A.P.T. v. J.L.T. ( 2017 )


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  • J-A03002-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    A.P.T.                                           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    J.L.T.
    Appellant                No. 1154 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2011-07420
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                           FILED MARCH 21, 2017
    J.L.T. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order denying Mother’s
    request to reinstate a June 2012 parenting plan, putting a new parenting
    plan into place, and granting A.P.T. (Father) primary physical custody and
    Mother and Father shared legal custody of the parties’ minor daughter,
    D.K.T. (born 5/2003).1 After careful review, we affirm.2
    The parties were married; they separated in January 2011.     In July
    2011, Father filed a custody complaint against Mother seeking shared legal
    custody and partial physical custody of D.K.T. and her siblings.           On
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Parents have three children D.K.T., A.M. (born 1/2011), and L.P. (born
    9/2006). Mother has primary physical custody of L.P. and A.M. The instant
    appeal involves only D.K.T.
    2
    Father has not filed a brief on appeal.
    J-A03002-17
    December 13, 2011, Father was awarded partial physical custody and a
    visitation schedule was arranged.      Father filed a contempt petition against
    Mother for failing to abide by the custody order. The court found Mother in
    contempt and sanctions were imposed against her.         On June 8, 2012, the
    court entered a new custody granting Mother primary physical custody and
    Father partial custody; the parties retained shared legal custody.
    In July 2015, Mother filed a petition for special relief, requesting that
    Father’s visits with D.K.T. be supervised, claiming that D.K.T. has suffered
    sexual, mental and verbal abuse while in Father’s custody.              Mother
    specifically averred that Father’s Stepfather (paternal Step-Grandfather) had
    sexually abused D.K.T. The petition was denied without a hearing and the
    court ordered conciliation for the parties.     On August 6, 2015, the court
    appointed Grace D’Alo, Esquire, as Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for D.K.T.
    On October 7, 2015, the Cumberland County Children and Youth
    Services (Agency) received a referral alleging that Mother had emotionally
    abused D.K.T. The court held a dependency hearing and a safety plan was
    developed which placed D.K.T. with her maternal grandparents. On October
    21, 2015, the court continued the safety plan, but permitted Father to have
    periods of partial physical custody.
    On October 29, 2015, the GAL filed a report and proposed order
    recommending that primary physical custody be transferred to Father. On
    October 30, 2015, the court terminated dependency, granted Father primary
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    physical custody, and ordered that Mother continue to have no contact with
    D.K.T. unless agreed to by all parties. Father was also ordered to provide
    counseling or other therapy for D.K.T.         Mother filed a motion for
    reconsideration, which was denied.      On February 17, 2016, the court
    appointed a second GAL, Robert Hawn, Esquire, for D.K.T. when GAL D’Alo
    had to travel out of the country.
    The court held a two-day custody hearing in March 2016.          At the
    hearing, Doctor Ashley Milspaw, an expert in clinical psychology, testified
    that she conducted a psychological evaluation of Mother and concluded that
    she “seems to be an adequate parent and [knows how to] appropriate[ly]
    parent[].”    N.T. Custody Hearing, 3/2/16, at 11.           Doctor Milspaw
    recommended that Mother engage in some outpatient psychotherapy to
    assist her with stress and anxiety she experienced associated with the
    current custody battle and to help her with her health issues. 
    Id. Child’s maternal
    grandmother testified that while she was Child’s custodian, D.K.T.
    seemed withdrawn and anxious at times and would try to seclude herself
    from the rest of the family. 
    Id. at 40.
    Grandmother also testified that she
    never saw Mother do anything that would have caused concern with regard
    to how she cared for her children.   
    Id. at 43.
      Prior to living with Father,
    maternal grandmother testified that Child was actively involved in basketball
    and softball leagues, 
    id. at 53,
    but since then had chosen not to play those
    sports and has taken up babysitting after school. 
    Id. at 53-52.
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    On April 7, 2016, the court held an evidentiary hearing where Father’s
    fiancée testified regarding her relationship with D.K.T., Father’s involvement
    with and parenting of D.K.T., and any interactions she had had with Mother.
    Fiancée is the parent to two girls, six years old and eighteen years old,
    whom she claimed have a sibling-like relationship with D.K.T.
    Father testified that he is concerned that a lot of negative talk about
    him occurs when D.K.T. is at Mother’s home, coming from both Mother and
    Mother’s father (maternal grandfather). N.T. Custody Trial, 3/3/16, at 45,
    48.    On June 1, 2016, Hawn issued a report recommending that Mother be
    awarded primary physical custody of D.K.T, with the following suggestions:
    (1)    D.K.T. promptly resume counseling sessions;
    (2)    D.K.T. actively reestablish herself in the community by
    engaging in sports, recreation, and social activities, as well
    as renewing friendships; and
    (3)    Mother undergo counseling to help her reconcile the failure
    of her marriage, resolve the issues with father, and move
    on with her life.
    Guardian ad Litem Report, 6/1/16, at 18.3          In response to GAL Hawn’s
    report, GAL D’Alo issued an unsolicited report contradicting GAL Hawn’s
    recommendation that Mother be granted primary physical custody of D.K.T.
    Specifically, GAL D’Alo made the following observations:
       Mother does not understand D.K.T.’s need for Father;
    ____________________________________________
    3
    On July 23, 2016, GAL Hawn informed the court that he no longer
    represented any party in interest in the matter after the court entered its
    final custody order on June 15, 2016.
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       Mother will denigrate Father if D.K.T. is returned to her
    care;
       Mother will continue to limit D.K.T.’s contact with Father;
    and
       Mother’s reactions are not in the best interest of D.K.T.
    GAL D’Alo’s Response to Report by GAL Hawn, 6/8/16, at 2.
    On June 15, 2016, the court entered the current custody order
    awarding Mother and Father shared legal custody, awarding Father primary
    physical custody and setting forth, in part, the following schedule:
       Mother has overnight physical custody of D.K.T. on the
    first and third weekends of even months; Father has
    overnight physical custody on the second weekend of even
    months;
       Father has overnight physical custody of D.K.T. on the first
    and third weekends of odd months; Mother has overnight
    physical custody on the second weekend of odd months;
       The parties shall attend co-parenting counseling at the
    request of either party;
       “Good night” phone calls shall be placed nightly to the
    non-custodial parent;
       Parents are encouraged to establish a mutually agreeable
    holiday custody schedule[.]
    Trial Court Order, 6/15/16.      After conducting its analysis of the sixteen
    section 5328(a) factors, the trial court set forth its reasons for fashioning the
    instant custody award as follows:
    This Parenting Plan is strongly focused on [D.K.T.], her needs
    and best interest. This action was required by the ongoing
    drama at Mother’s house that culminated in this court reporting
    the neglect of this child to Cumberland County Children and
    Youth Services Agency. Mother is found to be duplicitous and
    insincere. She often over[-]corrects for problems she creates.
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    Mother is narcissistic, in that she seeks favorable treatment for
    herself, and automatic compliance[,] or else she will become
    exploitative. There are those who would describe Mother as a
    helicopter parent; however, truth be told there are times that
    she allows the children to be unsupervised as was demonstrated
    in the making and posting of the YouTube video. The fact that
    [D.K.T.] is thriving in her current household, in spite of all the
    tumult and uproar she has experienced this school year, is
    indicative that the prior court ruling was exactly what she
    needed and there is no reason to endanger her education any
    further. It is noted that the Guardian Ad Litem Hawn report
    believes a return to the June 2012 Parenting Plan would be in
    order and this report was duly considered. Indeed, the report
    makes several future recommendations about the best interest
    of [D.K.T.] including ongoing counseling which . . . per the last
    testimony is continuing; having Mother undergo counseling to
    help her reconcile the failed marriage, resolve her own father
    issues, and move on with her life; cut the every weekend travel
    for the chi[ld]ren; and also require Father to repay his student
    loans to assure children’s eligibility in the future.          The
    circumstances that led the [c]ourt to this drastic midyear school
    change still exist[] and without the ability of each parent to
    develop the respective co-parenting skills necessary, a strict
    structure is all the court can provide. The flexibility that co-
    parenting would provide to allow children to participate in
    extracurricular activities that occur on weekends when hey may
    be in [the] custodial time of another parent cannot be magically
    resolved by the [c]ourt. Only the parents have this ability, if
    they choose to use it, which heretofore they have not. Thus, in
    the best interest of D.K.T. . . . the above Parenting Plan has
    been established.
    Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/16, at 13-14.      Mother filed a timely notice of
    appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on
    appeal. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion where it incorporated, by
    reference, the section 5328(a) custody factors set forth in its June 2016
    Parenting Plan/Custody Order.
    On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
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    (1)   Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its analysis of the
    factors under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a) by reaching
    unreasonable conclusions not supported by the evidence
    presented during the custody hearings?
    (2)   Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its analysis of the
    factors under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a) by failing to address
    the subject matter of multiple factors?
    (3)   Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its Reasons for
    Award by making inferences and deductions not supported
    by the evidence of record?
    Appellant’ Brief, at 4.
    The scope of review of an appellate court reviewing a child
    custody order is of the broadest type; the appellate court is not
    bound by the deductions or inferences made by the trial court
    from its findings of fact, nor must the reviewing court accept a
    finding that has no competent evidence to support it. . . .
    However, this broad scope of review does not vest in the
    reviewing court the duty or the privilege of making its own
    independent determination. . . . Thus, an appellate court is
    empowered      to    determine    whether     the   trial  court’s
    incontrovertible factual findings support its factual conclusions,
    but it may not interfere with those conclusions unless they are
    unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings; and
    thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion.
    Kaneski v. Kaneski, 
    604 A.2d 1075
    (Pa. Super. 1992) (citing McMillen v.
    McMillen, 
    602 A.2d 845
    (Pa. 1992)). In addition, with regard to issues of
    credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding judge
    who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.         C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 
    45 A.3d 441
    , 443 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Moreover, the primary
    concern in any custody case is the best interests of the child.
    Beginning on January 24, 2011, new legislation prescribed a number
    of factors that a trial court must consider discretely in entering or modifying
    a custody order. M.E.V. v. F.P.W., 
    100 A.3d 670
    , 671 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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    Those factors are enumerated in 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). “Notably, this Court
    has held that it is not sufficient that the trial court merely state its reasoning
    on the record in open court or conclusorily assert that it has considered the
    enumerated factors in reaching its disposition.” 
    Id. at 672.
    Rather,
    [t]he Act requires a court to consider all of the § 5328(a) best
    interest factors when "ordering any form of custody.” 23 Pa.C.S.
    § 5328(a) . . . [Subs]ections 5323(a) and (d) reinforce this
    mandate by requiring a court to delineate the reasons for its
    decision when making an award of custody either on the record
    or in a written opinion. Mere recitation of the statute and
    consideration of the § 5328(a) factors en masse is insufficient.
    C.B. v. J.B., 
    2013 Pa. Super. 92
    , 
    65 A.3d 946
    , 950 (Pa. Super.
    2013). A trial court's failure to place its reasoning regarding the
    § 5328(a) factors on the record or in a written opinion is an error
    of law. J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 
    2011 Pa. Super. 263
    , 
    33 A.3d 647
    , 652
    (Pa. Super. 2011). Accordingly, in C.B., when the trial court
    merely stated that it had considered the § 5328(a) factors, we
    held that the trial court's on-the-record explanation was
    insufficient under the 
    statute. 65 A.3d at 950-51
    . Similarly, in
    M.P. v. M.P., [
    2012 Pa. Super. 215
    , 
    54 A.3d 950
    , 955-56 (Pa.
    Super. 2012),] we found error where the trial court listed the §
    5328(a) factors but failed to apply them[.]
    
    Id., citing S.W.D.
    v. S.A.R., 
    96 A.3d 396
    (Pa. Super. 2014).
    On appeal, Mother’s claims boil down to one basic contention that the
    court abused its discretion in coming to its custody determination.
    Specifically, Mother contends that the court’s conclusions were unreasonable
    and unsupported by the record and that the court failed to consider several
    statutory factors under section 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). Mother asserts that
    had the court properly considered the evidence of record, it would have
    concluded that the best interests of D.K.T. would be served by awarding
    Mother primary physical custody.
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    We recognize that the trial court’s analysis of subsections 5328(a)(5)
    (availability of extended family), (7) (preference of children), and (9) (which
    parent more likely to attend to physical, emotional, developmental,
    educational and special needs of child) as it applies to D.K.T. is scant or
    lacking in depth. Specifically, when analyzing section (a)(5) the court does
    not mention Mother’s large extended family, all of whom live close by to her
    and some of whom acted as D.K.T.’s caregivers when D.K.T. was declared
    dependent.    In addition, we recognize that the trial court fails to mention
    D.K.T. at all, instead only discussing her brother, in its section 5328 analysis
    of factor (a)(9), a critical component regarding the well-being of a child.
    Finally, with regard to factor (a)(7), the court seems to rely upon “non-
    verbal cues indicat[ing] that [D.K.T.] is thriving within Father’s household,”
    to determine D.K.T.’s “well-reasoned” preference. However, not only is this
    determination not explained or supported by specific evidence in the record,
    it also fails to acknowledge that GAL Hawn noted in his report, only days
    before the instant custody order was entered, that “D.K.T. lacked sufficient
    maturity to express a well-reasoned preference and that D.K.T.’s preference
    has in fact changed from Father to Mother.” GAL Report, 6/1/16, at 11-12,
    16.
    However, after reviewing the entire record including all GAL reports,
    pleadings, petitions, orders, custody trial notes and professional opinions
    regarding the parties’ mental and psychological states, we cannot conclude
    that the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable.    Cf. M.E.V. v. F.P.W.,
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    J-A03002-17 100 A.3d at 681
    (trial court may not merely rely upon conclusory assertions
    regarding consideration of section 5328(a) factors in entering an custody
    order); C.A.J. v. D.S.M., 
    136 A.3d 504
    (Pa. Super. 2016) (where trial court
    only considered half of statutorily mandated custody factors in fashioning its
    order, order vacated and case remanded for preparation of opinion and
    order specifically addressing all section 5328(a) factors).   As an appellate
    court we are mindful that our role does not include making independent
    factual determinations. In re C.R.F., 
    45 A.3d 441
    , 443 (Pa. Super. 2012).
    We are also cognizant of the fact that while the result of custody
    proceedings no doubt has a “lasting impact on the lives of the parties
    concerned,” Ketterer v. Seifert, 
    902 A.2d 533
    , 540 (Pa. Super. 2006),
    upon petition, a trial court can modify a custody order to serve the best
    interest of the child.
    In C.W. v. K.A.W., 
    774 A.2d 745
    (Pa. Super. 2001), our Court
    recognized the role of a guardian ad litem in custody matters, noting
    A guardian ad litem is appointed by the court to represent a
    minor child in particular litigation. The function of the guardian
    is to represent and protect unrepresented minors and their
    interests. [citation omitted] A guardian ad litem is not a judicial
    or quasi-judicial officer.
    *   *    *
    In a non-jury trial such as this, the role of the judge is to
    interpret the law, determine the facts and apply the facts to the
    law for an eventual decision of the controversy. The trial court
    may not delegate its judicial powers [to the guardian ad litem].
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    Id. at 748-49.
    Here, we are confident that although the two GALs provided
    opposing recommendations with regard to the award of primary physical
    custody, the court made an independent determination regarding what was
    in D.K.T.’s best interests after observing the proceedings in the matter,
    assessing the credibility of the many witnesses, and weighing the requisite
    factors under section 5328. 
    C.R.F., supra
    ; 23 Pa.C.S. 5328 (“In ordering
    any form of custody, the court shall determine the best interest of the child
    by considering all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those
    factors which affect the safety of the child[.]”); M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 
    3 A.3d 331
    , 336 (Pa. Super. 2013 (“there is no required amount of detail for the
    trial court’s explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors
    are   considered   and   that   the   custody   decision   is   based   on   those
    considerations.”). Under such circumstances we are obligated to affirm the
    court as its order is neither manifestly unreasonable nor a gross abuse of
    discretion.
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    Order affirmed.
    Judge Dubow joins this Memorandum.
    Judge Stabile notes his dissent.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/21/2017
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Document Info

Docket Number: A.P.T. v. J.L.T. No. 1154 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 3/21/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024