Com. v. Slaughter, C. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SLAUGHTER :
:
Appellant : No. 289 MDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 21, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0002736-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 18, 2018
Appellant, Christopher Michael Slaughter, appeals pro se from the
order denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The trial court previously set forth the following detailed account of the
factual history of this case:
On April 20, 2013, Officer Terry Wealand, a Sergeant with
the Harrisburg City Police, was on duty assigned to the Street
Crimes Unit. (Transcript of Proceedings, Trial August 11, 2014,
p. 111)(Hereinafter, “N.T. Trial”). In the preceding 48 hours,
Officer Wealand received information regarding a Lincoln Aviator
SUV (hereinafter, “Lincoln”) involved in suspected criminal
activity. (N.T. Trial, p. 112). Officer Wealand obtained the
plate, registration and ownership information related to the
vehicle. (N.T. Trial, p. 113; p. 115). Officer Wealand began
work that day at 4:00 pm. He was in uniform in a two-man
marked police vehicle with his partner, Officer Jon Fustine. (N.T.
Trial, p. 114).
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Sitting in the parked police vehicle at Sixth and Curtin
Streets in Harrisburg, the officers saw the Lincoln drive by, park
and let out a passenger. The officers confirmed the plate
number as that of the Lincoln previously identified to them.
(N.T. Trial, p. 116). The vehicle re-entered traffic without
signaling. (N.T. Trial, p. 119). Officer Wealand radioed his
intention to initiate a traffic stop, followed the Lincoln a few
blocks then engaged the red and blue lights. The Lincoln pulled
over. (N.T. Trial, p. 120). Officer Fustine exited the police
vehicle on the passenger side and took five or six steps toward
the Lincoln. (N.T. Trial, p. 122). The Lincoln fled. (Id.). Officer
Fustine returned to the vehicle. Officer Wealand radioed that the
vehicle fled from the traffic stop. (Id.).
As Officer Wealand began to follow the Lincoln, it took off
at a high rate of speed, running a stop sign. The Lincoln passed
a playground and baseball field at a speed such that the back
end of the Lincoln lifted into the air. (N.T. Trial, pp. 123-124; p.
131). Officer Wealand activated his sirens to alert traffic
through an intersection. (N.T. Trial, p. 125). Because it was a
warm spring evening, many people were out on the sidewalks
and near their homes. (N.T. Trial, p. 125; pp. 268-269). The
Lincoln continued accelerating. Officer Wealand chose to follow
the vehicle with lights and sirens rather than engage in close
pursuit. (Id.; pp. 180-181). Officer Wealand attempted to
maintain sight of the Lincoln but realized he could not keep up
with it. (N.T. Trial, p. 190; pp. 269-270).
The Lincoln entered a narrow one way street, Jefferson
Street, on which parked cars lined both sides and where the
speed limit was 25 miles per hour. The Lincoln swerved around
cars, into empty parking stalls and ran stop signs. (N.T. Trial, p.
127). Officer Fustine observed the Lincoln nearly strike a
woman pushing a child in a stroller. (N.T. Trial, p. 269). Officer
Wealand slowed down and sped up to clear intersections and
stop signs. (N.T. Trial, p. 128). The Lincoln picked up speed
and ran stop signs. Officer Wealand observed it turn westbound.
(Id.) Officer Wealand received information that a collision
occurred involving a police vehicle. (N.T. Trial, p. 129).
At the same time, Officer Daniel Peiper, also with the
Harrisburg Police Street Crimes Unit, was on street patrol in a
police Chevy Tahoe with his K-9 partner, Thor, headed
southbound on Sixth Street. (N.T. Trial, pp. 78-79). Officer
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Peiper recalled that it was a warm spring day with many people
out enjoying the weather. (N.T. Trial, p. 79). At approximately
6:30 pm, Officer Peiper saw a vehicle fleeing on Jefferson Street.
(Id.) He suspected that the driver would reach the area he was
patrolling and jump out of the vehicle. (N.T. Trial, pp. 79-80).
As his vehicle coasted at a slow speed, Officer Peiper reached
back to open the K-9 cage. (N.T. Trial, p. 90). He took the
steering wheel and without seeing a vehicle coming, felt a large
impact. (N.T. Trial pp. 79-80; pp. 90-91). Officer Peiper could
not comprehend what had occurred. (Id.) Officer Peifer heard
other officers on the radio and another K-9 officer, taking care of
Thor. (N.T. Trial, p. 81).
Officer Wealand arrived at Sixth and Forrest Streets and
observed what he described as resembling a bomb scene: a
marked police Tahoe on its roof and another vehicle, a green
Rav-4, along the sidewalk at an angle to the Tahoe. (N.T. Trial,
p. 132). Officer Fustine described screaming. (N.T. Trial, p.
271). A man told Officer Wealand that his girlfriend was under
the Tahoe. (N.T. Trial, p. 137). Officer Wealand looked under
the Tahoe and saw a woman, Selina Martin entrapped, and the
K-9 crouched on the concrete. (N.T. Trial, pp.136-137).
Officer Wealand then approached the Lincoln. The officer
could see that the airbags had deployed and the driver, later
identified as [Appellant], leaning over and rummaging in the
center console. (N.T. Trial, p. 199). Officers removed
[Appellant] through the passenger window as they could not
open other windows and doors. (N.T. Trial, pp. 140-141).
Officer Wealand turned over custody of [Appellant] to other
officers at the scene. (N.T. Trial, p. 157).
Selina Martin, the woman trapped under the vehicle, had
been sweeping the porch of her home on North Sixth Street that
evening as part of a community cleanup. (Transcript of
Proceedings, Jury Trial, p. 62). Ms. Martin recalled little about
the events preceding the incident that day, only that she heard
vehicles, then a bang. She recalled seeing a vehicle flying
toward her, with no opportunity to flee. (Id.).
In order to speak with Ms. Martin, Officer Wealand lay
down under the vehicle. (N.T. Trial, p. 152). Officer Wealand
engaged her in conversation continuously, fearing that she was
going to expire. Ms. Martin gained leverage against Officer
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Wealand’s head to push herself out from under the vehicle.
(N.T. Trial, pp. 158-161).
Officer Peiper and Ms. Martin were transported to Hershey
Medical Center. Officer Peiper’s K-9 partner was transported to
an emergency veterinary hospital.
As a result of the impact from [Appellant’s] vehicle with
the police Tahoe, Officer Peiper suffered a severe scalp
laceration which exposed his skull causing life-threatening blood
loss, a lost kidney, a broken arm requiring surgical
reconstruction, a fractured hip, numerous fractured ribs, pelvic
fractures, a punctured lung and nerve damage resulting in
permanent numbness on his right side. (N.T. Trial, pp. 82-84;
pp. 105-109). He remained in a coma for 7-8 weeks and only
recalls being awake sometime in June. (N.T. Trial, pp. 80-81).
Officer Peiper remained hospitalized and in rehabilitation until
July 2013. (N.T. p. 84).
Officer Peiper endures relentless pain of such intensity that
at one point he wanted doctors to amputate his foot. (N.T. Trial,
p. 86). For an extended period of time, he required a walker or
cane and assistance with basic personal care. (N.T. pp. 84-85).
Officer Peiper has returned to work on a reduced schedule
performing sedentary duties. (N.T. Trial, p. 87).
As a result of the incident, Ms. Martin sustained two
collapsed lungs, broken ribs, a broken shoulder, a fractured
spleen, laceration of the liver, a crushed pelvis, legs, wrists and
arms, and cardiac injury which required numerous surgeries.
(N.T. Trial, p. 67; pp. 104-105). Ms. Martin remained in an
induced coma for three months. (N.T. Trial, pp. 63-64). Before
the accident, Ms. Martin enjoyed excellent health, walked and
rode a bicycle for fitness. Since the accident, she suffers
constant pain and struggles with ordinary daily activities such
including walking, standing, sitting and reaching. (N.T. pp. 67-
68).
Officer Travis Pidcock, assigned to the Dauphin County
Accident Reconstruction Team, participated in the search of the
Lincoln. Officer Pidcock collected a baggie from the second row
of the Lincoln which contained crack cocaine. In addition, he
collected a bag which contained other baggies. (N.T. Trial, pp.
207-208.)
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Dauphin County Chief Detective John Goshert provided
expert testimony that the amount of cocaine, 6.3 grams, and its
street value, $486,000, along with the possession of empty
plastic bags, evidenced drug trafficking. (N.T. Trial, pp. 257-
263.)
Trial Court Opinion, 9/17/15, at 3-8.
Appellant was charged with one count each of aggravated assault of a
police officer, aggravated assault, fleeing or attempting to elude an officer,
recklessly endangering another person, and possession with intent to
deliver.1 On August 13, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of all five of the
charges. On November 4, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve
an aggregate term of incarceration of twenty-nine and one-half to fifty-nine
years.
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court
denied on February 9, 2015. Appellant then took a timely direct appeal, and
this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on December 14, 2015.
Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 432 MDA 2015, 135 A.3d 658 (Pa. Super.
filed December 14, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not
seek further review.
On March 28, 2016, Appellant filed, pro se, the instant PCRA petition.
The PCRA court appointed counsel on April 4, 2016. On July 1, 2016, PCRA
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(2), 2702(a)(1), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2705, and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
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counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,
544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213
(Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On September 13, 2016, the PCRA court
entered an order permitting counsel to withdraw and providing Appellant
with notice of the PCRA court’s intent to dismiss his petition pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On December 2, 2016, Appellant filed a response to the
PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss. The PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s PCRA petition on December 21, 2016. This timely appeal
followed.
On January 25, 2017, the PCRA court entered an order directing
Appellant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement, which raised a mind-boggling seventy-seven vague issues. On
February 27, 2017, the PCRA court filed a statement in lieu of an opinion.
Appellant now presents the following issues for our review:
1. WAS PCRA COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR NOT
PERFECTING A TIMELY PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL
TO THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT?
2. WAS PCRA COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE
TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR FAILING TO FULLY
INVESTIGATE APPELLANT’S CASE AND PRESENT A PROPER
DEFENCE?
3. WAS PCRA COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE
TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR FAILING TO
SUBPOENA CORPORAL MILO HOOPER TO TESTIFY AT
APPELLANT’S TRIAL?
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4. WAS PCRA COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE
TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR NOT CORRECTING
WHICH JUROR NEEDED TO BE REMOVED FROM THE JURY
PANEL?
5. WAS PCRA COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE
TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR FAILING TO EITHER
OBJECT OR FILE A MOTION TO LIMINE IN ORDER TO FORBID
THE JURY FROM HEARING PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY ABOUT
APPELLANT BEING INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY?
6. WAS PCRA COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE
TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR FAILING TO OBJECT
TO HEARSAY TESTIMONY?
7. DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S
PCRA PETITION WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING?
Appellant’s Brief at viii-ix (verbatim).
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we
consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the
PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super.
2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super.
2014) (en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence
of record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling
is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa.
Super. 2012). We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that
are supported in the record and will not disturb them unless they have no
support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080,
1084 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must determine
whether those issues are properly before us. The PCRA court has asserted
that Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement lacks the specificity required by
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4), and thus, appellate review is precluded. PCRA Court
Opinion, 2/27/17, at 1-2. We agree.2
A concise statement of errors complained of on appeal must be specific
enough for the trial court to identify and address the issues the appellant
wishes to raise on appeal. Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (quoting Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa.
Super. 2006)). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 provides that
a Rule 1925(b) statement “shall concisely identify each ruling or error that
the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all
pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “Issues not
included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the
provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
This Court has considered the question of what constitutes a sufficient
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on numerous occasions and has established
that “[an] appellant’s concise statement must properly specify the error to
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2 As previously indicated, on January 25, 2017, the PCRA court directed
Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, which was due within
twenty-one days. On February 13, 2017, Appellant filed a ten-page
document entitled “‘1925(B)’ Concise Statement of Matters of Complaint.”
However, the mere fact that Appellant timely complied with the PCRA court’s
directive does not automatically equate to proper preservation of issues.
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be addressed on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415
(Pa. Super. 2011). “[T]he Rule 1925(b) statement must be specific enough
for the trial court to identify and address the issue an appellant wishes to
raise on appeal.” Id. (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted).
The compulsory requirement of adhering to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 is captured
in the following excerpt from Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394 (Pa. Super.
2004):
In Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa.
1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically held that
“from this date forward, in order to preserve their claims for
appellate review, Appellants must comply whenever the trial
court orders them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of
on Appeal pursuant to [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure] 1925.” Lord, 719 A.2d at 309. “Any issues not
raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” Id. This
Court explained in Riley v. Foley, 783 A.2d 807, 813 (Pa.
Super. 2001), that Rule 1925 is a crucial component of the
appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and
focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal. This
Court has further explained that “a Concise Statement which is
too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on
appeal is the functional equivalent to no Concise Statement at
all.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-[6]87
(Pa. Super. 2001). “Even if the trial court correctly guesses the
issues Appellants raise[] on appeal and writes an opinion
pursuant to that supposition the issues [are] still waived.”
Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. Super.
2002).
Kanter, 866 A.2d at 400.
Our law further makes clear that satisfaction of Pa.R.A.P. 1925 is not
simply a matter of filing any statement. Rather, the statement must be
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concise and sufficiently specific and coherent as to allow the trial court to
understand the specific allegation of error and offer a rebuttal. These
requirements are evident in the following language from Dowling:
When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing,
that is not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant
fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought
to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its
preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues.
. . . While Lord and its progeny have generally involved
situations where an appellant completely fails to mention an
issue in his Concise Statement, for the reasons set forth above
we conclude that Lord should also apply to Concise Statements
which are so vague as to prevent the court from identifying the
issue to be raised on appeal. In the instant case, Appellant’s
Concise Statement was not specific enough for the trial court to
identify and address the issue Appellant wished to raise on
appeal. As such, the court did not address it. Because
Appellant’s vague Concise Statement has hampered appellate
review, it is waived.
Dowling, 778 A.2d at 686-687 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, as we stated in Reeves:
There is a common sense obligation to give the trial court notice
as to what the trial court should address in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion. While there is a middle ground that [an appellant] must
travel to avoid having a Rule 1925(b) statement so vague that
the trial judge cannot ascertain what issues should be discussed
in the Rule 1925(a) opinion or so verbose and lengthy that it
frustrates the ability of the trial judge to hone in on the issues
actually being presented to the appellate court, see Kanter v.
Epstein, 866 A.2d 394 (Pa. Super. 2004), that is not an onerous
burden to place on [an appellant]. It only requires using a little
common sense.
Reeves, 907 A.2d at 2-3.
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In essence, the purpose of requiring a concise statement of matters
complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) is to allow the trial court to
easily discern the issues an appellant intends to pursue on appeal and to
allow the court to file an intelligent response to those issues in an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
fails in this regard.
The PCRA court offered the following thorough explanation regarding
why the deficiencies of Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement compels our
conclusion:
It is well-established that “Appellant’s concise statement
must properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super.
2011), appeal denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011)
(citation omitted). “[T]he Rule 1925(b) statement must be
specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the
issues an appellant wishes to raise on appeal.” Id. Further, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court may find a waiver where a concise
statement is too vague. Id. “When a court has to guess what
issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for
meaningful review.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d
683, 686 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). A Concise
Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the
issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of a no
Concise Statement at all. Id. at 686-[6]87.
In the instant matter, Appellant has raised … boilerplate
claim[s] that [fail] to identify any specific issues on appeal.
Instead, Appellant filed a Concise Statement containing 77
allegations of error.1 Many of these allegations have been
previously addressed and/or have been waived for failure to
raise on direct appeal. Because Appellant gave . . . boilerplate
claim[s] that failed to identify any specific issues on appeal,
Appellant has waived any issues he may have had on appeal in
this matter by failing to identify any specific issue on appeal.
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See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4); Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.
3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011).
1 “While criminal defendants often believe that the
best way to pursue their appeals is by raising the
greatest number of issues, actually, the opposite is
true: selecting the few most important issues
succinctly stated presents the greatest likelihood of
success.” Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137,
1140 (Pa . 1993). “Appellate advocacy is measured
by effectiveness, not loquaciousness.” Id., at 1140-
1141 (citation omitted). This is because “[l]egal
contentions, like the currency, depreciate through
over issue. The mind of an appellate judge is
habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower
court committed an error. But receptiveness
declines as the number of assigned errors increases.
Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one[.]”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 864 A.2d 460, 480
n.28 ( Pa. 2004) (quoting Robert H. Jackson, J.,
“Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court,”
25 Temple L.Q. 115, 119 (1951)).
Additionally, PCRA counsel and this Court have reviewed
the instant matter and determined that there are no genuine
issues and Appellant is not entitled to relief. We further note the
sound reasoning in PCRA counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and
incorporate our Memorandum Order, filed December 21, 2016
that dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/27/17, at 1-2.
Indeed, our review of the certified record reflects that this Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) document rambles on for ten pages in a barely coherent fashion
listing seventy-seven allegations of error. The ultimate result of Appellant’s
presentation is that any issues Appellant wishes to raise in this appeal are
lost in the midst of the rambling discourse laid out in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. Thus, due to the presentation of Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
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statement, the PCRA court was precluded from addressing any issues in its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) document. Given the foregoing and our agreement with
the PCRA court’s analysis, we conclude that Appellant’s challenges to the
PCRA court’s order denying post-conviction relief are waived.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/18/2018
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