Com. v. Seal, D. ( 2018 )

J-A07002-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DEAN EUGENE SEAL : No. 1618 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered September 18, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0001542-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 11, 2018
The Commonwealth appeals from the order of the trial court granting
the motion filed by Appellee, Dean Eugene Seal, seeking to suppress all
evidence obtained as a result of his vehicle stop. We reverse.
The history of this case is as follows. On February 6, 2017, a Criminal
Information was filed against Seal charging him with multiple counts of Driving
Under Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§
3802(a)(1), (d)(1)(i) & (iii), (d)(2) & (d)(3), Possession of a Small Amount of
Marijuana, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)(i), Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 35
P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), and two summary offenses. On May 3, 2017, Seal
filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop of his vehicle
on October 23, 2016, alleging that the stop “was illegal and in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution since Defendant had not
in fact committed traffic violations.” Motion to Suppress, 5-4-17 at 1-2. Seal
further contended that the observations of the interior of his vehicle and the
subsequent blood test results were all “fruits of a wrongful stop . . . .” Id.
A hearing on the suppression motion was held on August 24, 2017.
Police Officer Shannon Hilliard, of the Gettysburg Borough Police Department,
was the only witness. Officer Hilliard testified that on October 23, 2016, at
approximately 1:30 AM, he was on patrol in Lincoln Square when he noticed
a vehicle travelling southbound onto Baltimore Street. Hearing, 8-24-17 at 4-
5. The vehicle began to drift to the left, and eventually the driver’s side tires
were both over the double yellow lines for the duration of the block from East
Middle Street up to High Street. It was a full block, approximately 500 to 600
feet. Id. at 5, 8-9. The tires were at least one foot crossing over the double
lines. Id. at 8. There were no impediments on the road which would have
required the car to cross the double lines. Id. The car did not attempt to make
a left-hand turn but rather continued southbound. Id. Officer Hilliard stopped
the vehicle based upon the crossing of the double yellow lines. Id. at 7. In
time, Seal submitted to blood tests.
In an opinion and order dated September 18, 2017, the suppression
court granted Seal's motion to suppress. The Commonwealth initiated this
appeal on October 16, 2017, noting that under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), the
suppression of the blood test results terminates or substantially handicaps the
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prosecution. Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have complied with
Pa.R.A.P.1925.
The Commonwealth presents the following issue for our review:
Did the Honorable Suppression Court err in ruling that the
arresting officer lacked probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop
of Appellee’s vehicle pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.§ 3301, which resulted
in the suppression of evidence obtained following the traffic stop?
Commonwealth's Brief at 6.
We have stated the following with regard to our standard and scope of
review in an order granting a defendant's motion to suppress evidence:
[W]e are bound by that court's factual findings to the extent that
they are supported by the record, and we consider only the
evidence offered by the defendant, as well as any portion of the
Commonwealth's evidence which remains uncontradicted, when
read in the context of the entire record. Our review of the legal
conclusions which have been drawn from such evidence, however,
is de novo, and, consequently, we are not bound by the legal
conclusions of the lower courts.
Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 421 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1048 (Pa. 2012)).
Because there are no variances in the factual record, created entirely from the
testimony of Officer Hilliard, we will confine our analysis to the trial court's
legal conclusions.
The Motor Vehicle Code provides the authorization for a police officer
to stop a motor vehicle:
Whenever a police officer ... has reasonable suspicion that a
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a
vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the
vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle
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identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or
to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). However, this Court has explained the following,
consistent with our Supreme Court’s clarification of constitutional principles
under the Fourth Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution:
Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal
activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the
authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory
purpose. [Commonwealth v. Chase], 960 A.2d at 116. In
effect, the language of Section 6308(b)—“to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary
to enforce the provisions of this title”—is conceptually equivalent
with the underlying purpose of a Terry stop. Id. (quoting 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b)).
Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the
driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant
to the suspected violation. In such an instance, “it is [incumbent]
upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at
the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable
cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of
some provision of the Code.” [Commonwealth v. Gleason], 785
A.2d at 989 (citation omitted). See also Chase, 960 A.2d at 116
(reaffirming Gleason's probable cause standard for non-
investigative detentions of suspected Vehicle Code violations).
Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1290–91 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(emphasis in original). Therefore, there are two types of traffic stops, with
different standards of review applicable to each. In Commonwealth v.
Salter, 121 A.3d 987 (Pa. Super. 2015), we addressed the two kinds of traffic
stops under Pennsylvania law and the different constitutional burdens for
each:
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Accordingly, when considering whether reasonable suspicion or
probable cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop,
the nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not
necessary to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the
Vehicle Code has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause
to stop the vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is
necessary to further investigate whether a violation has occurred,
an officer need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the
stop. Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding
and DUI. If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must
possess probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because
when a vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to
the speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon
a highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient
knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer
may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code
violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed
opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under
the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.
Salter, 121 A.3d at 993. In this case, the Commonwealth does not dispute
that the stop served no investigatory purpose, and therefore the stop is valid
only if Officer Hilliard had probable cause.
With these guiding principles and examples in mind, we now turn to the
examination of the Vehicle Code violation subject of this appeal. Officer
Hilliard testified that the basis for the traffic stop was because Seal had drifted
left of the double yellow line for one entire block. The vehicle’s driver’s side
tires were both approximately one foot over the double yellow line for that
distance. These observations gave rise to a suspected violation of the Motor
Vehicle Code provision requiring that vehicles drive on the right side of the
roadway. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a). None of the exceptions listed in
subsection (a) were present that night.
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Based on the record of the suppression hearing, we conclude Officer
Hilliard was able to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of
the questioned stop, which provided probable cause to believe that Seal was
in violation of Section 3301(a). Officer Hilliard testified to his personal
observation of Seal’s vehicle, both front and back tires, veering across the
centerline. This testimony was uncontradicted. Probable cause is made out
when the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the
officer at the relevant time, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. “The question we
ask is not whether the officer's belief was correct or more likely true than
false. Rather, we require only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity. In determining whether probable cause exists, we apply a
totality of the circumstances test.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d
928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Seal argues that a “slight deviation over the double yellow line” is
momentary and minor, and is therefore insufficient to create the probable
cause necessary to support his vehicle stop. Seal’s Brief at 3. As stated above,
where a vehicle stop has no investigatory purpose, the police officer must
have probable cause to support it. Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291. Here, Officer
Hilliard stopped Seal for driving over the centerline, in violation of § 3301. He
did not stop Seal for suspected DUI.
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Additionally, Seal contends, based on Commonwealth v.
Gleason, 785 A.2d 983 (Pa. 2001), that Officer Hilliard did not articulate facts
sufficient to create probable cause because our Court has consistently applied
a “momentary and minor” analysis to these types of cases. However, the
Supreme Court in Gleason had before it an alleged violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3309(1), not section 3301(a). In Gleason, a police officer observed the
defendant's vehicle cross six to eight inches over the fog line two times over
the span of a quarter mile. Id. at 985. The officer stopped the defendant's
vehicle for failing to drive within a single lane, in violation of section 3309(1)
of the Vehicle Code. That section provides that “(a) vehicle shall be driven as
nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved
from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be
made safely.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1) (emphasis added). Subsequent to the
vehicle stop, and similar to the instant case, the police officer observed that
the defendant was intoxicated, and that he was in possession of drugs and
drug paraphernalia. Gleason, 785 A.2d at 985. The defendant argued that
the stop was unlawful and that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the
evidence the police officer gathered. Id. The Gleason Court concluded that
the vehicle stop was not supported by probable cause because no evidence
established that the defendant's driving “created a safety hazard.” Id. at 989.
The Gleason Court had before it the former version of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b)
which required a law enforcement officer to have “articulable and reasonable
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grounds to suspect a violation of the (Vehicle Code)” had occurred to
effectuate a vehicle stop. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 94
n. 12 (Pa. 2011).
Seal and the trial court also rely on Commonwealth v. Garcia, 859
A.2d 820 (Pa.Super.2004). In Garcia, a police officer observed the
defendant's vehicle momentarily drive over the right berm line two times over
the span of two blocks. Id. at 821–22. On both occasions, the defendant's car
veered slightly right in response to an oncoming vehicle traveling in the
opposite direction. Id. In executing the vehicle stop, the police officer noticed
that the defendant had glassy eyes and smelled of alcohol. Id. at 822. Again,
the defendant was charged with driving under the influence following the
stop. On appeal, the defendant argued that the police officer lacked probable
cause in support of the vehicle stop. Id. This Court held that the trial court
erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress, as his violations were
only “momentary and minor.” Id. at 823.
Based upon Gleason and Garcia, Seal makes similar contentions that
his Vehicle Code violation was momentary and minor and thus, cannot support
a finding of probable cause to support the stop. We disagree based upon the
sound analysis explained in Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843 (Pa.
Super. 2013):
First, . . . § 3309(1) of the Vehicle Code requires motorists to
maintain a single lane “as nearly as practicable.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3309(1). Thus, the statutory language does not foreclose minor
deviations. In comparison, § 3301 provides that “a vehicle shall
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be driven on the right half of the roadway” subject to
exceptions that are not implicated in this case. 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3301(a). The record plainly indicates that Enick violated § 3301 in
this case. Since the language of § 3301 does not include language
allowing for unspecified deviations from the rule, we need not
analyze whether she complied with § 3301 “as nearly as
practicable.” See Commonwealth v. Chernosky, 874 A.2d 123,
128 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc ) (noting that the defendant
violated § 3301(a) by crossing the double yellow line where none
of the statutory exceptions applied).
Enick, 70 A.3d at 847 (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, the record before us does not evidence a minor violation
of § 3301. Both tires on the driver’s side of Seal’s vehicle crossed the double
lines to the left, for an entire block, all within the view of Officer Hilliard.
Based on the foregoing reasons, we find that the traffic stop of Seal’s
Appellant's vehicle was legal. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
erred when it granted the Motion to Suppress.
Order of September 18, 2017 reversed. Case remanded for proceedings
consistent with this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/11/2018
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