Com. v. Fulmer, R. ( 2018 )

J-S82024-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT FULMER :
: No. 531 WDA 2017
Appellant
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 6, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0006087-2006
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STEVENS*, P.J.E., and STRASSBURGER**, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 12, 2018
Appellant Robert Fulmer appeals the judgment of sentence entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on March 6, 2017, at which
time he was sentenced to an aggregate term of five (5) years to ten (10)
years in prison following the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history herein
in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion as follows:
[A]ppellant, [ ] was originally charged with one count of
criminal attempt to commit rape of an individual under the age of
thirteen, one count of indecent assault, one count of endangering
the welfare of a minor, and one count of corrupting the morals of
a minor.[1] On October 4, 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, the
charge of criminal attempt to commit rape was withdrawn and the
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1 At the time of the assault, the victim was an eleven-year-old mentally
disabled girl and Appellant’s stepdaughter. See Probable Cause Affidavit, filed
3/26/06, at 5; N.T. 1/3/08, at 5.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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grading of the offense of indecent assault was reduced to a
misdemeanor in the first degree. An assessment was done by the
Sexual Offenders Assessment Board and it made a determination
on December 17, 2007, that [Appellant] was a sexually violent
predator. On January 3, 2008, [Appellant] was sentenced to a
period of incarceration of not less than thirty nor more than sixty
months for his plea of guilty. [Appellant] was sentenced to three
periods of incarceration of not less than two and one half to five
years, which were to run consecutive to each other.
[Appellant] filed a timely motion to reconsider his sentence,
which motion was granted and on March 11, 2008, [Appellant]
was sentenced to a period of incarceration of not less than two
and one-half nor more than five years, to be followed by two
period[s] of probation of five years, which were to run concurrent
with each other. On March 4, 2013, [Appellant] appeared at his
first probation violation hearing and at the conclusion of that
hearing, this [c]ourt sentenced him at counts 3 and 4 to period of
probation of five years, which were to run concurrent with each
other.
[Appellant’s] second probation violation hearing occurred on
January 5, 2015, where this [c]ourt again sentenced him to two
periods of probation of five years running concurrent with each
other. [Appellant’s] third probation violation hearing occurred on
December 17, 2015, when this [c]ourt again sentenced him to two
periods of probation of five years to run concurrent with each
other. On March 6, 2017, [Appellant] appeared for his fourth
probation violation hearing and this [c]ourt then sentenced him to
two periods of incarceration of two and one-half to five years,
which were to run consecutive to each other. [Appellant] filed a
motion to reconsider his sentence, challenging the discretionary
aspect of his March 6, 2017 sentence. A hearing was held on that
motion on April 3, 2017,[2] and this Court denied that request to
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2 Appellant failed to ensure the transcript of that hearing was made a part of
the certified record. We remind Appellant “[o]ur law is unequivocal that the
responsibility rests upon the appellant to ensure that the record certified on
appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary
for the reviewing court to perform its duty.” Commonwealth v. Preston,
904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
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reconsider his sentence and [Appellant] then filed the instant
appeal.[3]
[Appellant] was then directed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), to file a concise statement of
matters complained of on appeal and in filing that statement, he
has raised one claim of error and, that is that this [c]ourt abused
its discretion in resentencing [Appellant] to an aggregate period
of incarceration of not less than five nor more than ten years,
since it did not comport with the Sentencing Code or consider all
of the factors set forth in that Code, such as, [Appellant’s]
personal character and background, his age, the fact that he
suffers from a mental illness and has drug and alcohol problems
and that he has accepted full responsibility for the commission of
his crimes.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/20/17, at 2-3.
In his appellate brief, Appellant presents the following question for our
review:
Did the trial court fail to adequately consider and apply all of the
relevant sentencing criteria, including the protection of the public,
the gravity of the offense/violation, and especially [Appellant’s]
character and rehabilitative needs as required under 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(b) (Sentencing Generally; General Standards).
Brief for Appellant at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant does not dispute that he violated the terms and conditions of
his probation; rather, Appellant presents a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence. When reviewing such a challenge, we adhere to the
following standard:
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3 Although the trial court states that this is Appellant’s fourth probation
violation and the transcript of each proceeding is titled “Probation Violation
Hearing,” a review of the record reveals Appellant appeared before the trial
court on March 4, 2013, and December 7, 2015, to add conditions to his
probation. The trial court did not revoke Appellant’s probation at either time.
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Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Raybuck, 915 A.2d 125, 128 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence does
not entitle him to appellate review as of right. Commonwealth v. Allen, 24
A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2011). Prior to addressing such a challenge, this
Court engages in a four-part analysis to determine whether: the appeal is
timely; Appellant preserved his issue; Appellant's brief contains a concise
statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and the statement raises a substantial question that the
sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v.
Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 692, 77
A.3d 1258 (2013); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).4
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4 Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) entitled “Discretionary aspects of sentence” states:
An appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a
sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise
statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence. The statement
shall immediately precede the argument on the merits with
respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (f).
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Herein, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and preserved his claim
in his “Post-Sentence Motion Requesting a Modification of Sentence.”
Appellant also has included a Statement of the Reasons relied on for Allowance
of Appeal to Challenge discretionary Aspects of Sentencing” in his appellate
brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Brief for Appellant at 12-16. Thus,
we next turn to a consideration of whether Appellant has presented a
substantial question that his sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code. In doing so, we are mindful that “[t]he determination of what
constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”
Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal
denied, 633 Pa. 774, 126 A.3d 1282 (2015) (citation omitted). In addition,
[a] substantial question exists only when the appellant advances
a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie
the sentencing process.
Id.
Appellant claims that when fashioning its sentence, the trial court failed
to consider the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and
Appellant’s character and rehabilitative needs. These claims raise substantial
questions. See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa.Super.
2016) (concluding a claim the trial court failed to consider protection of public,
gravity of underlying offense, and appellant's rehabilitative needs raises a
substantial question in typical cases); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d
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1263, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“[A]n excessive sentence claim, in conjunction
with an assertion that the court did not consider mitigating factors, raise[s] a
substantial question.”). Thus, we now address the merits of Appellant’s case.
When reviewing the outcome of a revocation proceeding, this Court is
limited to determining the validity of the proceeding, the legality of the
judgment of sentence imposed, and the discretionary aspects of sentencing.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1031, 1033–34 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc)(explaining appellate review of revocation sentence includes
discretionary sentencing challenges). “In general, the imposition of sentence
following the revocation of probation is vested within the sound discretion of
the trial court, which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed
on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321, 322 (Pa.Super.
2006). Following the revocation of probation, the trial court may impose a
sentence of total confinement if any of the following conditions exist: the
defendant has been convicted of another crime; the conduct of the defendant
indicates it is likely he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or,
such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court. Id. at 323.
See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c).
The Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed following
a revocation of probation, and when imposing its sentence following a
revocation of probation, the trial court is limited only by the maximum
sentence that it could have imposed originally at the time of the probationary
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sentence. Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa.Super.
2001). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), “the court shall follow the general
principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it
relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “[T]he court
shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of
sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.”
Id. Nevertheless, “[a] sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy
discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the
statute in question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing
court's consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.”
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 661, 13 A.3d 475 (2010).
Appellant acknowledges he initially received a probationary sentence for
each of his convictions and was sentenced to a term of probation after his first
probation violation. Brief for Appellant at 23. Appellant further notes the trial
court “made it clear” to Appellant at his first probation violation hearing that
if he were again to violate the terms of his probation, it would impose a lengthy
sentence. Id. (citing N.T., 1/5/15, at 7-8). Yet, Appellant maintains that in
focusing on the fact he was a convicted and technical violator of his probation
when imposing an aggregate prison sentence of five to ten years on March 6,
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2017, the trial court “completely disregarded [Appellant’s] evidence of
mitigation” and the fact that he “took responsibility for his actions leading to
his technical violations.” Brief for Appellant at 21-22. Appellant submits the
trial court should have given him “one more chance” and imposed the same
sentence it handed down after his first probation violation, because he did not
dispute his technical violations, took responsibility for failing to register as a
sex offender, showed he was employable and able to comply with the
recommended treatment programs, and had a support system willing to work
with him. Id. 23-24.
Upon our review of the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when sentencing Appellant to a term of total confinement for his
various probation violations. Prior to doing so, at his second probation
violation and resentencing hearing held on March 6, 2017, the trial court
stated:
THE COURT: All right. [Appellant], we have a long history
with you going back to 2006. I have a presentence report from
December of 2007. I also have a presentence report from
December of 2014. I’ve reviewed the violation report and it is
readily apparent that you are intentionally failing to comply with
all the terms and conditions, in addition to which you’re contacting
the victims in this particular case.
[APPELLANT]: No, I did not contact my victims. My victim’s
step-sister contacted me.
THE COURT: I understand. You are not to have any contact
with them. It appears that we have provided you with every
avenue possible for you to comply. You have failed to register,
you contacted the victims, you manipulated the system.
Accordingly at count number three, I sentence you to a period of
incarceration of not less than two-and-a-half nor more than five
years. And at count number four I sentence you to [a] period of
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incarceration of not less than two-and-a-half or more than five
years to run consecutive to the sentence imposed upon you at
count number three. In light of your prior record, you are not
RRRI eligible.
***
N.T., 3/6/17, at 6-7.
In addition, in its Opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial
court provided further insight into the analysis which led to the sentence it
imposed:
At the time of [Appellant’s] fourth violation hearing, this
[c]ourt heard not only testimony from [Appellant] but, also, had
two presentence reports, one prepared in December of 2007 and
the second in December of 2014. In reviewing those presentence
reports, it is clear that [Appellant] was a career criminal since the
December 2014 presentence report indicated that [Appellant] had
thirteen other criminal cases, including a prior sexual assault in
Hennepin County, Minnesota, where he molested his six-year-old
niece and three-year-old stepdaughter. In addition to that sexual
offense, he also pled guilty to the charge of failure to register as
a sexual offender, which would have been the second time that he
had been convicted of that offense, once in Minnesota and once in
Pennsylvania.
In formulating [Appellant’s] sentence, this [c]ourt took into
consideration the fact that it was necessary for him to be
incarcerated for the protection of the public, the gravity of his
offenses and his rehabilitative needs. This [c]ourt noted that he
had thirteen prior convictions during which he had the opportunity
to address his mental health, drug and alcohol issues but failed to
do so. Even his claims at the time of his fourth [sic] violation
hearing, showed that he was only now attempting to make a
change in his lifestyle and there was no guarantee that that would
occur. It was obvious that [Appellant] is a sexually violent
predator in that the two cases that involve sexual offenses,
involved individuals who were under the age of thirteen years old
and all of whom were related to [Appellant].
[Appellant] had been given three prior opportunities to
address his alleged illnesses but chose to disregard them under
his periods of probation and continued to engage in criminal
activity. The record demonstrates that the only logical and rational
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sentence for the protection of the public with regard to
[Appellant’s] continued criminal activity and his own rehabilitative
needs was a sentence of incarceration which would permit him
opportunities to deal with those particular problems. In light of the
record generated in this case, it is clear that the sentences
imposed upon [Appellant] were fair, just and appropriate based
upon his ongoing criminal activity, the nature of his offenses and
his danger to the public, in particular, his own family.
Trial Court Opinion, filed July 20, 2017, at 4-6.
In light of the foregoing, Appellant’s claim that the trial court did not
consider certain mitigating factors is belied by the record. The trial court was
well aware of the mitigating factors and the facts surrounding this case. See
N.T., 3/6/17, at 6-7. Further, the trial court expressly stated it had reviewed
a presentence report from both December of 2007 and December of 2014, as
well as a Convicted Violation Report from the Probation Department dated
January 17, 2017. Id. As such, we must assume the trial court considered
the factors outlined in Section 9721(b). See Commonwealth v. Macias,
968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009) (“Where pre-sentence reports exist, we
... presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors.”) (citation omitted).
Moreover, contrary to Appellant's claims, the trial court informed him it
had considered the protection of the public and the gravity of the offense when
fashioning its sentence, and it heard from both defense counsel and Appellant
concerning the latter’s rehabilitative needs. See N.T., 3/6/17, at 4-7.
Appellant essentially asks this Court to reweigh the significance of each
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sentencing factor found at Section 9721(b) and impose our judgment in place
of the sentencing court’s; this we will not do. See Commonwealth v.
Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009). To the contrary, we agree that
Appellant’s repeated refusal to abide by the conditions of his probation evinced
a prison sentence was essential to vindicate the authority of the court and for
the protection of the public.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/12/2018
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