In the Int. of: A.B., a Minor ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.C., MOTHER No. 671 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order and Decree entered April 8, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,
Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 32 AD 2014, CP-22-DP-44-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, and OLSON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2015
C.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the order and decree which involuntarily
terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, A.B. (“Child”), born in
December of 2012. The order and decree also changed Child’s permanency
goal to adoption.1 We affirm.
On February 13, 2013, Mother brought Child to Penn State Hershey
Children’s Hospital, seeking treatment for Child’s injured leg. Once there, it
was discovered that Child had a fractured femur, thirteen fractured ribs, a
fractured clavicle, a fractured metatarsal, and several possible metaphyseal
fractures. Mother was unable to produce a satisfactory explanation for any
of the injuries.
On February 14, 2013, Mother was charged with aggravated assault
and endangering the welfare of a child. Mother was “indicated” for child
1
The parental rights of Child’s father, B.B. (“Father”), were terminated by a
separate order and decree entered that same day. Father is not a party to
the instant appeal.
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abuse in April of 2013, and a no-contact order between Mother and Child
was entered. Child was adjudicated dependent by order dated May 15,
2013, and aggravated circumstances were found as to Mother. Meanwhile, a
safety plan was put into place, with Child residing in the home of Father’s
grandmother. Child was subsequently placed in foster care after members
of the grandmother’s household admitted to drug use.
On May 2, 2014, Dauphin County Social Services for Children and
Youth (“the Agency”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights
involuntarily, and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. A hearing
was held on April 1, 2015, and April 6, 2015. On April 8, 2015, the orphans’
court entered its order and decree terminating Mother’s parental rights and
changing Child’s permanency goal. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal on
April 16, 2015, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
Mother now raises the following issue for our review: “Whether the
[orphans’] court abused its discr[e]tion when it determined to change the
goal from reunification to adoption and involuntarily terminated Mother’s
parental rights?” Mother’s Brief at 9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).2, 3
2
While Mother purports to challenge the change of Child’s permanency goal
to adoption, her brief does not contain any citation to, or discussion of, the
relevant provisions of the Juvenile Act. Accordingly, we conclude that
Mother has failed to preserve any challenge to the orphans’ court’s change
of goal order, and we focus our analysis on the termination of Mother’s
parental rights. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011),
appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884,
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We consider Mother’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of
review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“‘[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.”’).
3
The Agency argues, inter alia, that Mother has waived “the issues
presented in the statement of matters complained of on appeal,” because
these issues were not included in Mother’s statement of questions involved,
and because Mother failed to discuss those issues in her appellate brief.
Agency’s Brief at 19-21. To the extent the Agency is attempting to argue
that Mother has waived her challenge to the decree terminating her parental
rights, we disagree. Mother challenged the termination of her parental
rights both in her concise statement, and in her statement of questions
involved. Mother also challenges the termination of her parental rights in
the argument section of her appellate brief. We conclude that Mother has
properly preserved this claim.
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Agency filed its petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which
provide:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing
of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
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with an agency for a period of at least six months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or
will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).
We need only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection
of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863
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A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the termination of Mother’s
parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1)
The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or
more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003).
“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require an
evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that
led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).
Instantly, the orphans’ court explained its decision to terminate
Mother’s parental rights by emphasizing the abuse suffered by Child, and the
fact that Mother did not take responsibility for Child’s injuries. Orphans’
Court Opinion, 5/14/15, at 11-12. Mother argues that she should not have
been required to take responsibility for Child’s injuries, because such
requirement violates her right against self-incrimination. Mother’s Brief at
17-18.
After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the orphans’
court did not abuse its discretion. During the termination and goal change
hearing, Dr. Kathryn Crowell, a pediatrician, testified that she examined
Child at Penn State Hershey Children’s Hospital, and discovered Child’s
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numerous injuries, listed supra. N.T., 4/1/15, at 7-9. A follow-up
examination was conducted two weeks later to look for injuries that may not
have been apparent during the initial examination. Id. at 11-12. This
second examination revealed additional injuries, including a possible left
clavicle fracture, and other possible metaphyseal fractures. Id. at 12-13.
Dr. Crowell further testified that she spoke to Mother, who suggested
that Child’s injuries may have been suffered when Child rolled off a couch.
Id. at 14-15. However, Dr. Crowell opined, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, that Child’s injuries were not caused by rolling off a couch.
Id. at 15. Dr. Crowell explained that Child’s injuries were in various stages
of healing, and could not all have occurred at the same time. Id. at 13-14.
In addition, various different types of force would have been necessary to
cause the injuries. Id. at 16-18. Ultimately, Dr. Crowell concluded that
Child was the victim of physical abuse. Id. at 24.
Pennsylvania State Trooper, Kyle Tobin, testified that he investigated
the physical abuse suffered by Child. Id. at 30. As part of this
investigation, Trooper Tobin interviewed both Mother and Father. Id. at 34.
During her initial interview, Mother again suggested that Child may have
broken her leg by rolling off of a couch. Id. at 33. During a later interview,
Mother stated that Child’s leg must have been broken by Father, while he
was changing her diaper. Id. at 36. Mother also indicated that she had
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been “squeezing the baby to help get air bubbles out of her,” and that this
may have caused Child’s fractured ribs. Id. at 38.
According to Trooper Tobin, Father claimed that Child’s ribs likely were
broken when he “rolled over on her in bed the one time . . . .” Id. at 38.
Father admitted to breaking Child’s leg, but stated that this occurred
accidently. Id. at 39. Father “described that when he was changing the
baby’s diaper, she was fussy and kind of rolling around, and he had grabbed
her by the leg and pulled her across . . . . [w]hatever surface he had her on
to change her diaper . . . .” Id. Father also described an incident during
which Mother “toss[ed Child] on the bed.” Id. at 45. Father stated that
Mother is “a very violent person.” Id.
Agency caseworker, Erica Dressler, testified that a service plan was
created for Mother, which required, inter alia, that Mother “acknowledge
responsibility for her role in [Child’s] injuries[.]” Id. at 56. However,
Mother never discussed Child’s injuries with Ms. Dressler. Id. at 64, 70.
Ms. Dressler explained that, “[a]t the very first permanency review, the
judge had kind of advised that they don’t need to talk about these things so
they wouldn’t incriminate themselves. And that was kind of the whole
stance throughout my involvement, that we weren’t going to talk about it.”
Id. at 60-61. Ms. Dressler further explained that the Agency filed a petition
to terminate Mother’s parental rights because “[t]he issues which brought
[Child] into care have not been resolved in any way, shape, or form. We
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weren’t able to discern what had happened to [Child].” Id. at 64. Ms.
Dressler stated that while Mother and Father “may have talked with the
police officer, [] they had never sat down and talked with me about exactly
what happened. So we couldn’t put anything into place to prevent it from
happening again.” Id.
Accordingly, the record confirms that Child suffered severe physical
abuse at the hands of Mother and/or Father. Mother has never admitted to
abusing Child, nor has she provided any reasonable explanation for Child’s
injuries. Mother’s refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the harm
suffered by Child has prevented the Agency from addressing the causes of
this harm, and from ensuring Child’s safety while in Mother’s care. Thus,
Mother has failed to remedy the conditions which led to Child’s removal. In
addition, because Mother continues to pose a grave safety risk to Child, it is
clear that terminating Mother’s parental rights would serve Child’s needs and
welfare.4
4
While Mother contends that the orphans’ court was not permitted to
consider her refusal to admit to child abuse, she fails to cite any authority
which supports this proposition. In her brief, Mother relies entirely on
Commonwealth v. G.P., 765 A.2d 363 (Pa. Super. 2000). In that case,
G.P. was charged with various crimes relating to the sexual abuse of his
stepdaughter. Id. at 364. As part of a related child protective services
case, G.P. made statements to a court-appointed psychologist “regarding
what he perceived to be the victim’s sexual aggressiveness towards him.”
Id. at 365. The psychologist then testified to these statements during G.P.’s
criminal trial. Id. On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded, inter alia,
that G.P.’s statements should not have been admitted, as G.P. did not
engage in a “voluntary and knowing waiver of his rights against self-
incrimination and benefit of counsel . . . .” Id. at 368. The Court observed,
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We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). We have
discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884
A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”
In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern
the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
bond. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond
between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some
citations omitted).
Here, the orphans’ court found that terminating Mother’s parental
rights would serve Child’s needs and welfare. Orphans’ Court Opinion,
5/14/15, at 12-13. The court observed that Child is doing well in her pre-
adoptive foster home. Id. at 12.
Mother is not entitled to relief. Ms. Dressler testified that Child has
been residing in a pre-adoptive foster home since June of 2013. N.T.,
4/1/15, at 71. Child is “very healthy,” and is developmentally on target.
Id. at 76. Further, Child has a “very positive” relationship with her foster
however, that G.P.’s statements were, “[u]nquestionably, . . . available to
the court in the CYS proceeding . . . .” Id. at 368. G.P. is readily
distinguishable from the case sub judice, and we do not find its reasoning to
be relevant or persuasive.
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parents. Id. at 73. Ms. Dressler explained, “I know [Child] can’t verbalize
it, but, . . . it’s clear that she cares for them and goes to them for comfort.”
Id. at 73. Ms. Dressler noted that Child’s foster parents are willing to allow
ongoing contact between Child and Mother. Id. at 74.
Thus, the record supports the finding of the orphans’ court that
terminating Mother’s parental rights will serve Child’s needs and welfare.
Child is thriving in her pre-adoptive foster home, and is bonded with her
foster parents. In contrast, there is no evidence of any bond between Child
and Mother, and Mother poses a serious safety risk to Child.
Because we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child involuntarily, and
by changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption, we affirm the order and
decree of the orphans’ court.
Order and decree affirmed.
P.J.E. Bender joins the Memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/14/2015
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