Com. v. Jones, S. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S06008-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF                         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    SHARIF JONES                            :
    :   No. 1746 EDA 2017
    Appellant
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 13, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0012791-2015
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                FILED MAY 04, 2018
    Sharif Jones appeals from the judgment of sentence of four to fifteen
    years imprisonment followed by twenty years probation, which was imposed
    following his convictions of rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual
    intercourse (“IDSI”) with a child, unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of
    a minor, and indecent assault of a child. After careful review, we affirm.
    The victim testified to the following at trial. Late on the night of April
    29, 2014, while her mother was in the shower and without her knowledge,
    twelve-year-old D.J. went to get snacks at a convenience store located at 69th
    and Ogontz Streets in the West Oak Lane neighborhood of Philadelphia,
    Pennsylvania. When D.J. entered the store, she was approached by a man
    she did not know and had never spoken to previously, later identified as
    Appellant.   Appellant asked D.J. what her name was and her age.             She
    J-S06008-18
    identified herself and told him that she was “about to be thirteen.” N.T. Trial,
    10/3/17, at 16. Appellant questioned whether it was late for her to be out,
    and asked if anyone was home. D.J. told him that her mother was waiting for
    her at home.
    D.J. testified that at some point, Appellant “was touching on me” and
    “was grabbing my butt.” Id. at 28. She felt uncomfortable and scared, and
    put her hands up between her and Appellant’s chest. Id. at 19. He forcibly
    grabbed her hand and placed it on his groin.          The total interaction lasted
    approximately five minutes. Appellant wrote a name and phone number on a
    piece of paper, gave it to her, and left the store.
    When D.J. went outside, he was waiting for her. He wrapped his arm
    around her shoulder and they started walking. They stopped at a white house
    with a garden area, and Appellant put his hand down her shirt and touched
    her breasts underneath her clothes. Then he led her to steps on the side of
    the house leading to a basement, where he pushed her to her knees, held her
    head down, and forced her to perform oral sex.
    After that, they continued to walk. Appellant kept his arm tightly draped
    around her shoulders. They walked for many blocks, and stopped in an alley
    with a balcony above. Appellant pushed her face against the wall, pulled down
    her pants, and tried to penetrate her wearing a condom.            When he was
    unsuccessful, he removed the condom and penetrated her vaginally. Then he
    forced her to her knees, put his penis in her mouth, and ejaculated. He told
    her not to swallow it so she would not get pregnant. Id. at 33. Appellant left,
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    and D.J. finally found a street that she recognized and made her way home.
    The police were at her house because her mother had called them to report
    her missing.
    When the victim’s mother first asked her where she had been, she said
    she had just been on a walk. Based on her daughter’s disheveled appearance,
    her mother asked her again. D.J. told her that she had been raped. Id. at
    63. D.J. described to police how she was abducted at the store. When the
    police asked her to speak more clearly, she began crying stating she could
    not, because if she swallowed “that,” she could get pregnant. Id. at 71.
    The Commonwealth played the surveillance tape from the corner store
    during D.J.’s testimony. Exhibit C-1. D.J. identified Appellant and pointed to
    herself as she entered the store. She testified that the fourteen minutes of
    video accurately depicted what occurred between herself and Appellant while
    they were in the store.
    The evidence revealed that the police transported D.J. to the hospital
    for a physical examination and a psychological evaluation. The report from
    the physical examination was marked for identification as Exhibit C-5, and it
    noted flecks of dirt and gravel in the victim’s pubic area. Property receipts for
    the rape kit and the victim’s clothes were marked as Exhibits C-6 and C-7
    respectively, and admitted by stipulation. In addition, it was stipulated that
    the rape kit and saliva sample tested positive for sperm, which matched a
    prior sample of Appellant’s DNA, and the reports were marked as exhibits and
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    admitted. D.J.’s date of birth was the subject of a stipulation, and confirmed
    that she was twelve years old at the time of the sexual assaults.
    The eighteen-year-old Appellant testified at trial.   He denied that he
    touched the victim in the store and he testified that she was the aggressor.
    He also stated that he did not know her age. According to Appellant, the only
    sexual act was oral sex, it was consensual, and it occurred on the outside
    steps of his home with his mother inside.
    Following a nonjury trial, Appellant was convicted on all but one count.1
    The court imposed a sentence of four to fifteen years imprisonment followed
    by twenty years probation. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion for
    a new trial alleging that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
    He claimed that the video surveillance footage contradicted crucial factual
    allegations made by the complainant and conclusively proved that she
    seduced him in the store and lied to police and to the court. In addition, he
    alleged that her testimony was so inconsistent as to be unbelievable as to
    render the verdict unreliable and shock the conscience. The trial court denied
    Appellant’s motion, finding that Appellant’s sufficiency argument was
    premised on the twelve-year-old victim’s consent to the sexual activity, and
    that by law, a child victim cannot consent to sexual contact. Moreover, the
    court found that since the victim’s testimony was corroborated by both
    physical evidence and Appellant’s own testimony, the evidence was not
    ____________________________________________
    1   Appellant was acquitted of unlawful restraint-serious bodily injury.
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    patently unreliable. Finally, the trial court concluded that the verdict was not
    so contrary to the evidence as to shock its sense of justice.
    Appellant filed a timely appeal. The trial court directed Appellant to file
    a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and
    he complied. The trial court authored its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
    Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is:
    Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence because there
    is video surveillance footage which contradicts the complainant
    regarding crucial factual allegations and which conclusively proves
    that the complainant lied to the police and lied to this court under
    oath about what occurred and how she first made contact with
    Appellant thereby rendering the complainant’s testimony so
    inconsistent, contradictory, and not believable such that the
    verdict is unreliable, shocks the conscience and is unjust?
    Appellant’s brief at 14.
    Succinctly stated, Appellant’s claim is that the trial court abused its
    discretion when it found that the verdict was not against the weight of the
    evidence. A weight of the evidence claim “concedes that sufficient evidence
    exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed.”
    Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    172 A.3d 632
    , 643 (Pa.Super. 2017). In ruling
    on such a motion, the trial court need not view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the verdict winner, but “may instead use its discretion in
    concluding whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.”
    Miller, supra. Furthermore:
    A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in
    testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have
    arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge
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    is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are
    so clearly of greater weight to ignore them or to give them equal
    weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
    Commonwealth v. Clay, 
    64 A.3d 1049
    , 1055 (Pa. 2013) (quotation marks
    and internal citations omitted). In order for a trial court to find that a verdict
    is against the weight of the evidence, the proof must be “so tenuous, vague
    and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.”
    Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 
    820 A.2d 795
    , 806 (Pa.Super. 2003).
    On appeal, when we conduct a weight of the evidence review, “we do
    not actually examine the underlying question; instead, we examine the trial
    court’s exercise in resolving the challenge.” Commonwealth v. Leatherby,
    
    116 A.3d 73
    , 92 (Pa.Super. 2015). Since the trial judge heard and saw the
    evidence presented, we give the “gravest consideration to the findings and
    reasons advanced by the trial judge.” Clay, supra at 1055. We will find an
    abuse of discretion only where “the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
    where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a
    result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v.
    Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
     (Pa. 2000)).         For this reason, “[o]ne of the least
    assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's
    conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence.”
    
    Id.
    Appellant argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
    because the videotape evidence reveals that the “complainant irrefutably
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    lied.” Appellant’s brief at 18. He maintains further that the twelve-year-old
    victim initiated sex with him, and that her original decision not to tell her
    mother about the incident changed only after the police confronted her about
    her disappearance. 
    Id.
     The video surveillance tapes, he contends, contradict
    the victim’s testimony because they show that she approached him.            In
    addition, according to Appellant, the video does not depict him touching her
    inappropriately, and certainly, it did not show him placing her hand on his
    penis. 
    Id.
    The trial court found that the minor victim’s testimony was corroborated
    by the video surveillance tape:
    D.J’s body language in the footage shows a girl who is keeping her
    head down and avoiding eye contact as she answers defendant’s
    questions. See Trial Exhibit C-1. The footage also corroborates
    D.J.’s testimony that defendant placed his hand on her buttocks.
    
    Id.
     Contrary to defendant’s claim, the footage does not contradict
    D.J.’s additional testimony that defendant placed her hand on his
    groin.
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/17 at 4 (citations omitted). Moreover, the trial court
    rejected Appellant’s argument that the twelve-year-old victim initiated the
    sexual contact as legally irrelevant because, by law, she could not consent.
    The court found that whether or not D.J. told her mother immediately upon
    returning home was irrelevant as the physical evidence obtained from her
    medical examination, as well as the video surveillance, corroborated her
    testimony.    Based on its assessment of the evidence, the trial judge
    determined that the verdict did not shock its sense of justice.
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    The trial court applied the proper legal standard in reviewing the weight
    of the evidence, and we find no abuse of discretion.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/4/18
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1746 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 5/4/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021