Com. v. Scott, K. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
KEVIN FRANCIS SCOTT
Appellant No. 470 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 16, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0000854-2008
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2017
Appellant, Kevin Francis Scott, appeals from the February 16, 2016,
order denying as untimely his petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On September 3, 2008, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea
to two counts each of indecent exposure, corruption of minors, and open
lewdness.1 The court proceeded immediately to sentencing, and Appellant
received an aggregate term of ten to twenty years of incarceration, to be
served consecutively to a New York state sentence.
Appellant did not file a direct appeal, and accordingly, his judgment of
sentence became final on October 3, 2008. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3);
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1
18 Pa.C.S. § 3127(a), 6301(a)(1), and 5901, respectively.
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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see also Commonwealth v. Walters, 814 A.2d 253, 255-256 (Pa. Super.
2002). Appellant began serving his New York state sentence on November
17, 2008, and his Pennsylvania state sentence on November 23, 2010.
On October 27, 2011, Appellant filed a petition seeking PCRA relief.
Counsel was appointed and submitted a Turner/Finley letter.2 Appellant
filed a response in opposition. The PCRA court granted counsel’s petition to
withdraw and dismissed the petition as untimely on February 16, 2016.3
Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. The PCRA court issued a responsive opinion.
Herein, Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
I. Did the [PCRA] court err when it determined that Appellant
was time-barred from filing his PCRA when Appellant’s sentence
did not begin until Appellant was returned to Pennsylvania?
II. Did the [PCRA] court err by denying Appellant’s constitutional
right to a direct appeal of Appellant’s conviction and sentence
nunc pro tunc in which the [PCRA] court deemed the claim
meritless?
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2
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).
3
The PCRA court suggests that it sent notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
However, a review of the record does not reflect that notice was actually
sent. Nevertheless, the failure to issue Rule 907 notice does not
automatically warrant reversal, especially where a petition is patently
untimely. See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 917 n.7 (Pa.
2000) (declining to provide appellant with relief despite PCRA court’s failure
to send required notice, where appellant failed to invoke jurisdiction of the
court by pleading and proving the applicability of PCRA timeliness
exceptions).
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III. Did the [PCRA] court err when it held that Appellant’s plea
was knowing, wherein the plea was unlawfully induced where the
Appellant is actually innocent?
IV. Did the [PCRA] court err when it determined that Appellant’s
claim that the sentence was not [an] agreed upon sentence by
the negotiated plea and actual addition of all charges placed the
sentence outside the lawful maximum under the agreed upon
plea; as well as counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object to
the breach of contract?
V. Did the [PCRA] court err when it determined that Appellant’s
claim that Appellant’s trial/plea counsel was ineffective and had
no merit and should be dismissed?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition
under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v.
Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007).
We begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, as the
PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or
disregarded in order to address the merits of his claims. See
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the
PCRA, any petition for relief, including second and subsequent petitions,
must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence
becomes final. Id. There are three exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke these
exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have
been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); see Commonwealth v.
Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000).
Appellant’s petition is untimely.4 Accordingly, in order for this Court to
reach the merits of his issues, Appellant must plead and prove one of the
exceptions to the time bar. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267.
Appellant’s first issue consists of two parts. First, Appellant claims
that his petition should not be time barred because his “sentence did not
begin until he was returned to Pennsylvania.” See Appellant’s Brief at 8.
Further, he claims governmental interference prevented him from timely
filing his petition. Id.
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4
Appellant’s petition is patently untimely. His judgment of sentence became
final on October 3, 2008, at the expiration of the thirty day period for which
he could file a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (a judgment of sentence becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking that
review). October 3, 2009, was a Saturday. Accordingly, Appellant had until
October 5, 2009, to timely file a PCRA petition. Appellant’s petition, filed
October 27, 2011, was more than two years late.
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Appellant’s governmental interference claim consists of three sub-
issues. First, he claims that the prosecutor and trial court ordered that
Appellant’s Pennsylvania sentence run consecutively to the New York state
sentence, even though the prosecutor should have known Appellant would
not have access to Pennsylvania legal material in a New York prison. Id. at
8-9. Second, Appellant claims that New York prison officials allegedly held
him beyond his maximum New York prison sentence. Id. at 10. Finally,
Appellant claims that he was prevented from accessing legal materials in
Pennsylvania due to his concern that other inmates would assault him. Id.
at 12.
Appellant’s claim that his sentence did not begin until he was returned
from New York to Pennsylvania is waived and meritless. First, Appellant has
waived it for failure to cite to any applicable authority or properly develop
his argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c); see also Commonwealth v.
Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 748 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[T]he argument portion of an
appellate brief must be developed with a pertinent discussion of the point
which includes citations to the relevant authority.”) However, even if not
waived, Pennsylvania does not recognize equitable tolling in the context of
untimely filed PCRA petitions. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d
214, 223 (Pa. 1999).
With regard to Appellant’s claims of governmental interference, to
establish the applicability of this exception, “the petitioner must plead and
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prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference
by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained
earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal,
941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008). It is the petitioner’s burden to allege and
prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies. See Commonwealth
v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2008). The Act requires that a
petitioner file his claim within sixty days of the date the claim could have
been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); Commonwealth v. Stokes,
959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). Thus, with respect to this exception, the
petitioner must plead and prove he could not have filed his claim earlier. Id.
First, Appellant claims he did not have access to Pennsylvania law in
New York state prison, and that this amounted to governmental interference.
See Appellant’s Brief at 8. However, Appellant does not offer a reasonable
explanation why, with the exercise of due diligence, this alleged interference
of government officials could not have been ascertained earlier. See
Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94 (2001) (rejecting
governmental interference exception where petitioner failed to offer
reasonable explanation why, with the exercise of due diligence, alleged
interference of government officials could not have been ascertained earlier).
Appellant was sentenced in open court on October 3, 2008, was aware his
Pennsylvania sentence would be served consecutive to the New York
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sentence, and did not file a petition within sixty days of the date of the
discovery of the alleged interference.
Further, the trial court’s decision to impose the sentence consecutive
to Appellant’s New York sentence does not qualify as governmental
interference for the purposes of the PCRA, as it is within the trial court’s
discretion to impose consecutive sentences, and any challenge to the
discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence must have been preserved in a
timely post sentence motion. See Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d
798, 809-10 (Pa. Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d
786, 791 (Pa. Super. 2003). Appellant did not file such a motion. Id.
Next, Appellant claims that New York prison officials allegedly held him
beyond his maximum New York prison sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at
10. Appellant has waived this argument for failure to cite to any applicable
authority or properly develop his argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c); see
also Knox, 50 A.3d at 748 (“[T]he argument portion of an appellate brief
must be developed with a pertinent discussion of the point which includes
citations to the relevant authority.”)
Finally, Appellant claims that he was unable to access the Pennsylvania
state prison law library for fear of being beaten by other inmates, and
contends that this amounted to governmental interference. See Appellant’s
Brief at 10. This argument is meritless. Appellant was not returned to
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Pennsylvania until November 2010, more than a year after the date he was
required to timely file a PCRA petition.
The remainder of Appellant’s claims do not plead time bar exceptions.
Appellant’s petition is untimely, and he has not satisfied a timeliness
exception to the requirements of the PCRA. Consequently, the PCRA court
was without jurisdiction to review the merits of Appellant’s claim and
properly dismissed his petition. See Ragan, 932 A.2d at 1170.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/24/2017
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