Com. v. Gore, A. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
:
ALLEN GORE, :
:
Appellant : No. 1411 EDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 19, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division No(s).: CP-51-CR-0905541-2003
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 24, 2014
Appellant, Allen Gore, appeals from the order denying, without a
hearing, his first Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)1 petition entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. This Court previously vacated
the PCRA court’s earlier order reinstating Appellant’s direct appeal rights and
remanded for further proceedings.2 Appellant presently claims his prior
counsel were ineffective for failing to preserve an appellate challenge to the
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
Commonwealth v. Gore, 2981 EDA 2011 (unpublished memorandum)
(Pa. Super. Aug. 2, 2012).
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sufficiency of the evidence and a challenge the weight of the evidence. We
affirm.
Appellant was found guilty but mentally ill of, inter alia, first-degree
murder3 for killing his father, William Gore (“decedent”), on August 18,
2002.4 On that day, Appellant’s mother left Appellant and the decedent at
their home at 3:00 p.m. When she returned at 6:00 p.m., the front door
was locked, and Appellant opened the door for her after she called through
the mail slot. She then discovered the decedent bleeding and nonresponsive
in his bed. Appellant’s mother telephoned her other son to come over and
attempted to resuscitate the decedent. Appellant, in the meantime, left the
home. Police officers responded to the scene and found an aluminum
baseball bat under Appellant’s bed. Appellant’s mother told the officers that
Appellant was angry at the decedent for letting their dog out earlier in the
day.
At 7:30 p.m., Appellant entered the Philadelphia Police Administration
building and told the officer at the front desk he wanted to turn himself in
because he struck his father with a baseball bat. At trial, the officer testified
that Appellant told him the decedent “came up to him and said that he was
3
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 314, 2502(a).
4
The decedent was eighty-three years old and suffered from amyotophic
lateral sclerosis (“ALS”). He drank alcohol on the morning before Appellant
attacked him and was carried to his upstairs bedroom by Appellant’s mother
and Appellant’s brother.
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the devil.” N.T., 10/28/04, at 134-35, 138. The officer called for assistance.
One of the responding officers testified that Appellant reported he beat the
decedent after the decedent called him the devil and then put the baseball
bat he used under his bed. Appellant was taken to the homicide unit for
interrogation.
Appellant waived his Miranda5 rights and gave a statement that was
transcribed by the interrogating detective. Appellant reported he was being
treated for “[b]ipolar, manic depressive schizophrenia, psycho affective
psychosis.” N.T, 10/29/04, at 23. According to Appellant, after the
decedent was diagnosed with ALS, the decedent called himself the devil and
Appellant Jesus Christ. Id. at 26. Appellant stated the decedent stuck
needles in Appellant’s eyes at night and used mental telepathy against him.
Id. Appellant prayed every night for “God to get it over with.” Id. at 26.
Appellant told the interrogator that that on the morning of the killing,
he called the decedent a “dickhead” after the decedent let the dog out of the
home. Id. at 24. Later that day, the decedent came downstairs and “said
you know I’m the devil, right?” Id. at 25. The decedent spat and laughed
at Appellant. Appellant went to his room and noticed he had money in his
pockets. He then left the home and purchased the baseball bat from a
sporting goods store. When he returned to the home, he went back to his
room, listened to music, and “wrote something in [his] book[.]” Id. He
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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then hit decedent once on the head and twice in the back. Id. He wiped off
the bat and his hands with a towel. Id. at 26.
Appellant was found incompetent to stand trial, and the trial court
entered commitment orders from September 24, 2002, to June 3, 2003.
Thereafter, a preliminary hearing was held on September 3, 2003, and a
jury trial on the charges of homicide and related offenses commenced on
October 28, 2004.
At trial, Appellant raised an insanity defense. Appellant’s mother
testified for the defense and described Appellant’s social and medical
background, which included: (1) having behavioral problems beginning when
he was fifteen years old; (2) watching his friend killed in a robbery, (3)
destroying the interior of the home, which, on one occasion, resulted in a
stand-off with SWAT officers, (4) being voluntarily and involuntarily
committed for mental health reasons on numerous occasions, and (5) being
shot after claiming he was the devil and engaging in an altercation with
another individual. Appellant’s mother stated he was not taking his
medications before he killed the decedent.
The defense also called Dr. Pogos Voskanian, a forensic psychiatrist.
Dr. Voskanian noted Appellant was found incompetent after killing his father
and committed to a mental health institution before trial. The doctor
indicated that Appellant suffered “schizophrenia of paranoid type and post-
traumatic stress disorder” and met clinical criteria for temporal lobe
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epilepsy. N.T., 11/1/04, at 49-50. Dr. Voskanian opined Appellant was
incapable of differentiating right and wrong at the time of the incident given
Appellant’s belief the decedent was the devil. Id. at 51.
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. John
O’Brien. Dr. O’Brien conceded that Appellant had trouble conforming his
conduct to the law. He opined, however, that Appellant’s actions—i.e.,
locking the front door, killing the decedent, wiping blood from the bat and
his hand, hiding the bat under his bed, and then turning himself in to
police—evinced his knowledge that the killing was wrong. Id. at 175-76.
The PCRA court summarized the remaining procedural history of this
case.
On November 2, 2004, following a jury trial before the
Honorable Jane Cutler Greenspan, [Appellant] was found
guilty but mentally ill of one count of murder of the first
degree (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a)), and one count of
possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”) (18 Pa.C.S. §
907(a)). The Court immediately imposed the mandatory
sentence of life in prison for the murder charge (18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(a)(1) & 42 Pa.C.S. § 9727(a)) and a concurrent
sentence of one to two years incarceration for the PIC
charge. No post-sentence motions were filed. On
December 4, 2004, [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal. On
March 15, 2005, [Appellant’s] appeal was dismissed due to
the defense attorney’s failure to file a docketing statement,
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. [ ]3517. [Appellant] was
represented at trial and on direct appeal by James Gross,
Esquire.
On April 20, 2006, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).
[Appellant] filed an additional pro se PCRA petition on May
3, 2006. On June 20, 2006, Gary Server, Esquire, was
appointed to represent [Appellant]. On September 27,
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2006, Mr. Server filed an Amended PCRA Petition on behalf
of [Appellant], requesting reinstatement of [Appellant’s]
appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Judge Greenspan granted
the petition on October 6, 2006, reinstating [Appellant’s]
right to appeal. [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal on
October 26, 2006, and raised claims based on the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence. On November 1, 2007,
the Superior Court affirmed [Appellant’s] judgment of
sentence, finding that [his] weight of the evidence claim
was waived because it was not raised in the trial court, and
that [his] sufficiency of the evidence claim was waived
both because the necessary notes of testimony from the
original trial were not transmitted as part of the record,
and due to inadequate development of the claim in [his
counseled] appellate brief. [Commonwealth v. Gore,
3128 EDA 2006 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super.
Nov. 1, 2007). Appellant’s] Petition for Allowance of
Appeal to the Supreme Court was denied on April 16,
2008. [Commonwealth v. Gore, 678 EAL 2007 (Pa. Apr.
16, 2008)]
[Appellant] filed a third pro se petition on June 17,
2008. As Judge Greenspan had retired, [Appellant’s] PCRA
was reassigned to the Honorable Renee Cardwell Hughes.
On August 6, 2009, Lee Mandell, Esquire, was appointed to
represent [Appellant]. On January 26, 2010, Mr. Mandell
filed an Amended PCRA Petition on behalf of [Appellant], in
which he sought the right to file a second direct appeal
nunc pro tunc. On July 5, 2011, after Judge Hughes’s
retirement from the bench, [Appellant’s] PCRA was
reassigned to the undersigned [PCRA] judge. On
September 19, 2011, this Court granted [Appellant’s]
Amended Petition and ordered that [Appellant’s] right to a
direct appeal be reinstated.
On August 2, 2012, the Superior Court [vacated the
PCRA order granting the direct appeal nunc pro tunc.
Gore, 2981 EDA 2011, at 9.] The Superior Court
remanded the matter to the PCRA Court to “conduct its
analysis of Appellant’s claims pursuant to the strictures of
the PCRA.” [Id. at 9].
On November 14, 2012, Mr. Mandell filed a
Supplemental PCRA Petition (“Amended Petition”) raising
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one claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness and one claim of
appellate counsel ineffectiveness. Amended Petition at ¶¶
8(a)-(b). On February 15, 2013, after reviewing
[Appellant’s] PCRA Petition and the Commonwealth’s
Motion to Dismiss, this Court ruled that the claims set forth
in [Appellant’s] petition were without merit. On that day,
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the Court issued notice of its
intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing (“907
Notice"). On February 20, 2013, [Appellant] mailed a
letter to the PCRA Court that contained a litany of
complaints, none of which was germane to the PCRA
Petition pending before the Court. On April 5, 2013, the
Court entered an order dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA
Petition.
PCRA Ct. Op., 7/16/13, at 1-3 (footnote omitted). This appeal followed.
Appellant presents the following question for review:
Did the Honorable PCRA Court err when it denied
[Appellant’s] Amended PCRA Petition and Supplemental
Amended PCRA Petition without a hearing, but where the
[Appellant] pled, and would have been able to prove, that
he was entitled to relief as the result of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant first argues that prior appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to brief a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in light of his
insanity defense.6 He asserts “if this issue had been properly briefed and
6
As the PCRA court noted, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement set forth a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence sounding in direct error rather
than ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with the court’s conclusion
that a direct claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is waived
under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). The court also opined that
Appellant’s challenge could be considered within the framework of an
ineffectiveness claim and addressed it as such. PCRA Ct. Op. at 6. We
decline to find waiver based on a defective Rule 1925(b) statement and
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raised in the Superior Court . . . , the Superior Court most likely would have
granted [him] an arrest of judgment and, hence, [he] has been grossly
prejudiced.” Id. at 17. No relief is due.
The principles governing our review are
well settled: “In addressing the grant or denial of post-
conviction relief, an appellate court will consider whether
the PCRA court’s conclusions are supported by record
evidence and are free of legal error.” To be entitled to
PCRA relief, a petitioner must establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, his conviction or sentence
resulted from one or more of the errors found in 42
Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2) . . . .
. . . To be entitled to relief on an ineffectiveness claim, [a
petitioner] must prove the underlying claim is of arguable
merit, counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis,
and counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him prejudice.
Prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel
means demonstrating there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. . . . Failure to
establish any prong of the test will defeat an
ineffectiveness claim.
Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1060-61 (Pa. 2012) (citations
and footnote omitted). Moreover, “[a] PCRA petitioner is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing as a matter of right, but only where the petition presents
genuine issues of material fact. A PCRA court’s decision denying a claim
without a hearing may only be reversed upon a finding of an abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 1094 (citations omitted). This Court may affirm if there
review the trial court’s consideration of his claim based on prior appellate
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.
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is any basis on the record to support the PCRA court’s action.
Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized the legal principles
underlying a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.
[A] verdict of guilty but mentally ill is authorized by
Section 314 of the Crimes Code, as follows:
(a) General rule.—A person who timely offers a
defense of insanity in accordance with the Rules of
Criminal Procedure may be found “guilty but
mentally ill” at trial if the trier of facts finds,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is
guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the time
of the commission of the offense and was not
legally insane at the time of the commission of
the offense.
* * *
(c) Definitions.—For the purposes of this section
and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9727 (relating to disposition of
persons found guilty by mentally ill):
(1) “Mentally ill.” One who as a result of
mental disease or defect, lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
(2) “Legal insanity.” At the time of the
commission of the act, the defendant was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.
18 Pa.C.S. § 314. . . . Section 314(a) does not impose a
burden of proof concerning a defendant’s mental illness on
either party, but rather, is implicated where an insanity
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defense fails but evidence of the defendant’s mental illness
nevertheless “preponderates.” The insanity defense is
provided for in Section 315 of the Crimes Code, as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The mental soundness of an
actor engaged in conduct charged to constitute an
offense shall only be a defense to the charged
offense when the actor proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that the actor was legally insane at the
time of the commission of the offense.
(b) Definition.—For purposes of this section, the
phrase “legally insane” means that, at the time of
the commission of the offense, the actor was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing or, if the actor did know the
quality of the act, that he did not know that what he
was doing was wrong.
18 Pa.C.S. § 314.
Commonwealth v. Rabold, 951 A.2d 329, 330-31 (Pa. 2008) (some
citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The initial burden of establishing an insanity defense is on the
defendant, but once raised, the Commonwealth may rebut the claim by
proving the defendant’s sanity. See Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957
A.2d 734, 739 (Pa. Super. 2008). The Commonwealth can establish “sanity
not only by psychiatric testimony but also by lay testimony which shows that
he or she knew the nature and quality of the act committed and knew that
what had been done was wrong.” Id. (citation omitted).
We are also mindful that
the standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
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trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proof [of] proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above
test, the entire record must be evaluated and all the
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally,
the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free
to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 820 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citations omitted). “Furthermore, it is within the factfinder’s right to
disbelieve an insanity defense[.]” Yasipour, 957 A.2d at 739 (citation
omitted).
Instantly, we agree with Appellant that he presented sufficient
evidence to raise an insanity defense. However, the Commonwealth
presented rebuttal expert evidence regarding Appellant’s mental state at the
time of the incident. Dr. O’Brien testified that even if Appellant was
delusional at the time of the killing, he was capable of forming a specific
intent to kill and differentiating right and wrong. The Commonwealth’s
rebuttal evidence was not so weak or inconclusive that no probability of fact
regarding Appellant’s sanity could be drawn. Thus, the jury was entitled to
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disbelieve Appellant’s evidence and credit the Commonwealth’s rebuttal
evidence, and an appellate court would not reweigh the evidence when
considering Appellant’s underlying sufficiency argument. See Yasipour,
957 A.2d at 739; Lehman, 820 A.2d at 772. Accordingly, we agree with the
PCRA court that Appellant failed to establish arguable merit to his claim that
prior appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence.
Appellant next argues the PCRA court erred when considering his claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the weight of the
evidence. He contends that trial counsel’s failure to preserve a weight of the
evidence challenge in the trial court resulted in waiver of a meritorious issue
and that he is presently entitled to PCRA relief. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-
20. We disagree.
The principles governing a challenge to the weight of the evidence are
well settled.
A verdict is against the weight of the evidence “only
when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one’s sense of justice.” A weight of the evidence
claim is primarily directed to the discretion of the judge
who presided at trial, who only possesses “narrow
authority” to upset a jury verdict on a weight of the
evidence claim. Assessing the credibility of witnesses at
trial is within the sole discretion of the fact-finder. A trial
judge cannot grant a new trial merely because of some
conflict in testimony or because the judge would reach a
different conclusion on the same facts, but should only do
so in extraordinary circumstances, “when the jury’s verdict
is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
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justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that
right may be given another opportunity to prevail.” . . .
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 652-53 (Pa. 2008) (citations
omitted).
“[T]he role of the trial judge is to determine that ‘notwithstanding all
the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or
to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.’”
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
An appellate court reviews the exercise of discretion by the trial court, “not .
. . the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
Instantly, the parties presented divergent expert opinions on
Appellant’s ability to form the specific intent to kill and appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions. The defense and Commonwealth experts
attached different significance to Appellant’s actions before and after killing
the decedent and reached opposite conclusions. We are mindful that a mere
conflict in the evidence does not give rise to a meritorious weight of the
evidence challenge. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we
cannot conclude that a challenge to the weight of the evidence lacked
arguable merit.
Nevertheless, after review of the record, we are not convinced that
Appellant’s expert evidence was of such greater weight than the
Commonwealth’s expert evidence that the jury’s decision, to credit the
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Commonwealth’s evidence and find Appellant was not legally insane, denies
justice or shocks the court’s conscience. See Clay, 64 A.2d at 1055.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Appellant demonstrated prejudice, i.e.
that but for trial counsel’s failure to preserve this claim, there was a
reasonable possibility that a new trial would have been awarded. Thus, we
concur with the PCRA court’s decision to deny Appellant’s instant
ineffectiveness claim.
Because our review reveals no genuine issues of fact to be addressed
in an evidentiary hearing, we also agree with the PCRA court’s determination
that further proceedings were not required to consider Appellant’s claims.
See Keaton, 45 A.3d at 1094.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/24/2014
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