Com. v. Corliss, J. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S57042-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JUSTIN MEREDITH CORLISS
    Appellant                 No. 709 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered January 30, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Criminal Division at No: CP-45-CR-0000743-1997
    BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED DECEMBER 04, 2014
    Appellant, Justin Meredith Corliss, appeals pro se from the January 30,
    2014 order denying his petition for a writ of coram nobis. We affirm.
    On August 20, 1998, after a jury found Appellant guilty of statutory
    sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and corruption
    of minors, the trial court imposed a sentence of four to ten years of
    incarceration.     This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct
    appeal, and Appellant’s subsequent PCRA petitions were unsuccessful.
    Appellant was released from prison in 2008, having completed the full term
    of his sentence.
    Based on his 1998 conviction, Appellant is obligated to register as a
    sexual offender. In 2013, Appellant was charged with failing to comply with
    that obligation. Through this coram nobis petition, filed on August 7, 2013,
    J-S57042-14
    Appellant hopes to negate the 1998 conviction and, along with it, the
    obligation to register as a sexual offender. The trial court denied Appellant’s
    petition on January 30, 2014. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on
    February 27, 2014. His appellate brief presents three questions:
    1. When appellant is no longer subject to a sentence is coram
    nobis available to litigate errors which resulted in miscarriage
    of justice and collateral consequences that exact civil
    disabilities?
    2. Are the facts of record regarding absence of an alibi
    instruction for the time frame convicted of, when appellant
    was actually at Burger King, sufficient reason to grant the
    relief of a new trial on coram nobis review?
    3. When the lower court intentionally misrepresents or ignores
    facts of record regarding the alibi evidence, is that not only an
    abuse of discretion but justification for recusal?
    Appellant’s Brief at 8.
    The trial court treated Appellant’s coram nobis petition as an untimely
    petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
    Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. The trial therefore dismissed Appellant’s petition for
    lack of jurisdiction, because the petition does not comply with the PCRA’s
    jurisdictional time limits and because Appellant no longer is serving his
    sentence. We agree with the trial court’s disposition.
    The PCRA subsumes common law remedies where the relief sought is
    available under the PCRA: “The action established in this subchapter shall
    be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other
    common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when
    this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.”
    -2-
    J-S57042-14
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (emphasis added). If relief is available under the PCRA,
    the   PCRA     is   the   exclusive    means     of   obtaining   the   relief   sought.
    Commonwealth v. Eller, 
    807 A.2d 838
    , 842 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth
    v. Pagan, 
    864 A.2d 1231
    , (Pa. Super. 2004), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 909
    (2005).     In Pagan we explained: “coram nobis relief does not become
    available merely because the PCRA refuses to remedy a petitioner’s
    grievance; rather, we look at the claims a petitioner is raising.” 
    Pagan, 864 A.2d at 1233
    . “Here, [b]ecause Appellant’s claim[] could have been brought
    under the PCRA, [the] claim[] had to be brought under the PCRA.”                     
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).1
    In his brief, Appellant argues counsel was ineffective in presenting
    Appellant’s alibi defense and obtaining an appropriate jury instruction.
    Ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable under the PCRA.                     42.
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). As such, the PCRA was Appellant’s sole means of
    ____________________________________________
    1
    An en banc panel of this Court recently concluded that coram nobis relief
    was available to a petitioner who was denied re-entry to the United States
    based on his guilty plea to fraud. Commonwealth v. Descardes, ___ A.3d
    ___, 
    2014 Pa. Super. 210
    (Pa. Super. September 23, 2014) (en banc). The
    petitioner in Descardes alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to advise
    him his plea would affect his immigration status. 
    Id. at *3.
    In Padilla v.
    Kentucky, 
    559 U.S. 356
    , 370-71 (2010), the Unites States Supreme Court
    held that counsel have an obligation to inform clients that a guilty plea will
    result in deportation. In Descardes, this Court concluded the coram nobis
    petition presented “one of the rare instances where the PCRA fails to provide
    remedy for the claim.”         Descardes, 
    2014 Pa. Super. 210
    , at *8.
    Descardes does not command a different result in this appeal, as
    Appellant’s petition presents claims that are cognizable under the PCRA.
    -3-
    J-S57042-14
    obtaining relief, and he cannot now seek to avoid the untimeliness of raising
    these issues by filing a coram nobis petition.
    Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA requires a petitioner to file a petition
    within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence becomes
    final.    The PCRA’s timeliness provision is jurisdiction.   Commonwealth v.
    Ali, 
    86 A.3d 173
    , 177 (Pa. 2014). Likewise, a petitioner is ineligible after his
    or her sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole concludes.              42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i).
    Appellant concedes he is ineligible for relief under the PCRA. Since the
    PCRA is Appellant’s sole means of obtaining the relief requested, we affirm
    the order dismissing his petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/4/2014
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 709 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 12/4/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/4/2014