Com. v. Jean, J. ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J-A21014-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                           :
    :
    JOSHUA JEAN,                              :
    :
    Appellant               :           No. 2959 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 14, 2014
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
    Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0013192-2013
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    CONCURRING STATEMENT BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 22, 2016
    I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that, where the prosecutor had
    elicited testimony regarding Appellant’s prior arrest (or incarceration),
    defense counsel’s decision to forego a curative instruction waived Appellant’s
    ability to plead prejudice on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Norman, 
    549 A.2d 981
    , 986 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth v.
    Miller, 
    481 A.2d 1221
     (Pa. Super. 1221 (Pa. Super. 1984), and concluding
    that, “[w]hen counsel chooses to refuse appropriate curative instructions for
    [a] legitimate tactical reason, the defense may not plead prejudice on
    appeal.”).    I write separately to express my disagreement with the
    conclusions reached by this Court in Norman and Miller.
    A trial court may grant a mistrial “only where the incident upon which
    the motion is based is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to
    deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing
    J-A21014-16
    and rendering a true verdict.”   Commonwealth v. Cash, 
    137 A.3d 1262
    ,
    1273 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).     However, our Supreme Court has
    concluded that “‘[a] mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions
    are adequate to overcome prejudice.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Chamberlain, 
    30 A.3d 381
    , 422 (Pa. 2011)).
    Absent a defendant’s confession, nothing can be more damaging and
    prejudicial to a defendant than testimony regarding a defendant’s prior
    arrest or conviction.   In my 35 years of judicial experience, once a jury
    learns of a defendant’s prior conviction, the presumption of innocence, in
    reality, disappears.    The impact of such testimony is immediate, and
    prevents the jury “from weighing and rendering a true verdict.” See Cash,
    137 A.3d at 1273. The remedy of a “curative” instruction is illusory, as it
    cannot overcome the impact of such testimony on a jury.
    Judge Dubow joins this concurring statement.
    -2-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2959 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 11/22/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/22/2016