Com. v. Guy, K. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • J-S50028-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    KEVIN GUY
    Appellant                 No. 3879 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order November 30, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003258-2011
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:                         FILED OCTOBER 10, 2017
    Kevin Guy appeals, pro se, from the November 30, 2016 order entered
    in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition
    filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46.
    We affirm.
    On May 7, 2012, a jury convicted Guy of delivering a controlled
    substance, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”),
    and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia.1            On November 2,
    2012, the trial court sentenced Guy to 5 to 15 years’ incarceration for
    delivering a controlled substance, including a 2-year mandatory minimum
    sentence under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(a) for delivery of a controlled substance
    ____________________________________________
    1   35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), and (32), respectively.
    J-S50028-17
    within 1,000 feet of a school zone, and a consecutive 3 to 15 years’
    incarceration for PWID, including a 3-year mandatory minimum sentence
    under 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(2)(i) for an offense involving 2-10 grams of
    cocaine and a prior drug trafficking conviction. The trial court imposed no
    further penalty for the drug paraphernalia convictions.   On September 4,
    2013, this Court affirmed Guy’s judgment of sentence. Guy filed a petition
    for allowance of appeal, which our Supreme Court denied on March 25,
    2014.
    On August 26, 2014, Guy filed a motion to modify sentence, arguing
    that his sentence was illegal under Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S.Ct. 2151
     (2013), because it contained mandatory minimum sentences. The trial
    court treated Guy’s motion as a timely PCRA petition. Because the
    Commonwealth did not oppose resentencing in light of Alleyne, the trial
    court scheduled a new sentencing hearing. On December 2, 2014, following
    a hearing, the trial court vacated Guy’s judgment of sentence and imposed
    Guy’s original sentence without the mandatory minimum sentences.
    On December 8, 2014, Guy filed a motion to reconsider and/or modify
    his sentence. On March 4, 2015, following a hearing, the trial court vacated
    the sentence imposed on December 2, 2014 and resentenced Guy to 5 to 10
    years’ incarceration on the conviction for delivering a controlled substance
    and a consecutive 3 to 10 years’ incarceration on the PWID conviction. That
    same day, Guy filed another motion to reconsider and/or modify sentence,
    which the trial court denied on March 11, 2015.    On December 21, 2015,
    -2-
    J-S50028-17
    this Court affirmed Guy’s judgment of sentence. Guy did not file a petition
    for allowance of appeal.
    On August 9, 2016, Guy filed a pro se PCRA petition. On August 17,
    2016, the PCRA court appointed counsel. On October 25, 2016, counsel filed
    a motion to withdraw and a Turner/Finley2 “no-merit” letter. On October
    27, 2016, the PCRA court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and filed a
    notice of intent to dismiss Guy’s PCRA petition without a hearing under
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. On November 15, 2016, Guy
    filed a pro se amended PCRA petition.            On November 29, 2016, the PCRA
    court dismissed Guy’s PCRA petition.           On December 14, 2016, Guy timely
    filed a notice of appeal.
    Guy raises two issues on appeal:
    1) Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Guy’s]
    PCRA petition due to the change in law as announced
    by Commonwealth v. Hopkins[, 
    117 A.3d 247
     (Pa.
    2015),] as newly stated constitutional law to have all
    factors which would increase his sentence proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2) Whether the federal court’s action in      similar cases
    have created a precedent that the          state courts
    should follow, allow retroactive,          or whether
    retroactive application was necessary       when [Guy]
    filed a timely [PCRA] petition.
    Guy’s Br. at 2 (full capitalization omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988);
    2
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -3-
    J-S50028-17
    In his “Argument” section,3 Guy argues that his PCRA petition meets
    an exception to the PCRA time bar under 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
    However, there is no question that Guy’s PCRA petition is timely.        Guy’s
    judgment of sentence became final on January 21, 2016, 30 days after this
    Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Guy filed
    his PCRA petition on August 9, 2016, which is within one year of when his
    judgment of sentence became final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
    To the extent that Guy argues that his sentence is illegal because he
    was sentenced to mandatory minimum sentences, the issue is meritless. At
    sentencing, the trial court specifically stated that “mandatory sentences
    [would] not be applied in this matter.” N.T., 3/4/15, at 3. Nor is there any
    indication in the record that the trial court sentenced Guy to mandatory
    minimum sentences.           Therefore, not only are Hopkins and Alleyne
    inapplicable, Guy is not eligible for PCRA relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)
    (listing six bases for PCRA relief).
    ____________________________________________
    3 In his August 9, 2016 PCRA petition, Guy argued that counsel who
    represented him on his second appeal was ineffective for failing to file a
    petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court. See PCRA Pet.,
    8/9/16, at 4.     The PCRA court found that appellate counsel was not
    ineffective, because Guy’s second appeal raised a discretionary aspects of
    sentencing issue, which our Supreme Court is statutorily barred from
    reviewing. See Opinion, 1/23/17, at 5 (unpaginated); Commonwealth v.
    Perry, 
    32 A.3d 232
    , 236 n.10 (Pa. 2011) (noting that our Supreme Court is
    precluded from reviewing discretionary aspects of sentence under 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9781(f)). In any event, Guy has not raised this issue in his appellate brief,
    so we need not consider it.
    -4-
    J-S50028-17
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/10/2017
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3879 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 10/10/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024