Com. v. Silvonek, J. ( 2017 )


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  • J-A13021-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    JAMIE LYNN SILVONEK                        :
    :
    Appellant                :   No. 818 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 11, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0002141-2015
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., OTT, J. and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                                  FILED AUGUST 09, 2017
    Jamie Lynn Silvonek appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
    on February 11, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
    following her entry into a negotiated guilty plea to first-degree murder and
    related charges. Silvonek, a 14-year-old at the time of the crime, and her
    20-year-old boyfriend, Caleb Barnes, killed Silvonek’s mother, who had
    attempted to put an end to their relationship.           Prior to the guilty plea,
    Silvonek petitioned the court to have her case decertified so that she could
    be adjudicated in juvenile court. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court
    denied Silvonek’s motion to transfer.          She subsequently entered into the
    negotiated guilty plea mentioned above and was sentenced to 35 years’
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A13021-17
    incarceration to life, as agreed. In this timely appeal, Silvonek claims the
    trial court erred in denying her petition to transfer to juvenile court by
    requiring her to self-incriminate to demonstrate her ability to rehabilitate,
    misapplying several of the statutory factors, and in basing its determination
    on bias, prejudice, and/or ill will. After a thorough review of the submissions
    by the parties, the certified record, and relevant law, we affirm.
    Pursuant to statute, murder is exempt from classification as a
    delinquent act. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302, definition of “Delinquent act (2)(i).”
    Accordingly, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322, a juvenile charged with murder
    must petition the trial court for transfer to the juvenile system. In order to
    prevail, the juvenile has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
    evidence that the transfer will serve the public interest. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
    6322. This determination, in turn, is made by the trial court by considering
    the factors listed in section 6355(a)(4)(iii). Those factors are:
    (iii) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the public
    interest is served by the transfer of the case for criminal
    prosecution. In determining whether the public interest can be
    served, the court shall consider the following factors:
    (A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;
    (B) the impact of the offense on the community;
    (C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual
    posed by the child;
    (D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly
    committed by the child;
    (E) the degree of the child's culpability;
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    (F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives
    available under this chapter and in the adult criminal
    justice system; and
    (G) whether the child is amenable to treatment,
    supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering
    the following factors:
    (I) age;
    (II) mental capacity;
    (III) maturity;
    (IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
    the child;
    (V) previous records, if any;
    (VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent
    history, including the success or failure of any previous
    attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the child;
    (VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the
    expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction;
    (VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;
    (IX) any other relevant factors;
    42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii).
    Our standard of review is as follows:
    Decisions of whether to grant decertification will not be
    overturned absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of
    discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the
    misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a
    manifestly unreasonable judgment passed upon partiality,
    prejudice or ill will.
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    Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 
    10 A.3d 336
    , 338 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
    omitted).
    The underlying facts of this matter are particularly important to the
    disposition of this matter and must be understood to provide the needed
    context to the trial court’s determination and our ruling.        The trial court
    clearly understood this necessity and provided approximately 22 pages
    detailing the factual underpinnings of this matricide.1      We rely upon this
    recitation of the facts and direct the parties to attach a copy of the trial court
    opinion in the event of further proceedings.
    Here, we simply note that Silvonek was the instigator and willing
    participant in the murder of her mother,2 who was standing in the way of a
    continuing sexual relationship between Silvonek and her adult boyfriend,
    Caleb Barnes, a soldier stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    See Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/2015, at 2-24.
    2
    Texts from Silvonek to Barnes on the day they killed her mother capture
    the essence of this. 1) “She needs to go, Caleb. Right now. You don’t
    understand”; 2) “CALEB” “I’M SERIOUS” “She’s lying” [about Silvonek’s age]
    “Please do it, I’m going to throw up” “I can’t stand her lying to you like this”;
    3) “I don’t know what her problem is” “She threatened to throw me out of
    the house. I want her gone.”; 4) “I just need to you be able [sic] to come
    over so we can do whatever necessary, honestly”; 5) “I want her to shut her
    fucking face and stop being fake. She just God damn lied to you about my
    age and now she’s pulling this shit.”         See Commonwealth Exhibit 8,
    10/29/2015, Texts, 3/14/2015.
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    Silvonek’s first argument is that the trial court abused its discretion
    denying decertification by violating Silvonek’s fifth amendment right against
    self-incrimination. One of the statutory factors for the trial court to consider
    is amenability to treatment in the juvenile system. Case law demonstrates
    that a component of that determination can be whether the juvenile takes
    responsibility for his or her actions.    While taking responsibility may be
    considered, the court cannot require the juvenile to admit to guilt in order to
    prove he or she has taken responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Brown,
    
    26 A.3d 485
    (Pa. Super. 2011). If the court does use the failure to admit
    guilt to determine the juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation, the
    juvenile’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination has been violated.
    
    Id. Our review
    of the certified record shows that while the trial court did
    consider Silvonek’s lack of acceptance of responsibility for her actions, it did
    not require her to admit her crime. Rather, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,
    the trial court credited forensic psychiatrist, John S. O’Brien, M.D., J.D., who
    determined, “In [Silvonek’s] version, she ‘minimize[d] her problems and
    overlook[ed] personal fault,’ by ‘continuing to distance herself from any
    responsibility for the offense.’” Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/2015, at 31-32.
    The foregoing was not a statement faulting Silvonek for her failure to
    admit to her crime.    Instead, this comment is part of larger commentary
    indicating Silvonek, even at her young age, had become an adept liar and
    emotional manipulator of those around her. In using these traits, she was
    attempting to avoid responsibility and consequences of her actions. Indeed,
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    the record reflects Silvonek has been described by those around her as a
    “chameleon”, 
    id. at 29,
    “socially savvy”, “a psychological bully”, and a
    “manipulator”. 
    Id. at 32.
    Additionally, the record is replete with instances
    where Silvonek changed her story and attitude in response to her situation.
    The video of Silvonek’s voluntary interview with the police, immediately after
    she was taken into custody, is ample demonstration such behavior.3
    In reviewing the entire record, it is clear that the determination that
    Silvonek avoided responsibility of her actions was not based upon her failure
    to admit guilt.     She did, in fact, admit to certain aspects of her criminal
    behavior in the police interview.          Specifically, she admitted to minimally
    helping Barnes dispose of her mother’s body.           Our review of the certified
    record, in toto, confirms that the trial court’s determination that Silvonek’s
    failure to accept responsibility for her actions was not based upon a refusal
    to admit guilt.      Rather, the determination was based upon her actions
    viewed in their entirety. Silvonek is not entitled to relief in this issue.
    Next, Silvonek argues the trial court improperly considered certain of
    the required factors in denying her motion for decertification.        She claims
    the trial court considered her age and her relationship with co-defendant,
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Particularly relevant to this issue, we note: 1) how Silvonek attempted to
    blame a friend of hers, Witness One, for giving Barnes the idea of killing her
    parents, and 2) how Silvonek claimed Barnes had forcibly raped her after
    killing her mother. This court has viewed the interview, as well as all other
    available video evidence, in its entirety.
    -6-
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    Caleb Barnes, as aggravating factors rather than as mitigating factors.
    Specifically, she claims, “The trial court failed to consider the inherent
    coerciveness of Jamie Silvonek’s relationship with a twenty (20) year old co-
    defendant when Jamie Silvonek had not reached the age of consent and had
    just turned fourteen (14) years old.”      Appellant’s Brief at 24.   While the
    certified record does reflect expert testimony was presented to support this
    theory, specifically the testimony of Dr. Frank Dattilio, Ph.D., and Dr. Steven
    Berkowitz, M.D., the trial court considered the testimonial evidence of both
    experts and rejected them.       The trial court reasoned that the primary
    foundation of Dr. Dattilio’s opinion was admittedly based upon Silvonek’s
    “unreliable recounting and version of events.”      Trial Court Opinion at 27.
    The trial court further stated, regarding Dr. Dattilio’s reliance on Silvonek’s
    version of the events:
    Indeed, this Court recognizes that [Silvonek] has presented
    many different versions of the events, as they are constantly
    changing. Of prime importance, Dr. Dattilio based his opinion on
    the fact that [Silvonek] did not execute the killing of her mother,
    was surprised by the killing, and was an unwilling participant in
    it. However, [Silvonek’s] text messages between [her] and the
    Co-Defendant, the Walmart video (not reviewed by Dr. Dattilio),
    the Lehigh County Jail letter (not reviewed by Dr. Dattilio prior to
    preparing his report), as well as her telephone conversation with
    Co-Defendant in the presence of Witness Number One as
    recounted in the Preliminary Hearing testimony, undermine this
    assertion.
    
    Id. at 27-28
    (footnotes omitted).
    Dr. Berkowitz opined that due to Adolescent Brain Development,
    Silvonek exhibited poor judgment and should not be held to the same legal
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    J-A13021-17
    standard as an adult. He further testified that Silvonek suffered from a non-
    verbal learning disability. However, the trial court noted that although Dr.
    Berkowitz interviewed Silvonek while she was in the Lehigh County Jail and
    reviewed the battery of diagnostic assessments performed by Dr. Dattilio, he
    did    not   review   Silvonek’s    school     records,   the   Walmart   video, 4   the
    approximately 6,000 text messages between Silvonek and Barnes, the
    psychiatric report of Dr. John F. Campion, M.D.5, the sexual assault report of
    Dr. Debra Jenssen, M.D.,6 the social media sites used by Silvonek, and
    without having interviewed any of Silvonek’s teachers.
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The Walmart video is closed circuit video from the Walmart store Silvonek
    and Barnes visited to buy cleaning supplies after they had killed Silvonek’s
    mother and left her in the Silvonek vehicle in the driveway. The video
    shows, in part, Silvonek and Barnes walking arm in arm; Silvonek pulling on
    Barnes’ arm, directing him down a specific aisle; and Silvonek carrying a
    bottle of what appears to be bleach, swinging it as if it were a sand pail at
    the beach. The Lehigh County Jail letter was a note Silvonek attempted to
    send to Barnes regarding her decertification hearing in which she asks him
    to take the blame for her, claiming that if the situation was reversed, she
    would “be on the stand at that hearing, taking the fall for you.” Trial Court
    Opinion. 11/16/2015, at 28, fn. 14. In the letter, she further claims “…the
    only hope of us ever being together is if I get sent back to Juvenile Court.
    After 7 years I can move to wherever you are, and we can be together.” 
    Id. Finally, Witness
    One is the friend referred to earlier to whom Silvonek tried
    to shift blame. The phone call was one between Silvonek and Barnes, in the
    presence of Witness One, in which Silvonek suggested Barnes kill her
    mother.
    5
    Dr. Campion was Silvonek’s therapist prior to the murder.
    6
    This report was generated after Silvonek, during her police interview,
    accused Barnes of having forcibly raped her.
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    In light of the above, we see no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
    rejecting these expert opinions.7 Rather, the trial court found the testimony
    of John S. O’Brien, M.D., J.D., to have been credible. The trial court noted
    that Dr. O’Brien had both interviewed Silvonek and thoroughly reviewed the
    records:
    [Dr. O’Brien] found that [Silvonek] “seamlessly adjust[ed]” her
    story and provided multiple versions of what took place on the
    evening of March 14, 2015 and early morning hours of March 15,
    2015. In [Silvonek’s] version, she “minimize[d] her problems
    and overlook[ed] personal fault,” by “continuing to distance
    herself from any responsibility for the offense.” [Silvonek] was
    found to be “a good liar and had successfully lied on multiple
    occasions in order to get what she wanted.” She was seen by
    others in the community as being “socially savvy,” “a
    psychological bully” and a “manipulator.” Overall, [Silvonek]
    presented herself differently to different people in order to
    achieve her end goal. Indeed, during the course of her therapy
    with Dr. John Campion, [Silvonek] ironically was seen as having
    “a significant improvement in her symptoms” at a time when
    “her actual performance and participation in school activities
    deteriorated” and her relationship with her parents was
    contentious.
    Dr. O’Brien found [Silvonek] to be “a highly intelligent and
    manipulative young woman” who was not a “fearful or
    emotionally overpowered passive participant in the pre-planned,
    premeditated murder of her mother.” Dr. O’Brien concluded that
    [Silvonek] was “an individual who could size up her audience and
    behave in a manner that was consistent with their interests and
    ____________________________________________
    7
    Although the trial court did note that Dr. Dattilio testified that if, contrary
    to his belief, Silvonek did plot, encourage, and participate in the murder of
    her mother, then then it would not be in the public interest to decertify.
    Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/2015, at 30, fn. 15. As the trial court determined
    Silvonek was the instigator and a willing participant in the killing, the trial
    court accepted this aspect of Dr. Dattilio’s testimony.
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    their receptiveness to her            self-serving   and   ingratiating
    representation of herself.”
    
    Id. at 31-32
    (citations to the record omitted).
    The trial court accepted Dr. O’Brien’s expert testimony that Silvonek
    was a manipulator, not manipulated. As noted, we have reviewed the video
    evidence, read the expert reports and testimony, and reviewed the text
    messages between Silvonek and Barnes and we find no abuse of discretion
    in this determination. Accordingly, Silvonek is not entitled to relief on this
    issue.
    The last factor Silvonek claims the trial court erred in analyzing was
    the determination that juvenile dispositional alternatives were inadequate to
    address both society’s and Silvonek’s needs and that Silvonek was an
    unlikely candidate to be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
    court jurisdiction.8 Here, the trial court considered the evidence that the two
    programs available to Silvonek had never treated anyone for more than 2½
    years, making it likely that Silvonek would be released from such program
    well before her 21st birthday.          Given the extreme nature of the crime,
    including her willing participation in it, as well as Silvonek’s general lack of
    amenability for rehabilitation, the trial court reasoned:
    As such, this Court finds that the juvenile system is inadequate
    to supervise, treat or rehabilitate [Silvonek].       This Court
    recognizes that juvenile court jurisdiction ends at the age of
    twenty-one (21) regardless of whether or not [Silvonek]
    ____________________________________________
    8
    The claim relates to the factors at 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355 (F) and (G)(vii).
    - 10 -
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    continues to pose a threat to society. However, it is more likely
    than not that [Silvonek] would be released long before she
    attains the age of twenty-one (21) years old, as the treatment
    facilities are designed with a shorter duration of treatment in
    mind. A period of approximately two and a half (2½) years is
    woefully inadequate to expect that [Silvonek] would respond to
    treatment or rehabilitation after committing matricide.
    In contrast, within the adult system, a state correctional
    institution is available to [Silvonek] that would suit her needs.
    Specifically, SCI Muncy is a state correctional institution housing
    youthful female offenders younger than eighteen (18) years old,
    and young adult female offenders between the ages of eighteen
    (18) and twenty-one (21). The juvenile programing within the
    adult correctional system offered at SCI Muncy mirrors the
    programming for juvenile offenders offered at both North Central
    Secure Treatment Unit and Adelphoi Village. William Franz, the
    Correction Classification Program Manager and SCI Muncy,
    explained that the youthful offender and young adult prisoners
    are separated from the general prison population. The Youthful
    Offender Program offers a great deal of programs designed to be
    therapeutic in nature. The prisoners in this program meet with
    their counselors and psychologists daily, and overall there is [a]
    great deal of interaction with the staff. In this program, the
    prisoner would receive an education and be offered programs
    run by area Universities.       Under the Young Adult Offender
    Program, the prisoner undergoes a five (5) phase program, each
    phase lasting eight (8) weeks. A young adult prisoner would
    have the opportunity to participate in a myriad of programs
    which focus on, inter alia, positive relationships, coping skills,
    decision making and positive self-esteem. Mr. Franz indicated
    that the programs in SCI Muncy are similar to those offered at
    North Central Secure Treatment Unit in Danville, Pennsylvania.
    However, M. Franz noted that it is less chaotic at SCI Muncy
    because they have more options available to them to deal with
    rule breakers. Consequently, he believed SCI Muncy to be a
    placement that is more conducive to treatment.
    Trial Court Opinion, at 35-36.
    This rationale belies Silvonek’s claims that the trial court based its
    decision simply on the belief that as a juvenile offender Silvonek would be
    - 11 -
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    released in two and one-half years.       Contrary to Silvonek’s claims, we
    believe the trial court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of this issue before
    determining that Silvonek would be more appropriately served by the adult
    correctional facilities.
    Finally, Silvonek argues the trial court abused its discretion by basing
    its determination on partiality, prejudice or ill will.   Essentially, Silvonek
    argues, “The lower court found [Silvonek] effectively guilty of all alleged
    charges before a trial even commenced. Such findings clearly demonstrate
    partiality, prejudice or ill will towards Juvenile Jamie Silvonek.” Appellant’ s
    Brief at 29.
    We note that Silvonek has cited Commonwealth v Brown, 
    26 A.3d 485
    (Pa. Super. 2011) favorably throughout her brief. As discussed above,
    we have found Brown inapplicable under the facts of this case regarding
    Silvonek’s self-incrimination claim.    However, the Brown decision also
    states:
    Consistent with our discussion above permitting a psychiatrist to
    presume a juvenile’s guilt in determining amenability to
    treatment, we conclude that for purposes of analyzing the
    factors in § 6355(a)(4)(iii), a trial court may (but need not)
    assume that the juvenile is guilty and committed the alleged acts
    constituting the offense.
    Commonwealth v. 
    Brown, 26 A.3d at 508
    .
    Case law specifically permits the trial court to presume the juvenile’s
    guilt when considering decertification.       Accordingly, this argument is
    unavailing.
    - 12 -
    J-A13021-17
    Our review of this matter convinces us that this is an extraordinary
    case. Jamie Lynn Silvonek was still a young teenager when she conspired
    with her 20 year old boyfriend to murder her mother in order to continue
    their relationship.   Nonetheless, the trial court carefully considered the
    totality of the evidence and applied the facts to the statutory factors listed at
    42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). In doing so, the trial court determined, despite
    her age, Silvonek was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system
    and that the adult system would be better able to provide her with the help
    she requires. Accordingly, the trial court found that Silvonek had not carried
    her burden to prove that a transfer to the juvenile system would serve the
    public interest.   Our comprehensive review of the certified record in this
    matter confirms that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Silvonek’s motion to transfer to juvenile court.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/9/2017
    - 13 -
    Circulated 07/25/2017 11:50 AM
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Silvonek, J. No. 818 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 8/9/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/9/2017