Com. v. Porter, D. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S14027-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                               :
    :
    :
    DONALD PORTER                                :
    :
    Appellant                 :   No. 274 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 10, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0004047-2011
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                                   FILED MAY 10, 2019
    Appellant Donald Porter appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    after the trial court resentenced him for his conviction of robbery—threat of
    immediate serious injury.1 Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw
    and an Anders/Santiago2 brief.                 We affirm and grant the petition to
    withdraw.
    The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions are well known to the
    parties and need not be restated in detail in this appeal. Briefly, on July 9,
    2010, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Appellant approached the victim as the
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
    2Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,
    
    978 A.2d 349
    (Pa. 2009).
    J-S14027-19
    victim was walking through a playground.         Appellant pointed a gun at the
    victim and ordered him to “give it up.” When the victim asked what he was
    supposed to give up, Appellant demanded money. The victim attempted to
    grab the gun from Appellant’s hands. The gun fired during the struggle and
    the victim was struck in his left thumb, third, fourth, and fifth fingers. The
    victim underwent surgery to repair the ligaments in his hand, but his hand
    lost some of its functions.
    Appellant was charged with robbery, as well as possession of a firearm
    prohibited, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms in
    public in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of crime.3 A jury found
    Appellant guilty of the foregoing offenses. On June 14, 2013, the trial court
    sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of twelve to twenty-four years’
    imprisonment.      Specifically, the court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory
    minimum sentence of five to ten years’ incarceration for robbery based on 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9712 (sentences for offenses committed with firearms). The court
    also imposed consecutive sentences of four to eight years’ incarceration for
    persons not to possess firearms and three to six years’ incarceration for
    carrying a firearm without a license. The trial court imposed no further penalty
    for carrying a firearm in Philadelphia or possessing an instrument of crime.
    Appellant filed a direct appeal challenging the discretionary aspects of
    his sentence, arguing, in part, that the aggregate sentence was manifestly
    ____________________________________________
    3   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 907(a), respectively.
    -2-
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    excessive. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on August
    19, 2014. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 2324 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. filed
    Aug. 19, 2014) (unpublished mem.). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
    Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on January 7, 2015.             See
    Commonwealth v. Porter, 
    106 A.3d 725
    (Pa. 2015).
    Appellant filed a Post Conviction Relief Act4 (PCRA) petition on December
    17, 2015, asserting that the mandatory minimum sentence for his robbery
    conviction was illegal under Alleyne v. United States, 
    570 U.S. 99
    (2013)
    and Commonwealth v. Valentine, 
    101 A.3d 801
    (Pa. Super. 2014). The
    PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on
    November 15, 2016. The Commonwealth agreed that Appellant should be
    resentenced, and the trial court resentenced Appellant for robbery on August
    10, 2017.
    At the resentencing hearing, the trial court again imposed a sentence of
    five to ten years’ imprisonment for robbery. The court reasoned:
    The only issue before the [c]ourt was resentencing on the robbery
    charge, because as you pointed out very intelligently, that that
    sentence had to be vacated and had to be resentenced because of
    the changes with the [Alleyne] case. So we’re here really on that.
    So in imposing a sentence, the [c]ourt takes into account -- aside
    from everything everyone said, the [c]ourt takes into account
    everything that was said at the time of the trial, the time of the
    sentencing in the past[, which included a presentence
    investigation (PSI)]. The [c]ourt takes into account the need to
    protect the community, the gravity of the offense’s impacts upon
    the victim, and your rehabilitation needs. And the [c]ourt
    ____________________________________________
    4   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    -3-
    J-S14027-19
    appreciates everything that has been said about you being a
    changed person, etcetera. And that it’s helpful to always move in
    the direction of being a model citizen in society. And it looks like
    you’re working in doing that.
    Obviously, with the opportunity to resentence on robbery, the
    [c]ourt has a wide range. The [c]ourt could go below the sentence
    or the mandatory ranges, as [Appellant’s counsel] really would--
    and your family and yourself would like the [c]ourt to do.
    Otherwise, you wouldn’t be here. The [c]ourt can give the same
    sentence, because it’s right within the standard range or the
    [c]ourt can apply the deadly weapon possessed guideline which is
    even higher than the sentence the [c]ourt had imposed. The
    [c]ourt has free range to do any of those three things. [5]
    So I know the Commonwealth has not asked for the [c]ourt to
    impose the deadly weapon possessed [enhancement]. They
    haven’t asked directly, but I think a fair reading of the argument
    of [the Commonwealth] is they’ve--they’ve really asked implicitly.
    So and the [c]ourt appreciates that, but balancing that implicit
    request is the fact--is all the work that you’ve done . . . . So when
    I consider everything, there’s no need to make any changes at all
    with the sentence.
    So in considering all of the factors the [c]ourt has mentioned, the
    [c]ourt will impose a sentence in the standard range of five to 10
    years on the robbery. That will run consecutive to the four to eight
    years on the 6105 charge, the three to six years on the 6106
    charge. So the total sentence will remain as it was before of 12 to
    24 years.
    Sentencing Hr’g, 8/10/17, at 28-30.
    ____________________________________________
    5 At the resentencing hearing, Appellant’s counsel represented that the
    standard range minimum sentence applicable to the robbery charge was forty-
    eight to sixty months, plus or minus twelve months. N.T., 8/10/17, at 7; see
    also Sentencing Guidelines, 6th ed. revised (eff. Dec. 5, 2008) (Guidelines).
    The deadly weapon possessed enhancement called for a minimum sentence
    between fifty-seven and sixty-nine months. See N.T., 8/10/17, at 8. The
    Commonwealth noted that the deadly weapon used enhancement could also
    apply. Id.; see also Guidelines (indicating that the deadly weapon used
    enhancement called of a minimum sentence between sixty-six and seventy-
    eight months).
    -4-
    J-S14027-19
    Appellant filed a post-sentence motion asserting that the sentence was
    excessive.6     See Post-Sentence Mot., 8/10/17, at 3.             Appellant’s post-
    sentence motion was denied by operation of law on January 16, 2018.
    Appellant’s counsel filed the instant direct appeal on January 19, 2018.
    The trial court entered an order requiring Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement within twenty-one days.              Counsel filed a statement pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) indicating his intent to file an Anders brief in lieu of a
    statement of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court did not file an
    opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).7
    On appeal, Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and an
    Anders/Santiago brief. We note that we may not review the merits of the
    underlying issues without first examining counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
    928 A.2d 287
    , 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
    banc). Counsel must comply with the technical requirements for petitioning
    to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for leave to withdraw stating that, after
    making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined
    ____________________________________________
    6 Specifically, in his post-sentence motion, Appellant suggested that the
    sentence was excessive “in recognition of his age, mental health disabilities,
    rehabilitation to date, completion of programs offered to him at his facility,
    maturation since his arrest, continued familial support, and nearly
    unblemished record over the past seven and one-half years in correctional
    facilities.” See Post-Sentence Mot., 8/10/17, at 3.
    7Where counsel files a Rule 1925(c)(4) statement of intent to file an Anders
    brief, “a trial court opinion is not necessary.” Commonwealth v. McBride,
    
    957 A.2d 752
    , 758 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    -5-
    J-S14027-19
    that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) providing a copy of the brief to
    Appellant; and (3) advising Appellant that he has the right to retain private
    counsel, proceed pro se, or raise additional arguments that Appellant
    considers worthy of the court’s attention. See Commonwealth v. Yorgey,
    
    188 A.3d 1190
    , 1195-96 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).
    Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements
    established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago, namely:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
    counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
    counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
    Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
    case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
    that the appeal is frivolous.
    
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361
    . Only after determining that counsel has satisfied
    these technical requirements, may this Court “conduct an independent review
    of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues
    overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 
    113 A.3d 1246
    , 1250
    (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and footnote omitted); accord 
    Yorgey, 188 A.3d at 1197
    .
    Counsel has complied with the procedures for seeking withdrawal by
    filing a petition to withdraw, sending Appellant a letter explaining his rights,
    and supplying Appellant with a copy of the Anders/Santiago brief. See 
    id. at 1195-96.
    Moreover, counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief complies with the
    requirements of Santiago.      Counsel includes a summary of the relevant
    -6-
    J-S14027-19
    factual and procedural history, refers to the portions of the record that could
    arguably support Appellant’s claim, and sets forth the conclusion that the
    appeal is frivolous. Counsel explains his reasoning and supports his rationale
    with citations to the record and pertinent legal authority. Thus, counsel has
    complied with the technical requirements for withdrawal, see 
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361
    , and we will independently review the record to determine if any
    non-frivolous issues are raised. See 
    Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250
    .
    Counsel identifies one issue in the Anders/Santiago brief, which
    focuses on the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence.      Specifically,
    counsel indicates that Appellant intends to argue that the court’s decision to
    resentence him to the same sentence for robbery constituted an excessive
    sentence. Anders/Santiago Brief at 35. Counsel notes that a prior panel
    rejected similar arguments that the aggregate sentence was excessive. 
    Id. at 33.
    Appellant did not file a pro se response or a counseled response through
    new counsel.8
    An appeal challenging the discretionary aspects of sentencing is not an
    appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Bynum-Hamilton, 
    135 A.3d 179
    ,
    184 (Pa. Super. 2016). Appellant must meet the requirements that the appeal
    was timely, the issues were preserved, and that his brief contains a concise
    ____________________________________________
    8 This Court previously granted Appellant’s requests for extensions of time to
    respond to the Ander/Santiago brief. In the most recent order, we directed
    that Appellant file a response by April 10, 2019, and that no further extensions
    would be granted absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances. See
    Order, 3/11/19.
    -7-
    J-S14027-19
    statement    of   the     reasons   relied   upon    for   allowance   of   appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Malovich, 
    903 A.2d 1247
    , 1250 (Pa. Super. 2006). An
    appeal challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must also raise a
    substantial question that the sentence imposed was not appropriate under the
    Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    , 1042 (Pa.
    Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted).
    Instantly, Appellant has preserved his intended challenge to the
    excessiveness of the sentence by filing a timely post-sentence motion and
    filing a timely appeal.    Additionally, the Anders/Santiago brief includes a
    concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. See
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).      Therefore, we proceed to consider whether this appeal
    raises a substantial question.
    A substantial question “exists only when an appellant advances a
    colorable   argument that the        sentencing     judge’s actions were     either
    inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to
    the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.”                   Bynum-
    
    Hamilton, 135 A.3d at 184
    (citation omitted).                 “Generally, a bald
    excessiveness claim does not raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth
    v. Zeigler, 
    112 A.3d 656
    , 662 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
    Following our review, we agree with counsel’s assessment that
    Appellant’s intended issue is frivolous. A boilerplate claim that the trial court
    imposed an excessive sentence does not raise a substantial question. See 
    id. -8- J-S14027-19
    Even assuming the existence of a substantial question, this Court, as
    noted by counsel, previously rejected Appellant’s prior challenge to the
    identical aggregate sentence. Furthermore, our review of the record confirms
    that the trial court expressly considered Appellant’s mitigating circumstances
    and rehabilitative needs when resentencing Appellant to five to ten years’
    imprisonment for robbery. See N.T. at 28-30. We see no further basis to
    conclude that the sentence was clearly unreasonable.9 Therefore, Appellant’s
    intended claim that the trial court abused its discretion when re-imposing a
    five to ten year sentence of incarceration for robbery lacks support in the
    record.
    Accordingly, we agree with counsel’s assessment that the issue
    identified for appeal is frivolous. Having independently reviewed the record,
    we discern no other non-frivolous issues that have been preserved for review.
    See 
    Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250
    .
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
    ____________________________________________
    9 Where a sentence is imposed within the guidelines, we may only reverse the
    trial court if we find that the circumstances of the case rendered the
    application of the guidelines “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).
    Our review of the reasonableness is based upon the factors contained in 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9781(d), which include, among other things, “the nature and
    circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
    defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(1). Reasonableness is also based upon the
    trial court’s consideration of the general sentencing standards contained in 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), including that the sentence imposed is consistent with the
    protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs
    of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    72 A.3d 652
    , 663 (Pa.
    Super. 2013).
    -9-
    J-S14027-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/10/19
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 274 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 5/10/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024