In the Interest of: Z.I.B., a Minor ( 2017 )

J-S13032-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.I.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.W., MOTHER : No. 2234 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree June 8, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000447-2016,
CP-51-DP-0001145-2013, FID: 51-FN-001146-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.S.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.W., MOTHER : No. 2237 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree June 8, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000448-2016,
CP-51-DP-0001143-2013, FID: 51-FN-001146-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.A.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.W., MOTHER : No. 2239 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree June 8, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000449-2016,
CP-51-DP-0001144-2013, FID: 51-FN-001146-2013
J-S13032-17
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2017
C.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the consolidated decrees involuntarily
terminating1 her parental rights to her three minor children—Z.S.B., a
female born in March 2009, Z.A.B., a male born in January 2008, and Z.I.B.,
a female born in December of 2004 (collectively, the “Children”)—and
changing Children’s permanency goal to adoption.2 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history,
as follows:
In March of 2013, [the Philadelphia County Department of
Human Services (“DHS”),] pursuant to a substantiated
General Protective Services (GPS) report, found Z.S.B. and
Z.A.B. to be truant.
On May 20, 2013, an Adjudicatory Hearing was held to
address the truancy issue. The [c]ourt ordered [Mother]
to provide DHS with a name and address of the landlord,
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
By decrees entered on the same date, the trial court terminated the
parental rights of unknown father as to Children. No unknown father has
filed an appeal or is a party to the present appeal.
2
Although the notes of testimony reflect that the trial court granted the goal
change to adoption, the permanency review orders for this date still indicate
the current permanent placement goal is return to parent or guardian. N.T.,
6/8/16, at 45-47; Permanency Review Orders, 6/8/16. However, the orders
do note the case transfer to adoptions. Permanency Review Orders, 6/8/16.
Further, upon review of the certified record, the subsequent permanency
review orders reflect the current placement goal has been adoption. Any
potential procedural error is, therefore, corrected. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5)
(stating that the premature filing of a notice of appeal would be treated as
proper once a final, appealable order was entered).
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and comply with Family Stabilization Services (FSS), DHS
and child advocate.
On May 31, 2013, DHS went to the address Mother
provided in [c]ourt to assess the home. DHS was informed
by Mother’s landlord[] [that] Mother and [C]hildren[] had
been evicted more than three weeks prior to the visit.
DHS subsequently reported this information to the
Honorable Vincent L. Johnson[,] who then ordered DHS to
obtain an Order of Protective Custody (OPC). DHS
attempted to locate the [C]hildren for placement, without
success.
On June 4, 2013, Z.S.B., Z.A.B., and Z.I.B. were placed in
foster care through Bethanna.
On June 5, 2013, a Shelter Care Hearing was held for []
Z.S.B., Z.A.B., and Z.I.B., the OPC was lifted and the
temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to stand.
Mother failed to attend the court hearing. The identity of
father of Z.S.B., Z.A.B.[,] and Z.I.B. remained unknown to
DHS.
On July 8, 2013, an [A]djudicatory [H]earing was held for
Z.S.B., Z.A.B.[,] and Z.I.B. The [c]ourt discharged the
[C]hildren’s temporary commitment and adjudicated
[C]hildren dependent based on present inability to provide
proper parental care and control. The [c]ourt committed
the [C]hildren to the custody of DHS. The Honorable
Vincent Johnson ordered Mother to be evaluated and
complete a drug and alcohol assessment at the Clinical
Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) on August 27, 2013.
At the Permanency Hearing held on October 1, 2013, the
[c]ourt found that [Children’s] placement continued to be
necessary and appropriate and ordered they remain
committed. Mother was order[ed] to comply with [a]
parenting capacity evaluation, continue services through
the Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) and was re-
referred to CEU for a forthwith drug screen, assessment
and monitoring.
On October 1, 2013, the CEU completed a Report of Non-
compliance as to Mother. Mother failed to submit a
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forthwith drug screen pursuant to court order dated August
27, 2013 and fail[ed] to attend a scheduled CEU
appointment on September 30, 2013.
On December 17, 2013, the CEU completed a Report of
Non-compliance as to Mother. The report stated Mother
did not comply with the Honorable Vincent Johnson’s
October 1, 2013 court order requiring her to complete a
drug and alcohol assessment with the CEU. Mother failed
to attend another scheduled appointment on November 13,
2013 and failed to contact CEU.
At the Permanency Hearings held on March 24, 2014 and
June 23, 2014, respectively, Mother was re-referred to the
CEU for monitoring for her intensive outpatient treatment
through STOP [(“Sobriety Through Outpatient”)]. BHS
[(“Behavioral Health Services”)] was ordered to monitor
Mother’s mental health treatment. Mother failed to attend
hearings.
In December 2014, [ARC] completed a Parent/Caregiver
Closing Summary Report for Mother indicating her case
was closed for non-participation in ARC services and
unsuccessful outreach to mother. The reasons stated were
Mother did not complete the goal of housing, drug and
alcohol treatment attendance, nor mental health. In
addition, Mother’s visitation with the [C]hildren was
subsequently modified to be supervised visitation due to
an incident at a visit caused by [M]other’s inappropriate
behavior.
At the [P]ermanency [H]earings held between February
27, 2015 and November 20, 2015[,] the [C]hildren were
ordered to remain as committed.
According to CEU reports, Mother tested positive for
marijuana on May 29, 2015.
On August 20, 2015, the CEU completed a progress report
for Mother. The report stated Mother failed to attend her
scheduled assessment on July 1, 2015, failed to contact
the CEU and failed to complete a drug and alcohol
assessment with the CEU.
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On September 11, 2015, Mother tested positive for
marijuana.
The matter was [ ] listed on a regular basis before judges
of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas-Family Court
Division-Juvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the
Juvenile Act, 42 [Pa.C.S. §] 6351, and evaluated for the
purpose of determining and reviewing the permanency
plan of the [C]hild[ren].
In subsequent hearings, the Dependency Review Orders
reflect the [c]ourt’s review and disposition as a result of
evidence presented, primarily with the goal of finalizing the
permanency plan.
Trial Ct. Op., 10/19/16, at 1-3.
On May 19, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b),
and to change Children’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 6351. The court conducted a combined termination and goal
change hearing on June 8, 2016. In support thereof, DHS presented the
testimony of William Johnson, a Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case
manager at Northeast Treatment Center (“NET”). In addition, the parties
stipulated that CUA would testify as to the facts alleged in the petitions.
N.T. at 4. DHS also offered DHS Exhibits 1-7, which were admitted without
objection. Id. at 39. Mother testified on her own behalf.
Following the hearing on June 8, 2016, the trial court entered the
decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children and
the orders changing the permanency goal to adoption. Thereafter, on July
6, 2016, Mother, through counsel, filed timely notices of appeal, along with
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concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte on
August 9, 2016.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental
rights under 23 [Pa.C.S.] § 2511 (a)(1), where the
evidence showed that Mother substantially complied with
the Family Service Plan goals established by [DHS]?
2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental
rights under 23 [Pa.C.S.] § 2511 (a)(2), (5), and (8)
where [DHS] failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Mother’s conduct warranted involuntary
termination?
3. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental
rights without fully considering the impact of termination
on the emotional needs and welfare of the Children, as
required under 23 [Pa.C.S.] § 2511(b)?
4. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by changing the goal for all three Children from
reunification to adoption when DHS failed to present clear
and convincing evidence that such a goal change was in
the Children’s best interests?
5. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion when it inappropriately relied on
unauthenticated drug screen evidence at the hearing to
terminate the parental rights of Mother and change the
Children’s permanency goal to adoption?
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Mother’s Brief at 2-3.3
Mother, in her first two arguments, claims that DHS did not meet its
burden of proof for terminating her parental rights under Section 2511(a).
Mother asserts, “[t]he weight of the evidence suggests that the conditions
that led to the [C]hildren’s placement have been rectified, and Mother has
progressed toward reunification.” Mother’s Brief at 13. As related to her
objectives, Mother highlights that she obtained housing, completed a
parenting capacity evaluation, participated in mental health treatment and
had an appointment scheduled to re-commence treatment, and completed
“at least some” CEU drug screens. Id. at 14-15. Further, as recommended
through her parenting capacity evaluation, Mother obtained employment and
received some anger management counseling. Id. at 15. Mother,
therefore, posits that she was “satisfactorily working toward reunification.”
3
We observe that, in her brief, Mother states her issues on appeal
somewhat differently from her Rule 1925(b) Statement. We, nevertheless,
find that Mother has preserved her challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence as to the termination of her parental rights and opposition to the
goal change. We conclude, however, that any issue regarding the failure of
DHS to provide reasonable efforts would be waived, as Mother failed to raise
this issue in the statement of questions involved section of her brief and/or
discuss and argue this issue in her brief. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339
n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Krebs v. United
Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that a
failure to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion
of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues).
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Id. In addition, Mother contends DHS failed to establish her drug use was
continuing and improperly shifted the burden of proof to her. Id. at 15-16,
21-23. Mother concludes DHS failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to support termination of her parental rights. We disagree.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of
fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they
are supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial
court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the
opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citation omitted).
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The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the
child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the
court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to
terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the
conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s
conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination
of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the
second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under
the standard of best interests of the child. One major
aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the
nature and status of the emotional bond between parent
and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). Clear
and convincing evidence is that which is so “clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761
A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). We have held that in
order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the
trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843
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A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s
decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(8), which provides as follows:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist and termination of parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be
demonstrated: (1) The child has been removed from
parental care for 12 months or more from the date of
removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Once the twelve-month period has been established, the court must
next determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s removal
continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts of the agency
supplied over a realistic period. In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super.
2003). The “relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led
to removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and
child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.
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Super. 2009) (citation omitted). “Notably, termination under Section
2511(a)(8)[] does not require an evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or
ability to remedy the conditions that led to placement of her children.” In
re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations
omitted).
Instantly, in finding sufficient evidence supporting termination
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), the court recognized that Mother “failed to
complete any of the objectives” established for her in an effort to promote
and achieve reunification with Children. Trial Ct. Op. at 4. Moreover,
Mother was self-medicating for anxiety with marijuana. Id.Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s termination of
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). The record
substantiates that Children have been removed from parental care for a
period exceeding twelve months and that the reasons for removal persisted.
Children were removed from Mother’s care in June of 2013, a period of
approximately three years at the time of the hearing. N.T. at 11; Shelter
Care Orders, 6/4/13.
In addition, Mother failed to complete all of her case goals, which
included visitation, suitable housing, a parenting capacity evaluation, mental
health treatment, and drug and alcohol screening and/or assessment and
treatment. N.T. at 12, 18. Mother’s visitation with Children remained
supervised since December of 2014. Id. at 16. The supervision of visitation
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was a result of Mother’s displays of anger toward the prior CUA case worker
in front of Children. Id. Mother also missed visits in November and
December 2015 due to her failure to convey her work schedule. Id. at 26.
Mother was not compliant with all aspects of and/or recommendations
resulting from her parenting capacity evaluation, such as individual therapy,
family therapy, medication management, and a substance evaluation. Id. at
20-22. Mother was not actively engaged in mental health treatment.4
Mother failed to complete a drug and alcohol program and was non-
compliant with CEU.5 Id. at 16, 20. Although Mother completed some drug
screens at CEU, Mother tested positive for marijuana as recently as April 4,
2016. Id. at 16, 18; see also DHS Ex. 6, Progress Report 4/29/16.
Further, at her last drug screen on June 7, 2016, the day prior to the
termination/goal change hearing, Mother’s marijuana level was 49, with the
cutoff for a positive result being 50. Id. at 17-18. Additionally, her
creatinine level suggested dilution.6 Id.
4
An appointment to resume treatment was reportedly scheduled for June
20, 2016, approximately one month after the filing of the petitions to
terminate Mother’s parental rights. N.T. at 20.
5
Of particular concern to the trial court was Mother’s failure to complete her
objectives related to mental health and drug and alcohol treatment. N.T. at
31-33. Mother had last participated in mental health as well as drug and
alcohol treatment in 2015. Id. at 13-14, 15.
6
Despite discussion at the hearing of the addition of the most recent CEU
report to DHS Exhibit 6, N.T. at 17, a review of the certified record reveals
that the report was omitted.
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Likewise, the record supports the trial court’s finding that terminating
Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Children
under Section 2511(a)(8). Erica Williams, Psy.D., and Alexandra Vandegrift,
B.A., who conducted Mother’s parenting capacity evaluation and issued a
report dated June 16, 2015,7 observed Mother’s inability to provide for
Children’s permanency and safety at the time. DHS Ex. 7 at 8. They
indicated “[Mother] is demonstrating progress, however, there continues to
be barriers leading to [Mother] not currently presenting with the capacity to
provide safety and permanency to her [C]hildren.” Id. Critically, Dr.
Williams and Ms. Vandegrift reference Mother’s non-compliance with drug
screening and use of marijuana for anxiety. Id. Similarly, Mr. Johnson, the
CUA case manager, testified that he would not reunify Mother and Children,
expressing safety concerns. N.T. at 18. He stated, “My concerns would be
just the overall safety for the case—the overall safety for the [C]hildren,
mom’s safety and making sure that she’s able to take care of everything she
needs to take care of for herself, as well as the children.” Id. Thus, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily
terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to Section
2511(a)(8).
7
The parenting capacity report was marked and admitted as DHS Exhibit 7.
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Mother next argues that the trial court’s termination did not consider
Children’s best interests or the impact on their emotional needs and welfare
under Section 2511(b). Mother’s Brief at 24. Specifically, Mother
acknowledges that the CUA case manager testified to no detrimental impact
on Children if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. However, Mother
asserts a lack of support for this testimony other than her non-completion of
goals. Id. Mother contends that a bond existed between her and Children,
that the court ignored the importance of Children’s emotional bond with
Mother, and that the court instead focused on their bond with foster parents.
Id. at 25-26. Moreover, Mother maintains the court also ignored Children’s
relationship with one another as Children were not placed in a single foster
home. Id. at 27. As such, Mother maintains “[t]he court did not adequately
consider the impact that severing the Children’s bond with their Mother and
with each other would have on the emotional welfare of the Children.” Id.
Mother concludes that termination of her parental rights under Section
2511(b) was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
Section 2511(b) provides:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
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described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), we have stated:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As
this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) does not
explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is
not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however,
provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with
his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many
factors to be considered by the court when determining
what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, Children have been in their current foster homes since
January 2015.8 N.T. at 18. Mr. Johnson testified that, although Children
have a bond with Mother, their parent-child relationship is with their
respective foster parents. Id. at 25, 28-30. Foster parents, as opposed to
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Z.I.B and Z.S.B. are placed together, separately from Z.A.B. N.T. at 4-5.
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Mother, provide for Children’s financial, medical, and daily needs, as well as
taking them to the doctor or therapist. Id. at 24-25, 27-29. As a result,
despite the fact that Children would be upset if they were not able to see
Mother again, Mr. Johnson opined that there would be no detrimental impact
on Children if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Id. at 24-25, 30-
31. In fact, Mr. Johnson testified that he had concerns about Children’s
overall safety if they were reunited with Mother. Id. at 17-19. Referencing
Mother’s lack of completion of her established goals, Mr. Johnson asserted,
“[i]t would be in the best interest for the [C]hildren to actually be able to
flourish outside of worrying about what needs to transpire here with mom.”
Id. at 24-25.
Our review of the record confirms that terminating Mother’s parental
rights will best serve the needs and welfare of Children. Evidence was
presented that Mr. Johnson had concerns with regard to Children’s safety if
they were to be returned to Mother. Id. at 18. Likewise, a parenting
capacity evaluation revealed that Mother was unable to provide for
Children’s safety and permanency. DHS Ex. 7 at 8. Further, while Children
have a bond with Mother, Children have more of a parent-child relationship
with their foster parents, who provide for their needs. N.T. at 24-25, 27-30.
As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a
parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a
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child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the court terminating Mother’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
Mother’s next argument focuses on the trial court’s decision to change
Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Mother claims that the trial court
should not have changed the goal to adoption, as the “testimony at trial
demonstrated that the Children enjoy a loving relationship with their Mother,
and are bonded to their Mother.” Mother’s Brief at 28. Mother also points to
the fact that Children will lose their relationships with one another given
they are placed and would be adopted separately. Id. Hence, Mother avers
goal change to adoption is not in Children’s best interest and does not serve
their needs and welfare. Id. We discern no basis in these arguments to
disturb the trial court’s ruling.
We review a goal change for an abuse of discretion. See In the
Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015). The trial court must
examine and find the factors provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f) and (f.1),
regarding matters to be determined at the permanency hearing, and that a
goal change is in Children’s best interests. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(g); In re
R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
The primary purpose of the disposition of a dependent child is to
examine what is in the best interest of the child. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a);
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Z.W. v. Tioga Cnty. Servs. Agency, 710 A.2d 1176, 1178 (Pa. Super.
1998); see also In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 1990) (“[I]n
ordering a disposition under Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, the court acts
not in the role of adjudicator reviewing the action of an administrative
agency, . . . rather the court acts pursuant to a separate discretionary role
with the purpose of meeting the child’s best interests.” (citation and
quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the record reveals that a change of the permanency goal to
adoption was in Children’s best interests. Mother had not successfully
completed and was not currently enrolled in mental health and/or drug and
alcohol treatment. N.T. at 20. Mother apparently tested positive for
marijuana on April 4, 2016, and on June 7, 2016, a mere day before the
relevant hearing, Mother’s levels for marijuana were just below the cut-off
with evidence of dilution. Id. at 16-18. Moreover, not only did the CUA
case manager express safety concerns when questioned about reunification,
id. at 18, but a parenting capacity evaluation revealed Mother’s inability to
provide for Children’s safety and permanency. DHS Ex. 7 at 8. Notably, the
parenting capacity evaluation highlighted Mother’s marijuana use. Id.
Additionally, despite a bond with Mother, Children’s parent-child relationship
is with their foster parents. N.T. at 25, 28-30. Thus, a goal change was in
the best interests of Children. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion in changing Children’s permanency goal to adoption.
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J-S13032-17
In her final issue, Mother argues that the trial court “commit[ted] an
error of law and abuse of discretion when it inappropriately relied on
unauthenticated drug screen evidence” at the hearing. Mother’s Brief at 3.
We find Mother has waived this issue, as she failed to raise it with the trial
court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing for waiver of issues not first raised
in lower court); Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 515-16 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(stating that failure to make timely and specific objection before trial court
will result in waiver of that issue for appellate review, and this Court will not
consider any claim that could have been corrected in trial court). Mother
failed to object during the hearing when this evidence was referenced in
testimony, and failed to object when the evidence was submitted for
admission at the conclusion of the hearing. N.T. at 16-18, 39. Thus, this
claim is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the decrees of the trial court.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/10/2017
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