Com. v. Floyd, T. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S17024-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    TRACEY FLOYD, SR.
    Appellant                No. 403 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 25, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0012517-2014
    BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                               FILED MAY 17, 2017
    Appellant Tracey Floyd, Sr. appeals from the November 25, 2015
    judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
    County (“trial court”), following his bench convictions for carrying a firearm
    without a license and carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia.1
    Upon review, we affirm.
    The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly,
    on October 7, 2014, City of Philadelphia Police Officer Judith Kinniry
    observed, in plain view, an open bottle of alcohol in Appellant’s vehicle.
    When Officer Kinniry attempted to retrieve the bottle from inside the vehicle,
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1) and 6108, respectively.
    J-S17024-17
    she discovered a gun. Appellant subsequently was charged with the above-
    referenced offenses.
    On March 17, 2015, Appellant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that
    the police did not have probable cause to search his vehicle.     On July 9,
    2015, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing.     It summarized in
    detail the facts elicited at the hearing as follows:
    Philadelphia Police Sergeant John McGinley, assigned to
    the Advance Training Unit, testified that on October 17, 2014, at
    approximately 1:30 p.m., he performed his tour of duty in the
    6300 North 21st Street area of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
    Officer McGinley stated that he first came in contact with
    [Appellant], Tracey Floyd, Sr., and his son, Tracey Floyd, Jr.,
    when he was flagged down in his patrol car. He noted that he
    pulled over to speak to [Appellant] at which time [Appellant]
    informed him of the landlord/tenant dispute and that the person
    [Appellant] had the issue with was traveling eastbound on
    Chelten Avenue.        Sergeant McGinley stated the person
    [Appellant] had the landlord/tenant dispute with was then
    stopped. He testified that he then called for backup because
    there were two vehicles stopped.
    On cross-examination by Defense Counsel Daniel Alva,
    representing [Appellant], Sergeant McGinley testified that while
    he could not recall precisely how [Appellant] flagged him down,
    it was by either standing on the sidewalk waving his hand or by
    getting his attention seated in his vehicle and gesturing out from
    the window. He further explained that he believed [Appellant]
    was alone in the vehicle but was uncertain. Officer McGinley
    testified there was a second vehicle which was occupied by the
    son, Tracey Floyd, Jr., and another male. He stated [Appellant]
    explained to him there was a previous landlord/tenant dispute at
    the location of 5826 Crittenden in which [Appellant] had called
    the police and the police investigated. Sergeant McGinley noted
    that the landlord /tenant dispute occurred in the 14th District
    where he was the patrol sergeant at the time.             He then
    corroborated [Appellant’s] information by verifying that officers
    did indeed respond to an incident at said location. Sergeant
    McGinley stated he was unaware of who requested police to
    respond to the landlord/tenant dispute.
    When questioned about Defense Exhibit 1 (D-1), . . .
    Sergeant McGinley testified that it was a complaint form
    prepared by Officer Czepiel for the Complainant, Tracey Floyd,
    Sr. at 4826 Crittenden Street and at 1:16 p.m.       Sergeant
    McGinley stated [Appellant] flagged him down shortly after the
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    J-S17024-17
    reported incident, though he could not recall the precise time.
    He explained the reason he called for backup was because there
    was another vehicle following behind [Appellant] with one male
    and female inside. Sergeant McGinley further explained that he
    requested for general backup which took approximately a minute
    to arrive. He noted that while he was waiting for backup, there
    was a verbal dispute between [Appellant] and the male and
    female in the second vehicle. Sergeant McGinley testified that
    two female officers arrived as his backup, Officers Martinsen and
    Kinniry. He stated he did not provide the officers with any
    instruction once they arrived. Instead, he attempted to ensure
    [Appellant] and the two individuals in the second vehicle
    remained separated because they were “yelling and screaming.”
    Sergeant McGinley explained that he was the supervisor on the
    scene of the incident.
    He further explained that if he gave any instruction to the
    two female officers it was to keep [Appellant] and the other two
    apart. Sergeant McGinley stated that [Appellant] was standing
    on the corner of 21st Street and Chelten Avenue and they spoke
    with thirty (30) and forty (40) feet between them. He testified
    that [Appellant] was not his complainant at the time of the
    incident because he was attempting to determine what had
    occurred and ensure that the individuals in the second vehicle
    were unarmed. Sergeant McGinley explained that after speaking
    with [Appellant], he patted down Tracey Floyd, Jr. to make sure
    it was safe for the other officers, himself, and [Appellant].
    On cross-examination by Defense Counsel Jeremy Alva
    representing Tracey Floyd, Jr., Sergeant McGinley testified that
    once he separated [Appellant] and the other person from the
    second car, he believed that Tracey Floyd, Jr. was stepping out
    from a smaller vehicle with another male passenger. Sergeant
    McGinley stated Tracey Floyd, Jr. was eventually standing on the
    sidewalk near himself, [Appellant], and the other male. He
    explained that while everyone was pacing back and forth on the
    sidewalk[, h]e did not know if Tracey Floyd, Jr. ever walked
    away from [Appellant], his father, or did anything else besides
    pacing, in part because there was a lot of activity. Sergeant
    McGinley noted that once Tracey Floyd, Jr. was standing on the
    sidewalk, he was approximately five (5) to fifteen (15) feet away
    from [Appellant’s] vehicle and he was “right next to it.” He
    explained he could not recall whether Tracey Floyd, Jr. was on
    the driver’s or the passenger’s side. Sergeant McGinley also
    noted he did not recall if Tracey Floyd, Jr. ever went into the car
    and added, “I’m not saying he did not either.”
    Philadelphia Police Officer Judith Kinniry, assigned to the
    35th District, testified that on October 17, 2014, at
    approximately 1:30 p.m., she performed her tour of duty in the
    6300 North 21st Street area of Philadelphia. She explained that
    she was there because she and her partner, Officer Martinsen,
    were called to backup 14th District officers. Officer Kinniry
    further explained that when she arrived at the scene Sergeant
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    J-S17024-17
    McGinley and another officer had stopped two vehicles. She
    testified that it was at the scene she came into contact with
    [Appellant] and his son, Tracey Floyd, Jr. Officer Kinniry stated
    that once she approached the scene Sergeant McGinley
    requested she obtain the identification of the males.         She
    explained that Tracey Floyd, Jr. did not have identification on
    him so they brought him over to the patrol car to further identify
    him. Officer Kinniry remarked that Tracey Floyd, Jr. was frisked
    for safety and that a set of brass knuckles were recovered.
    She testified that she had witnessed Tracey Floyd, Jr.
    going “in and out the rear of the vehicle,” which was a Ford
    Expedition.    She searched this area of the car where she
    observed Tracey Floyd, Jr. and saw from the window an open
    container of Colt 45 and retrieved it. Officer Kinniry stated the
    bottle was wrapped in a white t-shirt and when she pulled it out
    she felt something heavy and found a handgun wrapped inside.
    She explained that when she recovered the handgun,
    [Appellant], Tracey Floyd, Sr., was standing behind the vehicle
    and stated, “that is not mine. I didn’t even know it was there.”
    Officer Kinniry testified that he said these things without being
    asked. She said after recovering the handgun she continued her
    search of the car, went to the other side of the car, and
    recovered two knives. Officer Kinniry stated she then asked
    [Appellant] if there was any other weapons in the vehicle and
    [Appellant] replied, “there might be a gun in the trunk or the
    back hatch.” She testified [Appellant] gave his permission for
    her to search the back hatch. She noted that once she went to
    the back of the car, there was a blue bag. “It looked like one of
    those bank bags with a zipper and lock.” Officer Kinniry testified
    she recovered an unloaded .45 caliber Ruger from the bag and
    ammunition, six (6) nine (9) millimeter rounds, which was
    separated from the firearm.
    On cross-examination by Defense Counsel Jeremy Alva,
    Officer Kinniry stated she could not recall how long it took her to
    arrive at the scene from the time she received the backup call.
    She explained that once she arrived her patrol car was facing the
    same way as the other vehicles. While she could not remember
    the first thing she witnessed at the scene, she did remember
    seeing Tracey Floyd, Jr. stepping out from the rear of the
    vehicle. Officer Kinniry stated the passenger’s side was on the
    same side as the sidewalk and that it was a one lane street
    which had parking on both sides. She noted the only non-police
    vehicles present were [Appellant’s] and Tracey Floyd, Jr.’s.
    Officer Kinniry explained [Appellant’s] vehicles were a Ford
    Expedition and a smaller car which were parked on the same
    side of the sidewalk. She noted it was not until she stepped out
    of her patrol car that she saw Tracey Floyd, Jr. and then
    Sergeant McGinley told her to retrieve their identifications. She
    further noted she did not know what Tracey Floyd, Jr. was
    reaching for or what he was doing but witnessed him reaching
    into the vehicle while standing on the sidewalk.
    -4-
    J-S17024-17
    Officer Kinniry testified she did not inform her partner of
    what she had witnessed. After seeing Tracey Floyd, Jr. reach
    into the rear of the vehicle, she took him to the back of her
    patrol car. She stated that she recovered the brass knuckles
    from a search of Tracey Floyd, Jr.’s person that occurred prior to
    his placement into the patrol car. When presented with her prior
    testimony from the preliminary hearing stating that [Appellant]
    was the person who did not have identification, was frisked and
    possessed the brass knuckles, Officer Kinniry clarified that she
    meant Tracey Floyd, Jr.
    She noted the white t-shirt, marked as Defense Exhibit 3
    (D-3), recovered from the back seat of the Ford Expedition, was
    the only t-shirt in question and that the alcohol was not
    recovered. Officer Kinniry stated she believed there were five
    (5) officers at the scene of the incident. When questioned why
    she and her fellow officers chose to frisk Tracey Floyd, Jr. and
    place him in the patrol car when they merely wanted to retrieve
    identification, she stated they were further investigating him and
    that he was fine with it. When further questioned why Tracey
    Floyd, Jr. could not remain standing on the corner with five (5)
    officers watching him while his name was checked, Officer
    Kinniry replied it was because they decided not to let him remain
    standing. Officer Kinniry further stated no police officer noticed
    bulges on Tracey Floyd, Jr.’s person.
    On cross-examination by Defense Counsel Daniel Alva,
    Officer Kinniry testified she has six (6) years of experience on
    the force and that one of the first things typically done upon
    arriving at a scene is to determine “who’s friend and who’s foe.”
    She stated when she arrived at the scene she was not informed
    that [Appellant] and his son, Tracey Floyd, Jr. were complainants
    and not the focus of the investigation. Officer Kinniry explained
    that she arrived at the scene without any preexisting information
    pertaining to who was the focus of the investigation.
    When questioned about whether Sergeant McGinley
    instructed her to retrieve identification in light of his testimony
    stating that he did not instruct her to do so, Officer Kinniry
    affirmed he did.     When questioned further about Sergeant
    McGinley’s instruction, she replied, “I don’t recall exactly what
    he said but we knew what we needed to do was get ID’s from
    the males involved.” In response to being asked if her individual
    instinct led to her attempting to obtain identification instead of
    being directed to, Officer Kinniry replied, “we asked him for ID.
    He did not have it, no. So we asked him. We took him over to
    the car like we generally do to look up information.” She noted
    she believed [Appellant] was still with the other officers when
    Tracey Floyd, Jr. was placed in the patrol car. Officer Kinniry
    stated that while Tracey Floyd, Jr. was not handcuffed prior to
    being placed in the patrol car, he could not voluntarily get out.
    She stated that at no point did she find out [Appellant] was the
    complainant.
    -5-
    J-S17024-17
    Officer Kinniry testified she first engaged with [Appellant]
    once she found the gun in the rear of the vehicle wrapped in a t-
    shirt when he said, “that is not mine.” She noted that after
    recovering the knives and the handgun, the officers did not take
    him into custody as an arrest and instead took him in as an
    investigation, though he was not free to leave. Officer Kinniry
    stated [Appellant] believed he had a Delaware permit to carry
    firearms; the permit was discovered to be expired. She further
    stated that while at the time [Appellant] was taken in for
    investigation, she had asked [Appellant] if there were any other
    weapons in the car to aid in the investigation.
    On    redirect-examination,     Officer Kinniry  testified
    [Appellant] was not handcuffed when asked if there were any
    other weapons in the car and had not been told he was under
    arrest. She noted [Appellant] offered to retrieve the handgun,
    but she said she would get it instead.
    Philadelphia Police Officer Martinsen, assigned to the 35th
    District, testified that on October 17, 2014, at approximately
    1:30 p.m., she performed her tour of duty in the 6300 North
    21st Street area of Philadelphia when she came into contact with
    [Appellant]. She stated that while Tracey Floyd Jr. was sitting in
    her patrol car, after Officer Kinniry found the handgun wrapped
    in the t-shirt, he said, “that’s mine.” She had not asked Tracey
    Floyd, Jr. any questions prior to him stating the handgun was
    his, nor was she aware of the handgun before he made the
    comment, which made her turn and look at Officer Kinniry who
    was holding the handgun.
    On cross-examination by Defense Counsel Jeremy Alva,
    Officer Martinsen testified that Tracey Floyd, Jr. was in the patrol
    car in order to check his identification.
    [Appellant] testified that he called the police to his house
    regarding the landlord/tenant dispute. He testified that once he
    left with the police from the area, a male squatter at his house
    driving a burgundy Trail Blazer SUV told him to pull over, and a
    chase shortly ensued. [Appellant] noted the chase lasted about
    five (5) minutes. He further noted that he was driving his
    vehicle alone and his two sons were driving behind him in a
    Nissan Maxima. He testified he saw the sergeant in his patrol
    car as he was attempting to get away from the male squatter.
    [Appellant] said once he saw Sergeant McGinley he rolled down
    his window and notified him that someone was following him and
    asked whether he received the call pertaining to the 5826
    Crittenden Street landlord/tenant dispute. [Appellant] noted the
    sergeant then backed up his car and cut off the squatter’s
    vehicle, preventing him from proceeding. He stated once the
    sergeant pulled the other car over, he told them to get out of the
    vehicle and then started to speak to them.
    [Appellant] testified more police officers arrived, including
    two (2) African-Americans and two (2) female officers. He
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    explained he only heard the patrol car of the female officers
    arrive, and did not see either of them until one seized his son,
    Tracey Floyd, Jr. [Appellant] testified he told Tracey Floyd, Jr. to
    remove the car keys from the ignition since he was speaking to
    the officers and that his son was in the front on the passenger’s
    side, not the rear of the car.
    On cross-examination, [Appellant] testified the individuals
    the sergeant pulled over were yelling. He stated Tracey Floyd,
    Jr. was not going in and out of the car but just reached in to
    grab the key after he asked him to turn the car off. He also
    affirmed the presence of the handgun wrapped in a t-shirt and
    that he told Officer Martinsen that it was not his. [Appellant]
    testified that after Officer Kinniry placed his son in the patrol car,
    she opened the driver’s door and starting searching the middle
    part of the car. He stated it was once she started searching the
    middle part of the car that he said, “if you're going to search my
    car, I'm going to let you know now I got two pistols in there that
    I went to the range and I didn’t take them out.” [Appellant]
    noted the handguns were not loaded, and that one was in a blue
    bag which was a lock. He stated, “I keep it in a safe and when I
    take it to the range, I put in in this case with a key and lock and
    I take the key with me.” He testified the other gun was wrapped
    in a t-shirt or towel.
    On redirect-examination, [Appellant] testified he was going
    to the range from his house before the chase occurred. He
    explained he was going to Philadelphia to take pictures to try to
    evict the squatters from his house because he had received his
    landlord/tenant license.
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/16, at 2-11 (footnotes and internal record citations
    omitted). Finding Appellant’s testimony incredible, the trial court denied the
    suppression motion. The case proceeded to a bench trial, at which Appellant
    was found guilty of carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a
    firearm on the streets of Philadelphia.     On November 25, 2015, the trial
    court sentenced Appellant to four years’ probation for carrying a firearm
    without a license and a concurrent one year of probation for carrying a
    firearm on the streets of Philadelphia.
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    J-S17024-17
    On appeal, Appellant raises only a single issue for our review.       He
    argues that “the trial court err[ed] in denying [his] motion to suppress any
    and all evidence used against him at trial[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 6. In this
    regard, he argues only that the “evidence put forth by the Commonwealth to
    support [the] search of [his] vehicle” was not “credible.”         Id. at 10.
    Appellant claims that “[t]he testimony of Officer [] Kinniry at the
    suppression hearing was incredible and insufficient as a matter of law to
    meet the standards required to establish reasonable suspicion or probable
    cause.” Id. at 10-11.     Specifically, Appellant argues that Officer Kinniry’s
    testimony that she observed in plain view an open bottle of alcohol was
    merely an “uncorroborated allegation.” Id. In essence, Appellant asks us to
    credit his version of the facts, i.e., no open container of alcohol was present
    in his vehicle, over Officer Kinniry’s.
    In reviewing appeals from an order denying suppression, our standard
    of review is limited to determining
    whether [the trial court’s] factual findings are supported by the
    record and whether [its] legal conclusions drawn from those
    facts are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a [trial] court,
    the appellate court considers only the evidence of the
    prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as
    remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record
    as a whole. When the record supports the findings of the [trial]
    court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the
    legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
    Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
    116 A.3d 1139
    , 1142 (Pa. Super. 2015). Our
    scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression
    hearing. In the interest of L.J., 
    79 A.3d 1073
    , 1088-89 (Pa. 2013).
    -8-
    J-S17024-17
    Here, we must reject Appellant’s sole claim on appeal as he challenges
    only the trial court’s weight of the evidence and credibility determinations.
    As we noted above, this Court may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute
    its judgment for that of the trial court sitting as the fact-finder. See Griffin,
    
    supra;
     see also Commonwealth v. Queen, 
    639 A.2d 443
    , 445 (Pa. 1994)
    (noting that an appellate court may “not substitute [its] credibility
    determinations for that of the suppression court.”). Thus, it is settled that
    we may not disturb a trial court’s credibility determinations.                 See
    Commonwealth v. Chine, 
    40 A.3d 1239
    , 1244 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
    denied, 
    63 A.3d 773
     (Pa. 2013).                  Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s
    argument for want of merit.2
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Appellant’s motion to strike denied.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/17/2017
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant filed a motion to preclude and/or strike Appellee’s brief as
    untimely failed and for failure to serve. In light of our disposition, the
    motion is denied.
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Floyd, T. No. 403 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 5/17/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/17/2017