this Court noted that Appellant’s judgment of sentence
    became final for PCRA purposes on January 7, 2009. Bohannon, 3561 EDA
    2014 at 2 n.2; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment becomes final
    at conclusion of direct review or at expiration of time for seeking review).
    Appellant had one year, until January 7, 2010, to file a PCRA petition. See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).    However, he did not file his motion to vacate an
    illegal sentence until more than four years and seven months later, on
    September 4, 2014. None of Appellant’s three motions acknowledged their
    untimeliness or presented any argument that one of the Section 9545(b)(1)
    timeliness exceptions should apply.     See Walters, 135 A.3d at 591-592.
    Accordingly, the PCRA court did not have jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s illegal
    sentence claims, and it did not err in dismissing Appellant’s petition as
    untimely. See Fahy, 
    737 A.2d at 223
    ; Walters, 135 A.3d at 591-92.
    Moreover, even if Appellant’s petition were timely filed, we would agree
    with the PCRA court that his double jeopardy claims lacked merit. See PCRA
    Court Opinion, 11/7/16, at 5 (Appellant’s double jeopardy rights were not
    violated in the 2008 case because he was properly tried for all offenses then
    known to the Commonwealth at that time, see Commonwealth v.
    Washington, 
    393 A.2d 3
    , 4 (Pa. 1978); Commonwealth v. Williams, 502
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    J-S29024-
    18 A.2d 227
    , 229 (Pa. Super. 1985)). For the same reasons, Appellant’s reliance
    on 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(2) — to argue that he was entitled to credit in the
    2008 case because of the subsequent 2013 conviction — is misguided. With
    respect to Appellant’s claim that he was not properly awarded credit for his
    confinement in Georgia, we reiterate that the sentencing order specified that
    he be given credit for any time served. Finally, we would also deny relief on
    Appellant’s challenge to his third-degree murder sentence because the 2013
    case is not properly before this Court.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/4/18
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2514 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 6/4/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/4/2018