Com. v. Abbott, W. ( 2017 )

J-S57002-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM ABBOTT
Appellant No. 3190 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 22, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009786-2015
CP-51-CR-0009787-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 19, 2017
A jury convicted Appellant, William Abbott, of first degree murder and
charges related to his possession of a firearm in the shooting death of Clyde
Holloman. In this appeal, Abbott challenges the sufficiency and the weight of
the evidence supporting his murder conviction. After careful review, we
affirm.
At his trial, Abbott did not contest that he had shot Holloman, or that
Holloman had died at his hands. Rather, Abbott argued that he did not act
with premeditation or a specific intent to kill. The jury did not agree.
On appeal, Abbott’s arguments are premised upon the same basis as
his trial arguments. He first contends that the evidence at trial was
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insufficient to establish that he acted with premeditation or a specific intent
to kill. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9-11.
Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences
therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the
crimes charged is established beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Commonwealth v. Dale, 836 A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citation omitted).
“[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). Any
doubt raised as to the accused’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder.
See id. “As an appellate court, we do not assess credibility nor do we assign
weight to any of the testimony of record.” Commonwealth v. Kinney, 863
A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Therefore, we will not
disturb the verdict “unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as
a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances.” Bruce, 916 A.2d at 661 (citation omitted).
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To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an
“intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). An intentional killing is defined
as “[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of
willful, deliberate and premediated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(d). Further,
our Supreme Court has held that, in order to support a conviction of first-
degree murder, the Commonwealth must establish that: a human being was
unlawfully killed; the defendant was responsible for the killing; and the
defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. See
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 967 (Pa. 2013). A jury may
infer the specific intent to kill, as well as malice, based upon a defendant’s
use of a deadly weapon on “a vital part of the victim’s body.”
Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1133-1134 (Pa. 2011) (citation
omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that Abbott used a deadly weapon on a vital part
of the victim’s body. See, e.g., N.T., Jury Trial, 4/19/16, at 49 (witness
testimony that Abbott shot Holloman); N.T., Jury Trial, 4/20/16, at 12
(expert testimony that Holloman was killed by a gunshot wound to the
chest). Abbott focuses on the testimony of Geraldine Holloman, the victim’s
sister.
Geraldine testified that Abbott and Holloman were involved in an
argument. See N.T., Jury Trial, 4/19/16, at 37-40. The argument culminated
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in Abbott shooting Holloman in the chest. See id., at 42. After shooting
Holloman, Abbott threatened Holloman’s wife. See id. Holloman’s wife
ultimately walked away from Abbott, and Abbott proceeded to stand over
Holloman and say “I [ought] to blow your brains out.” Id. Instead, he
disposed of his gun and walked away. See id., at 42-43.
Abbott argues that this post-shooting sequence demonstrates that he
did not have a specific intent to kill Holloman:
[Abbott] did not premeditate a shooting but rather acted from
fear, aggravation, or whatever other emotion can be attached to
the confrontation that immediately preceded the shooting.
[C]ounsel can think of no more compelling evidence [than]
where a defendant claims that he should do something but then
does not do it. Certainly the [d]efendant had the time to
premeditate whether he should shoot the victim in the head after
the victim was already on the ground. Having thought about it,
and perhaps where clearer heads prevailed, the [d]efendant
chose not to do it.
Thus, where the words and actions of the [d]efendant himself
clearly negate any concept of premeditation or specific intent to
kill, the [d]efendant should not have been convicted of Murder in
the First Degree.
Appellant’s Brief, at 11.
While this line of reasoning may have made a valid argument to the
jury, it does not provide a valid legal challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Just as the jury, based upon the evidence presented at trial, was
not required to find that Abbott intended to kill Holloman, it was not required
to find that he did not. As noted above, the law permits the jury to infer
specific intent to kill based upon a defendant’s act in using a deadly weapon
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upon a vital portion of the victim. Firing a gun into a victim’s chest surely
permits just such an inference. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 876 A.2d
916, 925 (Pa. 2005). Abbott’s first argument on appeal merits no relief.
Next, Abbott argues that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence at trial. We do not review this claim de novo on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (Pa. 2009). Rather, we
only review the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary judgment regarding
the weight of the evidence presented at trial. See id. “[W]e may only
reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d
403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted). A verdict is said to be contrary to
the evidence such that it shocks one’s sense of justice when “the figure of
Justice totters on her pedestal,” or when “the jury’s verdict, at the time of its
rendition, causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes
him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial
conscience.” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. Super.
2004) (citations omitted).
Abbott’s argument on this issue closely tracks the line of reasoning
contained in his sufficiency challenge. He once again claims that the
testimony that he threatened to kill Holloman after shooting him was
overwhelming evidence of his lack of specific intent.
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The trial court reviewed the entirety of the evidence presented at trial.
See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/16. After this review, it concluded that the
evidence did not shock its conscience. See id., at 14. While we once again
recognize the logic of the line of reasoning highlighted by Abbott, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. It is undisputed that
Abbott chose to shoot Holloman in the chest. It is certainly reasonable for a
fact finder to infer that in doing so, he intended to kill Holloman. Abbott’s
second and final claim on appeal fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/19/2017
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