Com. v. Moore, A. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALVIN MOORE :
:
Appellant : No. 735 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 24, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-40-CR-0003639-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT, J. *
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2018
Appellant Alvin Moore appeals from the judgment of sentence of forty
to eighty month’s imprisonment for failing to register as a sexual offender
under former Section 4915(a)(1).1 Appellant claims that his conviction must
be vacated in light of Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017).
We agree that we are constrained to vacate the judgment of sentence.
However, we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this memorandum.
The procedural and factual history of this appeal is not in dispute. On
April 16, 1998, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of rape and involuntary
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1).
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deviate sexual intercourse for offenses committed in 1993 (1998 conviction).
At the time of Appellant’s 1998 conviction, Megan’s Law I was in effect and
required him to register for ten years.2 In 2000, while Appellant was
incarcerated, Megan’s Law II took effect and required that Appellant register
for life.3
Appellant was released from incarceration in July 2005, when Megan’s
Law III was in effect. Upon Appellant’s release, a counselor informed him that
he needed to notify authorities of a change in residence within ten days.4
Appellant left Pennsylvania for Virginia and then moved to New York.
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2 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9795 (expired); see also Commonwealth v.
Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999) (rejecting an offender’s ex post facto
claim regarding Megan’s Law I).
3 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.9 (expired); see also Commonwealth v.
Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723, 725 (Pa. 2017) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(2)
(expired)); Commonwealth v. Anthony, 841 A.2d 542, 544-45 (Pa. Super.
2004) (rejecting an offender’s ex post facto claim regarding Megan’s Law II).
4 As noted in Derhammer,
[Lifetime registrants under Megan’s Law II] were given ten days
to notify the state police of address changes. See id. §
9795.2(a)(2) (2000). Any failure to make timely notification
constituted a first-degree felony, subjecting the registrant to a
mandatory minimum sentence of probation for life and to a
discretionary sentence of up to life in prison. Id. § 9795.2(d)(2)
(2000).[fn3]
[fn3]This
penalty provision was held to be unconstitutionally
punitive relative to persons classified as sexually violent
predators, as that status could be established without proof
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In 2012, the former version of the Sexual Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA)5 took effect. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41
(subsequently amended). Under SORNA, Appellant’s 1998 conviction was
classified as a Tier III offense and carried a lifetime registration requirement.6
See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.14(d), 9799.15(a)(3) (subsequently amended).
In August 2015, the Pittstown, Pennsylvania police department received
information that Appellant was residing at 20 Wilford Street in Pittstown. An
investigation revealed that Appellant was subject to a lifetime registration
requirement, was receiving mail at the Wilford Street residence, and was seen
staying at the residence, but had not registered a residence in Pennsylvania.
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to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See [Commonwealth
v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 985 (Pa. 2003)].
Derhammer, 173 A.3d at 725 & n.3.
5 For the purpose of this memorandum, SORNA refers to the former version
of the statute that was considered in Muniz. We note that the General
Assembly amended SORNA in response to Muniz in February of 2018, added
Subchapter I regarding sexual offenders who committed offenses before
December 20, 2012, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.51-9799.75, and created a new
failure to register provision for offenders required to register as required under
Subchapter I. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2. Currently, Section 4915.1 applies to
offenders who committed predicate crimes after December 20, 2012. Because
Appellant was convicted under former Section 4915.1, we do not consider the
applicability of these recent changes in the law.
6 SORNA created a new verification process requiring sexual offenders to
report a change of address in person within three days. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9799(g)(2). With SORNA taking effect, the former provision addressing the
failure to register, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915 (expired), was allowed to expire in 2012.
Section 4915.1 replaced former Section 4915.
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The police arrested Appellant on August 27, 2015, and Appellant was
initially charged under an expired version of the failing to register provision.
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915 (expired). The Commonwealth amended the charge
to former section 4915.1(a)(1), which was in force at that time.
Appellant proceeded to a nonjury trial at which the Commonwealth
presented the testimony of the investigating detective and a mail carrier.
Additionally, the Commonwealth admitted evidence that Appellant reviewed
and signed a Megan’s Law notification packet when he was released from
prison in 2005.7
Appellant testified that he maintained a residence in New York and was
merely visiting his friend, Sabrina Keating, at the Wilford Street address.
Appellant maintained that he was only thinking about moving back to
Pennsylvania when he was arrested. Keating testified in support of Appellant’s
claim that he would visit overnight, but did not reside at the Wilford Street
residence.
The trial court found Appellant guilty of violating Section 4915.1(a)(1).
On March 24, 2017, the court sentenced Appellant to forty to eighty months’
imprisonment. Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which the court
denied on April 21, 2017.
Appellant timely appealed. On June 28, 2017, after obtaining an
extension of time, Appellant filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement purporting to
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7At trial, the Commonwealth proceeded as if Appellant had failed to register
under the ten-day update period in effect at the time of Appellant’s release.
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challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in light of his and Keating’s
testimony. Three weeks later, on July 19, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decided Muniz. Appellant did not seek leave to file an amended Rule
1925(b) statement in the trial court.
On November 21, 2017, the trial court filed an opinion responding to
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement. On January 8, 2018, Appellant filed an
application for relief in this Court seeking remand for the filing of a
supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement to include an issue based on Muniz.
Alternatively, Appellant sought leave to raise Muniz in his brief. This Court
granted Appellant leave to address the applicability of Muniz in his brief.8
Order, 1/12/18.
Appellant raises the following issue for review: “Whether Appellant’s
conviction under [SORNA] violate[s] the Ex Post Facto clauses of the
Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions.” Appellant’s Brief at 1.
Appellant asserts that Muniz “held that the provisions of SORNA which
obligate a person to register, verify or provide information to the Pennsylvania
State Police cannot apply retroactively where an underlying sexual offense
occurred prior to December 20, 2012.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). From
this, Appellant argues that he “never should have been subject to SORNA’s
requirements and cannot be punished for failure to abide by [those
requirements].” Id. at 7.
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8Given this procedural history, the trial court did not have an opportunity to
address Appellant’s Muniz claim.
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The Commonwealth does not contest Appellant’s assertion that SORNA
should not apply retroactively to him. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 6. The
Commonwealth suggests, however, that Appellant’s claim based on Muniz
must be raised as a collateral challenge to his 1998 conviction. Id.
We regard Appellant’s arguments as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence.9 See Appellant’s Brief at 7 (asserting that Appellant cannot be
punished for his failure to comply with a registration requirement that did not
apply to him). Thus,
we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well
as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support
all the elements of the offense. Additionally, to sustain a
conviction, the facts and circumstances which the Commonwealth
must prove, must be such that every essential element of the
crime is established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted). All issues raised in this appeal involve questions of law. Thus, the
standard of our review is de novo, and the scope of our review is plenary. See
Commonwealth v. Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1266 (Pa. 2016);
Commonwealth v. Horning, ___ A.3d ___, 2018 Pa. Super. 204, 2018 WL
3372367, at *2 (filed July 11, 2018); Commonwealth v. Giron, 155 A.3d
635, 638 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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9 Because Appellant’s claim goes to the sufficiency of the evidence, we discern
no merit to the Commonwealth’s argument that Appellant’s challenge to the
instant conviction must be deferred to a post-conviction collateral proceeding
related to the 1998 conviction.
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Section 4915.1 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Offense defined.—An individual who is subject to
registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 (relating to applicability)
commits an offense if he knowingly fails to:
(1) register with the Pennsylvania State Police as required
under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15 (relating to period of
registration), 9799.19 (relating to initial registration) or
9799.25 (relating to verification by sexual offenders and
Pennsylvania State Police)[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the failure to register “as
required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15” is an element of the offense under
Section 4915.1(a). See 18 Pa.C.S. § 103 (defining an element of an offense
as conduct or an attendant circumstance that is “included in the description of
the forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense”).
At the time of Appellant’s conviction, Section 9799.15 set forth the
following relevant requirement:
(g) In-person appearance to update information.—In
addition to the periodic in-person appearance . . . an individual
specified in section 9799.13 [as a sexual offender required to
register] shall appear in person at an approved registration site
within three business days to provide current information relating
to:
***
(2) A commencement of residence, change in residence,
termination of residence or failure to maintain a residence, thus
making the individual a transient.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g)(2).
Although not in dispute in the present appeal, the following background
to Muniz is relevant. In Muniz, the offender was found guilty of indecent
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assault in 2007. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1193. Sentencing was initially scheduled
for May 8, 2007, at which time the offender would have been subject to a ten-
year registration period under Megan’s Law III. Id. However, before
sentencing, the offender fled Pennsylvania and was not returned to the
Pennsylvania until 2014, at which time SORNA was in effect and required the
imposition of a lifetime registration requirement. Id. After sentencing, the
offender filed a post-sentence motion claiming that a ten-year registration
period applied, which the trial court denied. Id. This Court affirmed the
offender’s conviction.
Five of the six participating justices in Muniz10 concluded that SORNA
constituted an ex post facto law.11 See id. at 1218 (Dougherty, J., with Baer
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10Justice Dougherty authored the lead opinion in Muniz, which Justices Baer
and Donahue joined. Justices Wecht and Todd joined parts of the lead opinion,
and Justice Wecht filed a concurring opinion, which Justice Todd joined. Chief
Justice Saylor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Mundy did not participate.
11 When considering whether a law violates ex post facto principles, a court
follows a two-part test. See Williams, 832 A.2d at 971. First, a court must
consider “whether the legislature’s intent was to impose punishment[.]” Id.
Second, if the intent was not to impose punishment, a court considers
“whether the statutory scheme is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate the legislature’s non-punitive intent.” Id. A court’s
analysis of the second part of the test is guided by multiple factors, including:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as
punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
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and Donahue, JJ. joining) (“the retroactive application of SORNA to appellant
violate[d] the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution”) & 1223
(holding that “SORNA’s registration provisions [were] also unconstitutional
under the state [ex post facto] clause”); id. at 1224 ( (Wecht, J., concurring,
with Todd, J. joining) (“the retroactive application of [SORNA] violates Article
I, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution”). Notably, the majority of
justices found it appropriate to consider SORNA as a whole and concluded that
the registration requirements, as well as the publication requirements, favored
finding that SORNA is “punitive in effect despite its expressed civil remedial
purpose.” Id. at 1208-18; see also id. at 1224.
More recently, in Horning, this Court followed Muniz and concluded the
application of the former version of SORNA was unconstitutional as applied to
an offender who committed crimes including rape and involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse between 2002 and 2004. Horning, 2018 WL 3372367 at
*1-2. At the time of the offender committed his crimes in Horning, Megan’s
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assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned.
Id. at 973 (reciting the factors enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza–
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
Further, a penal law must be “retrospective,” disadvantage a defendant, and
fall within one of four categories of ex post facto laws recognized in Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1195-96 (citation omitted). A
law that “changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,” than
the prior law is recognized as an ex post facto law. Id. at 1195 (citation
omitted).
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Law II was in effect and required that he register for life. Id. at *4. The
offender pled to the guilty to charges and was sentenced in 2017. Id. at *1-
2. At that time, the offender was ordered to register for life under the former
version of SORNA. Id. at *2. This Court concluded:
While SORNA did not enhance the registration period for [the
offenses], it did augment the registration requirements for all Tier
III offenders, which included quarterly in-person reporting and the
posting of their personal information on the Pennsylvania State
Police website. As our Supreme Court pointed out in Muniz, these
additional registration requirements constitute a greater
punishment than what Megan’s Law would have imposed and
consequently, their retroactive application violates the ex post
facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Id. at *5 (citations and italics omitted).
Returning to the specific issue in this appeal, Appellant’s conviction for
failing to register under former Section 4915.1(a)(1) required the
Commonwealth to prove that Appellant failed to register “as required under
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15.” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1). However, Appellant,
like the offenders in Muniz and Horning, committed the underlying sexual
offenses before the enactment of SORNA.
Thus, pursuant to Muniz, Appellant could not have been required to
comply with SORNA, including Section 9799.15, without violating the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. See Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1223 (vacating
that portion of the sentence requiring the offender to comply with SORNA);
Horning, 2018 WL 3372367 at *5. It follows that Appellant could not be
convicted for failing to register as required under SORNA, when imposing a
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duty to do so would be unconstitutional. Therefore, we conclude that
Appellant’s conviction for failing to register under former section 4915.1 must
be vacated.
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Appellant committed rape and
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in 1993 for which he was convicted in
1998. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court to determine and,
if necessary, notify Appellant of his registration requirements.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for proceedings
consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/26/2018
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