Riovo, T. v. Riovo, E. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TODD W. RIOVO IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
EVELYN I. RIOVO
Appellant No. 3578 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Dated October 23, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Civil Division at No(s): 5708 CV 2013,
731 DR 2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and COLINS*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 22, 2019
Appellant, Evelyn I. Riovo ("Wife"), appeals from the order entered in
the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, which denied her petition for
special relief in order to modify the overall distribution of marital debts in the
divorce decree of Wife and Appellee, Todd W. Riovo ("Husband"). For the
following reasons, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Husband and Wife married in August 1979, and on July 11, 2013, Husband
filed a complaint for divorce. On April 27, 2015, a divorce master entered a
report and recommendation, which provided for equitable distribution of
Husband and Wife's marital assets and debts. The equitable distribution
schedule allotted the marital assets 55/45 in favor of Wife and allocated 55%
of the marital debt to Husband and 45% to Wife. Specifically, the report
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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stated:
With regard to the total marital estate the Master computes
this at $117,410. A proposed distribution pattern would be
55% to Wife or the sum of $64,575, 45% to Husband or
$52,834. Husband's share would be funded with his truck
value of $15,000, his pickup $11,047, his tools at $2,000,
his life insurance $14,000, the balance of business account
$9,000, his CD of $500 or a total of $51,547.
Wife would receive the equity in the house which the Master
directs be listed for sale and after payment of mortgage,
closing expenses and commission that the net which would
be less than $49,000 be ordered to Wife. Wife should also
be awarded her retirement fund of $16,863.[1]
In regard to the school loans which were taken out for the
younger daughter's education...the debt which now totals
approximately $179,662.58, this is allocated 55% to
Husband or the sum of $98,814.42 and 45% to Wife or the
sum of $80,848.17.
(See Master's Report, filed 4/27/15, at 13-15; R.R. at 15A -17A.) Neither
party filed exceptions to the master's report and recommendation. On May
22, 2015, the court approved the report and recommendation and entered a
divorce decree, which disposed of the marital property and debt. The parties
did not appeal from the decree.
1 The divorce master valued the parties' total marital estate at $117,410. An
exact 55/45 split of this number would have awarded Wife with $64,575 and
Husband with $52,834. The final distribution of the marital property did not
constitute an exact 55/45 split, however. In an attempt to allow each party
to keep their personal property and to stay as close to the 55/45 division as
possible, the divorce master awarded Husband with his property valued at
$51,547, and Wife with her property valued at $65,863.
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On July 15, 2015, the parties listed the marital home for sale at an initial
price of $149,000.00. At the time, the home had an outstanding mortgage of
approximately $96,000.00. Husband had been living in the residence, but he
vacated the home in August 2015, and stopped paying all the expenses related
to the property. After Husband's departure from the home, Wife assumed
payment of the property expenses. By order of the court filed September 2,
2016, Wife was granted a limited power of attorney to execute any and all
documents on behalf of Husband with respect to the listing and sale of the
former marital residence. The home failed to sell and, per the realtor's
suggestion, Wife lowered the listing price. Due to the expenses related to the
home, and the lower listing price, Wife determined it was cost -prohibitive to
continue making mortgage, tax, and upkeep payments on the home. In late
2017, Wife stopped paying the expenses related to the property.
On March 26, 2018, Wife filed a pleading designated as a "Petition for
Special Relief," in which she asked the court to modify the equitable
distribution scheme. Specifically, Wife asked the court to restructure the
distribution of the student loan debt, because Wife had not received the
expected $49,000.00 in equity from the sale of the marital residence, and had
therefore not received 55% of the marital assets. Wife sought to restructure
the distribution of the student loan debt so that she would be responsible for
only 24% and Husband would be responsible for 76%. The court held hearings
on Wife's petition on August 2, 2018, and October 22, 2018. On October 23,
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2018, the court denied Wife's petition. In its order, the court cited Maj v.
Maj, 81 Pa.D. & C.4th 383 (Monroe Cty. 2007) as the basis for denying Wife's
petition as untimely under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332.2 Wife filed a timely notice of
appeal on November 15, 2018. On November 28, 2018, Wife filed a voluntary
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Wife raises the following issues on appeal:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING [WIFE]'S PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF ON THE
GROUNDS OF "TIMELINESS" AND IN SO DOING, FAILED TO
EFFECTUATE ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES[?]
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING
TO ADDRESS THE MERITS OF [WIFE]'S PETITION FOR
SPECIAL RELIEF AND IN SO DOING, REFUSING TO
REDISTRIBUTE THE MARITAL DEBT IN ORDER TO
EFFECTUATE ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHERE [WIFE] DID
NOT RECEIVE THE EQUITY AWARDED TO HER VIA THE
DIVORCE DECREE?
(Wife's Brief at 8).
Wife argues the Maj opinion is based on an analysis of 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
3332. Wife asserts Section 3332 pertains to a motion to open or vacate a
2 In its order, the court denied Wife's petition as untimely under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3332, for the reasons set forth in Maj, supra, and without further analysis
of its own. Our Supreme Court has consistently explained the need for
independent judicial analysis, which is defeated when a trial court fails to
articulate its individual reasoning on the case before it. See A.V. v. S.T., 87
A.3d 818, 823 (Pa.Super. 2014). For the same reasons we disapprove of the
trial court's wholesale reliance on Maj, supra in lieu of providing us with the
court's own reasoning on this case.
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divorce decree. Wife contends Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43, not Section 3332, governs
the timeliness of her petition because she sought to redistribute the marital
debt to achieve economic justice between the parties, not to disrupt the
divorce master's entire scheme of equitable distribution. Wife further
maintains Rule 1920.43 places no time restriction on her filing. Wife reasons
the trial court erred in denying her petition as untimely, based on Maj and its
analysis of Section 3332.
Wife additionally contends that Husband's behavior (i.e., leaving the
marital home in a state of disrepair and failing to sign sales documents in a
timely manner) prevented Wife from selling the marital home, which in turn
denied her the benefit of the equitable distribution scheme. Wife alleges 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(e) provides for relief where one party has failed to comply
with an order of equitable distribution. Wife maintains the trial court could
have redistributed the marital debt to compensate her for Husband's
deleterious conduct because his conduct thwarted the equitable distribution
scheme. Wife insists the court retained the authority, under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Domestic Relations Code, and applicable case law, to grant
Wife some relief; and the court's failure to do so constituted an abuse of
discretion. Wife concludes this Court should enter an order granting Wife's
petition for special relief or, in the alternative, remand the matter to the trial
court for a determination on the merits. We cannot agree.
After the divorce decree is final, parties lose their right to litigate
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equitable distribution claims stemming from the marriage. Justice v.
Justice, 612 A.2d 1354, 1357 (Pa.Super. 1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 635,
621 A.2d 581 (1993). Section 3503 of the Divorce Code states:
Whenever a decree or judgment is granted which nullifies or
absolutely terminates the bonds of matrimony, all property
rights which are dependent upon the marital relation, except
those which are vested rights, are terminated unless the
court expressly provides otherwise in its decree. All duties,
rights and claims accruing to either of the parties at any
time theretofore in pursuance of the marriage shall cease,
and the parties shall severally be at liberty to marry again
as if they had never been married.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503. Thus, as a general rule, "a divorce decree must be either
vacated or opened in order for the trial court to consider...economic claims"
arising from equitable distribution in the divorce decree. Justice, supra."A proceeding to open a divorce decree is equitable in nature, and the
appellate court will not reverse an order entered in such a proceeding unless
there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Egan v. Egan, 759 A.2d 405,
407 (Pa.Super. 2000) (citing Foley v. Foley, 572 A.2d 6, 9 (1990)). Section
3332 of the Domestic Relations Code governs motions to open or vacate
divorce decrees and provides:
§ 3332. Opening or vacating decrees
A motion to open a decree of divorce or annulment may be
made only within the period limited by 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
5505 (relating to modification of orders) and not thereafter.
The motion may lie where it is alleged that the decree was
procured by intrinsic fraud or that there is new evidence
relating to the cause of action which will sustain the attack
upon its validity. A motion to vacate a decree or strike a
judgment alleged to be void because of extrinsic fraud, lack
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of jurisdiction over the subject matter or a fatal defect
apparent upon the face of the record must be made within
five years after entry of the final decree. Intrinsic fraud
relates to a matter adjudicated by the judgment, including
perjury and false testimony, whereas extrinsic fraud relates
to matters collateral to the judgment which have the
consequence of precluding a fair hearing or presentation of
one side of the case.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (stating: "Except as
otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties
may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry,
notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from
such order has been taken or allowed").
Petitions to open the decree must be filed within 30 days.
During this 30 -day period, the court holds wide discretion
to modify or rescind its decree. The trial court's broad
discretion is lost, however, if the court fails to act within 30
days. After this 30 -day period, an order can only be opened
or vacated if there is fraud or some other circumstance so
grave or compelling as to constitute extraordinary cause
justifying intervention by the court. ... [A] general plea
to economic justice will not satisfy the stringent
standard set forth above. After 30 days, the divorce
decree may be vacated only as a result of extrinsic fraud,
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or a fatal defect apparent
on the face of the record.
Melton v. Melton, 831 A.2d 646, 651 (Pa.Super. 2003) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
By the expression "extrinsic or collateral fraud" is meant
some act or conduct of the prevailing party which has
prevented a fair submission of the controversy. Among
these are the keeping of the defeated party away from court
by false promise or compromise, or fraudulently keeping
him in ignorance of the action. ... The fraud in such case is
extrinsic or collateral to the question determined by the
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court.
Justice, supra at 1358.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.43 governs petitions for
special relief and provides:
Rule 1920.43. Special Relief
(a) At any time after the filing of the complaint, on
petition setting forth facts entitling the party to relief, the
court may, upon such terms and conditions as it deems just,
including the filing of security,
(1) issue preliminary or special injunctions necessary
to prevent the removal, disposition, alienation or
encumbering of real or personal property in accordance
with Rule 1531(a), (c), (d) and (e); or
(2) order the seizure or attachment of real or personal
property; or
(3) grant other appropriate relief.
Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43. A party may file a petition for special relief when seeking
to enforce the court's order for equitable distribution but not for the purpose
of modifying the court's equitable distribution of marital property after the
divorce decree is final. Sebastianelli v. Sebastianelli, 876 A.2d 431, 432-
33 (Pa.Super. 2005) (emphasis added) (holding husband's "petition for special
relief" was really "petition to modify" divorce decree; husband waived
economic claims related to equitable distribution by failing to file exceptions
to master's report and recommendation before court entered final decree in
divorce). Petitions for special relief are still available after the final disposition
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of all matters in the divorce action, to enforce some portion of the court's
order. Romeo v. Romeo, 611 A.2d 1325, 1328 (Pa.Super. 1992) (holding
wife's "petition to modify" final divorce decree was really "petition for special
relief" to enforce equitable distribution scheme and compel husband to
cooperate with distribution of marital property). A party may file a petition
for special relief to enforce the findings in a master's report, but if a party
wants to challenge the conclusions in the report, the party must file exceptions
to that report. Sebastianelli, supra at 433. These cases make clear that
the court must first deduce the proper nature of the pleading and identify the
actual relief requested before the court considers the merits of the pleading.
See id. See generally Commonwealth v. Porter, 613 Pa. 510, 35 A.3d 4(2012) (stating: "Misdesignation does not preclude a court from deducing the
proper nature of a pleading").
Instantly, on April 27, 2015, a divorce master issued a report and
recommendation on the parties' economic claims, which distributed Husband
and Wife's marital assets 55/45 in favor of Wife, and allocated 55% of the
marital debt to Husband and 45% to Wife. As part of the division of marital
assets, the report also directed the parties to sell the marital residence and
awarded the proceeds of the sale (after satisfaction of the mortgage) to Wife.
Neither party filed exceptions, so the court entered a divorce decree on May
22, 2015, which approved and adopted the master's report and
recommendation and directed the parties to carry out its terms. The parties
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did not appeal from the decree. On July 15, 2015, the parties listed the marital
residence for sale. By order of the court filed September 2, 2016, Wife was
granted a limited power of attorney to execute any and all documents on
behalf of Husband with respect to the listing and sale of the former marital
residence. After repeated failed efforts to sell the home, Wife filed a petition
on March 26, 2018, asking the court to rework the equitable distribution
scheme through a reallocation of the marital debt.
Although Wife styled her pleading as a "Petition for Special Relief," per
Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43, the relief she sought was essentially a modification of the
divorce decree by redistribution of the marital debt. A petition for special relief
filed after a divorce decree has been entered is a vehicle for enforcement of
the court's order of equitable distribution; it does not serve as a tool to modify
the final equitable distribution in a divorce decree. See Sebastianelli, supra.See also McMahon v. McMahon, 706 A.2d 350 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding
special relief petition was properly filed where wife sought trial court order
compelling husband to sign sales agreement). Here, Wife was trying to rework
the equitable distribution scheme by modifying the marital debt division. This
request constitutes an effort to modify the divorce decree. See Justice,
supra. Therefore, the court properly treated Wife's pleading under 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3332 as a petition to open or vacate the divorce decree. See
Porter, supra.
Under Section 3332, Wife had 30 days from the entry of the final divorce
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decree to petition the court to open or vacate the decree. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5505; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3332. Wife filed her petition for special relief on March
26, 2018, three years after the entry of the divorce decree. Further, Wife
made no allegations of extrinsic fraud to extend the time to open or vacate
the divorce decree to five years. See id.; Melton, supra. Instead, Wife
simply claimed the parties had made a mistake regarding the value of the
marital residence and its marketability, which caused Wife to lose out on the
expected equity in the home. To compensate for the loss, Wife sought to
restructure the distribution of the student loan debt so that she would be
responsible for only 24% and Husband would be responsible for 76%. Wife's
general plea for economic justice does not satisfy the stringent standard to
set aside the divorce decree. See id. (stating: "After 30 days, the divorce
decree may be vacated only as a result of extrinsic fraud, lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, or a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record").
Therefore, the court properly treated Wife's filing as a petition to open or
vacate the divorce decree based on the grounds asserted, and subject to the
terms and time constraints of Section 3332, and denied relief. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Jseph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 7/22/19
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